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This study constitutes an empirical examination of the
social| political and legal aspects of abortion law reform
in the United Kingdom between 1936 and 1977. Three main
legislative cycles are identified and, by a combination of
description and analysis of processes over time, a full
historical understanding of each is presented. This
involves an examination of how abortion law bee, one defined
as problematic; the agitation for amelioration or eradication
of the 'problem*; the identification of the protagonists
involved, their motivation, goals and tactics; the ensuing
legislative activity; and an assessment of the outcome.
The detailed description provided by the case study is used
to evaluate the applicability to abortion law reform of general
theories which have been advanced to explain law emergence;
conflict, pluralist and consensus theories. It suggests that
different theories may be appropriate to different types of
laws and that rather than adhering to a doctrinaire approach
to law emergence it may be more useful to employ a notion of
a continuum which would allow for such differentiation and also
treat the concepts of conflicts and consensus as matters for
investigation rather than assertion. The study examines
particularly the legislative procedures and tactics involved
in the passage of any new laws and argues that such an
examination of these essential pre-conditions is not only
helpful but essential to the formulation of any theory which purports
to explain law emergence. The conclusion is one of scepticism
as to the possibility of constructing adequate general theories
of law emergence on the basis of individual empirical case studies.
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INTRODUCTION
This study arose from a general interest in the way in
which laws emerge in society and, in particular, why certain
ways of acting are regarded either as criminal or as socially
acceptable at any particular point in time, whether the
factors giving rise to criminal designations remain constant
over time and, if not, what factors are important in the changing
viewpoints and definitions expressed in the criminal law. As
such it forms a case study in a growing body of literature1
which stresses the need to understand the philosophies underlying
and the processes involved in the ascription of a criminal
label to an area of behaviour or, indeed, the removal of that
label in a process of decriminalisation.
The growth of this body of literature is of comparatively
recent origin, the activities of criminologists having tended
previously to focus largely upon studying criminal behaviour.
That is not to say that observations have not been made that
it is the definition of behaviour as criminal which gives the
behaviour its criminal status and not the behaviour itself
which is intrinsically criminal. Durkheim recognised that
behaviour which is regarded as criminal varies from society
1. See, among others: Becker, H.S.: Outsiders: Studies in
the Sociology of Deviance, Free Press of Glencoe, New
York, 1963; Chambliss, W.J.: A Sociological Analysis
of the Law of Vagrancy, Social Problems, Vol.12 pp.66-77;
Duster, Troy: The Legislation of Morality; Law, Drugs
and Moral Judgements, The Free Press of Glencoe, New York,
1970; Gusfield, J.R.: Symbolic Crusade: Status Politics
and the American Temperance Movement, University of
Illinois Press, Urbana, 1963; Gunninghara, N.: Pollution,
Social Interest and the Law, Martin Robertson & Co., London,
1974; Paulus, 1.2 The Search for Pure Food: A Sociology
of Food Legislation in Britain, Martin Robertson & Co., London,
1974; Piatt, A.M.: The Child Savers: The Invention of
Delinquency, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1969.
2
to society and from time to time; Hall regarded the
examination of the origin of legislation as a necessary part
3
of criminological activity; Sutherland argued for the
scientific analysis of the conditions under which criminal
4
lave emerge. Nevertheless, on balance, it is fair to say
that the content of the criminal law which determines the
nature of officially recognised criminal behaviour has only
comparatively recently become the object of systematic
enquiry. This has meant that there has been a shift in emphasis
away from asking who becomes criminal and why, when other
individuals do not, towards first asking why and how certain
areas of behaviour come to be labelled criminal whereas
others do not. As Chambliss has stated:
If we are to explain crime, we must first explain the
social forces that cause some acts^to be defined as
criminal while other acts are not.
This shift in emphasis has led to the formulation of several
general theoretical explanations of how law and especially
criminal law emerges, which embrace different conceptions of
the nature of society; conflict, pluralist and consensus
models.
The present study examines a particular branch of criminal
2. Durkheim, E.: Professional Ethics and Civic Mocals. Translated
by Spaott, W.S. and Brookfield, C., Routledge and Kegan Paul,
London, 1957, esp. pp.110-120.
3. Hall, J.: General Principles of Criminal Law, Bobbs-Merril
Co., Indianapolis, 1947, p.559.
4. Sutherland, E.: Principles of Criminology, Lippincott,
New York, 1960.
5. Chambliss, W.J.: 'The State and Criminal Law', in Chambliss,
W.J. and Mankoff, M. (eds.): Whose Law? What Order? John
Wiley & Sons Inc., New York, 1976, p.102.
V.
law, that governing abortion and its legal availability. It
is normal in an introduction to attempt to answer the
question - 'why did you do it?'. The answer which springs
immediately to mind is that of the mountaineer - 'because it
was there*. This is not as flippant as it might sound for
when this study ki started the Abortion Act 1967 had been
in operation for only four years. It was a major piece of
social legislation effecting certain changes in the law of
the United Kingdom making for a very different approach to
abortion than that prevailing in many western countries. Yet
no objective, detailed, factual account and analysis existed
which took into consideration the perceived root causes of
the defined problem, the historical development of the
struggle for reform, the nature and magnitude of the forces
involved and their subsequent relative development. Nor
had there been any attempt to relate these facts and
activities to the general law-making framework. The
•history' of the struggle to pass the 1967 Abortion Act had
been subject to only one substantial examination, that of
Hindell and Sirams, Abortion Law Reformed.6 They were activists
in the pressure group advocating and securing legislative
change; their examination is primarily a partisan account of
the activities of one faction engaged in the struggle
to pass the 1967 Act and as such it almost constitutes a semi¬
official biography of the movement to which they belonged and
a vindication of its beliefs, aims, objectives and tactics.
6. Hindell, K. and Sirams, M.s Abortion Law Reformed, Peter
Owen, London, 1971.
It was suspected therefore that the 'story* might be
incomplete, that facts important to the 'outside'
researcher might well have been ignored or suppressed and
that a full and fair account of the activities and
motivations of the opponents Df the statute could not be
expected from such a work.
Furthermore, abortion had not ceased to be a controversial
issue nor had it ceased to be the focus of law-making activity
(nor indeed has there been any such cessation at the time of
writing). As such it was clearly a case which demonstrated
that the law is not static but that the passing of a piece of
legislation is but part of an ongoing process and deserves to
be examined as such. This present study is therefore an
attempt to fill that existing void by providing an all-embracing
description and analysis of the political history of abortion law
reform which brings new facts to light and does not stop with
the passage of the reforming Act, but is concerned with
law making as a continuing activity. It examines the activities
of all the major protagonists in the same manner and depth.
Its principal concern is to produce an objective account of
the political, historical, and social aspects of law-making in
relation to abortion. The historical review of the development
and outcome of the abortion controversy will however be followed
by a discussion of those general theories of emergence of law
mentioned in the opening paragraphs of this introduction, for
the exposition of the socio-political history facilitates an
examining the workings of major political institutions.
Sociologists' interest in law and law-making stems from the
law being a major social phenomenon reflecting and/or
regulating other major social institutions, relations and
phenomena. This study recognises the contribution of
such disciplines to a fuller understanding of law-making in
its various aspects by drawing from such disciplines. It
is hoped by so doing to demonstrate the inter-related nature
of many of the issues in those disciplines, to show how their
concerns impinge on one another and to show that reference
to these concerns can provide a more comprehensive account than
is otherwise possible of the impetus for legal change, the
processes by which it is effected, and the subsequent
developments of any change realised.
The study is principally concerned with the period
1936-77 and is divided into the main legislative cycles
during those years. Chapter One examines the law in existence
prior to the passage of the Abortion Act 1967 and analyses
the content of that law in order to facilitate an examination
and understanding of the pressure to bring about the 1967 Act
and the legal changes effected by it. Chapter Two deals with
the period between 1936 and 1961; it traces the early origins
and underlying concerns of pressure for reform, identifies the
opponents of such reform, describes the legislative attempts
at reform, and assesses why there was no legislation passed
at this time. Chapter Three examines the period between 1961 and
1967; it identifies the various groups involved in the
struggle for the 1967 Act, their concerns and tactics and
assesses their success or failure. The legislative attempts
at reform culminating in the successful passage of the
1967 Act are examined and reasons are suggested why these
attempts issued in success. The actual changes wrought in
the law by the 1967 Act are analysed. Since one of the
purposes of this study is to cast new light upon the history of
abortion legislation, a detailed description of the debates in
Parliament during the Silkin Bills and the passage of the
1967 Act has been omitted for this is very fully and
7
adequately covered by Hindell and Sitmns. Consequently only
the minimum has been presented here sufficient to carry the sense
of the history and allow for analysis. Chapter Four covers
the years between 1968 and 1974 and looks at developments
arising from the passage of the 1967 Act, the intensification of
the controversy on abortion, legislative activity and the
findings of the Lane Committee. Chapter Five continues this
examination of subsequent developments by describing the period
1975-77 and examines the changing nature of the abortion issue,
its politicisation and new polarisation of pressure groups.
Again it examines the legislative attempts to amend the 1967
Act and suggests why these attempts were unsuccessful.
Chapter Six provides a review of existing general theories of
emergence of law; conflict, consensus and pluralist theory,
7. Hindell, K. and Simms, M.s op.cit.. chapters 6-9, pp.132-213.
and examines the institutional arrangements for law_
making. It suggests the utility of the notion of a continuum
in which to allow for differentiation of different types
of laws, the need to treat the concepts of conflict and
consensus as matters for investigation as well as the need
to take into account actual parliamentary rules governing
procedure and tactics. In addition, it examines four
major works on abortion which touch upon the question of how
and why the law relating thereto has changed, to discover if
those accounts are implicitly underpinned by a particular
theoretical model. Chapter Seven draws the thesis to its
conclusion by dividing the study into three main legislative
cycles and examining the theoretical issues involved. It
assesses the applicability of these theoretical concerns and
stresses the need for emergence studies to examine law-making
procedures in practice in Parliament.
This study relies very heavily upon the private papers
of the Abortion Law Reform Association (ALRA) and the Society
for the Protection of Unborn Children (SPUC), full access to
which was freely given. The ALRA papers contained Lord Silkin's
and David Steel's private papers. In addition, open ended
interviewing was conducted with all the key members of both
organisations and considerable periods of time, approximately
six to eight weeks, were spent between 1974 and 1975 working in
both ALRA's and SPUC's offices where much valuable information
was obtained through personal conversation and observation which
augmented the formal interviewing. The additional sources
of data for the study were newspapers, medical journals,
official reports of the main bodies concerned, for example,
the medical profession and the churches, and Hansard.
The study therefore traces the history and development
of the law as it stood before the passage of the Abortion Act
1967, reconstructs the enactment of that statute and studies
ensuing developments. This constitutes an examination of
the conditions which give rise to the making of new laws by
identifying the individuals and groups involved who either
advocate change or seek to retain old forms of control and
thus the status quo. It examines the factors giving rise to
their concern, their beliefs and motivations and how they
translate those beliefs and concerns into action. It seeks
to identify the types of influence and tactics they use to
create a general awareness of the area they define as a problem
and a particular awareness on the part of those who have the
power to change or uphold the particular situation, the two
not being unrelated. It attempts to place these individuals
and/or groups within the larger social environment by reference
to the prevailing climate of opinion at the various stages in the
process and to evaluate the degree of support and/or opposition
they experience. It looks at the outcome of the struggle for
reform and assesses the degree of success and/or failure
experienced.
It would appear axiomatic that what is defined as
criminal behaviour is the result of a political process
within which rules are formed which prohibit or require
or allow people to act in certain ways. Criminal law is the
formal embodiment of norms concerning the way in which people
ought to behave and a statement of what will happen if they
do not so behave. Every specific criminal law is the expression
of a value or values and the question can be posed - 'whose
values are embodied in the criminal law?*. This question
is central to the general theories of law emergence to which,
as was stated above, the historical account of the abortion
controversy is related back. The purpose of this is not to
construct a new theory of emergence of all law, or even of
all criminal law, but to evaluate the applicability of those theories
to this particular law and to use the empirical case study
to suggest and develop a critique of emergence of law
theories. The detailed description of the historical and
political processes involved in abortion law reform is of
course intended to have the greater weight in the thesis, the
primary purpose of which is to provide a comprehensive account
of the emergence of only one branch of the criminal law
via, that regulating the availability of legal abortion. But,
in doing so, an opportunity is thereby created to subject the
'general* theories to the test of detailed empirical examination
which, although a secondary concern, nevertheless provides some
interesting and important implications for these theories and
facilitates the development of a critique.
This study is rather different from most emergence of law
studies for it provides a detailed examination of the
legislative procedures and tactics appropriate thereto in
Parliament and a detailed description of those as they
applied to all attempts to change abortion legislation. By
paying such particular attention to these processes it is
hoped that a fuller evaluation is achieved of the
applicability and relevance of the general theoretical
postulations advanced to explain how laws emerge.
In the critique which is developed it is suggested that
these various theoretical positions, conflict, consensus and
pluralism, attract so many caveats that their relevance may
not be consistent in different areas of law or even between
different types of law in the same general branch and that
none is all powerful even where generally applicable. It is
contended that differentiation must be allowed for between
varying types of law, that the concepts of conflict and
consensus must be treated as matters for investigation and not
mere assertion. Moreover, writers interested in general
theories have in the main ignored the simple fact that
Parliament is the only body empowered to legislate and that
there are recognised rules and procedures pertaining to the
process of creating new laws. It is suggested therefore that
relevant though the general theories may be to an
understanding of emergence, an adequate explanation must
encompass considerable reference to such rules and procedures
and, moreover, that such reference will both illuminate and
enhance general theories
The study is then both a descriptive and analytical
exercise looking at processes over time. The description
involved in the major part of the thesis is detailed but it
is submitted that there is much truth in Rock's statement:
... it is evident that law can no longer be the subject
of analyses which refuse to confront the issues ... The
utility of minute description is made abundantly
clear; ghe utility of conventional models has become
suspect.
Or, as a writer of another discipline, MacDonagh, has said in
a slightly different context:
... unless the complex interaction of executive practice
and legislation is specifically and exhaustively analysed ...
our type o£ governmental dynamic can scarcely be
disclosed.
The thesis constitutes an empirical case study. It is a further
attempt to meet the demand made by, for example, Becker10
and Taylor11 for such studies in order to overcome a problem
which Becker has aptly described:
The most persistent difficulty ... is a lack of solid
data, a paucity of facts and information on which to
base our theories. I think it a truism to say that
a theory that is not too closely tied to a wealth of
facts about the subject i|?proposes to explain is not
likely to be very useful.
8. Rock, P.: Introduction to Paulus, I. op.cit.. p.13.
9. MacDonagh, O.: A Pattern of Government Growth 1800-60,
MacGibben and Kee, London, 1961, p.9.
10. Becker, H.S.: op.cit.
11. Taylor, L.: Deviance and Society, Nelson, London,
1973, esp. pp.195-197, where Taylor argues that there is
an unfortunate lack of specific accounts of the making
of rules.
12. Becker, H.S.: op.cit.. p.165.
With a study on abortion it is perhaps necessary to answer
the question - 'has it not been done before?* - for the
issue's topicality and controversial nature has ensured
that it is not a subject ignored by the mass media or
indeed other researchers, so that the mistaken impression
may be gained that there is little more to be said on the
subject. But if I may return to my mountaineering analogy
for a moment, the next question usually put to the
mountaineer who replies 'because it was there' is normally -
•but hasn't it been climbed before?* - and the answer is often —
•yes, but I used a different approach*. This is also my
answer to this question. The study not only contributes to
our knowledge of abortion legislation by the discovery of
certain new facts hitherto undisclosed in amy description
of the concerns, goals and tactics of the main battalions
involved in the fight for legislative change and by covering a
longer time span which allows for fuller examination (which
is the primary concern). But by relating the empirical
case study back to wider issues of law-making in general and
by testing those wider general theories of emergence of
law as they pertain to abortion law reform, it gives a
different approach to the study of the subject matter. Moreover,
the secondary purpose of the study via, the evaluation of the
applicability of general law-making theories facilitates the
use of the empirical case study to produce some scepticism about
the general theories which have so far been advanced and
thereby contributes to our knowledge of these theoretical issues
xvi.
by its inclusion of considerable reference to the concerns of
political science viz. the societal and institutional
arrangements for law-making which serve to suggest refinements
of the 'general' theories of emergence of law.
It is perhaps worthwhile to expand briefly on the
differences between this study and certain others on the
same subject. A considerable number of articles have been
written on abortion but most of these are brief descriptions
of the various groups involved and have been descriptions situated
13
in time rather than over time as in this study. More
recently, articles have begun to be written on abortion from
particular ideological standpoints, principally feminism and
14
socialism. Of the books written on abortion with reference to
aspects of law-making in the United Kingdom the principal ones
X3 17
are those of Hindell and Simms, Greenwood and Young, Pym»
18
and Richards. The first has already been covered. Both Pym
13. Typical examples ares Barr, Johns The Abortion Battle, New
Society, 9 March 1967; Turner, Jill: The Battle of Abortion,
New Society, 11 March 1976.
14. An example combining both is: Roberts, Cathy and Millar,
Elaine: Feminism, Socialism and Abortion, Women's Studies
International Quarterly, Vol.1, (1978) pp.3-14.
15. Hindell, K. and Simms, M: op.cit.
16. Greenwood, V. and Young, J.: Abortion in Demand, Pluto Press,
London, 1976.
17. Pyra, Bridget: Pressure Groups and the Permissive Society,
David and Charles, Newton Abbott (Devon), 1975.
18. Richards, P.G.: Parliament and Conscience, Allen and Unwin,
London, 1970.
and Richards deal only with events up to the passage of the 1967
Act and then abortion is not the sole focus of their works,
but forins only a subordinate part. Pym's purpose is to
examine the role played by many different pressure groups in
effecting the controversial 'permissive' laws of the 1960s.
Richards too examines abortion only with other examples of
private members' legislation in order to explore the notion
of 'conscience' in Parliamentary affairs. Greenwood and
Young have written a rather different book. Where they fully
concentrate on abortion lawmaking in the United Kingdom they
do so only in relation to the James White Bill in 1975, giving
only a brief resume of the passage of the 1967 Act. Their
pulpose is to write on abortion from a socialist perspective and
by so doing to criticise and to expose the limits of reformism.
The present study is rather different therefore both in the
time-span it covers, its account of the socio/politica.1 factors
involved in law making and by its whole approach and purpose.
One final point: such questions as 'is the foetus a human
being?* and 'when does life begin?' are obviously crucial to
moral judgements on the abortion issue but their consideration
is not important to this study. The •Tightness' or 'wrongness'
of abortion as a moral issue (whatever may be the basis of
moral judgement) is immaterial to the nature of the study
undertaken which is concerned with what the individuals and
groups believe, and how they act on their beliefs, not with
whether they are correct to hold such viewpoints.
xviii.
A note on terminology
There exists a confusing array of terms used to describe
the means whereby a pregnancy is terminated. Miscarriage and
abortion might be thought to be synonymous; in various usages,
however, the terms have different meanings. Lay people, as
19
Hordern notes, tend to view the latter as carrying overtones
of criminality. But in other usages the term abortion has
different meanings. In medical terminology, abortion strictly
signifies the expulsion of the products of gestation before the
twenty-eighth week of pregnancy, i.e. before the foetus is
viable. This may occur spontaneously or as a result of an
accident ('miscarriage* being the popular term used in such
circumstances) or by induction. But even within the medical
profession specific distinctions are made by different
20
individuals. Thus, sometimes 'abortion* is applied to the
first three months of pregnancy, 'miscarriage' for the period
between three months and seven and 'premature birth* after
the seventh month. In law, the concern of which is to regularise
the incidence of 'induced abortion*, abortion is the term used to
describe any untimely delivery voluntarily procured with intent
to destroy the foetus at any time before the natural birth of
21
the child. It is in this sense that the term is used in this
thesis, except where a different meaning is specifically indicated.
19. Hordern, A.: Legal Abortion: The English Experience, Pergamon
Press, London, 1971, p.l.
20. Williams, Glanville: The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal




THE LAW(S) REGULATING ABORTION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
PRIOR TO 1967.
1. Introduction
No examination of the changes brought about by the
legislation of 1967 regarding the availability of legal
abortion or indeed the pressures which brought about that
legislation can be made without an understanding of the law
as it previously stood. That law was itself shaped by a
number of historical influences. It did not solely derive,
as might be assumed, from the ethical teachings of
Christianity for these teachings were themselves influenced,
to some degree, by the codes and practices of pre-Christian
civilisations. Consequently, this chapter traces the various
historical forces at work in defining the law in existence
before 1967, and analyses the content of that law.
2. Historical perspective on abortion; pre-Christian societies1
Abortion has been practised since the earliest recorded
times and different civilisations have adopted different
attitudes, at times condemning, condoning or permitting, its
practice. Taussig notes that the earliest known abortifacient
2
recipe is over 4,600 years old. Studies by anthropologists
working in Africa, Australasia and North America show how
1. For a concise but informative account of the place of abortion
in history see Appendix A of the Report of the Committee on
the Working of the Abortion Act. Cmnd. 5579. Vols. I, II &
III, 1974, on which much of this section is based, hereinafter
referred to as Lane or Lane Committee.
2. Taussig, F.J.s Abortion: spontaneous and induced,
Henry Kimpton, London, 1936, p.31.
2
widespread were the practices of abortion and particularly
3
infanticide which were used generally for population
4 5
control. Infanticide, Dickens suggests, was preferred
as being less damaging to the mother and more selective with
its victims generally being female and/or abnormal or
deformed children. In view of their significance in relation
to population growth, the practices of abortion and infanticide
were discouraged whenever it was thought desirable to
increase the population.
The history of abortion commissioned by the Lane Committee6
found the earliest surviving record of the law and practice
in relation to abortion to be the Middle Assyrian Code, based
on the Babylonian Code of Hammurabi. This decreed that *a woman
proved to have cast the fruit of her womb by her own act shall
7
suffer impalement*. There appears to be no clear record of
how Jews regarded abortion. One interpretation is that there was
3. See e.g. Westermaarck, E.: Origin and Development of Moral
Ideas, 2nd edn., Vol.1., Macmillan, London, 1924,
p.413 et seq.; Lecky, W.E.H.: History of European Morals
from Augustus to Charlemagne, Vol.11, Longmans and Co.,
London, 1911, p.9 et seq.; Davies, D. Seaborne: The Law
of Abortion and Necessity, Modern Law Review Vol.2. (1938),
p. 126 et seq.
4. See e.g. Williams, Glanville: The Sanctity of Life and the
Criminal Law, Faber and Faber, London, 1958, p.142 et seq.:
Dickens, B.M.: Abortion and the Law, MacGibbon and Kee,
London, 1966, p.11 et seq.
5. Dickens, B.M.t op.cit.. p.12.
6. See Lane Report, op.cit.. Appendix A.
7. Driver, G.R. and Miles, J.C.: The Assyrian Laws, Clarendon
Press, Oxford, 1935, p.117.
no specific penalty whereas another is that death could be
the punishment. Abortion was severely punished by the
ancient Egyptians yet the fact that many abortion procuring
methods were known in that society suggests that its practice
was widespread. The ancient Hindu code forbade abortion yet
again there is evidence of many recipes and methods being
used. Buddhism forbids all abortions. The ancient Chinese and
Persians are known to have practised it but such evidence as
exists is unclear as to whether its practice was legal.
In ancient Greece there are examples of abortion being
positively commended as a means of population control. Although
B
Hippocrates forbade physicians to administer abortive pessaries,
Plato commended both infanticide and abortion. He recommended
that imperfect children and those born of depraved citizens were
to be killed and abortion ordered when, at the time of
conception, the mother was older than forty years of age, or the
9
father older than fifty five. Aristotle, whilst recommending
that abortion should be legal as a means of limiting the size of
the population in the interests of an economically healthy
community, did so subject to the condition that the abortion
should be procured before the foetus had quickened 'for the line
between lawful and unlawful abortion will be marked by the fact
of having sensation and being alive*.
8. Adams, F.J.: The Genuine Works of Hippocrates, vol.2,
Bailliere and Co., London, 1939, p.780.
9. Plato: Respublica, V, 460 and 461. Translated by Jowlett, B.
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1888.
lO. Aristotle: Politics, VII, 1335b. Translated by Rackham, E,
Heinemann, London, 1932.
4.
The Romans appear to have practised abortion extensively.
Social motivations for abortion were strong,11 and included fear
of disgrace (ending a pregnancy of a widow or avoiding a
husband's discovery of adultery) and feminine vanity. In
Roman law, a foetus was not regarded as a child and its
destruction was not an offence against the criminal law but
an 'extraordinarium crimen' which had nothing to do with the
law against homicide but appears to be a wrong committed against
12
a husband in depriving him of his children. Justinian appears
to have accepted Aristotle's distinction between abortion
committed before or after quickening, regarding the latter
as more serious. He set the date on which quickening was
held to occur at forty and eighty days for the male and
female foetus respectively, but this discrimination was not
accepted by the glossators who settled on forty days for both
sexes.
13
3. Christian Influences: Ecclesiastical Law
Early Christian writers, most notably Tertullian, censured
all abortion as virtual murder irrespective of what stage in
14
the pregnancy abortion was performed, since it was held that
the soul entered the body at the time of conception and the
concern was to save an unbaptised soul from damnation. Formal
11. See Lane Report, Appendix A, op.cit.. for a brief resume of
available literature.
12. Digest of Justinian 47, 11.4.
13. See Lane Report, Appendix A, op.cit.; Williams, Glanville,
op.cit. pp.26—29 and 142-143; Dickens, B.M. op.cit. pp.15-20.
14. Tertullian.j Apologeticus, 9.8. Translated by Glover, F.R.,
Heinemann, London, 1931.
ecclesiastical legislation punishing the offence was enacted
by the Council of Elvira (c.300 A.D.) in the West and by
the Synod of Ancyra (c.314 A.D.) in the East. The former
decreed that a woman guilty of abortion be refused
Holy Communion, even on her death bed, and the latter ordered
ten years penance. The Council of Lerida (324 A.D.) allowed
the woman Holy Communion after seven years but in the eighth
century Pope Gregory III reverted to ten years penance.
The Greek and Roman distinction between abortion before
and after quickening was raised by Saint Augustine in the
fifth century. He distinguished between an 'embryo informatus'
which was unendowed with a soul and an 'embryo formatus' which
had been so endowed. Abortion of the former was regarded as
merely an act preventing life coming into being and punishable
only by a fine whereas abortion of the latter was murder of
an animated being and punishable by death. This distinction
was upheld by the Council of Worms (868 A.D.) and sometime
15
later, between the thirteenth and the sixteenth centuries,
passed into the ecclesiastical law. Excommunication was the
penalty for abortion of a quickened foetus but not for one
unquickened; quickening was set firdtly at forty and eighty
days for male and female respectively although later changed
to forty days for both. In the sixteenth century, this
distinction was abolished and abortion once more decreed to be
15. Williams, Glanville: op.cit. pp.142-143.
homicide whether the
revived later in the
abandoned by Pius IX
foetus was animated or not. It was
same century before being finally
in 1869.
4. Ecclesiastical taw in England
References to laws regulating abortion in early English
history are rare, so much so that it has been commented that
•abortion is evidently a crime without much recorded or
reported history*. Both Williams and Dickens attribute the
earliest mention of abortion in English law to the Leges Henrici
Prirai, a compilation of Anglo-Saxon laws attributed to the
reign of Henry I from which it appears that abortion was then
punishable only by religious penalties. This law penalised both
the woman and anyone aiding her and drew the distinction between
abortion performed before and after forty days gestation:
Women who have illicit intercourse and destroy their
unborn children, and those who help them expel the
foetus from the womb are expelled from the Church for
their lives by an old ruling, but not it is more
leniently laid down that they should do penance for ten
years. If a woman deliberately got rid of her foetus
within forty days, she must do penance for four years;
if it was done after it was alive, because it amo^ts
to homicide, she must do penance for seven years.
After the Norman Conquest and the more rigid separation of secular
and ecclesiastical courts, abortion remained almost exclusively
the concern of the latter, the offence being the denial of the
prospect of eternal life to the soul of the unborn, and so
16. Davies, D. Seaborne: op.cit.. p.126.
17. Thorpe, B.: Ancient Laws and Institutes of England,
(Record Commission 1840).
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unbaptised, child. In the Middle Ages treatment of
abortion became more severe; guilty women were condemned
on a capital charge. A distinction too was drawn during
this time between the woman and a third party aiding the
abortion, the latter being tried before regional customary
courts and being treated more severely.
5. The common law in England and Wales
References to abortion by the institutional writers are
scaree, probably because the offence was generally dealt with
in the ecclesiastical courts. Bracton, writing in the early
part of the thirteenth century, said that abortion after
19
quickening was homicide. Later authorities, however, do not
share this view. Coke describes abortion as a 'great
misprision* but not murder or manslaughter because a foetus,
2Q
even though quickened, is not in rerum natura; Hawkins agreed,
though he described abortion of a quick child as a common law
21
misdemeanour. Blackstone suggests that although the law in
Bracton*s time may have treated the abortion of a quickened
foetus as manslaughter this was no longer so and he translates
22
Coke's 'great misprision' as a 'heinous mi^demeanour•. Dickens
sees this translation as a contemporary evaluation of the crime
18. Dickens, B.M.s op.cit.. p.19.
19. Bracton, Henry de: Book III (Oe Corona), fol.121.
20. Coke, Sir Edward: Institutes of the Laws of England,
Third Part, p.50, 4th edn. A. Crooke, London, 1669.
21. Hawkins, William: Pleas of the Crown, 1.3.16, 7th edn. by
Thomas Leach Robinson, London, 1795.
22. Blackstone, Sir William: Commentaries on the Laws of
England, vol.1, p.129, adapted by R.M.Kerr, London, 1857.
8.
of abortion, of its having ceased to be regarded as almost
23
a capital offence or even close thereto. He notes:
The Commentaries on the Laws of England were written
by Blackstone for the lay public, and one may suppose
that they were intended to be read according to the
common usage, by which misdemeanours were ^mailer
faults and omissions of less consequence".
In brief, the position at common law appears to have been that
abortion performed before quickening was not against the law
but was so after quickening; both the woman and any third
party aiding were punishable although the seriousness of the
offence diminished over time and it was generally regarded
as a matter for the ecclesiastical courts.
6. Statute law in England and Wales
It was not until 1803 that abortion was regulated by
statute in England and Wales and t*ied by the criminal courts.
Mannheim notes that this was 'remarkably late for a country
which, at that time, possessed already a very elaborate
25
system of statutory offences'.
(i) Lord Ellenborouqh's Act of 18Q326
This Act made the procuring of abortion a felony and
abolished the common law rule that the unlawful act of abortion
came only after quickening although the distinction was retained
in one sense in that abortion performed before quickening was
23. Dickens, B.M.: op.cit.. p.21.
24. Ibid., p.22.
25. Mannheim, H.: Criminal Justice and Social Reconstruction,
Kegan Paul, London, 1946, p.43.
26. 43 Geo.Ill Ch.58.
punished less severely. The reason for placing abortion on a
statutory basis is given in the preamble as being:
certain ... heinous offences, committed with intent
to destroy the Lives of His Majesty*s Subjects by
Poison, or with intent to procure miscarriage of
Women ... have been of late so frequently committed;
but no adequate means have been hitherto provided for
the Prevention and Punishment of such offences.
Section 1 of Lord Ellenborough's 1803 Act provides:
That if any Person or Persons ... shall wilfully,
maliciously and unlawfully administer to, or cause
to be administered to or taken by any of His
Majesty's Subjects, any deadly Poison or other
noxious and destructive Substance or Thing, with Intent ...
thereby to cause and procure the Miscarriage of any
Woman then being quick with child ... then and in every
such case the Person or Persons so offending, their
Counsellors, Aiders and Abettors, knowing of any privy
to such Offence, shall be and are hereby declared to be
Felons and shall suffer Death.
Section 2 draws the distinction between abortion performed before
and after quickening, making abortion before quickening also a
felony, a more restrictive position than the common law
position, but punishing it less severely than abortions after
27 28
quickening. Both Williams and Dickens note that, in practical
terms, this provision is significant as having far more
widespread application than the other since nearly all women
who procure their own abortion do so in the early stages of
pregnancy before quickening occurs. Section 2 of the 1803 Act
provides:
And whereas it may sometimes happen that Poison or
some other Noxious and destructive Substance or Thing
may be given or other means used, with intent to procure
Miscarriage or Abortion where the Woman may not be quick
with Ctkild at the Time, or it may not be proved that the
27. Williams, Glanville: op.cit.. p.144.
28. Dickens, B.M.: op.cit.. p.24.
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Woman was quick with Child, be it therefore
enacted, that if any person or Persons ... shall
wilfully and maliciously administer to, or cause to
be administered to, or taken by any Woman, any
Medicines, Drugs, or other Substances or Thing
whatsoever, or shall use or employ, or cause or
procure to be used or employed, any Instrument or
other Means whatsoever, with Intent thereby to
cause or procure the Miscarriage of any Woman not
being, or not being proved to be with Child at the
time of administering such things or using such Means
that this shall be felonious and punishable with
fine, imprisonment, whipping or transportation for
up to fourteen years.
It is unclear in s.l of the Act whether a woman could be found
guilty of procuring her own abortion although this seems likely
29
and is consistent with the position at common law. In another
respect s.l may have been more restricted than the common law
in that no mention is made of abortion being illegal if
procured by instrument, manipulation or exercise.
30
(ii) Lord Lansdowne's Act of 1828
The 1803 Act was repealed by Lord Lansdowne's Act of 1828
which did not clarify whether a woman could be found guilty of
procuring her own abortion, but made it illegal to induce abortion
by use of instruments (in addition to the other means specified
in the earlier Act). This Act preserved the ecclesiastical
distinction of before and after quickening with respect to the
nature of the punishment imposed; death being the penalty
imposed for abortion performed after quickening and imprisonment,
transportation or whipping for abortions performed before







9 Geo. IV Ch.31.
9 Geo. IV Ch.31 s.8.
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(ill) The Offences Against the Person Act 1837
The next instance of legislative action is to be found in
the Offences Against the Person Act 1837. This Act abandoned
the ecclesiastical and common law distinction of quickening and
also abolished the death penalty for abortion, the punishment
being transportation or imprisonment. It is noteworthy that
this Act did not distinguish between the woman who was pregnant
and the one who was not. Again there is no express reference
to a woman procuring her own abortion but Dickens is of the
opinion that there can be no doubt that the Act was intended
33
and understood to include her within its ambit. This Act
did use the word 'unlawfully* with respect to procuring abortion
whereas the 1803 Act had used 'wilfully, maliciously and
unlawfully' to characterise abortions performed after
quickening and 'wilfully and maliciously' before quickening and
the 1828 Act had used 'wilfully and maliciously* for both.
Whether this characterisation was intended to have any
meaningful or distinctive purpose is impossible to say. Dickens
thinks it may have been so intended but admits that the point
34
is 'elusive*. Nevertheless, the use of the word 'unlawfully'
in relation to abortion was to assume great importance in
later years by its implication that there might be some
circumstances in which abortion could be lawful. Indeed, in 1846
32. 7 Will. IV and I Vict. Ch.85.




the Criminal Law Commissioners suggested that the 1837
Act be amended to contain the proviso that:
Provided that no act specified in the last preceding
Article shall be punishable when such act is done in
good faith with the intention of saving the life of
the mother whose miscarriage is intended to be
procured.
They stated:
This proviso seems expedient: it is contained in other
codes, but does not appear to have been adverted to in
our treatises.
In the event, the Commissioners' suggestion was never taken
up with respect to abortion.
36
Section 6 of the Offences Against the Person Act, 1837 reads:
That whosoever, with Intent to procure the Miscarriage
of any Woman, shall unlawfully administer to her or
cause to be taken by her any Poison or other noxious
Thing, or shall unlawfully use any Instrument or other
Means whatsoever with the like Intent, shall be guilty
of a Felony.
37
(iv) The Offences Against the Person Act 1861
Section 58 of the 1861 Act for the first time made it
expressly clear that a woman could be found guilty of procuring
her own abortion. In such cases it was necessary that she be
shown to be pregnant whereas, in the case of third parties, it
was immaterial whether or not she was pregnant. As in the 1837
38
Act, the word 'unlawfully* is used and the use of 'poisons,
other noxious things, instruments or other means whatsoever* is
proscribed. It reads:
35. British Parliamentary Papers - Reports, Commissioners,
1846, 24, 42 (Art 16).
36. 7 Will. IV and I Vict. Ch.85.
37. 24 and 25 Vict. Ch.lOO.
38. 7 Will. IV and I Vict. Ch.85.
Every Woman, being with Child, who, with Intent to
procure her own Miscarriage, shall unlawfully
administer to herself any Poison or other noxious
Thing, or shall unlawfully use any Instrument or
other means whatsoever with the like Intent and
whosoever, with Intent to procure the Miscarriage
of any Woman whether she be or be not with Child,
shall unlawfully administer to her or cause to be
taken by her any Poison or other noxious Thing,
or shall unlawfully use any Instrument or other
means whatsoever with the like Intent, shall be
guilty of Felony.
It was decreed that the punishment of
... those convicted thereof shall be liable, at the
Discretion of the Court, to be kept in Penal Servitude
for Life, or for any Term not less than Three Years,
or to be imprisoned for any Terra not exceeding Two
Years, with or withou^Hard Labour, and with or without
Solitary Confinement.
These penalties were changed over time. The Statute Law Revision
40
Act 1892 repealed the words 'or for any Term not less than
Three Years' relating to penal servitude and 'for any Term
not exceeding Two Years, with or without Hard Labour' relating
to imprisonment. In 1893 the Statute Law Revision (Number 2)
41
Act repealed the provisions regarding solitary confinement
leaving the punishment as liability to penal servitude for life.
42
The Criminal Justice Act of 1948 abolished penal servitude and
the offence became punishable with (as maximum) imprisonment for
43
life but Williams records that in practice, nothing near the
maximum is imposed.
39. s.58. Offences Against the Person Act 1861.
40. 55 and 56 Vict. Ch.19.
41. 56 and 57 Vict. Ch.54.
42. 11 and 12 Geo.VI. Ch.58.
43. Williams, Glanville: op.cit.. p.145.
The Offences Against the Person Act 1861 created, in
s.59, a new offence of supplying or procuring poison etc.,
knowing it is to be unlawfully used with intent to procure
abortion. This offence is a misdemeanour. The Act reads:
Whosoever shall unlawfully supply or procure any
Poison or other noxious Thing, or any Instrument
or Thing, whatsoever, knowing that the same is
intended to be unlawfully used or employed with
Intent to procure the Miscarriage of any Woman,
whether she be or be not with Child, shall be
guilty of a misdemeanour.
The punishment provided:
... and being convicted thereof shall be liable,
at the Discretion of the Court, to be kept in Penal
Servitude for the term of Three Years, or to be
imprisoned for any term not exceeding Two Years, with
or without Hard Labour.
44
The Penal Servitude Act 1891f s.l, gave the court a discretion
of imposing a sentence of imprisonment for not less than three nor
more than five years and when penal servitude was abolished by
45
the Criminal Justice Act 1948 the maximum sentence became
five years imprisonment.
46
(v) The Infant Life Preservation Act 1929
This statute created a new offence of child destruction,
closely allied to abortion since the latter can occur at any
point during a pregnancy before the child has a separate




54 and 55 Vict. Ch.69.
11 and 12 Geo.IV Ch.58.
19 and 20 Geo.V. Ch.34.
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viable foetus is involved. Section 1(1) of the 1929 Act
provides:
... any person who, with intent to destroy the life of
a child capable of being born alive, by a wilful act
causes the child to die before it has an existence
independent of its mother, shall be guilty of felony,
to wit, of child destruction.
and s.1(2) reads:
... for the purposes of this Act, evidence that a woman
had at any material time been pregnant for a period of
twenty eight weeks or more shall be prima facie proof
that she was at that time pregnant of a child capable
of being born alive.
The allied nature of the two offences of abortion and child
destruction is recognised by the 1929 Act, for ss. 2(2) and 2(3)
allow a jury finding an accused person not guilty of any offence
under s.58 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 to
return a verdict of guilty of the alternative offence of
child destruction, and vice versa. The importance of the 1929
Act with regard to the law of abortion, however, lies in its
inclusion of the proviso suggested by the Criminal Law Commissioners
in 1846 for the law of abortion viz.:
provided no person shall be found guilty of an offence
under this section (1(1)) unless it is proved that the
Act which caused the death of the child was not done in
good faith for the purpose only of preserving the life
of the mother.
and the later use of this proviso by Mr. Justice Macnaghten in
47
Rex v. Bourne. In 1929, however, no exception to the law of
abortion was made by the insertion of an amendment to the Offences
Against the Person Act 1861 so that statute law prohibited (or
appeared to prohibit) all abortion.
47. Rex v. Bourne [1939] 1 K.B. 687, [l938] 3 All England Reports
615.
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7. Range of criminality under statute law
A wide range of persons could find themselves criminally
accused. A woman could be charged with procuring her own
abortion only if it could be shown she was pregnant. But a
non-pregnant woman could equally find herself charged with
conspiracy or of aiding and abetting if she agreed with others
to administer drugs or use instruments with the intention of
terminating the pregnancy. Persons supplying drugs etc., knowing
they were to be used with intent to procure abortion were also
liable for prosecution. Third parties could be accused of
procuring abortion, whether or not the woman was pregnant, and
irrespective of the status of the third party, no distinction
being made in law between the unskilled or backstreet operator
and the qualified medical practitioner. Nor did statute law
allow for consideration of motivation or the particular
circumstances of individual cases so that no exceptions were
made for therapeutic abortions.
8. Case law in England and Wales
48
Dickens in his study of Abortion and the Law provides
extensive coverage of the important case law stemming from the
interpretation of statutes regulating abortion. In particular
he examines numerous cases stemming from the provisions of
the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 which provide detailed
48. Dickens, B.M.: op.cit. See especially pp. 26, 31-36, and
62-72.
clarification of the meaning of its terminology and provisions.
Discussion of case law here will be limited therefore to the
case which made an important and far-reaching change in the law
by permitting an exemption to be made in some cases for
49
therapeutic abortion, Rex v. Bourne, and to two subsequent
50
unreported cases which followed the reasoning of that case,
(i) Rex v. Bourne
The events leading to the case of Rex v. Bourne were as
follows. A fourteen year old girl was so violently raped by a
number of Guardsmen after she had accepted an invitation to see
a horse with a green tail that she was taken to St. Thomas1
Hospital where she came to the notice of Dr. Joan Malleson, a
member of ALRA. Dr. Malleson asked a fellow ALRA member,
Mr. Alec Bourne, a leading gynaecologist and obstetrician, to
admit the girl to his wards for observation with a view to
51
terminating the pregnancy. Bourne agreed and wrote to Malleson:
... I have done this [operation] before and have not the
slightest hesitation in doing it again ... I have said that
the next time I have the opportunity I would write to the
Attorney-General and invite him to take action.
This has been generally interpreted as meaning that Bourne himself
*52
indeed reported the operation to make it a test case. Although
49. Rex v. Bourne [l939] 1 K.B. 687, [l938] 3 All E.R. 615.
50. Rex v. Berqmann and Ferguson: Unreported, but see 1948
(I)B.M.J. 1008 and Williams, Glanville: op.cit. p.154, who
quotes the official transcript; Rex v. Newton and Stunqo.
unreported, but see 1958 Criminal Law Review, 469.
51. Bourne, A.: A Doctor's Creed, Victor Gollancz, London, 1962,
p.98.
52. See, for example, Williams, Glanville: op.cit.. p.151;
Dickens, B.M.: op.cit.. p.38; Richards, P.G.: op.cit., p.87.
18.
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Bourne leaves that impression in his autobiography, The Times
54
report of the case states that Bourne promised the girl's
parents to keep the abortion secret and the Attorney-General
is reported as making clear in court that although the case was
brought to his notice, it was not Bourne who had done so. It
is perhaps possible that the operation was reported by
Joan Malleson.
Before performing the abortion, Bourne kept the girl under
observation for eight days until he was satisfied of her state of
55
mind and bearing. He wrote later that this was necessary:
... to be sure of the type of girl I was dealing with. Many
of the prostitute type and those of low intelligence are
completely untroubled by pregnancy, except for the first
of these groups it is a nuisance but nothing more. The
mentally retarded girl is usually, if not always, entirely
indifferent to her condition. Abortion for her is quite
unnecessary for any physical or mental considerations and
also because if it is done it is highly probable that she
will soon become pregnant again ... In her [the girl] there
was nothing of the cold indifference of the prostitute.
On the day of the operation, but after it was performed, Bourne
recalls that he was visited by two policemen who wanted him to
give evidence as a witness against the Guardsmen. They advised
him that under no circumstances could an operation be countenanced
on humanitarian grounds. To this Bourne replied that the abortion
was done and that he 'did not recognise his [the policeman's]
right to dictate to me what I, as a surgeon, should or should not
53. Bourne, A.: op.cit.
34. The Times, July 19th 1938.
55. Bourne, A.: op.cit.. p.98.
decide to do in the best interest of my patient, that I did
not understand what he meant by "humanitarian grounds" as
56
most of medicine is humanitarian'. Bourne appeared firstly
57
on a summons at the magistrates' court charged that he:
on June 14th at St. Mary's Hospital, with intent to
procure a miscarriage of a woman did unlawfully use
an instrument contrary to s.58 of the Offences
Against the Person Act 1861.
The agent for the Director of Public Prosecutions said that:
Although the law of this country does not specifically
recognise any interference in pregnancy as justifiable,
it appears, on such authorities as I have been able to
find, that to procure a miscarriage is considered
permissible on two grounds:
1. where it is necessary to save the life of the mother
2. where it is necessary to save the life of the child
Apparently it is not permissible in the present state of
the law in any other circumstances whatsoever - not for
family honour or any other ethical reason.
He maintained that Bourne had openly defidNi the law in order
to ventilate his opinion that the law ought to be changed. In
reply, the defence argued that Parliament intended in certain
circumstances that such a use should be lawful, and that this
constituted such a lawful instance. Bourne was sent to the
Central Criminal Court for trial on indictment where he appeared
on 18 July 1938.
There he was accused of having committed an offence against
s.58 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, in that he used
an instrument upon a female with intent to procure her miscarriage.
No mention was made of his having 'unlawfully' used such an
56. Bourne, A.: op.cit.. p.99.
57. See report in The Times, July 2nd 1938.
instrument and the indictment was challenged by the defence
on this ground. Defence counsel stated that the indictment
implied that abortion was always unlawful but that he
understood that it was conceded by the Attorney General
that abortion was lawful, if undertaken to save the life of
the pregnant mother and the defence intended to argue on the
58
word 'unlawfully*. This point was conceded by the Attorney
General who agreed that 'the case may well hang on the
59
construction of the word unlawfully'. Macnaghten J. ruled
that the word be inserted in the indictment for, in order to
constitute an offence, the Crown had to prove that the
defendant had unlawfully used an instrument and not merely that
he had used one.
The Attorney-General, before calling evidence, said:
Might I just make this brief submission or admission -
viz. that on the construction of these statutes, if it
were necessary in order to save the life of the mother
to use an instrument to procure a miscarriage I shall ^
not submit that it would be an offence under this section.
He went on to argue that Bourne had not operated with a view
of saving the girl's life but because he thought that continuance
of the pregnancy would adversely affect her mental and physical
health and so had broken the law. Moreover, the offence was
deliberate in that Bourne knew that the law prohibiting abortion
did not allow exemption on the grounds of saving women from
58. Report of case in The Times, July 19th 1938.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid.
mental ill-health. He had proceeded with a view to
engineering a test case in order to publicise his views and
hopefully to change the law. The Attorney-General called no
medical experts to substantiate his view that there was a
fundamental difference between life and health.
The defence countered by stating that Bourne was not seeking
to alter or extend the law,nor to be acquitted on sympathetic
grounds. He believed what he did to be lawful, a view
supported by many of his medical colleagues, and he wanted a
clear declaration by a court of the legality of his actions.
The defence cited the Infant Life Preservation Act 1929 which
allowed a viable foetus to be destroyed in order to save
the life of the mother. The difference in this case, it was
argued, was that the girl was at an early stage in pregnancy
but that destruction of the foetus was necessary in order to
save the mother's mental health and, since life depends on
health, thus to save her life.
Several eminent medical men were called to give evidence
on Bourne's behalf including Lord Horder, Dr. J.R. Rees, a
psychiatrist, and Mr. William Gilliat, a senior gynaecologist
at King's College Hospital. The principal argument, the
defence alleged, was that the use of the word 'unlawfully'
implied that the legislature had intended that in some
circumstances abortion was lawful. The proviso in the Infant
Life Preservation Act 1929 could, by analogy, suggest just such
circumstances viz. that it was lawful to save the mother's life
and, since life depended on health, abortion was lawful
in this case to save the mother's mental health for, as
Mr. Rees put it, 'surely it can be claimed that a serious
6X
mental breakdown is tantamount to mental death'.
In his summing up, the judge expressly stated that in
his opinion the word 'unlawfully* was not a meaningless word,
and the meaning he read into it was of vital and decisive
significance in this case, and to the law as it was
thereafter interpreted. The definition of legality he
adopted was drawn from the Infant Life Preservation Act 1929
i.e. that abortion was not unlawful if carried out in good
faith with the purpose only of preserving the life of the
mother. This, in his view, was in accordance with 'what has
always been the common law of England*. His direction to
the jury was that the burden rested with the Crown of proving
beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant did not procure
the miscarriage of the girl in good faith for the purpose
only of preserving her health. It did not lie with the
defendant to prove that he had acted in good faith to preserve
the life of the girl. Macnaghten J. is alt* reported as saying
that the unborn child must not be destroyed 'except for the
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purpose of preserving the yet more precious life of the mother',
but this does not appear in the Law Reports, which judges have
the right to peruse before publication, and to 'correct' if
61. Quoted in Bourne, A.: op.cit.. p.I 02.
62. [1939] 1 K.B. at 691.
63. [l938] 3 All E.R. at 620 and report in The Times,
July 19th 1938.
necessary. He also distinguished, obiter, what in his opinion
was not lawful, stating that the desire of a woman to be
relieved of her pregnancy was no justification for performing
the operation; nor was it the law, as some people said
on religious grounds, that abortion should not be performed
under any circumstances. Indeed, he suggested that a doctor
refusing to perform an abortion on a woman who later died as
a result could find himself charged with manslaughter by
negligence.
In discussing what was meant by 'for the purpose of
preserving the life of the mother* Macnaghten J. said that:
It was not contended that those words meant merely
for the purpose of saving the mother from instant
death; life depended on health and it may be that
health is so gravely impaired that death results.
He rejected the defence plea that a 'wide and liberal'
interpretation be placed on these words and hoped instead that
a 'reasonable' view be taken. His 'reasonable* construction
was that:
If a doctor is of the opinion on reasonable grounds and
with adequate knowledge, that the probable consequence
of the continuance of the pregnancy will be to make the
woman a physical or mental wreck, the jury aire quite
entitled to take the view that the doctor who, under
these circumstances and in that honest belief, operates
is operating^for the purpose of preserving the life of
the mother.
Before discussing lawful abortion, the judge began his
summing up by distinguishing this case from that of the ordinary
back street abortion. The jury was told that the present case
concerned a man of:
64. [1939] 1 K.B. at 694.
The highest skill [who] openly in one of our great
hospitals, performs the operation ... as an act of
charity, without fee or reward, and unquestionably
believing that he was doing the right thing, and that
he ought, in the performance of his duty as a member
of a profession devoted to the alleviation of human
suffering, to do it.
He returned to this theme at the conclusion of his summing up by
observing:
... it does not touch the case of the professional
abortionist. As far as members of the medical
profession are concerned «. and they alone could
properly perform such an operation - we may hope and
expect that none of them would ever lend themselves
to the malpractices of professional abortionists, and
in cases of this sort, as Mr. Bourne said, no doctor
would venture to operate except after consulting^gome
other member of the profession of high standing.
Bourne was acquitted, and a Times leader commented:
The state of the law as ascertained by this case is
very much what common sense would at any time have
supposed it to be - so much so in fact that it remains
a mystery why,this case should have been necessary to
establish it.
Macnaghten J's interpretation of the word 'unlawfully* in the
1861 Act, his view that the legislature had implied lawful
exceptions to the general law and, indeed, his view that
his interpretation was only 'what the common law had always
been' may all be questioned. The 1803 Act had used the words
'wilfully, maliciously and unlawfully' if the woman was quick
with child and 'wilfully and maliciously' if she was not; the
1828 Act had used 'unlawfully and maliciously' in either
case; the 1837 Act first used the sole condition of
'unlawfully*. These changes may simply reflect a change in
65. [1939] 1 K.B. at 690.
66. Ibid, at 695.
67. The Times, July 20th 1938.
style of draftsmanship rather than different requirements
in the nature of the Act. It is true that the Criminal Law
Commissioners in 1846 had suggested that a proviso be
added to the relevant legislation which, if adopted, would
have made abortion lawful when performed out of necessity
to preserve the life of the mother but this proviso was not
adopted when the 1861 Act was drawn up, and it was not until
1929 that such a proviso found its way into the law and
then not into the law regulating abortion but into the Infant
Life Preservation Act 1929 relating to child destruction.
Moreover, there had been no legal definition of, nor judicial
discussion expressly about, circumstances in which abortion
could be deliberately and lawfully procured. Our conclusion
must be that this case brought about a great change in the
law by judicial 'declaraction'.
The case established the legality of abortion when done
to preserve the life of the mother and extended the concept
of life to include both physical and mental health. It is
physical and mental considerations which are important and
not the circumstances in which the pregnancy was caused; legal
abortion was settled as being justified when childbirth would
endanger a woman's life or cause such harm to her health that
her life was endangered thereby either in quality or length.
The danger to health must then be of considerable seriousness.
Moreover, the case was not intended to apply to abortions
carried out by anyone other than a medical practitioner who
formed an opinion in good faith that the operation was so
26.
necessary. It is not necessary that that opinion be
correct, no objective standards are applicable, only that
it was formed in good faith. Although not a requirement in
law, nor conclusive proof of good faith, consultation with
another doctor, would seem to help provide evidence of that
good faith whereas the lack of such consultation would seem
to risk damaging a defence and increase the likelihood of
prosecution. Similarly, the receipt of a fee might be
prejudicial in any prosecution, more so if the fees are so
excessively high as to suggest bad faith or opportunism. The
burden of proof was placed firmly on the Crown, thus affirming
the basic rule of evidence.
It is generally agreed that Rex v. Bourne88 provided an
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example of the application of the defence of necessity.
Glanville Williams wrote:
The judge's direction to the jury is a striking
vindication of the legal view that the defence
of necessity applied not !j»Qly to common law but
even to statutory crimes.
Gordon has stated:
R. v. Bourne may be regarded as authority for the view
that lesser crimf>| are justified by the necessity of
preserving life.
68. [1939] 1 K.B. 687. [l938] 3 All E.R. 615.
69. So far as abortion is concerned, the general defence of
necessity is now excluded by s.5(2) of the Abortion Act 1967,
which provides that anything done with intent to procure an
abortion is unlawfully done unless authorised by the Act, none
of the provisions of which authorise any action by a person
who is not a registered medical practitioner.
70. Williams, Glanville: op.cit.. p.152.
71. Gordon, G.H.: The Criminal Law of Scotland, 1st Edn., Green
& Son Ltd., Edinburgh, 1967, p.379. (2nd Edn., 1978)
References here are to 1st edition, unless otherwise indicated,
since this chapter describes the operation of the law prior to
1967 and the 2nd edition has been up-dated to describe the law
in force after 1967.
Smith wrote:
R. v. Bourne rejes^ed a narrow interpretation of the
law of necessity.
The case would appear to illustrate a limitation of that
defence with respect to abortion in that Macnaghten J. envisaged
lawful abortion as being performed by medical practitioners
only and by no other person, but this may not have been so.
If it is correct that this does provide an example of the
application of the defence of necessity, and it would appear so,
then the law is laying down a ruling regarding the choice of
values; the life of the mother is to be preferred to that of
the unborn child and the law might then have recognised a defence
of necessity put forward by an unqualified person who performed
an abortion on an opinion formed in good faith that it was
73
necessary to save the woman's life.
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(ii) Rex v. Berqmann and Ferguson
This case involved two women doctors charged with conspiring
together unlawfully to procure abortion and went unreported.
The Crown's case rested on the evidence of four women, all of
whom had seen Dr. Bergmann and two of whom had seen Dr. Ferguson,
a psychiatrist, who was associated only with these two cases.
The defence maintained that of the two women who saw only
Dr. Bergmann, one of the operations was to remove a foetus that
72. Smith, T.B.: A Short Commentary on the Law of Scotland,
Green and Son Ltd., Edinburgh, 1962, p.141.
73. This possibility is no longer open following the 1967
Abortion Act. See fn. 69 supra.
74. See a short account of the case in 1948 (l)B.M.J. 1008.
was already dead and the other was to cure an inflammation.
In the other two cases, the defence said that Dr. Bergmann
had performed abortions on the good and proper grounds of
risk to the patients* mental and physical health, grounds
endorsed by Dr. Ferguson. The fees received were seen as
being reasonable; Bergmann had received £75 in two cases and
£50 in another, whilst Ferguson had received three guineas for
each consultation. Nor did the fact that Bergmann had
performed the operations in her consulting room rather than
hospital affect her good faith. The judge addressed the jury:
You are not concerned with the question as to whether
Dr. Ferguson arrived at the right conclusion: you have
not to decide whether Dr. Ferguson did or did not
make a mistake ... you are not here to weigh up
whether Dr. Ferguson was correct or incorrect in the
view she had formed. You have to be satisfied by the
prosecution that she had expressed a dishonest opinion ...
did not act in good faith an^was therefore advising
something that was unlawful.
This confirmed that the burden of proof is on the prosecution and
that the criterion of legality is not the mother*s state per se
but the doctor's genuine belief as to her condition and the
consequences of the continuation of the pregnancy upon the
mother, as interpreted by the doctor in good faith. Moreover,
Williams contends that this case indicates that where serious
injury to health is feared, the court will not look too
76
narrowly into the question of danger to life.
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(iii) Rex v. Newton and Stunqo
The facts surrounding this unreported case in 1958 were that
75. Quoted by Williams, Glanville from official transcript:
op.cit.. p.165.
76. Williams, Glanville: op.cjtt. „ p.154.
77. See 1958 Criminal Law Review at 469.
a young nurse was admitted to hospital, ill and in a state of
agitation but not, according to medical evidence, suffering
from any mental disorder. She later died from renal failure
following an abortion. The nurse had consulted a
psychiatrist about her pregnancy who had referred her to a
London West End doctor. She then saw a second psychiatrist.
Dr. Stungo, who referred her to Dr. Newton, with the opinion
that her disturbed state (she had talked of throwing herself
in the river) made an abortion desirable. Dr. Newton who
had no specialist qualifications in obstetrics or
gynaecology and who described himself as an endocrinologist
concluded that she was 'definitely suicidal'. He aborted
her in his consulting rooms by giving her an intrauterine
injection of utus paste then sent her back to her hotel
without further treatment.
The prosecution alleged that when Newton spoke to a
hospital doctor, he at first denied aborting her. Newton
denied this in court but his good faith was called into
question. The defence was that the mental condition of the
nurse required the termination of her pregnancy.
On a submission, Dr. Stungo was found not guilty of being
an accessory before the fact to using an instrument unlawfully
to procure an abortion. His counsel, examining one of the
expert witnesses, a psychiatrist, read hi® a letter, published
in the Lancet, about the difficulties of assessing suicide threats
by pregnant women. The witness agreed with what was said and
the defence revealed that the letter had been written by Stungo
seven years previously.
Ashworth J. directed the jury:
If a person, in the course of, or as a result of
carrying out an illegal operation, caused the
death of the woman, then he is guilty of
manslaughter ... The law about the use of
instruments is that: Such use of an instrument is
unlawful unless the use is made in good faith for
the purpose of preserving the life or health of the
woman ... When I say health I mean not only her
physical health but also her mental health ... But
although I have said that "it is unlawful unless",
I must emphasise and add that the burden of proving
that it is not used in good faith is on the Crown.
Newton was found guilty of manslaughter, by unlawfully using
an instrument to procure an abortion, and also of unlawfully
using an instrument to procure an abortion. He was sentenced
to consecutive terras of three and two years imprisonment
respectively. He was found not guilty of manslaughter by
criminal negligence.
The judge's direction in this case followed that laid
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down by Macnaghten J. in R^ v. Bourne by re-asserting that the
burden of proof lay with the Crown; that the question of
legality centred on the question of good faith; that an opinion
was formed in that good faith that the operation was necessary
to save the life and health of the woman. It also appears to
extend the exception in the law for therapeutic abortion further
than that in v. Bourne by following R^ v. Beromann and
Ferguson (if Glanville Williams is correct) on the point that
in considering health, the risk of death should not be inquired
into too closely. The case further clarified the point that
health means not only physical health but also mental health.
78. [1939] 1 K.B. 690.
9. The law of Scotland
In Scotland, the history of the law of abortion followed
a somewhat different course from England. The early
institutional writers seem to have dealt with it as a problem
of classification and discussed whether the destruction of the
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unborn foetus should be treated as murder. Mackenzie was of
the opinion that it should be treated as parricide, an
aggravated species of murder, but cites no instances of the
60 81
practice of the law. Hume and Burnett " took the opposite
view. Death arising from abortion, however, was regarded as
32 83 84 83
murder by Hume,^ Burnett, Alison^'" and Macdonald, ^ but
Gordon8^ states that this view finds no support in the reported
cases and does not accord with practice which invariably means
that homicide caused by abortion is charged as culpable
homicide although he notes that it may theoretically still be
the law that death caused in this way is murder if wicked
79. Mackenzie, Sir G.: The Works of Sir G. Mackenzie,
2nd edn., Edinburgh, 1716-22. 1, 113.
80. Hume, Baron: Commentaries on the Law of Scotland Respecting
Crimes, 4th edn., Bell, Edinburgh, 1844, vol.1, pp.186-187.
81. Burnett, J.: A Treatise on Various Branches of the Criminal
Law of Scotland, Edinburgh, 1811, 6.
82. Hume, op.cit.. i. 264.
83. Burnett, op.cit.. 5.
84. Alison, Bir A.J.: Principles and Practice of the Criminal
Law of Scotland, Edinburgh, 1832, vol.i, 52.
85. Macdonald, J.H.A. (Lord Kingsburgh): A Practical Treatise
on the Criminal Law of Scotland, 5th edition by Walker, J.
and Stevenson, D.J., Edinburgh, 1948, at 91.
86. Gordon, G.s op.cit.. 2nd edn., 1978, pp.23-28, 744-745.
recklessness is present although it is unlikely that a
murder charge would ever now be brought.
Although not murder, procuring abortion is a crime in
87
Scotland but differs from that in England. The Offences
Against the Person Act 1861 did not apply to Scotland and
88 89
the criteria therefore differ. Anderson, Macdonald and
90
Smith all take the view that abortion is not criminal if
carried out as a necessary medical operation. Smith says:
Such a course may be necessary for the safeguarding
of the life or health of the woman who is pregnant
and thus cjjipes within the scope of the doctrine of
necessity.
However, as Gordon points out, there is in fact no clear law
in support of this. The case usually cited in support of this
92
is H.M. Advocate v. Graham. A typical part-time professional
abortionist, not a medical practitioner, was indicted on
three charges of procuring abortion by the use of drugs and
an instrument and one charge of attempted abortion by using
drugs. The only reference to necessity in the case is a passing
87. Alison, op.cit.. i. 628.
88. Anderson, A.M.: The Criminal Law of Scotland, 2nd edn.,
Edinburgh, 1904, 156.
89. Macdonald, op.cit.. 114.
90. Smith, T.B.: op.cit.. p.191.
91• Ibid.
92. [1897} 2 Adam 412.
one by defence counsel to the effect that the acts libelled
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might have been lawful and necessary in the circumstances
and his only reference to justification was that the
administration of drugs might have been justifiable
and done in ignorance of the pregnancy. The question of
necessity regarding abortion was not then properly raised but
Gordon is inclined to the view that *no doubt the decision
94
in H.M. Advocate v. Graham could be suitably interpreted by
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a court which wanted to acquit a therapeutic abortionist*.
This, he says, could be possible in that Lord Justice-Clerk
Macdonald did indicate that he would tell the jury that on the
indictment 'there is no crime at all in using drugs or
instruments, even if they caused abortion, unless they were used
criminally*.^
The practice in Scotland with regard to genuine therapeutic
abortions carried out by qualified medical practitioners is
that the Crown Office does not prosecute. Indeed, Gordon notes
that:
Had Dr. Bourne carried out his operation in Scotland, he
would probably have failed in his purpose of clarifying
the law and giving guidance to his profession, bemuse
the authorities would have declined to prosecute.'
Procuring abortion in cases other than therapeutic is of course
93
a crime. Anderson states that abortion is 'criminal if done
93. Ibid, at 413.
94. [1897] 2 Adam 412.
95. Gordon, G.H.: op.cit.. 1st edn., 1967, p.382.
96. [1897] 2 Adam at 415.
97. Gordon, G.H.: op.cit.. 1st edn., 1967, p.383.
98. Minnie Graham. 1897 2 Adam 412 esp. at p.415.
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feloniously and not as a necessary medical operation';
Macdonald says that in abortion 'there must be criminal intent,
lOQ
for it may be necessary to cause abortion'. By contrast
with England, in Scotland the crime is not the use of drugs
or instruments to procure abortion, but the procuring of
abortion. The means used can be drugs, instruments or other
means, for example, manual manipulation or giving the mother
a fright. It can be committed at any stage between conception
and birth but it is a defence to show that the foetus was dead
before any attempt was made to clear the womb.*01
In Scotland the law is again different from England in
its requirement that for a charge of attempted abortion to
succeed there must be proof that the woman was actually
pregnant;*°2 nor is it a separate crime to administer
103
abortifacients to a woman who is not pregnant. A woman
who permits someone to carry out an abortion on her or
takes drugs supplied to her for the purpose of the crime is
104
art and part guilty of the crime. There are no modern
cases in which the woman has been charged, partly because it is
usually impossible to convict the abortionist without her
evidence but if she were so charged, by contrast with the
99. Anderson, op.cit., 156.
100. Macdonald, op.cit., 114.
101. Gordon, G.H.: op.cit.. 2nd edn., 1978, 28.02 p.812.
102. H.M.Advocate v. Anderson 1928 J.C. 1.
103. H.M.Advocate v. Semple 1937 J.C. 41.
104. Alison, op.cit.. i.628; Macdonaldi op.cit.» 114; ILM.Advocate
V. Chas. Rao (1882) 2 White 62.
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position in England, she would be punished less severely.
It is undecided whether it is a crime for a pregnant woman to
take drugs in order to procure her own abortion even where
106 X07
she is unsuccessful but both Macdonald and Gordon think
that this is probably the case.
IO. Conclusion
To sum up, the law in force in England and in Scotland on
the eve of the 1967 Abortion Act was thus fairly clear. In both
jurisdictions the procurement of abortion was proscribed under
criminal law, though the legal definition was not identical.
In England, the modern law on abortion and related offences was
statutory, in Scotland the crime was regulated by common law.
The Bourne case in England (and its successors) had defined the
nature of lawful abortion, and settled that the burden of proof
of *unlawfulness* lay on the Crown. Scottish commentators largely
favoured the view that similar exceptions obtained in Scotland,
but, as a result of Crown Office practice, the point had not
been tested judicially. In future chapters the history of the
development of pressure for change in the law will be examined,
as will its outcome and legal effect and the subsequent
developments.
105. Alison. op.cit.. i.628.
106. Macdonald: op.cit., 114.
107. Gordon, G.H.: op.cit.. 2nd edn., 1978, 28-03 p.813.
CHAPTER TWO
THE EARLY ORIGINS OF PRESSURE AND ATTEMPTS TO REFORM
THE LAW OF ABORTION (1936-61).
1. Introduction
It is necessary to understand the way in which an area of
behaviour comes to be seen as a problem area requiring attention.
Such an understanding helps to explain how legislation may
subsequently arise; it may not totally explain the passing of
the legislation itself but an account of the precipitating
factors aids our understanding of the perceived need to
legislate and also the form which the legislation takes. Fuller
and Myers in their classic definition of a social problem state
that it is a condition which is an actual or imagined deviation
from a social norm cherished by a considerable number of
persons.^ There are two aspects of every social problem:
(a) the objective, which is a verifiable condition,
situation or event, the existence and magnitude of which
can be checked by impartial and trained observers.
(b) the subjective, which depends upon the awareness
or definition of certain people that the condition,
situation or event is a threat to certain cherished values
2
and a consciousness that something must be done about it.
The latter commands most attention since it is the subjective
definition which makes the problem a social one requiring attention.
Yet Fuller and Myers have failed to consider the possibility of
1. Fuller, R.C. and Myers, P.C.: Some Aspects of a Theory of




differential definitions of the same phenomena. Becker
criticises them for failing to realise that the definitions
themselves play a role in shaping the form the problem takes
3
in society. For Becker, social problems are the result of
a basically political process in which opposing views are
advanced, argued and compromised. The motivations and
machinations of the groups possessing different conceptions of
the social problem take many forms and the groups attempt to
persuade others of their views so that public action will be
4
taken to further the goals they wish to achieve. The role
of such groups in promoting or opposing legislation over various
problem areas is now relatively well documented in specific
case studies.^ The task is then to consider whether such a
grouping or groupings arose in relation to abortion legislation
and, if so, who were they, what were their motivations, what
was the nature of the social problem they perceived and how did
they achieve or fail to achieve their goals.
During this period a number of individuals and organised groups
expressed viewpoints on the legality of abortion, including women's
3. Becker, H.S. (ed. )s Social Problems: A Modern Approach,
John Wiley and Sons Inc., New York, 1966, p.6.
4. Ibid, p.11.
5. See, among others, Chambliss, W.J.: A Sociological Analysis
of the Law of Vagrancy, Social Problems, vol. 12, (1964)
pp.67-77} Fuller, R.C.: Morals and the Criminal Law,
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, vol. 32, (1942),
pp.624-630; Hall, J.: Theft, Law and Society, Bobbs-Kerrill,
Indianapolis, 19 52; Piatt, A.M.: The Child Savers: The
Invention of Delinquency, University of Chicago Press, Chicago,
1969; Becker, H.S.: Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of
Deviance, Free Press of Glencoe, New York, 1963.
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groups and the medical profession but the most energetic
and sustained voice was that of ALRA. Such a group is never
created or indeed operates in a vacuum however. Thus,
although this chapter is principally concerned with the
formation of ALRA, its underlying concerns, aims and tactics,
it would bedeficient if it did not account for concerns and
events prior to ALRA*s formation and with subsequent landmarks
in the history of abortion law reform over which ALRA had
little or no direct control or influence. Essential and helpful
though the study of motivation and causes is, over-concentration
on them is not useful in that it leads to a tendency to ignore
the fact that a movement has to organise its activities within
the larger environment of many groups who may hold different
definitions, values and aims and with whom the principal reform
group interacts. It is essential then to look at their interplay
to assess the nature of any ensuing legislation. This approach
is most succinctly summed up by Lemert who argues that what is
needed is a model of group interaction rather than of interpersonal
interaction, so that interests, values and claims of others
and the order in which they are likely to be sacrificed in the
light of group interaction can be accounted for. This chapter
will therefore describe, chronologically, those concerns,
groupings and important events which were significant in the struggle
to effect change in the law regulating the availability of legal
abortion.
6. Lemert, Edwin: Human Deviance, Social Problems and Social




2. Individual expressions of disquiet
Stella Browne, later to be a founder of ALRA, is
reputed to have been the first person to raise the question of
abortion law reform on a public platform as early as 1915 and, in
1922, when addressing an international birth control conference,
7
she advocated abortion on demand. Her reception at that
s
time is reputed to have been one of cold disapproval. Before
the formation of ALRA it is however possible to find other
examples of people in more influential positions advocating
some measure, albeit limited, of abortion law reform. The role
of such people in shaping subsequent opinion has long been
noted. Both Dicey and Allen have stressed •legislation is
governed by the public opinion of those citizens who have, at a
9
given moment, taken an effective part in public life1, and that
•the opinion which affects the development of the law has, in
Modern England, often originated with some single thinker or
school of thinkers*.10 In 1927 Lord Riddell in addressing a Joint
Meeting of the Medico-Legal Society and the Section of Obstetrics
and Gynaecology of the Royal Society of Medicine had raised the
7. Roberts, H. et. aL; Symposium on Abortion, Allan and Unwin,
London, 1935.
8. Hindell, K. and Simms, M.: Abortion Law Reformed, Peter
Ownn, London, 1971, p.59 and Hindell, K.: Profile of Stella Browne
and Janet Chance, The Listener, 29 June 1972.
9. Dicey, A.V.: Law and Public Opinion in En9land *n the 19th
Century, Macmillan, London, 1948, p.lO.




issue of abortion lav; reform as a topic requiring detailed
consideration, although he himself offered no remedy. The
subject was again raised publicly by Mr. Justice McCardie in
1931 and in 1933 in giving the Galton Lecture to the Eugenics
Society when he expressed the views:
The law of abortion as it exists ought to be substantially
modified. It is out of keeping with the conditions that
prevail in the world around us ... It is plain to me that
many of those who seek to uphold this law of abortion are
wholly ignorant of the social problems which menace the
nation. I cannot think it right that a ^man should be
forced to bear a child against her will.
3. Groups' resolutions in favour of reform
In addition to those individuals advocating change, calls
for reform of the law had also been made prior to 1936 by both
the Women's Co-operative Guilds (WCG) and the National Council
of Women (NCW) and it appears that Mme Lorsignal, later to be
an executive member of ALRA, had been instrumental in securing
12
the resolutions passed. The WCG called for immediate revision
of the abortion laws of 1861 and an amnesty for those women
imprisoned for breaking 'these antiquated laws' but with little
success. However, the resolution of the NCW sent to the Home
Secretary calling for a ^mmittee of jiquiry to be established
was later heeded with the setting up of the Interdepartmental
11. Mr. Justice McCardie: Eugenics Review, April 1933.
12. ALRA Private Papers (uncatalogued).
Committee on Abortion under Lord Birkett's Chairmanship.
4. Expression of professional opinion: British Medical Association
13
(BMA) Committee Report
From 1932 onwards the problem of abortion had been raised
at successive BMA annual conferences. Sufficient concern was
generated by advocates of reform, most notably Alec Bourne, for
the Council to set up a working party in 1935 to report on the
medical aspects of abortion. It was chaired by
Professor James Young of Edinburgh who was personally in favour
of legal change in the abortion laws and included in its
members Alec Bourne. Two reasons were advanced for appointing
the coromttee* Firstly, it was felt to be unfair that doctors
had to interpret an unclear law. The second was that doctors
should guide public opinion. The latter point was rejected in
the report, for the problem was seen to encompass so many aspects
that the 'medical profession has no special right and no special
14
competence to deal with them*.
The motivating factor was then principally one of self-
interest stemming from the view that the law left doctors
exposed to risks of suspicion and professional damage. But there
was also a humanitarian concern for women since the committee
report of 1936 stated that in its view practitioners may demur to
13. British Medical Journal, vol.1 25 April 1936 (Supplement)
pp.230—238 which includes ti debate on the report at the
1936 Annual Conference. This section is based on the BMJ
article.
14. Ibid.
perform therapeutic abortion with the consequent risk of
sacrifice of the health or life of the patients under their
care. The report recognised that social and economic factors
were strong motivating reasons for women seeking abortion and
took the view that the legalisation of abortion for such reasons
would rescue the public from the risk to life and health implied
in the illicit procedures of unskilled operators. However,
having stated that medical practitioners were not qualified to
deal with such matters, the committee did not expressly recommend
such grounds as specific circumstances in which therapeutic
abortion should be carried out, saying that this was a matter
for the whole community to decide.
It did recommend that there be an explicit statement of
the principles which should govern the lawful termination of
pregnancy and made suggestions that these should cover risks to
life and health including mental health and that^pregnancies
occurring among the under 16 year olds, or where there is a
risk of the child being born defective, should be recognised as
affecting the health of the mother. It also advocated that
abortion should be carried out only on the approval of two
doctors and that, to avoid collusion, one of the doctors should
have some recognised status or approval similar to that given by
the Board of Control under the Mental Health Treatment Act 1930.
Specifically too, the committee recommended against
notification of therapeutic abortions as being impracticable
and prejudicial to the special nature of the doctor-patient
relationship. Increased advice on and provision of
facilities for contraception was seen as being necessary to
the avoidance of abortion.
There is some evidence however that the necessity of a
second opinion and especially of a *recognised status' did
15
not meet with full approval within the profession itself.
When the report was discussed at the annual conference in 1936
it was greeted with considerable hostility. Most representatives
protested that they had little or no doubt how the law should
be applied and thought that legislation would lead to
irresponsible demands for abortion. Several attempts were made
to suppress the publication of the report but these were
defeated.
5. The formation of ALRA 1936
In the same year that the BMA committee reported, there was
formed, for the first time, a group designed specifically to
fight for the liberalising of abortion laws, ALRA. This
development was perhaps one of the most important factors in
the reformation of the law governing abortion as will be shown
later in this chapter in a fuller description and analysis of its
structure and activities.




6. Report of the Committee on Maternal Mortality 1937
The next important date in the history of abortion law
reform was 1937 when the committee investigating maternal
mortality recommended that the Government should establish
another committee specifically to examine the prevalence of
abortion. This recommendation was perhaps more responsible
for such a committee being established than the resolutions
submitted by the aforementioned women's groups.
7. The establishment of the Birkett Committee 1937
The interdepartmental committee set up in 1937 under the
chairmanship of Norman Birkett, KC, later Lord Birkett, was a
joint committee of the Home Office and the Ministry of Health to
•enquire into the prevalence of abortion and the law relating
thereto and to consider what steps can be taken by more
effective enforcement of the law or otherwise to secure the
reduction of maternal mortality and morbidity arising from this
17
cause*. It is interesting as Hindell and Simms point out, that
the pro-reformers who saw the report as feeble fail to record that
it was within the committee*s terras of reference to advocate more
18
effective enforcement.
16. Report on an Investigation into Maternal Mortality, Cmnd. 5422,
H.M.S.O., London (April 1937).
17. Report of Inter-Departraental Committee on Abortion, Joint
Report of Ministry of Health and the Home Office, H.M.S.O.,
London, 1939. Hereinafter referred to as *Birkett* or 'the
Birkett Committee*.
18. Hindell, K. and Sirams, M.: Abortion Law Reformed, op.cit..
pp.73—75»
The Birkett Committee consisted primarily of men. A large
number were doctors, a majority of them being gynaecologists;
there were two lawyers and only four women on the committee!
Lady Ruth Balfour, a suffragette and a doctor; Lady (later Dame)
Williams, an economist who was the daughter of the Edwardian
novelist Elinor Glynn; Mrs. Stanley Baldwin, wife of the
Prime Minister; and Mrs. Dorothy Thurtle who later joined
ALRA. (She was the Labour leader of the Shoreditch (London)
Borough Council, the daughter of George Lansbury and the wife
of Ernest Thurtle, both Labour M.P.s.) The committee held forty-
seven meetings and heard evidence from fifty-five witnesses
including representatives of various organisations; the medical
profession, bith control movements, women's groups, the police,
religious lay organisations and secular groups. Perhaps
surprisingly the churches did not give evidence per se but the
leaders of the Anglican, Roman Catholic and Jewish faiths
provided the committee with statements of their church's viewpoints
on abortion.
8. Evidence to the Birkett Committee
(i) The BMA
The evidence given to the Birkett Committee by the BMA has
already been described in this chapter for it consisted of the
BMA Committee report published in 1936.
(ii) The British College of Obstetricians and
Gynaecologists (BCQG)
The position adopted by the BCOG in its evidence to the
Birkett Committee was that therapeutic abortion should be
clearly legal but only within certain restrictions and subject
19
to many safeguards in order to avoid its abuse. It was felt
that such abuses could best be avoided by insisting upon a
second opinion and more especially that the second opinion should
be that of a specialist. In particular, the general practitioner
ought not to be trusted as he was likely to be unduly sympathetic
to the woman; not only should he not take part in the
decision-making process but he was not to be trusted in
suggesting the source of the second opinion; only gynaecologists
were responsible enough to do this. Another check was seen as
being to require notification of all therapeutic abortions but there
was no agreement as to the body to which notification should be
made. Yet another difference between the BMA and the BCOG was the
latter's view that a classified list of conditions justifying
abortion was to be avoided whereas the BMA had asked for
specific guidelines. Such provision was seen by the BCOG however
as strengthening the position of the woman and weakening the
position of the gynaecologist who would then 'find it difficult
to refuse to perform the operation and might even be sued for
negligence for refusal to terminate*. The only ground on which
extension of the law was welcomed was where a girl had been raped
and was under the age of consent. The dominant motivation of the
19. Birkett Committee Papers 1937-39, a copy of many of these papers
is contained in the ALRA Private Papers collection to which they
were given by Dorothy Thurtle a member of the Birkett Committee
and later ALRA member. A full set of Committee Papers is
available at Public Records Office (PRO).
BCOG was one of professional concern (including concern for the
status of specialist obstetricians, and, to that extent, self
interest) and although ostensibly in favour of clarification, its
position is such that it would almost be better considered an
opponent of liberalisation.
(iii) Other medical bodies
In addition to the BMA and the BCOG, the committee received
evidence of a much less substantial nature from the Medical
20 21l
Women's Federation, the Fellowship of Medicine, the
22 23
Midwives Institute, the Joint Council of Midwifery (which
included representatives of the BCOG, the BMA, the College of
Nursing, County Medical Officers of Health and the Medico-
Legal Society) and the Westminster Branch of the Catholic
Nurses Guild.24
The Medical Women's Federation was of the view that abortion
was an undesirable and unnatural practice which was to be
avoided in as far as was consistent with preserving the life,
health or sanity of the mother. It regarded the prevailing
law as satisfactory. If, however, legislation was recommended
by the committee then the Federation wished to see a statutory
requirement that there be two medical opinions (one of which it






operation was necessary to save the life or health of the
mother and that there should be notification of the abortion
to a relevant government department. The Federation was
specifically against abortions being performed on social or
economic grounds alone but thought possible exceptions to
this general prohibition could be made in certain cases where
pregnancy was a result of criminal assault or where the girl
was under the age of consent.
The Fellowship of Medicine expressed the hope that the law
would be changed by statute to make it unmistakably clear that
there were circumstances in which therapeutic abortion was
lawful but it did not specify which provisions it would wish to
see embodied in legislation.
The Midwives Institute denied that abortion was a prevalent
practice and was of the opinion that in the relatively few cases
which occurred the principal causes were economic. It advocated
more extensive education on birth control methods and a system
of family allowances as preventive measures and increased
enforcements to stop the advertisement of abortifacients. It
expressed no views on the desirability of legislation.
The evidence of the Joint Council of Midwifery advocated that
changes be made by statute to allow therapeutic abortion in cases
where two doctors were of the opinion that such an operation was
medically necessary. It further recommended that one of the two
medical opinions should be that of a consultant approved for
the purpose by the Ministry of Health. The Joint Council was
also in favour of a system of notification in order to avoid
abuses.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Westminster branch of the
Catholic Nurses Guild condemned all abortion as contrary to
natural moral law and disapproved of any proposed changes which
would make abortion legal.
(iv) Position of the churches
As mentioned earlier, the churches did not give evidence
to Birkett but statements were sent to the committee by the
25 26
Archbishops of Canterbury and Westminster J and by the Chief
27
Rabbi but not by the leaders of the Church of Scotland or the
Methodist Church.
The statement made by the Anglican church recorded its
... abhorrence of the sinful practice of abortion and
strong denunciation of abortion ... as contrary to the
law of God and of man.
This view was shared by the Roman Catholic church in its statement
that j
No exception of any kind [can be made] to the law of God
and of nature. The direct causing of abortion is a crime.
In those cases in which the life of the foetus appears to
be in conflict with the life of the mother, it is unlawful









The Jewish view of abortion was less forbidding in that
exceptions to the general rule forbidding abortion were
allowed where the mother's life was in danger.
(v) Religious lay organisations
28
The Modern Churchman's Union expressed the view that the
'present law is cruel, inhuman, ineffective and unchristian'.
It opposed any general license of abortion but thought that in
making any decision regarding the operation's necessity the
hraealth of the mother and the life likely to be led by the
child, if born, should be regarded as of paramount importance.
Circumstances in which it was thought therapeutic abortion could
be justifiable included: to save life; where pregnancy resulted
from rape or incest; where the mother was 'feeble-minded' and
there was a risk the child would be 'hereditarily tainted*.
29
By contrast, the Westminster Catholic Federation predicted
that legalisation of therapeutic abortion would lead to moral
laxity, an increase in venereal disease and to a totalitarian
society such as the Soviet Union which had permitted such a
practice. Abortion was regarded as being against natural law.
The Federation opined that 'legalised abortion would not free
women from sex slavery but would intensify it'.
(vi) ALRA
Two strands may be discerned in the evidence ALRA gave to
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
Birkett: one represented its ideal viewpoint and the other
a more moderate line which was thought to be more likely to
secure wider agreement. Ideally, ALRA wanted the actions of
both doctors and women seeking abortions totally removed
from the ambit of the criminal law. It did not however wish
for total decriminalisation which would have allowed back street
abortionists to operate freely and legally. It regarded the
stigmatisation of both women and doctors as ill-conceived,
for women were not seen to seek abortion from a desire wilfully
to break the law and doctors who did perform abortions were
seen as providing a valuable humane service which ought to be
recognised by the law as a proper part of medical practices
and services. The more moderate recommendation was that
abortion should be unmistakably legal when it was in the
30
interests of the health of the mother.
From this memorandum there is clear indication of the
cases which ALRA felt ought to be covered by any legislation
making abortion laws more liberal. It wished the committee to
recognise the reasons for which women seek abortion and to
advocate legislation covering these reasons as specific grounds
for termination of pregnancy. The reasons advanced were:-
(a) The maintenance of an adequate standard of living
(financial, health, housing, well-being, educational ambitions).
(b) The undesirability of births resulting from incest, rape
or criminal assault.
30. ALRA Memo to Birkett Committee: ALRA Private Papers
(uncatalogued). Also in P.R.O. MH/71/22.
yV-
52.
(c) The immature age of the mother-to-be.
(d) The disastrous consequences in the present state of
opinion of childbirth by an unmarried mother.
(e) The loss of employment consequent on childbirth for
women whose earnings the family depends.
(f) The fear of handing on some trait which has proved
disastrous in the family history of husband or wife.
(g) The death of or desertion by the wage earner.
(h) The mother's feeling that although she is willing
to suffer the disabilities of another pregnancy, her strength
and happiness will fail under it.
Specifically, ALRA was against: notification of abortion as
likely to drive abortion further underground; selection panels
as endangering the doctor/patient relationship, causing
embarrassment to the woman, and calling upon lay people to make
decisions when they might not possess *a scientific unprejudiced
attitude towards sex and reproduction'; differentiation of
treatment between married and unmarried women; and harsher
penalties for those breaking the law. There is also some evidence
to suggest that it thought the termination should take place within
three months of the time of conception and only in cases of extreme
31
danger to health after that period, and that any woman who had
borne four children or had four previous pregnancies and who did









With the exception of the Mothers Union and the Union
34
of Catholic Mothers both of which regarded abortion as the
wilful destruction of human life and advocated more effective
enforcement of the existing laws, the organised women's groups
welcomed the idea of reforming legislation which would allow
therapeutic abortion on socio-raedical considerations. These
35
groups included the National Council of Women, the Women's
36




Support for legislative reform to allow increased
availability of therapeutic abortion came from the Society of
38 39
Birth Control Clinics, the National Council of Equal Citizenship,
40
the National Birth Control Association and the National Secular
41 42












relaxation of the law was expressed by the League of National
43
Life. The Chief Constables* Association advocated more
44
extended enforcement of the existing law.
(ix) Polarisation of opinion
It is perhaps useful to try to summarise the polarisation
of viewpoints. Opposition to all legalised abortion came from
all the Catholic bodies and the Mothers Union. Within the
medical bodies, the BMA was most in favour of reforming legislation
and welcomed precise provisions as to the circumstances in which
therapeutic abortion would be legal. Support for legislative
reform was also expressed by the Fellowship of Medicine and the
Joint Council of Midwifery. Neither the BCOG nor the Medical
Women's Federation saw any need for legislative action and are
perhaps more accurately described as opponents of legislative
reform. The churches were not in favour of reform although one
lay organisation, the Modern Churchman's Union, did not share
this viewpoint. ALRA had the support of the secular organisations
and the majority of women's groups, with the aforementioned
exceptions. Of the groups supporting ALRA, however, none explicitly
expressed a view in sympathy with ALRA's ideal position although
the WCG and the secular organisations did wish for abortion to be




cane from the BMA, the BCOG and ALRA and when considering
later in this chapter whose views, if any, the committee
supported, the analysis will relate to the three basic
positions presented by these groups.
9. The Bourne Judgment 1938
Whilst the Birkett Committee was deliberating, the
important case of Rex v. Bourne was decided. This laid down
the criteria to be applied in deciding whether abortion was
unlawfully carried out and thus effected a far-reaching
change in the law.
45
In the previous chapter, the principal cases which
effected a change in the law on abortion were discussed. It
will suffice here to point out how the decisions in these cases
were regarded by the various groups interested in the abortion
issue. Of those groups opposed to further legislation, some
thought that any form of legal abortion was unacceptable and
therefore deprecated these judicial decisions: others objected
to the provisions allowing for consideration of health,
especially mental health: a third school of thought held that the law
now reflected morally and socially •correct* attitudes to
abortion. Of those groups favouring legislation, some merely
45. Rex v. Bourne [l939] 1 K.B. 687. [l938] 3 All E.R. 615.
Rex v. Bcrgiuartn and Ferguson. Unreported but see 1948 (1) BMJ
1008 and Glanville Williams, op.cit.. p.154.
Rex v. Newton and Stunqo. Unreported but see 1958 Criminal
Law Review 469.
advocated statutory declaration of existing case law, regarding
statute law as more authoritative and as removing any possibility
of these cases being overruled in a higher court. Although in
strict legal theory these rulings were not binding on
High Court judges and could be overruled in the Court of Criminal
Appeal or the House of Lords, the fact that this was unlikely
did not provide the degree of certainty desired, particularly
by the medical profession. This view concerning the need for
certainty was shared by ALRA who of course also desired further
legislative changes to extend the grounds on which legal abortion
could be obtained.
Although ALRA was moderately pleased by the Bourne
decision, it is open to speculation whether its cause would have
been better served by a conviction. Such a result might well
have caused a rallying of public and medical support given that
Bourne was a highly respected surgeon of considerable social
standing and that the facts of the case aroused general
sympathy and support. The consequence of a conviction could have
been an increase rather than a decrease in the demands for
legislation.
10. The Birkett Report 1939
After sitting for two years, the Birkett Committee reported
in 1939. The committee worked on the BMA estimate that 16-20
per cent of all pregnancies endad in abortion and estimated that
each year there were some HO-15G thousand abortions taking place
in Britain of which 40 per cent were illegal. The impression
46
it held was that criminal abortion was increasing. It
endorsed ALRA's view that abortion was most prevalent in urban
areas; that the practice extended to all classes; that the
overwhelming majority of abortions occurred among married
women; and that the practice was most common in the case of
47
mothers in the higher age group. It did not agree however that
abortion, even when carried out by skilled doctors in hygienic
conditions, was relatively free of risk to life or health and
felt that such risks ought to be considered in any decision to
48
liberalise therapeutic abortion. But it did recognise that
abortions done within three months of pregnancy were
comparatively safe, again endorsing the ALRA viewpoint. The
committee also agreed with ALRA as to the reasons which
motivated women to seek abortions. Most importantly, it
recognised that economic causes were predominant - poverty, bad
housing, unemployment; that purely selfish motives
predominated in only a small minority of cases; and that
abortion was commonly resorted to in the belief that the best
interests of the patient and other members of the family were
49
thereby served. The committee upheld the views of ALRA, the
BMA and the BCOG that the law required clarification so as to





remove any doubt which might exist regarding the position of
general practitioners vis-a-vis abortion. It wished to see
a clear statement that a practitioner would be acting within
the law where he terminated a pregnancy in order to avoid
risk of serious injury to health likely to occur if the
pregnancy continued.
In its recommendations, however, the committee disagreed
with ALRA and agreed more with the medical bodies but
especially with the BCOG. Specifically, ALRA had recommended
legalising abortion for non-medical reasons and giving the
medical profession unrestricted discretion to perform abortions;
failing that, ALRA recommended legislation making it
unequivocally clear that abortion was legal when there was
risk to health. At no point did ALRA suggest that the risk
involved should be serious. The BMA had declined to recommend
the legislation of abortion on non-medical grounds as outwith
its realm of competence, but had expressed the view that to do
so would greatly reduce the number of illegal abortions. The BC06
had specifically rejected the idea of abortion for social reasons.
In its recommendations for extension the committee mainly
followed the lines of the BCOG. It was recommended that:
The law should be amended to make it unmistakably clear
that a medical practitioner is acting lawfully when in
good faith he procures the abortion of a pregnant woman
in circumstances which satisfy him that continuance of the
pregnancy ig0likely to dndanger her life or seriously impair
her health.
50. Ibid, pp.37-44.
The suggestion that the medical profession should have
unrestricted freedom to perform abortions was totally rejected5'1"
and, by the inclusion of the word 'serious* relating to the
risk to health, it was made clear that ALRA's recommendations
did not carry as much weight as did its analysis of the
situation relating to abortion.
The committee disagreed with the BMA and thereby agreed
with the BCOG, that specific grounds be laid down for abortion
as it felt that the real test was not that the woman was
suffering from any particular form of illness, but that her
illness was likely to make the continuance of the pregnancy
seriously dangerous to her life or health. In its rejection
of non-medical grounds for the termination of pregnancy, the
committee accepted the reasoning of the BCOG and thereby
implicitly agreed with the churches' statements that:
Such proposals are contrary to religious and ethical
teaching and to fundamental principles on which society
is based and we believe tha£ if given effect they would
have serious consequences.
It was thought that among these consequences would be a
diminution in the belief in the sanctity of life:
... that the individual is sacred is one of the main
principles upon which social life rests ... this principle
means that life must not be deliberately taken, save in
very exceptional circumstances, and any measure which would
detract seriously from the sanctity of life raust^in our





It would lead to a decline in the population:
Any measure designed widely to extend the basis
upon which the induction of abortion was permissible
would have that [popujL«|tion reducing] effect ... this
would be regrettable.
It would lead to abortion on demand:
We consider that the approval which would be implicit in
the legal recognition of induced abortion as an operation
which might properly be performed at the woman*s request,
or generally on social and economic grounds, would serve to
create a widespread demand for it, and would^n itself tend
to result in the lowering of the bitth-rate.
Finally it would lead to loose and immoral donduct:
There can be no doubt that such a measure would prove
an added temptation to loose and immoral conduct ... The
fact that such a consequence would be likely to follow
would in itself make it difficult tg^support any
considerable relaxation of the law.
In addition, the committee thought that there would be increased
health risks for women if abortion were too freely available
and rejected, on practical grounds, the provision of abortion
for rape, incest or any eugenic reason and for girls under
sixteen years of age.
In the safeguards which the committee proposed there was a
compromise of conflicting viewpoints with some groups winning a
point here but losing a point there. Before a decision to terminate
was taken, it was advocated that a second opinion was necessary.
This safeguard had been proposed by both the BMA and BCOG both of




recognised status, the BCOG wishing to exclude general
practitioners totally from decision-making. The report,
however, did not go as far as this, merely stating that the
concurrence of a specialist in the condition which was thought
to render continuance of the pregnancy a serious danger to
life or health, although desirable, was not practicable. In
its recommendations on notification, the views of the BCOG
were again upheld whilst those of the BMA and ALRA were
overridden. The report advocated that notification should be
made within 48 hours of the termination to the Medical Officer
of Health of the local authority and that such notification
should be confidential but access be available on request to
the Chief Constable.
In view of the many groups holding such divergent positions
and the role of such committees in 'cooling passions* it is
perhaps not surprising that the final report should represent
such a compromise, nor that it failed to advocate either of
the two extreme solutions. The report shows that the committee
itself was split to quite a considerable extent between these
two extremes. No fewer than six of its fifteen members advocated
provision for extended enforcement through the notification to
the police of all cases involving abortion, including those
coming before the medical profession as a result of spontaneous
or what appeared to be criminal abortion, whilst one member,
Mrs. Dorothy Thurtle, was so outraged by the conservative tone of
the main report, that she insisted on having her minority report
published in which she advocated all the ideal aims of ALRA.
What is perhaps surprising is the recommendations
regarding contraception contained in the main report for,
although economic reasons were recognised as predominant
in those seeking abortion, and, although the committee
advocated the adoption of any social, economic or educational
measure to alleviate the need for abortion (which was seen
as a great social evil), it refused to advocate the extension
of the provision of contraceptive facilities to all married
couples but endorsed the status quo by recommending that
contraception only be freely available for married women to whose
57
health a further pregnancy would pose a grave danger. Its
reasons for doing so appear mainly to stem from its concern with
the ,welfare and continuity of the State' at a time when the
58
birth rate was falling. Another reason for this failure to
innovate lay in the belief that to spread contraceptive knowledge
would lower the traditional and accepted standards of sexual
morality. This failure met with severe criticism from both
59
the BMA and ALRA.
The appointment of royal commissions, interdepartmental
committees, standing advisory committees and select coramittes
of either House of Parliament usually indicates that a number of
pro—legislation factors are already operative to a greater or
lesser extent. This was certainly time in relation to the
57. Ibid, p.102.
58. Ibid, p.67 and p.81.
59. British Medical Journal, vol.1 (1939), pp.1236-1237.
Birkett Committee. It should also be noted that even after
the report of such a committee any one or more of these
same factors can continue to operate to determine whether or
not legislation will result and/or what form it will take.
Such committees are usually set up 'to inquire into the
facts, to have an exhaustive examination' but this
ascertaining by experts of the best or most feasible solution
to a problem often acts as a guise to forestall criticism
60
and prevent anticipated political pressure. So it was with
the abortion issue. As war broke out immediately afterwards,
it is impossible to assess whether there was ever any
intention of acting upon the committee's recommendations, but
the reluctance of succeeding Home Secretaries in both the 1950's
and 1960's to implement its proposals does lend weight to this
view, as does the report's classification as 'non-parliamentary*.
This meant that the report was not automatically issued free
to M.P.s and that it was not included in the bound sets of
official publications; in other ivords, the feport was not regarded
as being of major importance or as being likely to lead to early
legislation.^* Furthermore, the report cost eleven shillingst
approximately four times that of other publications of similar
size issued at that time by the Stationery Office. Richards
60. Clokie, H.McD. and Robinson, J.W.: Royal Commission of
Inquiry, Stanford University Press, Palo Alto, 1937, pp.123-5.
61. See Ford, P. and Ford, G. : A Guide to Parliamentary Papers,
Blackwell, Oxford, 1955, especially pp.16-17.
concludes that bne can but assume that the high cost to
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purchasers was deliberately designed to restrict circulation1.
With the outbreak of war and consequent governmental
inertia over implementing the Birkett Report, the abortion
issue became once more a subject neglected by everyone except ALRA.
11. ALRA
(i) The people involved
ALRA was formed in 1936 by a group of women with the
specific intention of liberalising the abortion laws. Its
principal founders were Janet Chance, Alice Jenkins, and
Stella Browne, with Dorothy Thurtle, a keen advocate of
reform, joining a few years later. These names came to be
identified with the cause of abortion law reform but others
involved to a lesser degree were Dora, wife of Bertrand Russell,
and Frida, wife of Harold Laski. To any organisation pressing
for reform there is an urgent need to appear prestigious,
responsible and respected, for this affects its ability to operate.
•Good reputation is one of its [a movement's] most effective
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means of influence.' The importance of prestige helps explain
a movement's attempts to gain the allegiance of influential
people and to get them to identify themselves publicly with the
pressure group. To this end, the founders of ALRA sought and
obtained from the beginning the help of the husbands of
62. Richards, P.G.: Parliament and Conscience, op.cit.. p.93.
63. Mackenzie, W.J.M.: Pressure Groups in British Government,
British Journal of Sociology, vol.6, (1955), pp.133-148.
Dora Russell, Frida Laski, Dorothy Thurtle (whose husband
was an M.P.); Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Aldous Hudley,
Lord Horder, H.G. Wells and many others were listed among
64
their active advisers and supporters.
The founders of ALRA are remembered, by Mrs. Garrett, one
of the first secretaries of ALRA, as being radical and fiercely
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feminist. Most were actively interested in the state of
women and especially in maternal welfare. Frida Laski and
Dora Russell had toured the DurlaiM'coal-fields in the early
1920's lecturing on birth control to miners' wives.
Dorothy Thurtle, Alice Jenkins, Janet Chance and Stella Browne
all met on the birth control committee formed by Frida Laski
and Dora Russell to bring contraceptive knowledge to the working
classes. This approach of women in high positions in the social
structure to those in subordinate positions, is quite common in
66 67 63
moral reform campaigns. Becker, Gusfield and Piatt are
only three writers whose work clearly demonstrates this type of
crusading activity. This birth control committee because known as
the Workers Birth Control Group and helped form the National Birth
Control Association, later to become the Family Planning
Association.
64. Jenkins, Alice: Law for the Rich, Victor Gollancz Ltd. , London,
I960, p.50.
65. Interview with Mrs. Margaret Garrett, one of the first
secretaries of ALRA.
66. Becker, H.S.: Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of
Deviance, op.cit.
67. Gusfield, J.R.: Symbolic Crusade: Status Politics and the
American Temperance Movement, op.cit.. 1963.
68. Piatt, A.M.: op.cit.
The women themselves were also interested in the
wider field of women*s suffrage and most were active members
of the Labour Party and free thinkers. Janet Chance is
remembered by Mrs. Garrett as extremely good looking with great
personal magnetism and dynamism. She also suffered periodically
from extreme mental depression. She is typical of the dominant
upper-class woman whose life revolved in a gay social whirl,
living for a time on yachts with her stockbroker husband, and
devoting herself to good causes for the benefit of the under¬
privileged. It was she who in the early years was to be the
mainstay of ALRA, often financing the organisation and finding
many supporters from her social circle. Her work in the birth
control movement and in the sex advisory centre she set up in
the east end of London convinced her of the need to liberalise
abortion. Stella Browne often appears the most emancipated of
the group, the most fiercely feminist and the one most strongly
convinced that abortion was fundamentally a woman's right. She
was regarded, Mrs. Garrett recalled, as an eccentric who often
caused the others much embarrassment by her refusal to moderate
her views. Alice Jenkins was the administrator of the group
coming from an intensely suffragette and politically minded
family whose friends included such radicals as Philip Snowden,
Robert Blatchford and the Pankhursts. Dorothy Thurtle*s
background was similarly very political; she was involved in
Labour politics and was both the daughter and the wife of
Labour M.P.s.
(ii) Definition of the social problem
Their concern arose from various sources. In their work in
birth control centres, they were presented with many women who
came for advice not on birth control but abortion. Not only
were they asked to advise on termination methods, but they
were faced with women to whom abortion was an everyday reality
and who were not deterred by its illegality. Many poor women
had resorted to backstreet abortionists, unskilled operators
working in insanitary conditions, or had managed to self-induce
abortion either alone or with the help of family and friends.
The clinics saw the results of these undesirable practices,
for those who survived often suffered from many complications
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giving rise to a state of chronic ill-health. Although it was
impossible to obtain accurate figures regarding the prevalence
of illegal abortions, it was felt by the reformers to be high.
Dr. Joan Malleson, an ALRA campaigner, had pointed out that 35%
of 300 women questioned in hospital by a Birmingham gynaecologist
had admitted to having had at least one abortion and, given that
the subject was generally regarded as taboo, and, given that they
were admitting to having committed an offence, she took the view
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that the real figure was probably much higher. Later the
Birkett Committee was to accept estimates based upon observations
in hospitals to the effect that there were between 44,OOO and 60,000
illegal abortions every year. As Glanville Williams later
calculated, accepting the lower of these estimates, this meant
that there were over 120 illegal abortions taking place every day
71
or one every twelve minutes.
69. For a discussion of the methods used and their results see
Hordern, A., op.cit.. chp.l
70. Qyoted in Jenkins, Alice: op.cit.. p.51.
71. Introduction to Jenkins, Alice: op.cit.. p.13.
They felt too that the suffering caused by illegal
abortions fell mainly upon working-class women. They
recognised that middle and upper class women did obtain
iU*«al abortions but in the comparative safety of Harley
Street; their exploitation was therefore financial. This
practice, it was felt, should not be complained about 'except
in so far as it meant that there was one practice for the well-
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to-do and another for the poor*. Dorothy Thurtle was
convinced that society women who did not wish to be
inconvenienced by bearing a child were allowed to obtain
abortions for reasons of slight ill-health or for quite
frivolous reasons. This was seen in stark contrast to working
class women who were regarded as driven to abortion not mainly
because of personal health considerations, but rather through
concern for their families. In the 1930*s the largest section
of the community earned less than £3 per week and it was felt
that women in this class had abortions because of the need to
maintain an adequate standard of living for the family as a
whole in terms of health, accommodation, education and general
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well-being.
Concern was also aroused over respect for the law itself.
The disparity of treatment between rich and poor could lead to
loss of faith in the principle of equality before the law and
72. Thurtle, Dorothy: Abortions Right or Wrong?, T.Wenner
Laurie Ltd., London, 1940, p.22.
73. ALRA Memo to Birkett Committee. ALRA Private Papers
(uncatalogued).
thereby to disrespect for all laws. Also, abortion laws
were viewed as out of step; public opinion was seen as
being in advance of this; and they could not fail to be
ineffective given that the sanction of the people was not
behind them.
Society too was seen as suffering as a result of illegal
abortions since many working days were being lost following
incapacity as a result of such abortions. Again reliable figures
are difficult to obtain but Glanville Williams has estimated,
on the basis of figures given in Parliament, that on average
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some 76,000 working days were lost due to criminal abortions.
These concerns gave rise to a perceived need to alter the
abortion laws. The need, it was felt, was greatest for women,
thousands of whom broke the law yearly and with it their
health. But it was also a burden for doctors who were not free
to advise and act as doctors, and for the population as a whole
since 'no one can wish our race to be increased by tinwilling
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and conscripted parents'. This concern led to the formulation
in January 1936 of ALRA's express aim 'to repeal the present law'
and substitute one, 'freeing the medical profession from all
legal restrictions except those required by medical or humanitarian
considerations•.^
74. Introduction to Jenkins, Alice: op.cit.. p.14.
75. ALRA Newsletter, February 1938.
76. ALRA Executive Committee Minutes, 24 January 1936.
The definition of the area of concern has important
implications for the subsequent nature of the legislation to
control the problem area. The definition of abortion by the
reformers was not limited to any one aspect. For them in
the early stages of pregnancy there was only a potential and
not an actual human being. They took the view that the ordinary
woman was not convinced that it was wrongful for her to
endeavour to terminate a pregnancy in the early stages, if
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having a child would be a serious burden to her. In part
then their definition was that abortion was a legal problem
in so far as the law was perceived as lagging behind public
opinion and required reform.
But their definition also encompassed the view that this
was a public health problem since many women suffered the
effects of illegal abortion. Indeed, the public health definition
was later to gain in prominence with the realisation that a
pressure group must legitimise its fight in terms of generally
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held values in order to gain any ground. Thus in 1943,
Janet Chance wrote:
The best line at present to take is health and the benefit
to the health of the mother likely to result from giving
doctors greater legal protection in performing abortions
for health reasons and by encouraging women to discuss their
desire for abortion with a qualified doctor instead of ^
going to a quack or performing the operation themselves.
Abortion was also presented as a medical problem not only in
terms of the alleviation of suffering but as freeing the medical
77. Williams, Glanville: Address to ALRA AGM 1963.
78. See Clark, B.R.: Organisational Adaptation and Precarious
Values: A Case Study, American Sociological Review, vol.21,
(1956), pp.327-336.
79. Chance, Janet: Personal correspondence in ALRA private
papers (uncatalogued).
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profession from what were seen as unbearable restraints
upon it. This presentation of the problem as medical appears
to have been governed more by tactical considerations than
anything else since at times members of that profession are
subjected to much criticism, being, for example, described
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as 'reality evaders'. Where legislation envisaged by a
pressure group is permissive and requires professionals to
implement it, then their co-operation [the doctors] needs to
be secured.8'''
The early reformers felt strongly that abortion was
primarily a woman's problem. It became popular with the later I
reformers to present Stella Browne as the outrageous radical
advocating abortion on demand whilst the others advocated
liberalisation as a solution primarily to a public health
82
problem, but this is to oversimplify the position adopted by
the early reformers as will be shown later. Certainly Stella Browne
was a strong advocate of abortion on demand, defining abortion
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as 'the key word to a new world for women'. Finally, the
area is presented as a moral problem in that it was regarded as
immoral of society to allow such hypocrisy and suffering.
80. Chance, Janets The Cost of English Morals, Noel Douglas,
London, 1932, p.47.
81. For a discussion and case-study see: Colombotos, J.:
Physicians and Medicare, American Sociological Review, vol.34,
(1969), pp.318-332.
82. Hindell, K. and Simms, M.: op.cit.. Ch.3.
83. Browne, Stella: The Right to Abortion (1935) quoted in
Hindell, Keith, op.cit.
(iii) Stereotype of the deviant
The stereotypical view of the deviant or offender also
has important ramifications for the nature of the public
response to that deviance. Gusfield makes the point that the
designators of deviant behaviour ffeact differently to different
84
norm-sustaining implications of an act. He distinguishes
four main designations; the repentant deviant who accepts
societal definitions of prescribed standards of behaviour but
experiences moral lapses; the sick deviant to whom a hostile
response becomes both inappropriate and illegitimate! the
cynical deviant who is the professional criminal whose
designation as deviant is supported by wide social consensus
and whose deviance designation does not then threaten the
legitimacy of the normative ordeij and the enemy deviant who is
neither repentant nor sick but upholds an opposite norm and
accepts his own behaviour as proper, denouncing the public norm
as illegitimate. The enemy deviant designation is then the
one which is the greatest stimulus to efforts to designate
his act as publicly defined deviance. Gusfield uses this
distinction to trace the development of efforts to control
drinking habits through legislation.
The importance of the perception of the deviant is again
illustrated by Troy Duster in his work on legislation governing
drug-taking. He points out that it was not until the drug-taker
was seen to be lower class, young and black instead of mainly
84. Gusfield, J.R.s Moral Passage: The Symbolic Process in
Public Designations of Deviance, Social Problems, vol.15,
pp.308-320 at 311.
upper or middle class, middle-aged and white that efforts
were made to control drug taking despite the fact that the
actual numbers involved were higher at the end of the last
85
century.
In the previous chapter, the wide range of persons who
could be accused of breaking the laws prohibiting abortion
was delineated. ALRA, as mentioned earlier, wanted the
actions of both women and doctors removed from the ambit of
the criminal law and regarded the stigmatisation of both as
ill-conceived. Yet it concentrated primarily on the •wrongly*
stigmatised woman. The woman who seeks abortion as a remedy
to her situation was publicly presented by the reformers as
a working-class, hard pressed married woman, the mother of
several children:
It is not the thoughtless or debased woman who approaches
the thought of abortion: it is the averagg^normal woman;
it is every second or third woman we meet.
As such their designation does not readily fit any of Gusfieldfs
categories exclusively. There is some of the repentant
deviant in that in all other respects, the woman is seen as a
normal law abiding citizen; there is some of the enemy deviant
in so far as the reformers believed that women seeking abortion
had a fundamental right to do so (even though they did not
85. Duster, Troy: The Legislation of Morality: Law, Drugs
and Moral Judgements, Free Press of Glencoe, New York, 1970.
86. Chance, Janet: op.cit.. p.52.
openly defy the law in the name of that right); there is
more than a little of the sick if that notion is stretched
to cover those who cannot help themselves in adopting
certain responses through circumstances outwith their
immediate control; and there is nothing of the cynical
deviant.
The perception of the deviant as working-class and the
persistent presentation of her as such may well explain why
liberalisation did not come more quickly if Duster's aniflfcysis
|
is correct. If upper-class women had not been able to secure
discreet Harley Street abortions with comparative ease, then
liberalisation might well have been achieved more quickly. It
is difficult to find evidence of the way in which the woman
seeking abortion was more widely regarded in society at large
given that it was a topic rarely mentioned in the press. On
the other hand, given that against those who fought to make
contraception acceptable, a view often advanced was that
contraception was the knowledge of the prostitute, it is not
difficult to imagine that the abortion seeker was viewed as
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being unworthy of consideration.
(iv) Motivation
From previous case studies it has been possible to categorise
or delineate certain bases of reaction through which concern arises.
87. See Wood, Clive and Suitters, Beryl: The Fight for
Acceptance: A History of Contraception, Medical and
Technical Publishing Co., Aylesbury (Bucks.), 1970.
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These include self-interest, moral indignation, humanitarianisra,
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boredom, and status politics pursued through symbolic
92
crusades. However, these categories should not be treated
as mutually exclusive.
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In ALRA boredom may well have been a motivating factor.
All the women were well educated, intelligent and most were
upper middle class at a time when it was still not widely
accepted that women, and especially upper middle class women,
have full-time absorbing occupations and at a time when
marriage still often acted as a bar to continuing in any
occupation. It was acceptable, however, and even laudable,
to devote their spare time to worthy causes. The fact that
abortion law reform was not seen as a worthy cause would perhaps
appeal to their radical free-thinking.
It may also have been in their self-interest to find such
consuming concerns by providing them with a sense of fulfilment.
88. e.g. Dickson, D.J.: Bureaucracy and Morality: An organisational
perspective on a moral crusade, Social Problems vol.16, (1968)
pp.143-156.
89. e.g. Young,J.: The Drug-takers, Paladin, London, 1971.
90. e.g. Becker, H.S.: op.cit.
91. e.g. Piatt, A.M.: op.cit.
92. e.g. Gusfield, J.R.: Symbolic Crusade, op.cit.
93. Cf. Piatt, A.M.: op.cit. 'Portrait of a Child Saver:
Louise De Koven Bowen and Jane Addams', pp.83-100.
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Self-interest is, however, usually taken to mean direct
financial self-interest in relation to reforming crusades and
there is no evidence of abortion law reform bringing any
financial gain to them or of any financial loss accruing to
them as a result of the prevailing laws.
But self-interest can also be given another meaning in that
they were all women of child-bearing age and there is evidence
94
that at least one had personal experience of illegal abortion.
Although ALRA itself gave little attention to population policies
or control save in a secondary way, such self-interested concerns
figured largely in Mr. Justice McCardie's concern and he was
regarded by ALRA as a liberal reformer whose influence on ALRA
was considerable. In his already mentioned Galton Lecture, (1933)
he advocated abortion liberalisation as well as sterilisation.
He declared:
A large proportion of the nation represents not assets but
liabilities. If birth control had been widely practised
by tfae poor and inefficient during the last 30 years, the
national difficulties of today would be infinitely less and
the general standards of life would be considerably higher.
It is a matter of regret that birth control started at the
wrong end. It has developed amongst those who represent the
best of our racial stock including the strongest sections of
well organised labour. To get a strong and healthy nation
it is essential that we breed from the right stock.
Given that one aspect of the social problem they perceived related
to the degree of suffering experience as a result of illegal
abortion, one would expect to find a sense of humanitarianism
figuring largely in the motivating concern of the reformers and
this is indeed widely evidenced. In a leaflet produced by ALRA
94. Hindell, Keith: Portrait of Stella Browne and Janet Chance,
op.cit.. and Jenkins, Alice: op.cit.. p.21.
with a foreword by Douglas Houghton, Labour M.P., later
Cabinet member and chairman of the Parliamentary Labour Party,
husband of Vera Houghton, who was to become chairman of ALRA
in the I960*s,and now Lord Houghton, this humanitarianisra
is most explicitly shown:
Many mothers take their lives into their own hands and
bring their unwanted pregnancy to an end by most crude
and horrifying methods. Others are 'helped1 by a
husband, friend or criminal abortionist. During the
next few days, some of these women will be rushed to
hospital where medical skill may enable them to escape
death. A proportion will die, leaving a bereaved husband
to bring up his orphaned children. When these tragedies
ensue, the mother's death is recorded as being due to
sepsis, gangrene or air embolism following illegal abortion.
Most unskilled operations are not fatal, but an incalculable
amount of ill-health and disease, particularly in later
life, results from this back-street surgery. It is
impossible to estimate ttM£«human suffering involved.
Within the early reformers* concern there is a fusion of moral
indignation and symbolism. The concern for the woman who suffers
because safe legal abortion was not available and has resorted
to illegal abortion which inspired humanitarian considerations
for their plight also inspires moral condemnation of a society
allowing such suffering to continue:
Society as a whole is sympathetic to almost evejry
tragedy except this [unwanted pregnancy]. It will
wink at fornication, will view indulgently those
who break its sexual code so long as they do so with
discretion - but as soon as the indiscretion of a pregnancy
is committed, its whole attitude changes.
95. Abortion: Legal or Illegal, ALRA Publication, 1958.
96. Chesser, Eustace: Society and Abortion, ALRA Publication,
1949.
There is indignation at the hypocrisy of the medical profession
which tells mothers not to produce any more children without
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advising them how to avoid doing so. There is indignation
over the slow compliance of local authorities to a memorandum
on maternity and child welfare issued in July 1930 by the
Minister of Health as a response to pressure from the Workers
Birth Control Committee. This allowed local authorities to
give advice on contraception to married women in cases where
98
further pregnancy would be detrimental to health. There is
indignation over the fate of poor working-class women who
suffer at the hands of unqualified operators while rich women
have safe terminations. 'Must safe surgical terminations
99
remain the prerogative of the rich?*
The abortion issue is also viewed as symbolic of the role
and status of women in society; it is seen as a symbol of
their oppression and subordinate status and that symbolic
view contains much moral indignation. It was stated earlier
that only Stella Browne is normally presented as being the reformer
inspired by a sense of women's rights; but that obscures the
real position. Janet Chance was a spirited exponent not only
of the wrongness of what she saw as the subordinate role of
97. Jenkins, Alice: op.cit.. p.21.
98. Of the 409 authorities in England and Wales only 246 took
action, 79 of which gave advice at special clinics they set
up, the other 169 referring women to hospital doctors or
voluntary clinics.
99. Jenkins, Alice: op.cit.. p.28.
women but also of her right to an enjoyable sex life and
abortion. Her view of the subordination and oppression of
women is nicely summed up:
Women are a fatally acquiescent lot. But if the
20th century thinks that the upheavals of its first
three decades have finished the tale of women's
dissatisfactions and of women's emancipation, it has
a rude awakening before it ... Emancipated?
With their bodies still at the mercy of one of the
two strongest appetites? Satisfied? When one day
women will look back on 1930 as a time of personal
and bodily sj^ery for their sex too distressing to
contemplate.
Dorothy Thurtle too demanded a happy sex life for women, 'free
from shame, furtiveness and the fear of childbearing•.151
Mme Lorsignal, it is stated,
...did not dwell on the needs of the poor woman or
the signle woman but on the right of a woman to be
a mothej^gr not to be a mother according to her
lights.
Only Alice Jenkins does not explicitly grant the woman herself
such an absolute right although she credits Dr. Joan Malleson
as 'endorsing the opinion of the founders of ALRA' in her
statement that 'the ultimate decision must rest with the women
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themselves'. Stella Browne paints her own view very vividly:
The present situation of enforced motherhood was a
survival of the veiled face, of the barred window and
the locked door, of burning, branding, mutilation and
100. Chance, Janet: op.cit.. pp.54-58.
101. Thurtle, Dorothy: op.cit.. p.32.
102. Quoted by Jenkins, Alice: op.cit., p.53.
103. Quoted by Jenkins, Alice: op.cit.. p.51.
stoning and all the pain and fear inflicted ever
since the growth of ownership and sup^g|tition came
down on women thousands of years ago.
The typical sex life of women in Britain was seen as one of
slavery:
Men in England shy at understanding sex but at least
they enjoy sex. English women too often neither
understand nor enjoy it. Many English married women
are living adult lives with the sensations and emoting
of children. The weaker women succumb to a slavery.
As well as indignation that this should be so there is also a
humanitarian concern for the women themselves and for society
as a whole. An increased knowledge of sexual matters is
seen as bringing a growing realisation that to most people of
normal instincts, a happy sex life is necessary and when it
is absent, abnormalities, neuroses and other mental illnesses
106
are likely to arise. It was felt:
We are paying too high a price for our English morals.
They hamper intellectual life and they debase sexual
life. If sex could becNNt "pleasant and inspiring" then
it was felt that marriages would be stronger and
ultimately society would be healthier. Moreover, if
reproduction were handled wisely, then one of the main
causes of poverty would be abolished and again society
would benefit.
The laws regarding abortion are also taken as symbolic of whose
morality dominated British society, imposed upon the great mass
of people by a minority. There is a belief that the general
104. Quoted by Jenkins, Alice: op.cit.. p.53.
105. Chance, Janet: op.cit.. p.34.
106. Thurtle, Dorothy: op.cit.. p.45.
107. Chance, Janet: op.cit.. p.15.
public wished to cure this 'hidden evil but its efforts
are hampered by a dogmatic minority which exercises
108
influence out of all proportion to its members'. There
is no hesitation in naming this minority as certain sections
of persons in high office in medical, clerical and legal
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circles, or in stating that they claim to exercise a
moral dictatorship over others and that the morality they
impose can be defended only by 'the ignorant, disgusting the
clear-sighted and hurting the helpless'."1 This enemy is
most clearjty seen as being composed of clericists and, in
particular, the Roman Catholic Church,3"15" and the imposition
of their morality is resented as being against the freedom
and tolerance which is extended to them as a minority group:
One section is using compulsion, the compulsion of
ignorance and legal penalties to enforce its morality
upon the rest. The priest, defeated as an incendiarist
of his fellow-man, is now politically and socially putting
his hand over the mouths of the doctors, the scientists
and the humanitarians. And social reformers still do
deference morality even when they no longer
endorse it.
The influence of the^^urch must be reduced - these are
our moral dictators.
TIM* doctor is still the puppet here; the cleric holds the
strings.
108. Jenkins, Alice: op.cit., pp.89-93 reporting on IPFF 4th
International Conference held in 1953.
109. ALRA: Enquirers leaflet, ALRA Publication, 1951.
110. Chance, Janet: op.cit.. p.20.
111. See Williams, Glanville: Introduction to Jenkins, Alice: op.cit
112. Chance, Janet: op.cit.. p.62.
113. Ibid, p.73.
114. Ibid, p.101.
(v) Aims and Tactics
ALRA members' shared beliefs and attitudes stemming from
feelings of discontent and desire for action, from their belief
that a problem exists and 'something has to be done about it*
were fundamental in shaping the programme of action embarked
115
upon and the aims they hoped to achieve. It follows then
that, given the nature of their concern, an examination of
their platform, of what they wanted and demanded (not always
the same) is essential.
From their concern over the status of women and from their
belief in the absolute right of women to decide the fate of
their bodies, it would be expected that the removal of all
restrictions upon abortion would be demanded. During this
period they debated the relative merits of partial and possibly
more immediate reform against the advocacy of certain fundamental
principles. The latter would cost them the support inside ALRA
of the half-way and less committed reformer yet as early as 1936
it was decided on as the only possible course of action since:
... ours is not a medical or legal right; it is an
ethical one. To go for short range and diplomatic .^
considerations would be to curtail ultimate freedom."
Yet this determined attitude was not evident in their cautious
demands contained in the basis of the association wherein they
115. See Heberle, Rudolf: Collective Behaviour, in Gittler,
Joseph B. (ed.) Review of Sociology: Analysis of a Decade, John
Wiley, New York, 1957, p.128.
For a case study see e.g. Olds, Victoria M.: Freedom Rides:
A Social Movement as an aspect of Social Change, Social Work,
vol.8 (1963) pp.16-24.
116. ALRA Private Papers (uncatalogued).
demand legalisation of abortion by qualified practitioners
117
'within such limitations as may be considered advisable'.
What they wanted is then very different from what they
demanded which suggests that from its inception the organisation
realised that its formal demands had to appear reasonable
and within acceptable boundaries. But, in their writings and
speeches, they continued to advocate the extreme position perhaps
in the hope that the moderate views would then appear rea onable
and desirable and come to be widely adopted. Nowhere in their
writings however is there evidence of this position being
adopted on tactical considerations so that if it did achieve
this end, it was an unintended consequence of their actions.
There is clear evidence however of the tactical considerations
governing their formal demands as opposed to their real wishes.
As has been shown in their evidence to the Birkett Committee,
after stating their ideal position which represented their real
aims they added that*
... should this prove to be too far in advance of the
average of publicly expressed opinion of the country
then, as a minimum, this Association proposes that abortion
should be made unmistakably legal when^Jg is in the
interests of the health of the mother.
A discrepancy between the stated aims and the desired aims
is also to be noted in ALRA's submission as to who should make the
decision on abortion. The members of ALRA desired that the woman
herself decide, yet their public line was that the doctor should
117. ALRA Annual Report J936-37.
118. ALRA Memo to Birkett Committee: ALRA Private Papers
(uncatalogued).
decide. Statements are frequently to be found in official
ALRA literature similar to that of Eustace Chesser, an
eminent member of the medical profession, that:
... it is not, however, suggested that a woman,
married or unmarried, should be able to have her
pregnancy terminated merely by asking for it. She
is not the right.person to judge ... the decision must
be the doctor's.
The failure of the Birkett Committee to recommend any sweeping
changes in the law and, more especially, the perceived
inadequacy of judicial precedent and governmental inertia
over implementation of Birkett's proposals, all served to
strengthen ALRA's aim of securing legislation to li&walise
abortion laws. But the aims or goals of an organisation have
important implications for the means chosen to achieve such
goals. It was inevitable that ALRA should function as a
pressure group on the legislature and this meant that to
achieve even a modicum of success it would have to come to
terms with accepted patterns of pressure group activities.
If a movement is regarded as responsible, as an opponent but
an honourable one which recognises the proper channels of
dissent and 'the rules of the game' then it has a greater freedom
to operate and its chances of being listened to are increased.
ALRA had presented both its extreme and its moderate aims
to the Birkett Committee. Thereafter they avoided advocating
the former in order to avoid being criticised as an extreme
organisation convinced of the 1Tightness' of its cause which
119. Chesser, E.: op.cit.. p.8.
would make possibility of compromise very remote. An issue
of this kind is almost always characterised by compromise.
The task of a pressure group is made hUNtar if the values
on which its proposals are based are not firmly entrenched
x20
and legitimated but are already subject to criticism.
Abortion on request was an extreme view which had little
agreement either in the larger society or in the law, whereas
abortion on certain defined grounds relating to health and life
was a moderate position which already received support from
other grouK# and from the law itself. By 1954 therefore a
decision had been taken by the executive committee deprecating
any pronouncement purporting to be made under ALRA•s auspices
to the effect that women should have the legal right to abortion
121
on request.
With the outbreak of war the movement entered a period
of relative quiescence which was followed in the post-war
years by a gradual resurgence. In the immediate post-war
years ALRA concentrated principally upon its educative
function of publicising the abortion issue, trying to generate
awareness of the defined problem and to gain support for its
cause. A reform pressure group will usually also appeal to the
public and try to shape public opinion by propaganda, often
through the media. Such groups try to show the legislature the
strength of feeling concerning an issue and to give the impression
120. Dickson, D.J.: op.cit.. p.146.
121. ALRA Executive Committee Minutes 1954.
that, although not all members of the public have joined
122
the movement, many are favourably disposed to it. To
that end, ALRA sent copies of its literature and speakers
to various groups, but concentrated mainly on women*s groups,
medical associations and legal bodies since it had variously
defined abortion as a women's, health, medical and legal
problem. There is some evidence that they enjoyed a limited
success in this for several organisations passed resolutions
during this period in support of legislation reforming the
123
law.
In attempts to gain support and appear respectable, the
aims of a pressure group are often couched in terms of general
ethical principles. It tries to show that the demands which
are being made are in accordance with traditional generally
accepted values, for it is only when the goals of a group are
seen as in accordance with the existing value system that it is
124
likely to obtain legitimate status. This helps explain the
concentration by ALRA on the need to alleviate suffering, its
stress on the public health aspects of abortion, and its
presentation of the deviant as an exploited downtrodden woman.
Against these humanitarian calls, a hostile response perhaps
becomes illegitimate.
122. Steedraan, Murray, S.: Pressure Groups and the American
Tradition, Annals of American Academy of Political Science,
vol.318—320, pp.123-129.
123. These included the NCW, WCG, the National Council of Equal
Citizenship, the National Women*s Citizens Association. For
a full list see ALRA newsletters. In 1954 ALRA gained the
support of the FPA.
124. Clarke, B.R.: Organisational Adaptation and Precarious Values:
A case study, American Sociological Review, vol.21, (1955),
pp.327-336.
In part this helps the legitimating process but an
important aid to legitimation is the attachment of influential
and prestigious people to the cause. Their involvement can
be on two levels. They serve as legitimising agents by virtue
of lending their name to a cause but they can also play an
important part in generating a movement's ideology. To the
cause of ALRA the involvement of Glanville Williams was
of enormous importance in legitimating the arguments for
reform and in shaping the nature of the reform that was
eventually achieved. Although he was of the opinion that the
only real solution to the problem was the granting of total
discretion to the medical profession, he was prepared to
accept the limitations placed on ALRA's activities and to
a
work for an acceptable solution on m«ierate lines.
jf
By 1950 ALRA had decided that it must turn its
attention in a more positive manner to Parliament in which
arena the struggle for reform would be resolved. There is
125
some evidence that it did not regard the securing of
legislation as an immediately realistic outcome of its
activities but thought it a useful exercise in generating
interest within that body and thereby perhaps within the country
at large.
12. Legislative attempts to reform the law regulating abortion
(i) Joseph Reeves* Bill 1952^2^
In 1952 Joseph Reeves secured a low place in the private
125. ALRA Private Papers (uncatalogued).
126. Hansard: H.C.: vol.511, <*ol.2506. For text see Appendix j
members* ballot. As chairman of the Rationalist Press
Association and s vice-president of the Ethical Union with
many ties with the co-operative movement, he had established
contacts with ALRA and he agreed to sponsor a Bill on abortion
law reform which had its second reading in 1953. In drafting
the Bill, ALRA considered whether it was advisable to follow
the recommendations of the Birkett Committee in merely putting
case law into statutory form or whether to press for further
changes by making express reference to mental health and/or
stating that therapeutic abortion ought to be legal 'when it
appears medically or socially desirable either in her own
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interest or in that of the community'. There is some
contradiction in the reasoning which determined the contents of
the final draft Bill for it was mooted that if the purpose was
to have it passed into law then it would be necessary to drop
all references to social desirability, but if the purpose was
to arouse parliamentary and public opinion and discussion then
it would be wise to keep them in. In view of the low place
secured in the ballot and the unsympathetic climate of opinion
prevailing in Parliament it was unlikely that the Bill would become
law and the second aim and line of attack might then have had more
publicity value.
Yet ALRA chose to proceed on the more moderate line and
also dropped any explicit reference to mental health. In
recognition of the interests of the medical profession and the
127. ALRA Private Papers on Reeves' Bill.
proposals of the Birkett Committee, it was intended in
this Bill to provide that where abortion was undertaken to
preserve the health as opposed to the life of the woman then
a second opinion was necessary although it was not stated that
the second opinion ought to be that of a specialist, as was
desired by the medical profession. There is some indication
that ALRA considered it was compromising quite enough by
stipulating the a second opinion was required since this
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was going beyond the provisions of current case law. The
Bill did not follow the proposals of the Birkett Committee
and the BCOG that notification of abortions should be
compulsory and therefore reflected ALRA's views and those of the
BMA.
The original short title of the Bill was:
•The Offences Against the Person (Amendment) Bill*
the long title being:
•A Bill to remove doubts concerning the legality of
therapeutic abortion*
but the official Parliamentary draft®®®0 objected to the use of
the word 'therapeutic* on the ground that members would be uncertain
of its meaning and the long title was changed to:
'A Bill to amend the law relating to abortion*.
Thus reference to the therapeutic nature of the abortion
was lost and opponents of liberal reform seized upon this to
subject the Bill to much criticism. The term 'medical practitioner*
128. ALRA Executive Committee Minutes 1953.
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was also missing from the first clause so that the Bill then
read that 'no person shall be found guilty of which again
allowed for much criticism. The Bill was a hotch-potch of
views designed to meet as little criticism as possible. It
was not particularly well drafted by ALRA in its omission of
reference to medical practitioners in clause 1(a) and the
alterations required by the parliamentary draftsmen, viewed
with suspicion by ALRA, further opened the Bill to criticism.
In the event, Joseph Reeves was left with one and a half
minutes to address the House, the debates on the two preceding
Bills having been prolonged, deliberately, or so ALRA thought.
Prlonging discussion of a relatively uncontroversial Bill is
a favourite tactic of opponents of another waiting in line. In
the case of Reeves' Bill, it was the Simplified Spelling and the
Pharmacy Bills which took up so much time. In his one and a half
minutes, Reeves stressed that the object of the promoters of the
Bill was not to extend the practice of abortion but to give
unmistakable authority to the medical profession to act in the
interests of the mother by putting into statute form the provisions
of case lav/. But it was to no avail. It being four o'clock, the
end of main business on Fridays, the day on which balloted
private members* Bills are introduced, the Bill was talked out.
(ii) Lord Amulree's Bill 1954
On January 20 1954 Lord Amulree introduced a private member's
129. Hansard; H.L.: vol.185. 61.411. For full text see Appendix
1, 2.
Bill In the House of Lords on the lines of the Reeves' Bill
but stipulating that the Bill applied to medical practitioners.
This Bill introduced the concept of 'seriousness' to the
degree of risk involved to the mother's health and specifically
included reference to the woman's mental health. Amulree did
not accept ALRA's proposal that one of the grounds on which
therapeutic abortions could take place was that of grave risk
of the child being born grossly deformed or with a physical
or mental abnormality of such a degree as to require constant
hospital treatment or hospital care throughout life.
The relationship between a private member and a pressure
group is a sensitive one. Private members prefer to feel they
are working with rather than being used by pressure groups so
that the group must deal with the private member in a tactful
way and not appear to be steamrollering him into action. This
fact is recognised by David Steel in his foreword to Abortion
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Law Reformed:
Parliament is sovereign. Pressure groups and specialist
bodies do indeed influence what happens there, and rightly
so. But, especially in private members* legislation,
Parliament must exercise its collective judgment amid
the tumult of conflicting advice. Its Bills are its
own property and nobody else's.
It appears that ALRA on this occasion failed to act with
sufficient tact. Alice Jenkins is reputed to have so alarmed
Lord Amulree by her manner and proposals that he chose not to




proceed with the Bill. On this occasion ALRA was totally
responsible for its own lack of success.
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(iii) Kenneth Robinson's Bill 1961
Kenneth Robinson had long been a supporter of abortion
law reform and had been one of the sponsors of the ReeveJ Bill
which had its second reading in February 1953. On February 10
1961 his Bill to amend existing abortion laws was given its
second reading in the Houee of Commons. He had drawn tenth
place in the private members ballot which again restricted
the chances of the Bill ever becoming lav/.
The Bill was introduced under the title 'Medical
Termination of Pregnancy Bill ~ A Bill to amend the law
relating to the Termination of Pregnancy by registered
medical practitioners* and was drafted by Glanville Williams.
There is some indication that the new title was deliberately
chosen in an attempt to assuage the passions normally aroused
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by theanotive term abortion. The Bill itself went in some ways
a great deal further than Reeves' and would have provided in
clause 1 for abortion on the grounds of
a. preserving the life of the patient or
b. avoiding grave risk of serious injury to physical or
mental health or
131. HansarcS UG1D February 1961: Vol.634 Cols.853-888. For full
text see Appendix 1, 3.
132. ALRA Executive Committee Minutes 1961.
c. avoiding grave risk of the child being born grossly
deformed or
d. where the pregnancy had resulted from intercourse
which was an offence under ss. 1, 5, 10 or 11 of the
Sexual Offences Act 1956 (rape, incest, under the age
of 16) or when the pregnant woman was a person of unsound
mind.
The Bill required the concurring opinion of a second medical
practitioner and also set a time limit within which therapeutic
abortion could take place viz. 13 weeks. The burden of proof
in any prosecution that the operation had not been performed
in good faith was to remain on the Crown.
The Bill therefore went further towards extension of the
legal grounds for abortion than Reeves* by the provisions of
sub" 1(c) and 1(d) but was stricter in sub clauses 1(a)
and 1(b) in its requirements that the degree of risk involved
to health be grave and the injury likely to result be serious.
In clause l(a-C) inclusive it was exactly similar to Amulree's
Bill but sub clause 1(d) was a radical departure from the
previous Bills. ALRA had been encouraged to include rape and
incest by an interview with the BMA whose secretary had
indicated that such provision met with the organisation's
approval, but its reference to defectives reflected solely its
own views. The Bill was again more restrictive than case law by
its requirement of a second opinion but this, as has been noted,
was favoured by the medical profession and the Birkett Committee
and again ALRA felt its inclusion would further the Bill's
chance of success. The imposition of a time limit was a
radical departure from case law and from the previous Bills
in imposing a much more restrictive requirement.
That there was some disagreement between ALRA and
Kenneth Robinson over the provisions of the Bill became clear
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in Robinson's speech to the House. Robinson was very keen
that M.P.s should be free from any organised pressure and asked
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ALRA to keep its lobbying and letter writing to a minimum.
In his speech to the House, Robinson described his Bill as
a modest and moderate measure, the primary purpose of which
was to clarify the present situation by putting into statute
form present case law. Having announced that that was his
intention, it is not surprising that he followed this by saying
he was prepared to reconsider the grounds proposed in sub clauses
1(c) and 1(d) relating to deformity, sexual offences and
defectives but that sub clauses 1(a) and 1(b) must stand as
merely embodying case law.
The position adopted by the Government to a private member's
Bill is crucial to its chances of success. At best, its
attitude must be one of neutrality but its chances are increased
if that neutrality is benevolent. The Government was merely
neutral towards Robinson's Bill. David Renton, Under-Secretary
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of State for the Home Office put the Government's views. He
133. Hansard ^ H.G, j id ffeboaay igei • <bls.862-866.
134. ALRA Executive Committee Minutes 1961.
135. Hansard iH.Cs 3D Rdiruacy 1961 x 3>ls.873-877.
stated that the Bill was so limited in scope that it would make
no real impact on the position of back-street abortion and
pointed out that the Bill was more restrictive than case
law by its provision of a time limit of thirteen weeks. He
strongly criticised measures 1(c) and 1(d) which were designed
to help solve the problem of back-street abortion on legal
and technical grounds of difficulty of proof and of being open
to abuse and expressed the view that the Government hoped to
see the Bill amended in committee to avoid those difficulties.
If this were not done then the Government would have to consider
what advice to give the House on the Bill's third reading.
The Government was then neutral to the second reading but not
to the Bill itself.
If the Bill had passed its second reading then it is
Anlikely that it would have emerged from its committee stages in
anything approaching the same form given the Government's
attitude and the general opposition to sub clauses 1(c) and
1(d). In the event it never reached the committee stage. The
Bill had had almost two and a half hours of debate and both
its promoter and another M.P. had tried to move the closure but
this motion 'that the question be now put' will only be accepted
if the Speaker feels that adequate discussion has taken place.
With the attempt to move the closure a group of Roman Catholic
M.P.s indicated they would like to speak, although they had not
so indicated previously, so the Speaker refused to put the
question and the opponents successfully kept the debate going
past 4.00 p.m. and the Bill was lost. As in the Reeves
Bill, the rules of parliamentary procedure determined its
outcome.
13. Other influences 1936--61
As already mentioned, ALRA was the only body between 1936
and 1961 which consistently advocated reform and tried to
generate awareness of the perceived problem and to gain support
for its cause. From the time the Birkett Committee reported until
the end of this period under examination only sporadic interest
was shown by other bodies.
(i) The Btedical ffrrofession
The medical profession was virtually silent during this
time except for a press statement issued by the BMA at the time
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of Reeves' Bill. This reiterated the Association's view of
1936 that the medical profession had no particular competence
to decide the fundamental question of whether it was right to
perform therapeutic abortion. Nevertheless, it welcomed the
opportunity for unequivocal statutory clarification of whether
in fact therapeutic abortion was permissible under the existing
law. The BMA advocated that the decision to terminate should
be left to the doctor doncerned (within the limitations imposed by
136. Contained in ALRA's Private Papers (uncatalogued).
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law) and advised that any doctor proposing to carry out a
therapeutic abortion should obtain a second professional
opinion. It did not however specifically state that
obtaining such an opinion should be a statutory requirement.
(ii) The churches
The Roman Catholic church consistently opposed any moves
to liberalise abortion laws since its teaching asserts that
human personality commences at conception when the foetus is
given a soul and that if a foetus dies without baptism, it
137
is condemned to eternal punishment. "" It is from the view
that human personality starts at the moment of conception that
there stems one argument which was to gain much prominence,
viz. that concerning the right to and the sanctity of life. The
Catholic view of marriage has always been that the primary end
of marriage is the procreation and education of children. This
belief had been restated in 1931 by Pius XI in an encyclical
stressing the unnatural character of contraception which was
seen as shameful and intrinsically vicious and was further
emphasised in 1951 when the church's objection to contraception
and artifical insemination was again reiterated in a Papal
pronouncement which also laid down that abortion was never
justified even in cases of saving the life of the mother.
The Church of England's statement to the Birkett Committee
had been a reiteration of a resolution passed at the 1930 Lambeth
Conference and it was not until 1958 that the church reconsidered
137. For discussion of these issues see Williams, Glanville: Sanctity
of Life and the Criminal Law, Faber and Faber, London, 1958,
especially Ch.6 and Stevas, Norman St.Johns Life, Death and
the Law, Eyre and Spottiswoode, London, 1962, especially Ch.2.
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its viewpoint. In that year abortion was again generally
condemned 'in the strongest terms* but on this occasion there
was added a statement that this general condemnation did not
apply when there was a genuine medical necessity to save
138
the life of the mother.
The Methodist Church had neither given evidence nor
provided a statement of its viewpoint to the Birkett Committee.
Between 1936 and 1961, the first reference to the church's
concern on abortion is to be found in a footnote to the 1939
Declaration of the Christian View of Marriage and the Family
which states:
While no scriptural precept can be adduced which
makes contraception within marriage sinful, the
case is very different for abortion. The Christian
principle of the sanctity of human life applies to
this and (almost without exception) condemns this ...
... The uncertain judgement of ill-informed public
opinion raakej^ecisive Christian witness desirable on
this matter.
This footnote does not however state which exceptions were not
condemned. Moreover, despite the statement that decisive
Christian witness was desirable, the issue was given no further
consideration until 1952 when, in response to the Pope's
Address to Midwives of the previous year, the opinion of the
Methodist Conference was redirected to the 1939 Declara£|||afe
The next occasion on which the Conference considered its position
was in 1961 when the 1939 Declaration was revised to drop
reference to ill-informed public opinion and the desirability
of Christian witness but to include the church*s condemnation of
138. Church of England Report of the Committee on the Family and
the Christian Community 1958, 2, 148.
139. Declaration of the Methodist Church, 'Christian View of




abortion as a means of family limitation.
The Church of Scotland discussed abortion on only one
occasion in this period when, in 1952, it opined that when
a choice has to be made between the life of the mother and
_i:. ■! '' " '■ '' ' ' ''
that of the foetus then the life of the mother should have
. . . 141
priority.
(iii) The larger social environment
Reference has already been made to the women's groups which
passed resolutions during this period advocating reform. Perhaps
the most important resolution,in terms of influence^ to be
passed however was that of the Magistrates Association in 1955.
An ALRA member who himself took the extreme view that abortion
was a woman's right, R. Pollard JP, was instrumental in securing
this resolution. The resolution called for legalised
therapeutic abortion where there was risk of death or of
serious injury to the health of the mother and where there was
a risk of the child being born defective, either physically or
mentally.
Within the larger social environment, abortion was very
much a 'taboo* subject. Newspapers rarely mentioned it at all, far
less advocated reform of the law and, for many years, neither
television nor radio regarded abortion as a 'suitable subject for
140. Revision of s. vi. of Declaration of Methodist Church on the
Christian View of Marriage and the Family: Parenthood and
Family Planning, June 1961.
141. Report of the Committee on Church and Nation to the General
Assembly of the Church of Scotland, 1952.
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broadcasting* so that it was not until 1955 that the BBC
included a factual talk by a solicitor on the abortion laws
and not until the 1960*s that any real interest was shown
in the topic by the mass media.
Given both this general lack of interest in the subject
of abortion law reform and the fact that it was 'taboo*,
especially prior to any Bill being introduced in Parliament,
which contrasts sharply with the level of discussion reached
in the period to be examined in the next chapter, one aspect of the
Bills presented in Parliament must be recognised as being to make
the subject more discussable; an object which ALRA had hoped
to achieve.
14. Conclusion
In its activities between 1936 and 1961, ALRA had
matured from an organisation convinced in the absolute Tightness
of its extreme views and its decisions never to compromise
on their beliefs to an organisation which recognised and
adapted to the 'rules* governing pressure group activity. Yet
the activities of a pressure group and the chances of its
success also depend on the social environment within which it
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works, and on the activities of other groups interested in
142. See Perrow, Charles: Organisational Prestige: Some
Functions and Disfunctions, American Journal of Sociology,
vol.66, (1960-61), pp.335; and Thompson, J.D. and McEwan,
W.J.: Organisational Goals and Environment: Goal Seeking
as an Interaction Process, American Sociological Review,
vol.23, at p.22.
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the same area. The environflMnit in which ALRA started
its campaign was one in which abortion was regarded as almost
a taboo* subject. It was rarely mentioned by the mass media
and the churches on the whole condemned its practice and did
not welcome reform. The medical profession desired only
limited measures and only a few groups publicly demanded legal
reform.
Any attempt to secure legislation by a pressure group is
made easier if the personal value-system of the members of the
144
legislative body is favourable to the ioflixm desired. This
was overwhelmingly not so regarding abortion. In debates on
maternal mortality rates in the House of Commons, abortion was
rarely mentioned. In particular no government during this
time perceived the need for reform. R.A. Butler, the Home
Se€retary, when asked whether he intended to implement the
Birkett Report replied that *Legislation would be highly
controversial and I have no reason to think that there is
any practical need for it*. All these factors combined against
ALRA's success but when the opportunities arose in Parliament
their failure was due principally to the rules of parliamentary
procedure governing private members* Bills and, in one case, to
ALRA * s failure to recognise that private members can rarely be
persuaded beyond the point of their own principles.
143. See Blau, P.M. and Scott, W.R.: Formal Organisation,
Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1963.
144. Levine, J.P.: Methodological Concerns in Studying Supreme
Court Efficacy, Law and Society Review vol.4, 1970,
pp.583-592.
CHAPTER THREE
THE STRUGGLE FOR THE 1967 ACT
1. Introduction
It is axiomatic that an explanation of the growth of
concern over any area of behaviour and the dem.and for
legislation does not wholly explain the emergence of nor the
form of any ensuing legislation since only some legislative
campaigns are successful. Many groups may exist, all
interested in abortion law reform, but with diverse views
as to the extent and nature of the desired legislation. The
success each one achieves may be assessed by examining the
shape of the legislative attempts to reform and the reasons
for their success or failure. In order to facilitate this
examination and avoid repetition of the viewpoints adopted
by the interested groups, this chapter will deal firstly with
the positions adopted by the groups and secondly with how and
why those positions affected legislative attempts to reform.
2. ALRA
(i) The Association in 1961
By 1961 ALRA had been in existence for twenty-five years
and its membership was composed of people advanced in years.
Janet Chance had died in 1953 at the age of sixty-eight,
Stella Browne in 1955, aged seventy-five, and Alice Jenkins
and Dorothy Thurtle had retired. In the late 1950»s the
executive committee had realised that the movement would
decay if new, younger members could not be found, but no
determined effort was made to do so. The fighting spirit
of the early years had gone; the group continued to meet but
the atmosphere was more of a social event for old friends
than a dedicated reform pressure group.'1'
ALRA* s lassitude is evidenced by their total lack of
effort to capitalise on the tragedies resulting from the drug
thalidomide in 1961. ALRA had been fighting for legal abortion
in just such situations yet the events passed unnoticed in
terms of ALRA activity. Yet thalidomide did have tremendous
repercussions on ALRA in that it acted as a spur to a whole
new generation of reformers who were horrified at the effects
of the drug and horrified that the law allowed no remedy for
the woman faced with a high risk of producing a grossly
deformed child. Some of these people were already nembers of
ALRA but had played no active role and others joined in the
early 1960's. In any organisation cont&lning members from
2
different generations problems may arise over aims and tactics.
So it was with ALRA. The immediate problem facing the younger
reformers was to attain positions of influence within the movement
and so direct its actions on a rejuvenated course. This was
achieved, not without some bitterness and rancour, in the years
1. Interview with Mrs. Garrett, Secretary of ALRA at that time.
2. Gusfield, J.R.s The Problem of Generations in an
Organisational Structure, Social Forces, vol.35, (1956-57),
pp.323—330.
1962-63, and a new leadership was established for the next
decade or so.3
(ii) The new personnel
The new principals were Vera Houghton, Diane Munday,
Madeleine Sirams and Alastair Service. Dilys Cossey also
played an essential, although less public, role in the
organisation as administrative secretary. Peter Diggory,
a consultant gynaecologist, provided medical advice during these
years and Glanville Williams, Professor of Law at Cambridge,
continued as chairman of the organisation, bringing to that
role a keen involvement in the practicalities of legislation.
Of the organisation*s membership at this time more can be
4
said than in the early years. In total it never passed the
thousand mark and was often much lower. A survey conducted by
ALRA itself found that two-thirds were women, two-thirds were
married, two-thirds had had higher education and one-fifth
were doctors or in para-medical occupations. One in three of
the women members had required an abortion at some stage in her
life and one in four had obtained one, mostly legally and
mostly privately. Seventy-four per cent were atheist or agnostic
3. For the mechanics of this changeover see Hindell, K. and
Simms, M.: op.cit. ch.5.
4. Hindell, K. and Simms, M.: op.cit.. p.120.
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although nearly all had been brought up in the conventional
religious denominations, especially Anglican (50 per cent),
Non-Conformists (13 per cent) and Jews (13 per cent).
Politically the group was composed of 51 per cent Labour,
21 per cent Conservative and 13 per cent Liberals. Apart from
membership in the Family Planning Association, the National
Trust and the Fabian Society, little interest was shown in
other reform groups.
With the sole exception of Alastair Service, the key
personnel in ALRA were again women. Once again they were
essentially middle class, the wives of husbands who could
support their increasing involvement in ALRA. Again all were
well educated and articulate with forceful personalities.
Their political outlook was left of centre and they had many
important links with the Labour Movement. Later,
Christopher Chataway's wife was to be instrumental in establishing
ties between ALRA and Conservative M.P.s of whom her husband
was one. Vera Houghton's influence was considerable. Her
experience as Executive Secretary of the International Planned
Parenthood Federation (IPPF) was to prove useful to the running
of the new ALRA and as she was married to Douglas Houghton, a
Labour M.P., she was able to gather valuable knowledge of the
mechanics of parliamentary procedure and possibly had a ready made
channel of communication with those holding influence in the
legislature.
(iii) Definition of the social problem
This was similar to that of the previous generation. The
suffering (perceived as unnecessary) on the part of women;
the restrictions on the medical profession; the risk to
public health; the existence of what was seen as an
archaic and thus ineffective law; its differential
application in operation to segments of the community according
to wealth; the number of working days lost due to abortion;
5
these all figured in ALRA literature. What is added to this
is the belief that all babies should be wanted and loved** and
that those who were not often suffered emotionally and
physically as a result. What is missing from any official
ALRA literature at this time is the presentation of abortion as
a woman*s problem, not in relation to her health but as of her
right.
The operation itself was seen as a comparatively simple
surgical technique, especially when carried out in the first
three months of pregnancy and by skilled doctors. In 1964 a
comparison was made of deaths resulting from childbirth, legal
7
abortion and criminal abortion and in this context, childbirth
presented most risk to the pregnant woman. The use of reference
models both to exemplify the need for change and to encourage
s
compliance is an established pressure group technique. In the
fight to liberalise abortion laws in Britain, figures were
obtained from countries abroad, where abortion was legal on wide
5. See ALRA Publications: What is ALRA?; What help can ALRA
give?; A Clergyman*s view; A Doctor*s view; A Lawyer's
view.
6. Abortion - Some Facts, ALRA Publication.
7. Ibid.
8. Colombotos, J.s op.cit.
grounds. These showed that it was not an intrinsically
dangerous operation and was often safer than childbirth.
This was especially so in countries where the operation was
carried out early in pregnancy with the consent of only one
doctor and where social grounds constituted separate criteria.
The risks were higher in countries where it was necessary
to obtain the consent of a panel of referees; and where
decisions to terminate were based on consideration of medico-
social grounds and where terminations were performed rather
9
later in pregnancy. Furthermore, the death rate from abortion
(legal, criminal and spontaneous) was very much lower in
countries with more extensive grounds for legal abortion than
the United Kingdom. "I"0
(iv) Stereotype of the deviant
In their designation of the deviant, the new ALRA group
did not depart widely from that of the previous generation. In
their leaflet In Desperation, however, there is an important
addition to the usual category of hard pressed, working class
mothers of several children by the inclusion of a new category;
that of the middle class woman. ALRA's principal speaker,
Diane Munday, had herself sought and obtained an abortion after
much difficulty and with what she describes as considerable
9. Cernock, A.s Les Autorisations d*interuption de grossesse en
Tchecoslovakquie, Gynaecologea, vol. 160, pp.293-299.
Quoted in ALRA leaflet, Abortion Statistics from Eastern Europe.
lO. Proceedings of International Planned Parenthood Federation
Conference 1964. Quoted in ALRA publication, Abortion
Statistics from Eastern Europe.
humiliation. In her numerous talks to different groups she
stated so publicly. This presentation is of importance in
terms of the reaction to the deviant. By presenting herself
in a manner which in effect said *1 am just like you - would you
so subject rae to this humiliation?* much support was probably
gained for the cause of abortion law reform. It is impossible
to assess accurately if this was so but by openly admitting her
abortion, Diane Munday*s experience was that women often
approached her at the end of meetings to discuss their similar
experiences. Many resolutions were passed at this time advocating
reform of the law.
(v) Motivation
The motivation to action again covered boredom, self-
interest, humanitarianism and moral indignation and, to some
extent, symbolism or status politics, albeit the last being
concealed from the public.
The women involved, with the exception of Vera Houghton,
were the mothers of small children which made working away
from home very difficult, but they at the same time felt a need
to keep their minds alive to problems existing outwith their
own family circles. ALRA relieved the boredom they experienced
by providing contacts, stimulation and fulfilment. At the same
time, self-interest was operating in that they were going through
the child producing years and felt they might require an abortion
11. Among those resolutions were those passed by the Socialist
Medical Association, University Humanist Association,
Co-operative Women's Guilds, National Association of Women's
Clubs, National Council of Women, National Union of
Townsworaenk Guilds.
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themselves. Diane Munday had experienced that need and
her attempts to secure a legal abortion had brought home
to her the hurdles which had to be overcome. Thalidomide had
made the personal need appear more imminent to all the ALRA
women.
Self-interest in the financial sense is more difficult
to discover; where it is evidenced it does not apply to the
principal ALRA people but to some of the lesser figures, and did
not take effect until after the Abortion Act 1967 had been put
into operation when at least two of the ALRA members who had
served on the executive committee established links with
private clinics which grew out of the implementation of the
Act. There is some evidence that this was not an unexpected bonus
accruing from the Act but a consciously desired consequence.
There had been some discussion within ALRA of the possibility of
setting up a social agency to deal specifically with the abortion
problem, perhaps on the lines of Alcoholics Anonymous, but also
perhaps with an attached abortion unit. It was decided however
that these plans 'ought to remain secret until the law had
changed*.12
There is evidence that huraanitarianisra remained prominent
among the motivating factors. All ALRA literature stressed the
effects of illegal abortions on health. The view that those
13
who suffered most were the poor was also frequently reiterated.
Moral indignation at a society which was seen as turning a blind
eye to the suffering caused by its archaic laws was also present.
12. ALRA Private Papers (uncatalogued).
13. See e.g. ALRA A.G.M. Report 1964.
In the earlier history of the movement, a large motivating
factor lay in the view that abortion was symbolic of the role
and status of women in society. This did not figure in
official ALRA literature or public statements in the 1960's.
Yet it cannot be dismissed as a motivating factor on the
part of ALRA members and especially of the key members of its
executive.
Vera Houghton has described the effect of Glanville Williams*
speech to ALRA in 1964 (which advocated the decision to abort be
left entirely to the woman and her doctor) as terrifying the
other members by the extremity of his views. Yet it was not
the expressed views per se that were terrifying but the perceived
effect they would have on the cause's aims. It was felt that to
stress the women's rights aspects of abortion would be to
postpone indefinitely the likelihood of reform. She has said
that 'it was expediency which made us decide not to emphasise
this aspect in the 1960's, although most of us felt it was
a woman's right to decide; it was too far in advance of public
14
opinion'. Alastair Service also holds the view that it is a
woman's right to control her own fertility and that women will
not achieve any real measure of equality until they have both
15
the recognised right and the facilities to do so. Diane Munday,
Dilys Cossey and Madeleine Sirams16 all espouse similar viewpoints
14. Interview with Vera Houghton, February 1975.
15. Interview with Alastair Service, February 1975.
16. Interviews with Diane Munday, Dilys Cossey and Madeleine Simms,
February 1975.
but with Madeleine Sirons the motivating factor goes further
than an involvement and interest in women's role and status
in society. Her involvement in ALRA is much more a reflection
of her philosophy on societal relations which she herself
labels social libertarianism. The opponents of liberal
abortion laws were again seen as principally the Roman Catholic
Church and conservative entrenched elements of the medical
profession which were seen as moral authoritarians.
(vi) ALRA1s aims
In the movement in the 1960's there was again the
realisation that its aims must not appear too extreme or much support
for its cause would be lost. There is clear evidence that the
demands of the organisation were again much more modest than
its ideal aims. In January 1964, at a meeting of ALRA's
executive committee, it was declared that, for publicity
purposes, it was essential for the association to have a clear
statement of its aims. In the formulation of these aims
regard for many considerations was operating. The clearest
statement of the discrepancy between formal aims and desired
aims is to be seen in the statement:
While fully agreeing that nothing short of a return to the
position before 1803 would put an end to ckstreet surgery,
the committee was of the opinion, that it v>uld not advance
the Association's cause in the public eye to say so at
present.
17. ALRA Executive Committee Minutes 1964
The formal aims were consequently presented as being:
to secure such changes in the law as will provide that
a registered medical practitioner may lawfully terminate
a pregnancy at the request of the patient or her
guardian:
(1) when it is necessary for preserving the physical or
mental health of the woman
(2) when there is serious risk of a defective child being
born
(3) when the pregnancy results from a sexual offence
(such as rape, ^gcest or intercourse with a girl
under sixteen).
That the stated aims did not include any reference to social
conditions, which had long been recognised by ALRA as the prime
cause of women seeking abortion and had been so recognised in
both the BMA report in 1936 and the Birkett Committee Report
in 1939, is again an indication of ALRA's willingness to
compromise on its goals. It was not until Lord Silkin's Bill
to amend the law on abortion had been presented in the House of
Lords and support manifested for the clause contained in his Bill
which would have allowed termination where the pregnant woman's
capacity as a mother would be severely over-strained that this
was adopted as a specific ALRA aim. There was still a reluctance
on the part of ALRA to endorse the need for a second opinion in
decision making and a decided aversion to notification. It was
also hoped that it would be possible to avoid the imposition of
a time limit on the period in which abortions could be performed
but, if not, that this could be set sufficiently late to cover cases
where women did not seek h«l$ until quite late in their pregnancy.
18. ALRA Annual Report 1963-64.
(vii) Tactics and the larger social environment: a favourable
climate of opinion?
The recognition by ALRA of tactical considerations in
the formulation of its aims has already been noted, but these
considerations also governed its choice of means. In attempts
to gain public support and demonstrate that support, it continued
to press both literature and speakers upon organisations and
it used its members within such groups to promote resolutions.
It also developed an important tactic in its use of opinion
polls, some conducted by ALRA itself and others by National
Opinion Polls (N.O.P.). These polls were aimed at assessing
public opinion and the opinion of doctors and clergymen.
Two surveys were done by ALRA on medical practitioners in
late 1964, one in south-east London and the other in
Cumberland. Both produced results suggesting that almost
70 per cent of doctors supported ALRA's aims. The reliability
of ALRA•s surveys can be questioned particularly in the light
of the low response rate (750 out of more than 2,000 cases) but
they served their purpose in drawing attention to the issue in
the press and were quoted in Parliament.
The N.O.P. polls all demonstrated support for reform. In
March 1965 a survey of public opinion showed that two-thirds of
the electorate thought abortion should be legal in some cases and
one-quarter that it should be illegal in all cases. N.O.P.•s
conclusion was that opposition came from old people, those
living in Scotland and the north of England, working class
people and Roman Catholics. This survey was followed a year
later by another testing women's attitudes towards abotf4<Ki
law reform. Results were released at a press conference with
David Steel and the supporters of his reform Bill. This poll
demonstrated that support among women was strongest where the
baby was likely to be born deformed (91 per cent) and weakest
where living conditions made it undesirable to have a child
(36 per cent). Eighty-five per cent favoured abortion when
the woman's health was at risk, 32 per cent when the woman had
been raped, 65 per cent when the pregnancy was the result of
incest and 50 per cent when the girl was under sixteen. Support
for easier abortion was least among Roman Catholics yet more
than half were favourably disposed to reform. This poll also
attempted to estimate, on the basis of the women's response, the
number of abortions occurring each year and this was thought
to be approximately 85,000, of which 40,000 were successful and,
of these, 31,000 were illegal.
The effect of such polls in Parliament, where they were
treated as authoritative indications of the need and degree of
support for reform, led to further surveys being undertaken.
ALRA carried out one on clergymen in south London and the
southern Home Counties, again with a poor response rate, which
indicated that, of Protestant clergy, 84 per cent favoured
abortion to preserve physical health; 83 per cent to preserve
mental health; 68 per cent to avoid the birth of a defective
child; 84 per cent when pregnancy resulted from rape; 74 per cent
when from incest; and 49 per cent when the girl was under sixteen.
Fifty-seven per cent thought that social conditions should be
taken into account when assessing the risk to health.
Ninety-five per cent of Roman Catholic clergy did not approve
of abortion under any circumstances but five per cent approved
in the case of rape. An N.O.P. survey, in February 1967, of
the general public on their attitude to David Steel*s Bill
showed that 65 per cent favoured a social clause (the
over-strained mother clause), 80 per cent were favourable to the
inclusion of a clause relating to deformity in the foetus and
80 per cent to the inclusion of a sexual offences clause.
Most importantly, 44 per cent of Roman Catholics were favourable
to the inclusion of a social clause.
In response to the claim by parliamentary opponents of
reform that the medical profession was opposed to reform, a
further survey by N.O.P. was commissioned to inquire into the
attitude of members of the profession. This was completed in
May 1967, when Steel*s Bill was undergoing changes in its
committee stages, and 65 per cent were in favour of the Bill or
its further liberalisation, 21 per cent wished to see the
grounds more restricted and 10 per cent were opposed in principle
to all abortions. That these polls did much to aid ALRA's
cause in Parliament there can be no doubt.
In attempts to influence pO&Lic opinion and the media,
advertisements were placed in all the major daily newspapers but
appeals for letter writing were restricted to those who were
perceived as the more *sophisticated* readers of the
quality newspapers and magazines. The policy on tactical
activities at that time was that although no effort was to
be spared, no effort was to be wasted. To that end all
advertisements ran for a trial period at the end of which a
type of Which analysis was done to find out which brought most
action in terms of the costs involved and those which showed
19
a poor response were discarded. The tone of the advertisements
was deliberately kept unemotional and every effort was made
to produce 'facts' which legitimised beliefs. There was a
perceived recognition that 'we are up against emotional reactions,
peopfe's inhibitions, their fears and guilt, tradition and
ignorance' and that publicity had then to be 'carefully reasoned,
the art of the hidden persuader*.
That ALRA succeeded in generating both interest and
support in its aims there can be no doubt for, as has been already
mentioned, numerous organisations passed resolutions in favour
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of reform during this period. Throughout the period many
19. ALRA Private Papers (uncatalogued).
20. ALRA Private Papers (uncatalogued).
21. See ALRA Annual Reports 1961-67 for a full list of those
resolutions, included in which were the British Humanist
Association, the Family Planning Association, The
Socialist Medical Association, The National Council of
Labour Women, The Society of Labour Lawyers, The National
Union of Townswomen's Guilds and the National Council of
Women.
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newspapers ran articles on abortion and television at
last decided it was suitable subject matter for discussion and
many programmes were devoted to the issue. Significantly,
there was public recognition of the woman seeking abortion as
including many middle class women 'who could be the wives or
22
daughters of anyone*.
Four main methods were used to assess parliamentary support
for reform. Keen supporters in the Commons put down early day
motions calling for reform. The chief value of such motions lies
in the publicity they receive from the press but they can
impress upon party leaders and the Government the weight of
parliamentary opinion behind distinctive views. From the
signatures these motions attracted, it was possible to assess
the number of supporters. Individual ALRA members also wrote
to their own M.P.s and their replies were forwarded to the ALRA
lobbyists who also spent three evenings a week talking to M.P.s
in the House. Two mass lobbies were held which again gave a
good indication of support and finally ALRA sent out group letters
to all M.P.s. Files were kept of all changes of opinion and
at any by-election or general election any change of attitude
was noted and with each stage in the passage of the 1967
Abortion Act the degree of support was continually tested. By
these methods ALRA knew that before Kenee Short's Bill in
June 1965 it had approximately 150 supporters; that by February
22. See e.g. Shirley Conran's article on abortion in About Town.
June 1961. For an account of the position adopted by the
mass media see Hindell, K. and Sirams, M.s op.cit..
especially pp.127-129.
1966 this support base had grown to 340 and by October 1966 it
was known that some 436 members supported some measure of
23
reform although not necessarily all aspects of Steel's Bill.
ALRA was then a reform group which tactically was very
thorough. Not only was there a recognition cf the technical
requirements of pressure group activity but there was an
adaptation to and manipulation of them in a highly
efficient manner. All energies were directed at Parliament
and those avenues which gave no return were quickly discarded.
But in many respects its task in the 1960*s was considerably
easier than in its early days and it owed a considerable debt
to the founders who had diligently and gradually opened up
abortion as a subject for discussion. By the 1960s contraception
had come to be regarded as respectable and desirable, as is
perhaps evidenced by the growth of Family Planning Association clinics.
Certain countries abroad pursued liberal abortion policies, and
the whole decade was seen at that time as being one enhancing
individual liberties, questioning seemingly established values
and as a reforming era in general, in which Parliament tackled
a number of controversial issues, e.g. capital punishment,
homosexuality and divorce law reform.
3. The Medical Profession
From the moment it became known that Lord Silkin intended
introducing in the House of Lords a Bill to reform the abortion
23. ALRA Private Papers (uncatalogued).
laws, the medical profession once more examined the issue
and sought to have its views recognised in any legislation
which might ensue. The profession recognised that the
possibility of reform was greater than in previous decades.
There were numerous discussions of the issue in the medical
journals, in contrast to the small attention the subject
had previously received.
(i) BMA reports
The BMA tried to persuade Lord Silkin that he should
delay his Bill until the profession had reported its views
on reform, but when he refused to do so an interim report
was published in January 1966 which dealt specifically with
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the provisions of Silkin's proposed Bill. A Church of England
committee had just completed its report Abortion; An Ethical
Discussion in December 1965 and this was considered by the BMA
committee in conjunction with Silking Bill. Specifically,
the interim report recommended that on the question of maternal
health as a medical ground for the termination of pregnancy the
form proposed by the Church of England should be accepted;
1. It shall be lawful for a registered medical practitioner
to terminate pregnancy in good faith in the reasonable
belief that if the pregnancy were allowed to continue
there would be grave risk of the patient*s death or of
serious injury to her health or physical or mental well-being.
24. BMJ (Suppl.) 22 January 1966.
2. In determining whether or not there is grave risk of
serious injury to health or physical or mental well-being
account may be taken of the patient's total environment,
actual or reasonably foreseeable.
The provision in Silkin's Bill relating to foetal deformity
was approved by the committee, which however declined to
approve any statutory ground allowing for abortion as a matter
of course for girls under the age of sixteen. It expressed the
view that this should be considered in assessing the risk to
health. Doubt was expressed regarding the provision of abortion
following rape because of the difficulty of proof in such
circumstances, but as the Bill made provision for termination
in rape cases only where a medical certificate had been
obtained of evidence of sexual assault 'freshly after the
fact*, the BMA was prepared to endorse this ground. The
committee also recommended that the decision to terminate
should be made by at least two doctors and that the operation
should be carried out by or under the direction of a consultant
gynaecologist who was under contract to either an NHS regional
board or board of governors of a teaching hospital. The
committee also favoured notification to the Chief Medical
Officer of the Ministry of Health but added that it should be
confidential and disclosure of individual cases made only on
authorised request.
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In June 1966 the committee presented its main report. It
25. BMJ 2 July 1966
advocated that the ultimate decision on termination had to
rest with the doctor in charge of the case and to depend upon
individual circumstances.
It rejected the need for precise definition of the grounds
for legal abortion and thus completely reversed its 1936
position. Allowance for the risk of foetal abnormality had
always been favoured by the BMA but it now recommended that
this should only be taken into account in decision making. In
this report it was further recommended that rape and other
sexual offences were similarly only to be taken into account
in assessing risk to health and were not to constitute a ground
per se. The problem of the girl under the age of consent was
again rejected as a statutory ground.
The BMA advocated that the need to provide security for the
pre-viable foetus could best be met by regulating the
qualifications of the persons carrying out the procedure and
the places where it could take place, and that the decision
to terminate should be taken only after adequate consultation
with professional colleagues. To that end it advocated that
the decision required at least two medical opinions. It was
suggested that the opinions which were most relevant were
those of the family doctor and the doctor responsible for
performing the operation and that the latter ought to be an
NHS consultant or someone specially approved for the purpose by
the Minister of Health. It was also suggested that in this
case the doctor should have been on the full register of the GMC
for a specified time.
It was suggested that abortions should be carried out only
in an NHS hospital or 'other such premises as approved for
the purpose by the responsible Minister of the Crown* and that
such approval ought to be subject to annual review. Whilst
moving from its 1936 position of advocating doctors of
recognised status, the committee also overturned its previous
position in advising favourably on the provision of abortion
notification. It was stated that this was not regarded as a
safeguarding procedure but as a fact-finding measure for
statistical research purposes. It suggested that notification
ought to be made within fourteen days of the operation, by the
person performing it, and should give the name of the practitioner
providing the second opinion, the grounds on which the decision
to terminate was made, the age of the woman, and the number of
previous pregnancies. Such notification was to be confidential,
made to the Chief Medical Officer of Health and inspection of
the records was to be carried out only on the granting of a
court order.
(ii) Report(s) of the Royal College of Obstetricians and
Gynaecologists (RCOG)
The RCOG's immediate reaction to Silkin*s Bill was that it
should be postponed indefinitely and a Royal Commission set
up 'to establish the facts'. When this delaying tactic
failed, the RCOG set up a special committee which reported in
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April 1966. The College saw no urgent need for reform for
the law's current state was regarded as commending itself to
most gynaecologists by leaving them free to act in what they
considered the best interests of each individual patient. But
it did commend clarification to make it positively clear that
there were circumstances in which abortion was justified and
that these circumstances were only in cases where the life or
health of the mother was seriously at risk or where there was
a substantial risk that the child, if born, would suffer from
such physical or mental abnormalities as to deprive it of any
prospect of reasonable enjoyment of life. In deciding whether
abortion was justifiable, the RCOG recommended that:
The person performing the operation (and only he can
judge) has to satisfy himself that the risk of the
pregnancy to continue is, for that particular woman,
greater than the dangers of terminating it.
Numerous safeguards against abuse of any ensuing law were
advocated, for example at least two medical opinions should be
necessary in decision making, one of which ought to be that of
the consultant gynaecologist expected to undertake the operation.
But the report adopted a much more restrictive approach in
advocating that gynaecologists' sphere of influence should also
26. BMJ 1966 1, 850.
extend to the choice of the other doctor certifying the
need for the operation and that the second person should also
be a senior member of a hospital staff. The RCOG also
recommended that abortions be performed only in NHS hospitals
or places specifically approved for the purpose by the
Minister of Health. Finally it recommended a system of
compulsory notification to the Ministry of Health.
In December 1966 a joint report of the RCOG and the BliA
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was published. By this time the BMA appeared to have
adopted all but one of the RCOG's recommendations. It refused
to accept that the opinion of a consultant gynaecologist be
written in as a requirement to the Bill although saying that
this would probably evolve as normal practice; nor did it
accept that the gynaecologists should choose who was to give
the second opinion. The joint report also recommended that the
words •serious* and 'grave* be removed in clause 1(1)(a) in
relation to the risk to life and injury to health of the
pregnant woman. It respectively advocated that it was both
unnecessary and undesirable to frame the indications for
termination too narrowly. The BMA also had reservations about
expressly qualifying that the risk of serious abnormality to
the foetus be substantial although expecting that a criterion
of substantial risk would become normal in practice.
The core of the report lay in its objections to clause
1(1)(c) and (d) as specifying non-medical grounds, as their
27. BMJ 31 December 1966.
inclusion would lead to serious practical difficulties,
and probably to an excessive demand for termination on
social grounds, which it regarded as unacceptable. Again,
it was stressed that each case ought to be decided
individually and that any express reference to the factors
mentioned in clause 1(1)(c) and (d) (although only permissive)
would 'inevitably lead the public to believe that termination
would automatically be carried out in the instances mentioned*.
The report did however suggest that a sub-clause be added to
the Bill which would have the effect of allowing *the patients*
total environment actual or reasonably foreseeable* to be taken
into account in deciding whether or not to terminate the
pregnancy in the interests of the mother's health. This view
had first been advanced in the report of the Church Assembly
Board for Social Responsibility. The joirt report again emphasised
similar safeguards regarding place of termination and
notification as contained in other reports.
(iii) Report of the Medical Women's Federation
The report of a special sub-committee set up by the Medical
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Women's Federation was published in October 1966. In tone, it
was very similar to those of the BMA and RCOG. It recommended
that specific indications should not be listed in the Bill and
that instead there should be one general clause making it
lawful to terminate a pregnancy in the interests of the physical
28. BMJ 1966 2, 1512.
and mental health of the mother, taking into account her
whole family situation and circumstances past, present and
future. It also stressed the desirability of the decision
being made on the advice of at least two medical practitioners
but did not recommend any restrictions regarding the status
of either or both practitioners. Again it was recommended that
the place of termination, if not an NHS hospital, should be
specially approved by the Minister of Health and that a system
of notification be established. Two minority reports were
attached to the memorandum: one by a Roman Catholic,
Professor Ruth Bowden, who took the view that the 'deliberate
prevention of implantation or deliberate procurement of
abortion, however tragic in the circumstances, constitute
murder* and who could not therefore endorse the majority report;
and the second by apathologist, Amy Paintin, who took the view
that 'flift,; right to decide whether to continue a pregnancy or not
and the moral responsibility for that decision rests with the
pregnant woman and with no-one else*.
(iv) Report of the Royal Medico-P ycholoqical Association
(RMPA)
This Association, representing about three thousand
psychiatrists in this country, produced a report rather different
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from the other medical associations. It argued that in
addition to traditionally accepted medical and psychiatric criteria,
all social circumstances should be taken into account and if, after
29. BMJ 1966 2, 42.
considering these factors, a psychiatrist formed the opinion
that the mental health of the mother and of the whole family
would be protected by termination, then it should be lawful
for him to recommend it. The Association, however, was
against laying down specific grounds in the Bill, preferring
to have a general clause which was then open to interpretation.
Specifically, the Association did recommend inclusion of
reference to possible foetal deformity. Notification and
abortion decision-making boards or panels were heavily
criticised as leading to unnecessary stress. Although agreeing
that decisions to terminate required two medical opinions, the
RMPA did not wish to see any statutory delineation of the
status or speciality of the doctors involved. However it
envisaged that in normal practice they would be the woman's
general practitioner and a consultant gynaecologist. Nor did
the report make any recommendations regarding the place of
termination.
(v) A comment on the stance of the medical profession
In the reports of the medical profession in the 1960's,
the BMA moved furthest from its previous position as stated in
1936, whereas the RCOG maintained its conservative attitude.
Both bodies recommended provisions which were much more
restrictive than prevailing practices in medical procedures
generally or abortion in particular. No other operation was
required to be performed by a consultant and at this time abortions
could be carried out by any medical practitioner. Nor was
it legally necessary to obtain two medical opinions
although this was normal procedure. Similarly, no precedent
existed in legislation requiring a medical operation to be
performed in a particular place, nor did current law require
notification. The suggestion, however, that the qualifying
adjectives, 'serious' and 'grave', be removed from clause
1(1)(a) may be regarded as more liberal than the views
expressed in earlier reports or as laid down by case law.
The more restrictive recommendations, if accepted, would
have had considerable consequences on the legislation's
implementation. The proposal that only a consultant
gynaecologist could perform the operation and make the
decision to operate, in conjunction with another registered
medical practitioner, especially was restrictive since there
were approximately only five hundred consultant gynaecologists
employed by the NHS and the distribution throughout the country
was by no means uniform. When this is considered with the
proposal that the &:t be framed in general rather than
specific terms to allow consideration of individual cases on
their merits by at least one consultant gynaecologist, its
effect would have been to restrict severely the number of
abortions which could take place given the conservative attitude
of that branch of the profession.
As such the groups, whilst failing to stop the legislation
being passed, tried to build in barriers to its implementation
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which would seriously undermine the intentions of those
proposing the reform. That the medical profession adopted
such a stance and that there existed a diversity of opinion
within the profession itself deserves closer examination of
the underlying concerns behind the specific recommendations
of the reports.
(vi) Underlying concerns and motivations of the medical
profession
It has been shown that different specialisations within
the medical profession held different viewpoints and it is
axiomatic that the different branches in forming their viewpoints
relied upon their specialised interests and knowledge. This
I
can be clearly seen from the RCOG's insistence upon the views
of a consultant gynaecologist operating in the decision making
process and from the RMPA*s insistenee that all factors,
including social ones which affect physical or mental health,
be taken into account in that decision making. That polarisation
of viewpoints and concerns arose as a result of the division
of labour within the profession is so far obvious. But
polarisation can also occur within professions and within branches
of professions according to the values which individual members
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within the profession and/or its branches hold. From
correspondence in the medical journals it is obvious that this
30. Bucher, R. and Strauss, A.: Professions in Process, American
Journal of Sociology, vol. 66, pp.325-334.
was true of the medical profession over abortion. That such
different values exist gives rise to different opinions as
to what kind of work the profession should be doing and which
tasks should take precedence. In so far as these competing
definitions arise, a struggle for status will take place as each
segment vies with others to have its definitions accepted as
the 'legitimate1 ones to hold. This struggle was principally
concerned with the code of ethics and conceptions of health
and illness.
It has been suggested that when the medical profession faces
a new and difficult problem there will be a revival of interest
in its code of ethics in the hope that in the code there will
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be found a solution to the difficulties. Medical ethics
in western societies are based on the oath which is generally
attributed to Hippocrates but may have been influenced by
Pythagoras and his followers who may have introduced the
Christian element based on the precept 'Thou shalt not kill*.
One part of the modern translation reads:
I will give no deadly medicine to anyone if asked; nor
suggest such counsel; and in like manner I will ng£
give to any woman a pessary to induce an abortion." £
The Declaration of Geneva, 1947, formed the basis for an
international code of medical ethics intended to replace the
Hippocratic Oath, and contains the statement:
I will maintain the utmg^t respect for human life from
the time of conception.
31. Ormrod, Sir Roger: Medical Ethics, Symposium on Medicine, Science
and Humanity, in BM-J 1968, 2, 7.
32. Quoted in BMA Handbook 'Medical Ethics', 1965, p. 1.
33. Ibid, p.2.
It is this concept of respect for human life around which much
of the controversy regarding abortion arose. The commitment
to save life raises problems where two lives are involved
whose interests conflict as in the case of abortion and this is
further complicated in that the Declaration of Geneva also imposes
a commitment to preserve health:
34
The health of my patient will be my first consideration.
When the mother's life is threatened by the continuation of
pregnancy then the doctor can feel that he is justified in
performing an abortion on the grounds that he is preserving
life. When the grounds for abortion relate to health however,
this dilemma is greater since there is no clear definition of
what constitutes health or ill-health. The apparent conflict
between the values of preserving health accounts for much of
the polarisation of medical opinion regarding abortion. The
conflict may be particularly acute because it usually involves
obstetricians at least some of whom regard abortion as the:
'most unpleasant and unsatisfactory operation we are
called upon to perform, since it convicts with our
most basic training and philosophy'.
The balance between the two commitments, to life and to
health, was a crucial theme in the abortion debates. It can be
said generally that those who favoured no change in the law or
measures of only a restrictive nature emphasised the medical
34. Ibid.. p.2.
35. Morris, N.: Abortion and the Health Service: the hospital.
In, FFA Symposium, Abortion in Britain, Pitman (Medical),
London, 1966, p.35.
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profession*s commitment to life and also employed a narrow
definition of health whereas those who favoured liberal reform
including clause 1(1)(c) and (d) (the social clauses) of Steel's
Bill argued that the doctor's prime duty was to the health
of the patient and also favoured a wide definition of health
based upon that of the World Health Organisation (WHO):
A state of complete physical, mental and social
well—being, and not merely the absence of disease
or infirmity.
It is the conception of 'health* which is the key to the j
determination of how the potential conflict between duty to life
and to health is solved. Those who argued from a broad
definition of health contended that it was within the doctor's
sphere of duty and competence to promote this type of
health, i.e. not only should the doctor take into account social
factors but he could measure and evaluate them. Baird wrote:
The physical and emotional components of ill-health
cannot be disentangled and both are profoundly affected
by the enviroraMKit.
Those against the extension of the law to include social factors
argued that these were not medical and as such were not within the
doctor's province; Lord Brock:
It is not an acceptable medical cgge to perform an
operation on non-medical grounds.
The distinction between what is medical and not medical was never
36. Quoted in Mechanic, D.: Medical Sociology, Collier Macmillan,
London, 1968, p.49.
37. Baird, Sir D.: Letter to The Scotsman, 15 February 1966.
38. Lord Brock: Letter to The Times, 3 February 1967.
clearly defined. But both groups did agree that only doctors
could make the distinction.
If a continuum of conceptions of health is imagined with
a narrow disease model at one end and the WHO definition at
the other, then it is possible to see the reports of the
different segments of the profession as outlined above on that
continuum. The RCOG holds the narrow disease concept of
health at one end'the RMPA at the opposite end, and the BMA
somewhere in the middle. These conceptions of health influenced
the reactions to the proposals in the Abortion Bfll(s) but their
importance in terms of motivation lies in the vested interests
and desire to retain or achieve status through the
acceptance as legitimate of one set of definitions over another.
The concern generated over status was also manifest in the
concern to retain professional autonomy. Professional autonomy
is conditional, however, in that it is the State which grants
it but this appears to have been forgotten by the medical
39
profession. For most medical and surgical procedures, not
only are the criteria for decision making determined by, and
within, the profession, but the patient may never know what these
criteria are. This mystique may be seen to support the authority
of the doctor vis a vis the average patient. But the perceived
threat contained in the Abortion Bill(s) lay in the fact that
the permissible criteria were to be decided by representatives
39. Friedson, Elliot: Profession of Medicine, Dodd Mead and Co.,
New York, 1972, p.24.
of the lay public, and these criteria were theoretically
within the public's knowledge.
All four reports emphasised that not only should the
medical profession be consulted before legislation was passed
but also that decisions to terminate had to be made only in
individual cases and that only doctors possessed the necessary
knowledge to make such decisions. Consequently specific
grounds for termination should not be embodied in legislation.
The BMA in particular had moved from its 1936 position when it
stated that it was a matter for the whole community to decide.
The change in attitude, given the concern for autonomy, may be
explained in part by the advent of the NHS in the intervening
years and the perceived increase in the State's regulation of
medical affairs. The concern for professional autonomy is
illustrated in the following:
Whether or not a pregnancy should be terminated is a
question which can be decided only in the particular
case. The ultimate decision to advise termination of
pregnancy lies with the doctors the law should not
seek to influence this decision.
Doctors would not wish a situation to be created by law
which would encroach upon their independence in matters
requiring professional and ethical judgement. Spelling
out in detail when a doctor should or should not have
the right to induce abortion would have the effect of
introducing an element of coercion in the sense that in
each defined situation the patient might reasonably
expect the doctor to acquiesce and the role of the
surgeon or gynaecologist would be reduced to tha^of
a technician carrying out an objectionable task.
Both pro- and anti-reformers were equally concerned with the likely
40. Proceedings of Council of BMA, BMJ 1966, 2, 10 (Suppl.).
41. RMPA. Memo on Therapeutic Abortion, British Journal of
Psychiatry, vol. 112, 1966, pp.1071-73.
effects of the Bill on professional autonomy but their
interpretation of the effects is different. Those who saw
it as restricting medical freedom did so on the grounds that
it was a directive from the Government:
Parliament should not dictatg2to doctors how they
should treat their patients.
and also because it would lead to indirect pressure being
brought to bear on individual doctors by their patients who
would view any specific grounds contained in legislation as
granting rights rather than being indications. Those who
supported the Bill, however, considered that it would augment
the profession1s freedom:
Mr. Steel's Bill is permissive and in no way obligatory
and I welcome it because it removes the only outside
pressure that can ever ovggride a doctor's decision,
namely a restrictive law.
The desire for freedom from pressure is related to the desire to
retain control over the responsibility for decisions which all
segments of the profession wanted. Implicit in the arguments
advanced regarding decision making was that the doctor 'knew best*
both in relation to their patients and to society:
The problems are peculiarly human and inornate matters
which we as doctors are trained to face.
The assumption that doctors did know best was rarely questioned.
Only one explicit example of this questioning was found:
It is often a matter of pride that we know best for our
42. Dignan, J.: Letter to BMJ, 1967, 3, 52 (Suppl.).
43. Potts, Malcolm: Letter to BMJ, 14 January 1967.
44. Cocks, D.P.: Letter to BMJ, 17 December 1966.
patients; how closely this is allied to a benign
paternalism or even a savage desggtism, I must ask
you to examine your consciences.
The desire to retain control over decisions is clearly linked
to the desire to retain status:
I for one ha^g no intention of being reduced to a licensed
abortionist.
The BMA should take a stand and tell the country we wj^l
not be the tool of various sections of the community.
The desire to avoid status degradation was perhaps strongest
among gynaecologists and obstetricians, e.g. the RCOG:
Obstetricians and gynaecologists are not to be
regarded as technicians whose functions include
applying their technical skilly irrespective of
their knowledge and expertise.
Although there was unanimous agreement by the profession
as a whole that the decision to terminate must rest with the
profession, that is to keep 'outsiders1 out, there was
considerable conflict between its various segments as to which
segment was most eminently qualified to make the decision. Again,
as shown by the RCOG report, gynaecologists were most
vociferous in their assertion that they, above all, were
equipped to make the decision by nature of their specialist
knowledge and function in the operation. In their desire to retain
45. Lennox, I.G.: Problems of the Abortion Act in General Practice.
In The Abortion Act 1967; proceedings of a symposium, Pitman
(Medical), London, 1969, p.19.
46. Bushby, A.F.: Letter to BMJ, 23 March 1966.
47. Heath, A.: BMJ, 1969, 3, 14 (Suppl.).
48. Findings of a survey into the first year's working of the 1967
Act, BMJ, 1970, 2, 529.
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responsibility for decision making, many individual
gynaecologists reiterated the views in the JRCOG report which
had wished to extend the gynaecologists* sphere of influence
to the choice of the second opinion, normally that of another
consultant gynaecologist. They tended to label those who
performed abortion on social grounds as inferior beings, lacking
in conscience:
Presumably the [psychiatrists] as abortion advocates, ...
have no conscience in these matters an<|gdo not share the
surgeon's high regard for foetal life. *
Even the so-called abortionist working with his
pseudo-psychiatrist will^ave to move to an
"approved" nursing home."""'
Psychiatrists however had not sought to influence the choice
of decision maker, stating that the choice depended upon the
circumstances of the individual case. The RCOG also sought to
exclude general practitioners from the decision making process
whereas the BMA saw no need for a consultant gynaecologist
to be expressly provided for in legislation.
Three arguments for the doctor's control over the
decision can be discerned. The first was that women's
judgment is unsound in early pregnancy and she cannot therefore
make a rational decision. The second was that once a child is
born there is an unfolding of maternal instinct. The third, and
most often voiced, «as that the profession was trained to make
such decisions. But implicit in many statements were arguments
outwith the technical realm of competence of doctors and containing
statements which were quasi sociological-cum-moral arguments about
49. Sim, Myre: Letter to BMJ, 20 May 1967.
50. McLaren, Professor H.: Letter to BMJ, 25 March 1967.
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the effects of abortion, for example a concern over 'what
52
it does to youth, to marriage and the family'.
This tends to support the view that a doctor in his work
does depend and rely heavily upon the authority of his moral
senses independently of the general authority of his science
and that status is accorded to him as much for the mystique
with which he surrounds his work as for his technical knowledge
and competence.5"
(vii) The medical profession as a pressure group
In matters regarding health and especially definitions of
'illness* the opinions of the medical profession are likely to
54
take precedence over the opinions of laymen. That the
profession sought to control legislation over its work is
obvious. The fact that the profession is composed of its own
associations makes it an 'interest' group concerned chiefly with
protecting the interests, financial or professional, of its
members. As such it is in a very influential position. The
55
strength of the BMA in particular has long been recognised. In
51. For further discussion of implications of this see: Maelntyre,
Sally: The Medical Profession and Termination of Pregnancy,
M.Sc. Thesis, University of London, 1971.
52. McLaren, Professor H.: Letter to BMJ, 1967, 1, 758.
53. Friedson, Elliot: op.cit.. p.170.
54. Friedson, Elliot: Professional Dominance, Atheston Press,
New York, 1970, p.l.
55. See Eckstein, H.: Pressure Group Politics: The Case of the
BMA, Allen and Unwin, London, I960.
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general it may be said that the BMA is the most influential
of the three associations, with the RMPA weakest. The profession
is so powerful since it is both established and respected.
Moreover Governments depend upon it for the administration of
the NHS and it is consulted by the Health Ministry on
everything which is not a matter of routine administration.
Its effectiveness is to some extent also due to public
atti$fedes towards it and the prettige and status awarded it. Such
attitudes give it a particularly powerful position vis a vis public
5i
officials compared with other pressure groups of a •cause* nature.
This power is partly derived from its established contacts with
civil servants and ministries but also from the practice of
consulting experts when legislation is proposed dealing with
matters involving technical expertise. The role of such experts
in framing legislation has been discussed by many including
Becker"'7 and Duverger,58 a specific example of this being the
role of the medical profession and especially of psychiatrists
59
in framing sexual psyttopath laws.
A pressure group is most effective if it presents a unified
front which the medical profession failed to do. The diffi#*#nt
positions adopted by each segment could perhaps have been
56. Ibid, p.70.
57. Becker, H.S.: The Outsiders, op.cit.
58. Duverger, M.: Party Politics and Pressure Groups: a
comparative introduction, Methuen, London, 1972.
59. Sutherland, E.H.: Diffusion of Sexual - Psychopath Laws,
American Journal of Sociology, 1950, pp.142-148.
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dismissed as arising from their various spheres of competence
but the fact that segments arose within segments, holding
different definitions and values, tended to undermine its
position of authority as a whole and was seized upon by ALRA
in an attempt to convince Parliament that the views of the
profession should not be adhered to too closely. The NOP
polls on general practitioners* attitudes also served as a
reminder that the official spokesmen for the profession were
not necessarily representative of the ordinary members, since
considerations of time, money and security of practice are
important determining factors in the decision to play a part
in the politics of a profession. The workload of a middle
class practice and the income from a secure consultant
position all make for easy participation in medical politics,
resulting in the leaders coming predominantly from the more
conservative branches of each segment.
The abortion issue revealed the spoilt within the profession
and within its segments. The BMA, perhaps realising the
importance of unity, hastened to assure the Home Secretary
and Minister of Health that they were united:
During the committee stage of the Bill, the views of
individual doctors received very considerable publicity,
with the result that a misleading impression was given
that the profession is widely divided on the issues in
the Bill. The Council has never doubted that the profession
as a whole is strongly in favour of ^e views expressed in
the report of its special committee.
The official spokesmen used the traditional forms of interest group
tactics; consultation, negotiation, and public statement. Each
60. BMJ 1967, 2, 66 (Suppl.)
141.
segment tried to delay the possibility of reform by calling
for fact-finding surveys and Royal Commissions. Those individual
practitioners who were most against new abortion legislation
tried to show that such practices were totally contrary
to established generally held principles and societal values.
They described the reform movement as a 'sinister plot of
hideous atheistic •atpediency* characteristic of an era of
'sex-sodden prurience*. They denied that women who sought
abortion were hard-working overstrained mothers and sugges1ed
instead that they were pleasure seekers with little sense of
responsibility. To what extent the medical profession succeeded
in its attempts to influence the legislation embodied in the
1967 Abortion Act will be evaluated later in this chapter.
4. Other influences
In addition to the memoranda prepared by the medical
profession, there vere ntNNSMMts detailed reports from many
other groups, some of the more influential of which will now be
considered.
(i) Report of the Church Assembly Board for Social
Responsibility
The Board approached the problem of legislating on abortion
from a standpoint similar to that of the medical profession, viewing
the issue as primarily a medical problem. The report took the form
61. Donald, Professor Ian: Quoted in New Humanist, May 1972.
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of a discussion of Lord Silkin's Bill to amend the law.
In defining the problem as medical it did not favour the
inclusion of explicit reference in legislation to deformity,
sexual offences, or over-straining the mother's capabilities
(clauses l(l)(b)(c) and (d)), although it did not wish to
negate the intentions underlying these clauses. Consequently,
the vital part of the Bill was seen to lie in clause 1(1)(a)
allowing termination when there would be grave risk of the
patient's death or serious injury to her health. To encompass
some of the intentions of clauses 1(b) (c) and (d) the committee
recommended th# iaddition of 'risk to physical or mental well-
being*. It therefore favoured a broad conception of health.
This is also exemplified by the suggestion to add a sub-clause
to clause 1(a) to allow social conditions affecting health and/or
well-being to be taken into account in decision making. It was
proposed that the sub-clause should read;
In determining whether or not there is grave risk of
serious injury to health or physical or mental
well-being, account may be taken of the patient's
total environment, whether actual or reasonably foreseeable.
The Board also recommended a statutory requirement to have two
medical practitioners certifying the operation and hoped that
Parliament would stipulate that the second opinion be one of
consultant status. Notification of all abortions was further
suggested as a necessary safeguard against abuse of the law.
It did not wish to see any statutory time limit up to which
terminations could be performed and consequently recommended the
62. Church Assembly Board: Abortion; An Ethical Discussion 1965.
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deletion of the whole of clause 2 of Silkin's Bill.
(ii) Church of Scotland
The Church of Scotland1 Social and Moral Welfare Committee
s
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reported in May 1966. J Its prime consideration was the
inviolability of the rights of the foetus and consequently the
report condoned abortion only where there was serious risk to
the life or grave injury to the physical or mental health f the
pregnant woman or where there was a high risk of serious etal
deformity. It did not however wish to see a separate deformity
clause but preferred this factor to be taken into general account.
The committee expressly rejected the woman's being either
defective or under the age of consent as sufficient grounds in
themselves to justify termination. It failed to consider the
case of pregnancy arising as a result of a sexual offence. The
Church of Scotland endorsed the Anglican Report regarding
notification and the need for a second opinion.
(iii) Methodist Church
The July 1966 Methodist Conference resolution on abortion was
more liberal in its recommendations than either the Anglican
64
or Church of Scotland reports. The Methodists wished to see
'the provisions of the law being related to the actual reasons why
many women seek abortions' and accordingly recommended legislation
to cover cases where there was risk to life or health, whether
63. Church of Scotland: Supplementary Report of the Social and
Moral Welfare Committee, May 1966.
64. Methodist Church: Report on Abortion, 1966.
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physical or mental, and whether before, at, or after the
birth of the child; where there was risk of serious
deformity to the child; where pregnancy occurred as a
result of a criminal offence and where the woman's capacity
as a mother was severely overstrained. The Conference did not
suggest a need for two opinions but suggested that the
practitioner performing the operation should be a senior
gynaecologist and that the operation should be performed only An
an NHS hospital or a specially approved place. It also
suggested that any Act be reviewed at the end of five years.
(iv) Other churches
The Methodist position was very similar to the resolutions
passed by the Congregational Church of England and Wales and
the Free Church Federal Council except that neither accepted the
•capacity of the mother1 clause and the latter restricted the
•sexual offences' provision to cover rape alone. They did
however wish to see specific references to the other grounds
for abortion. Of the Protestant Churches only one, the Free
Church of Scotland, did not wish to see any extension of case law.
It stated in its report that if the Bill became law, 'society would
enter into the era of disposable babies' and 'another slide down
the slope of .the permissive society will have been registered'.65
(v) Joint report of The Law Society and The British academy
of Forensic Sciences
The memorandum66 prepared by this body was one of the last to
65. Free Church of Scotland: Report on Abortion, May 1966.
66. Memorandum of the Joint Committee of The Law Society and The
British Academy of Forensic Sciences, January 1967.
145.
be produced which had influence in shaping the views of the
legislature. It stated that the law as it stood was both
uncertain and unsatisfactory and ought to be re-stated so as
to 'embrace responsible medical opinion'. It specifically
rejected the view that therapeutic abortion should be placed on
the same footing as most other operations believing that women
in the early stages of pregnancy were unlikely to make a
satisfactory decision and also that abortion on request would
lead to intolerable pressures on the medical profession.
It recommended that social factors were insufficient to
justify abortion but should be taken into account in assessing
risk to physical or mental health or 'the future well-being of
herself and/or the child'. But it went further than this in
stating that any inclusion of reference to social factors
warranted a system of control. To this end it suggested that
the Minister of Health should set up a panel of registered
medical practitioners approved for the purposes of the
proposed legislation. It recommended that therapeutic abortion
should be available when 'there was substantial risk that if the
child were born it would suffer from such physical or mental
abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped'. Further safeguards
against abuse were envisaged in the need for two opinions,
notification, and that the operation should only be performed
in an NHS hospital or place approved by the Minister for the
purposes of the Act.
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5. Opponents of abortion law reform
(i) Roman Catholic Church
The Roman Catholic Church continued to condemn all abortion
reform. Following a meeting of Roman Catholic Bishops in London
in October 1966, a statement was issued from Cardinal Heenan's
Westminster headquarters which re-affirmed the Catholic view
that 'abortion and infanticide are abominable crimes'.67 Support
for the official view of the Catholic Church came from many
Catholic organisations, including the Guild of Catholic ijoctors,
63
Catholic Women's Groups, the Link Society and the Lamp Society.
All of these groups emphasised their definition of abortion as
murder and their view that 'if this Bill is not defeated it will
be the beginning of the end of traditional Christian morality
in this country*. Moreover, to extend the law on therapeutic
abortion was seen as opening the door to 'the sterilisation of
the unfit, and the killing of the sick and old and the socially
useless .,.'.6^
But Catholics were not as united as one might expect from the
absolutism of the church's teaching. The journal of the Roman
Catholic marxists, Slant, argued for a radical revision of the
70
church's attitude to abortion. It expressed the view that
life only assumed a human form after birth for it was only then
67. Catholic Herald, 28 October 1966.
68. For a description of these groups see: Barr, John: The
Abortion Battle, New Society, 9 March 1967; and Close-up
on the Abortion Lobby, The Scotsman, 3 December 1966.
69. Lamp Society Pamphlet, Wanted.
70. Copy of article in ALRA's Private Papers (uncatalogued).
that life became social and meaningful. Although it did not
recommend abortion, it did state that in some cases it was
justifiable because a human life was balanced against an
inhuman object.
(ii) Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (SPUC)
SPUC was formed in January 1967 when the committee stages
of David Steel's Bill were about to start. It has become the
main organisation fighting for the amendment of the 1967 ct and
as such its aims, motivations and tactics will be more fully
discussed in later chapters; a brief mention of the
organisation will suffice here. It was founded specifically
to fight the passage of David Steel's Bill and as such it
constituted a counter-reform group of a 'cause* nature. Its
definition of abortion was overwhelmingly that abortion was a
synonym for killing and that any taking of life had to be
justified. Consequently it was not against all abortion but could
only accept its necessity when there was serious risk to life
and grave injury to health.
In its conception of health SPUC argued for a narrow 'disease'
model rather than the wider WHO definition. From this standpoint
it rejected all social factors as grounds for abortion either in
themselves or as indications in any assessment of health. In
the early stages of its campaign SPUC attempted to use the
traditional delaying tactic of calling for the setting-up of a
Royal Commission or interdepartmental committee. To that end it
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organised petitions and marches but by that time David Steel*s
Abortion Bill was well under way in Parliament.
6. Legislative attempts to reform
(i) Renee Short's Bill 196571
In June 1965 Renee Short, a Labour M.P., sought leave to
introduce a Bill under the procedure known as the Ten Minute
Rule which allows a private member to introduce a Bill I
the end of Question Time on Tuesdays and Wednesdays. The Bill
had little chance of success since the procedure alJUvws only
one Ten Minute Rule Bill to be introduced each Tuesday and
Wednesday and one week's notice must be given. As the name
implies the sponsor of the Bill is given only ten minutes to
introduce it and any opposition is similarly limited after
which a motion for leave to introduce the Bill is put.
In an attempt to avoid opposition, the Bill introduced
was designed on the same lines as Robinson's in 1961. It hoped
to legalise therapeutic abottion in cases involving serious risk
to the life of or grave injury to the physical or mental health
of the pregnant woman; or to avoid grave risk of the child
being born grossly deformed; or where pregnancy resulted from
a sexual offence.
Termination on the last three grounds was to require the
71. See Hansard H.C. 15th June 1965, vol.714, Cols.254—258, and
Appendix 1(4).
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concurrence of a second medical practitioner and was not to
be performed after the thirteenth week of pregnancy. The
burden of proof in any prosecution that the operation was not
performed in good faith was to rest with the Crown. Short*s
expressed aim was to clarify the law for the medical profession
and thereby also to improve the position of women. The deviant
was again presented as being the married woman with several
children. At the end of her speech the question was put and
agreed to in an unopposed first reading.
The second reading on 2 July did not however meet with the
same success. As is normal with this type of Bill there was
no time for a full debate; it could advance only with a
formal second reading, i.e. with no one objecting. The opponents
of reform defeated the Bill when William Wells, a Roman Catholic
M.P., used the established rules of parliamentary procedure to his
advantage by calling *object* and thus the Bill was lost.
7?
(ii) Lord Silkin*s first Bill 1965
The Abortion Bill introduced in the House of Lords by
Lord Silkin in November 1965 followed the line of attack
conceived by ALRA on the failure of limited proposals. It
presented the extreme case of middle-range proposals, giving no
rights to women but including social factors as grounds for
72. See Hansard H.L. Nov. 11th 1965, vol.270, ol.H3; Nov. 30th
1965 01.270, ols.1139-1242; Feb. 1st 1966 ol. 272, ols.284-356
Feb. 2rd 1966 Col.272, ols.491-557; Feb. 7th 1966 ol.272,
ols.581-634; ^Feb. 22nS 1966 ol.273, ols.92-151; I eb. 28th
f966 ol.273, ols.520-576; Mar. 7th 1966 ol.273, ^ols.910-920;
Hinde^l, K. anS Simras, M.: Abortion Law Reformed, op.cit..
pp.132-154; and Appendix 1(5).
termination. It sought to legalise therapeutic abortion
on four grounds:
a. in the belief that if the pregnancy were allowed to
continue there would be grave risk of the patient's
death or of serious injury to her physical or
mental health resulting either from giving birth to
the child or from the strain of caring for it.
b. in the belief that if the pregnancy were allowed to
continue there would be grave risk of the child eing
borij grossly deformed or with other serious
physical or mental abnormality.
c. in the belief that the health of the patient or the
social conditions in which she is living (including
the social conditions of her existing children) make
her unsuitable to assume the legal and moral
responsibility for caring for a child or another
child as the case may be.
d. in the belief that the patient became pregnant as the
result of intercourse which was an offence under
sections one to eleven inclusive of the Sexual Offences
Act 1956 or that the patient is a person of unsound
mind.
The Bill also sought to limit terminations to the first sixteen
weeks of pregnancy where termination was performed on grounds
(c) or (d) and placed the burden of proof on the Crown in
criminal proceedings.
This Bill was drafted by Glanville Williams after discussions
with Vera Houghton and Lord gilkin. As such it came much
closer to representing ALRA's real aims than other Bills had
done by its inclusion of clause 1(c) which was entirely new to
legislative attempts at reform. It was not even a publicly
stated ALRA aim and little public support for it could be
demonstrated, especially on the part of the other main pressure
groups. But the proposed Bill also contained another important
innovation in its apparently innocent inclusion in clause 1(a)
of the words 'from the strain of caring for it*. This a
radical departure from previous presentations of this cl u e
(designed to cover case law provisions for therapeutic
termination of pregnancies) in its extension of the normal
interpretation of the law. Throughout the presentation of
Silkin's Bill, the stereotype of the woman who would benefit
under its provisions was presented as the working class married
mother of several children who lived in poor surroundings or
who was married to a lifelong criminal, drug addict or
alcoholic. That this evoked a non-hostile response is evident
from the fact that only a few peers opposed the Bill as a matter
of principle, whereas other opponents of reform limited their
criticisms to its specific wording and provisions. The argument
became one of interpretation as to how best to improve and protect
the position of the woman without threatening medical freedom or
totally disregarding the rights of the foetus.
This tactical argument was persuasive to Lord Silkin who,
at the end of the second reading of his Bill, gave the assurance
152.
that all criticisms would be given serious consideration
and that he was willing to collaborate with his main
opponents, Lords Dilhorne and Brain and the Bishop of Exeter,
in producing a more acceptable measure, either by withdrawing
it totally and substituting a new one, or by substantially
amending it. During the second reading, he conceded the need
for two medical opinions for all abortions except emergency
cases; the need for clarification of his social clause by a
re-phrasing which would avoid objections relating to judgements
being made on the suitability of some women as mothers; and
also for a re-appraisal to be made of the difficulties of
proof regarding sexual offences. His reassurances led to an
overwhelming favourable vote of 67 to 8 at the second reading.
Silkin's reassurances marked the start of a two year period
of compromise. ALRA had already lost ground by his agreeing
to the necessity for a second medical opinion but, if pushed
to compromise, was willing to agree to a second opinion in all
decisions except those made on the grounds expressed in clause
1(a). Between second reading and the Bill*s committee stages,
Silkin consulted many groups including ALRA, the BMA and his
principal opponents in the Lords. The Church Assembly Board
also presented its report.
As a result of these meetings, Silkin substantially amended
his Bill to include the necessity for two medical opinions except
in emergencies; and for notification to take place within seven
~r
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days to the Chief Medical Officer of the Ministry of Health.
In doing so, Silkin was following the recommendations of the
BMA and the Church Assembly Board but had avoided both bodies*
suggestion (as opposed to decided requirement) that the second
opinion should be from a practitioner of consultant status.
The substance of the grounds for abortion did remain virtually
the same, albeit with three changes. To clause 1(a) was added
risk to the woman's physical or mental well-being in order to
encompass a wide concept of health which had been suggested in
the report of the Church Assembly Board. Clause 1(c) was
tightened to remove any explicit reference to social conditions
or other existing children so that inadequacy related only to the
woman's physical or mental capacities. The loss of express social
conditions as grounds for abortion was also ALRA's loss but
the addition of a sub-clause to clause 1 tempered this apparent
defeat, whilst being ostensibly a victory for the views of the
BMA and the Church of England, by including the recommendation of
the Church Assembly Board's report, as endorsed in the report
of the BMA that:
In determining the patient's health or physical or
mental well-being account may be taken of the patient's
total environment whether actual or reasonably foreseeable.
Thirdly, criticisms of the difficulty of proving rape had led ALRA
to suggest a safeguard that any termination on the grounds of
rape would require a certificate that there was evidence of such
n/
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an assault from a registered medical practitioner who was
consulted as soon as practicable after the assault. These
discussions and compromises did not lead to an easy committee
stage for the Bill. •Well-being' did not survive in clause (l)(a)
as it was considered too ill-defined. Instead the woman's
health was to be considered 'whether before, at or after the
birth of the child'. This constituted an extension of case law.
•Total environoent* was changed to 'circumstances, whether past,
present or prospective* although the effect of such considerations,
it may be argued, was the same. After a heated discussion, clause
1(c) (the inadequacy of the mother clause) was passed but the
sexual offences clause provided the most bitter debate,
especially with reference to a girl under sixteen and to rape.
In the event, rape was lost as being too difficult to prove; as
leading in all probability to false allegations of rape; and
as being covered, in genuine cases, by clause 1(a) in relation
to mental health. The 'under-sixteen* provision however did
survive the committee stages. The provisions relating to
notification and to two medical opinions were widely approved.
Clause 1(b) now required the degree of deformity to be so high
as to deprive the child, if born, of any prospect of reasonable
enjoyment of life.
Before the report stage, Silkin tabled further amendments
and, as a result, was persuaded to allow the Bill to be
re—committed to the Committee of the Whole House for full
discussion. At the first report stage clause 1(c) was lost by
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81 to 51 when the opponents of this provision marshalled their
forces well and argued that the medical profession was not
qualified to make judgements on the adequacy or otherwise
of women as mothers nor, in a democracy, was society entitled
to do so. This was possible at the first report stage because
the tabled amendments related to technical points by which the
principle involved in clause 1(c) was unaffected.
The Committee of the Whole House supported Silkin's
amendments, thus further reducing the influence of ALi . uhe
specific form of legislation and enhancing that of the medical
profession and the Church of England. Silkin's Bill now required
that the medical practitioner performing the abortion had to be
a registrar (or someone of similar or superior status) employed by
the NHS and holding an appointment in gynaecology and that the
operation could only be performed in an NHS hospital or 'in a
place for the time being approved for the purposes by the
Minister of Health as the Secretary of State*. The requirc?raents
relating to status were to become an ever present feature of the
legislative history of the Abortion Act 1967 and have continued
to dominate attempts to amend that Act. Lord Silkin thus became
the first person to successfully take an Abortion Bill through
one of the Houses of Parliament. However, the Bill was lost
with the dissolution of Parliament.
(iii) Simon Winqfield-Diqby's Bill 19667
Whilst Silkin's first Bill progressed in the House of Lords
another attempt to reform the law on abortion was made in the House
73. See Hansard H.C. 25th February 1966, vil.725 Cols.837-854, and
Appendix 1(7).
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of Commons, this time by Simon Wingfield-Digby, a Conservative
M.P. He had drawn eighth place in the private members* ballot
which gave him little chaise of success, but he was persuaded
to take up the cause of abortion law reform. Partly because of
his low place, the Bill he introduced was much more modest than
its immediate predecessors. ALRA's aims were not totally
covered by the Bill for it was drafted by Wingfield-Digby
himself with the help of a barrister friend who was also p rtly
responsible for the publication, Abortion - a Conserve I:'
74
Viewpoint. which ac^o cated only strictly limited reform.
Wingfield-Digby decided to introduce only modest proposals
in the hope of altering the Bill in committee to allow for
social factors to be considered in the decision making process.
He sought to give statutory effect to the Bourne judgment, that
is to cover cases where there was a serious risk to life or
grave injury to physical or mental health and also to extend
case law by covering cases where 'it was more probable than not that
the child, if born, would suffer from such physical or mental
abnormalities or both as to deprive it of any prospect of
reasonable enjoyment of life*. As such, it fell far short of
ALRA's aims but was in accordance with the views expressed by the
BMA (at this point neither the RCOG nor the RMPA had reported).
Although much more limited than the proposals of many women's
organisations, it was more advanced than the stance taken by
the Church Assembly Board in its explicit inclusion of deformity
74. Conservative Party Political Centre Bulletin: Abortion - A
Conservative Viewpoint, 1965.
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as a ground for therapeutic abortion; the church had desired
only implicit recognition of this factor. In another sense,
the Church Assembly Board's report was more advanced than
Wingfield-Digby*s Bill in recommending that the concept of
health to be employed ought to be wide and include reference to
the woman's well-being and that her total environment, whether
actual or reasonably foreseeable, should be taken into account.
Again, the ostensible reason for reform xvas to free the medical
profession: Wingfield-Digby deliberately avoided both cial
and a sexual offences clause because of the difficulties o*
assessment and/or proof and also because such considerations might
be seen to require skills outside the realm of the medical
profession's technical competence. The opinion of the BMA
and the Church Assembly Board prevailed in the provisions for
notification and for a second opinion, both of which ALRA
had hoped to avoid as being more restrictive than case law.
It was prepared to concede the latter, however, if it became
unavoidable.
The modest nature of Wingfield-Digby's proposals did not win
him the support he anticipated. Like its predecessors, his Bill
was talked out at second reading after one hour's debate, this
time by a Roman Catholic M.P. , Peter Mahon. The exercise ua.s
useful to ALRA in that for the first time a Conservative M.P.
had presented a reforming Bill which stimulated interest in the
issue in the Conservative ranks and made it much more a non-party
issue. More importantly, it confirmed that modest proposals did
not necessarily aid the cause of reform; a future tactic
would be to aim for the most extreme of middle range proposals
with a view to making concessions in committee.
(iv) Lord Silkin*s second bill 19667"3
In the next session of Parliament Silkin introduced his
second Abortion Bill in the Houee of Lords. It was exactly similar
to the one which had been passed earlier and as such it was
given an unopposed second reading. In its committee stag.- ,
however, Silkin introduced two princif^i amendments. The
first was an attempt to reintroduce the •social* or what came to
be known as the •inadequacy* clause. In doing so, he was
responding to increased pressure from ALRA which had thought
that the final form of his first Bill constituted a less than
adequate extension of the law. The form of the amendment was
largely influenced by the arguments against the *inadequacy•
clause, viz. that it implicitly made moral judgements on the
adequacy of women as mothers. The new amendment simply said that
therapeutic abortion ought to be available in cases where the
woman's capacity would *be severely overstrained'. The
picture presented was that of a helping hand to the woman rather
than of a moral judgement upon her and as such found favour in
the Lords and was passed by a large majority. This success for
ALRA was tempered by defeat in the second amendment, for Silkin
75. See Hansard H.L. lOth May 1966, v ol.274, c ols. 577-605;
23rd May 1966,V ol.274, cols.1208-1250; Hindell, K. and
Simms, M.: Abortion Law Reformed, op.cit.. pp.132-154; and
Appendix 1(6).
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gave way to pressure from the RCOG and stipulated that abortions
could only be carried out by or under the supervision of
a consultant gynaecologist.
Silkin*s second Abortion Bill was never to complete its
parliamentary life, for, in May 1966, David Steel agreed to
sponsor a Bill in the House of Commons and Lord Silkin withdrew
so that the Commons could debate the issue.
(v) David Steel's Bill 1966/6
David Steel, a young Scottish Liberal M.P. , had d r . third
place in the private members* ballot thus allowing reform to be
debated more fully than ever before in the Commons. The
immediate problem facing Steel and ALRA concerned the nature of
the Bill. Silkin urged that he should introduce a Bill on
exactly similar lines to that which had gone through the Lords
but ALRA was reluctant to support a Bill which omitted many of
its desired aims and which it considered something less than
a reforming measure. It also feared that the increasing
interest taken in the subject by other bodies opposed to liberal
reform, especially the medical profession, would lead to further
restrictive amendment. Consequently, it advised that on tactical
considerations a more extreme measure than Silkin's Bill should
be introduced since some provisions could then be discarded in
76. See Hansard H.C. 15th June 1966 vol.729 col.1459; 22nd July
1966, vol.732 cols.1067-1166; 2nd June 1967 vol.747 cols.448-536;
29th June 1967 vol.749 cols.895-1102; 13th July 1967 vol.750
cols.1159-1386; 25th Oct. 1967 vol.751 cols.1737-1782; Reports
of Standing Committee F 1966-67 vol.X <cols.3-616; Jan. 18th,
25th; Feb. 1st, 8th, 15th, 22nd; Mar. 1st, 8th, 15th, 16thy
22nd; April 5th; H.L. Debates 19th July 1967 vol.285 cols.258-355
26th July 1967 vol.285 cols.939-1 06; 27th July 1967 Vol.285
cols.1394-1509; Hindell, K. and Simms, M.: op.cit., pp.155-213;
and Appendix 1(8).
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attempts to compromise conflicting opinions. This, it was
hoped, would have the added benefit of allowing ALRA to appear
as a reasonable body.
To this end, ALRA advised Steel that only one medical
opinion was necessary; that there ought to be no stipulation
of the status of that practitioner; that an extended concept
of well-being and thus of health should be introduced into
clause 1(a); that notification should be dropped totally; and
that rape should be reintroduced as a separate ground for
abortion, subject to the safeguards proposed by Lord Silkin it
his Bill. ALRA was willing to compromise on the rape clause
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but only if clause 1(c) were accepted.
ALRA was not, however, the only adviser to Steel at this
time. His drafting committee included his twelve M.P. sponsors
one of Tvhom, Dr. Michael Winstanley, was a general practitioner
and a BMA official (as well as a fellow Liberal M.P.). The
Home Office, which had urged Steel to take up either abortion law
reform or homosexual law reform, was also acting in an advisory
capacity by commenting on his draft Bills. It objected to the
inclusion of the term 'well-being' on the grounds that it -was
too vague and would open the door to abortion on demand; nor did
it change its position regarding the rape clause to which it had
all along been totally opposed. It did, however, favour consideration
of the woman's total environment in assessing risk to her health.
Other suggestions included the necessity for a second opinion;
77. ALRA Private Papers (uncatalogued),
that the operation be performed only by a consultant
gynaecologist employed by a Hospital Board; that the operation
be performed only in an NHS hospital or in 'a place for
the time being approved for the purpose1; and that a system
of notification be devised. Later, it was to advise on the
inclusion of a conscience clause and the exclusion of any
reference to the child which eould be understood as implying that
it would be better for it to be aborted than born except in
cases where it would suffer a degree of deformity as to deprive
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it of reasonable enjoyment of life.
The Bill which Steel presented in the Commons on 15 June
1966 represented a mixture of the advice given to him. The
actual grounds he proposed for therapeutic abortion largely
followed ALRA's views. They were:-
a. That the continuance of the pregnancy would involve
serious risk to the life of or grave injury to the
health, whether physical or mental, of the pregnant
woman whether before, at, or after the birth of the
child; or
b. that there is a substantial risk that if the child were
born it would suffer from such physical or mental
abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped; or
c. that the pregnant woman's capacity as a mother will be
seriously overstrained by the care of a child or of
another child as the case may be; or
78. David Steel's private papers contained in ALRA's private
papers (uncatalogued).
d. that the pregnant woman is a defective or became
pregnant while under the age of sixteen or as
a result of rape.
The Bill contained a safeguard to the rape clause in that
any termination performed on this ground required a certificate,
obtained from a registered medical practitioner consulted
freshly after the alleged assult, to the effect that there was
evidence of a sexual assault. The Bill did not, howeve r, ' nclude
any reference to well-being in clause 1(a) and so Steel Lowed
the advice of the Home Office on this point but disregarded the
suggestion that a sub-clause be added to allow for the woman's
total environment to be included as a factor in the decision
making. Abortions performed on girls under the age of sixteen
were to swquire the written consent of the girl and any
necessary consent of her parent or guardian.
It is in the Bill's safeguarding provisions that Steel
largely ignored ALRA's advice and followed the suggestions of
the medical profession, the Church Assembly Board, and the Home
Office. He included the necessity for two medical opinions
except in the case of emergencies, and also for notification.
He did not go as far however as the RCOG would have wished by
stipulating that the second opinion be that of a consultant
gynaecologist nor did he specify that the practitioner
performing the operation should be a consultant gynaecologist.
He did, howevert accept that operations should be performed only
in NHS hospitals or specially approved places. At this point
no mention was made of a conscience clause and as there was
no specific objections to such provision it is difficult to
understand why. One possible explanation, given that Steel
himself later offered to amend in committee to this effect,
lies in a tactical consideration that the postponing of
its inclusion would have the anticipated consequence of making
him appear reasonable and amenable to compromise.
Steel's Bill obtained a large majority at second r -a-. ng,
223 votes to 29. It is surprising that no attempt was made by
its opponents to talk it out, a tactic which had succeeded on
every other occasion in the Commons. Only guesses can be
hazarded as to why this was so. Of thirty two Catholic M.P.s
only fourteen voted that day but numbers do not affect 'talking
out* so that is not a sufficient explanation in itself. Perhaps
it had become obvious that the pro-reformers were not about to
give up and that some measure of reform was almost inevitable,
so that it was better to try to get as moderate a law as possible.
This view is probably strengthened by the fact that Roy Jenkins
had become Home Secretary and chose to speak in the debate in
his personal capacity. He was very much more in favour of
reform than previous Home Secretaries and was also, in his
ministerial capacity, willing to offer drafting assistance to
Steel. They perhaps also believed that an attempt to talk the
Bill out would be futile since the Speaker could honestly declare
that there had been sufficient time for full debate.
The debate itself followed what had become a predictable
pattern. The pro-reformers argued for an extended
definition of health, the anti-reformers for a narrow
definition; the pro-reformers for the quality of life and
the anti-reformers for the sanctity of life; the pro-reformers
for an interlinked set of factors and the anti-reformers for
the isolation of the rights of the foetus; the pro-reformers
for the hard pressed mother who unselfishly was forced to have
an abortion because of her social conditions and the h ;
reformers against the frivolous, irresponsible, immoral yonig
girl or the selfish 'imsatural' jet setter or career woman.
Between the two extreme stereotypes of the deviant presented
there was one voice, that of Edward Lyons, willing to state that
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his wife had required an abortion. The importance of this lies
in its being an admission that middle class married women did
seek abortions, that 'anyone's wife or daughter' might require one.
In the six months between the second reading and the committee
stages, Steel was subjected to great pressure from all the
pressure groups concerned. He had numerous consultations with
the BMA and the RCOG but not with the RMPA. Both bodies also
negotiated with the Home Office and the Ministry of Health, and
again the RMPA did not. The BMA and RCOG issued their joint report
in which the BMA gave way considerably to the more conservative
RCOG. The Joint Committee of the Law Society and the British Academy
of Forensic Sciences also issued their report which advocated more
79. Hansard H.C. 22nd July 1966, Vol.732, Cols.1088-90.
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moderate reform than that contained in Steel's Bill.
At the same time as resolutions in favour of reform were
being sent to individual M.P.s and to ministries, SPUC
was organising its activities for the committee stages of
the Bill. Steel himself was bombarded on all sides by conflicting
advice and viewpoints but, as a private member, he felt the
Bill was still essentially his whatever his supporters tried to
do. That Steel was no puppet of ALRA's had been demonstr:f ?d
in the form in which he presented his Bill, but this was to
become more evident both before and during the committee stages
of the Bill. Later Steel was to recall that of all the
pressure groups he negotiated with during the history of his
Bill, the medical profession was the least willing to compromise
on its views: 'at times the medical hierarchy came near to
demanding that Parliament accept their word as final'. y
In the event, the Bill changed radically in committee.
Steel himself, against ALRA's advice and very much to their
annoyance, tabled an amendment to extend clause 1(a) to include
reference to the woman's well-being and to allow for her
total environment to be taken into account. Although this
amendment owed its form to the Church Assembly Board's report,
it owed its existence to the pressures of the BMA. Steel was
convinced that the support of the BMA was crucial to both the
passing of the Bill and to its implementation. Ironically, it
SO. Hindell, K. and Simms, M.: op.cit. Foreword by David Steel.
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was one of ALRA's chief medical advisors and one of the
keenest advocates of reform, Sir Dugald Baird, who convinced
Steel that it was both impossible and, from the standpoint of
doctors, wrong to separate social and medical indications for
termination of pregnancy and instead that an extended
definition of health contained in clause 1(a) was preferable
to a separate social clause 1(c). ALRA itself had previously
recommended the inclusion of the proposed amendment's provisions,
but as an addition to clause 1(c) and (d) not as a replacement,
and now Steel, although hoping to have a full discussion in
committee of clause 1(c) and (d) in addition to his amended
clause 1(a), expressed his willingness to drop the more
controversial clauses if his amencWnt was accepted.
Consequently, clause 1(c) and (d) were dropped without a
division. After seven and a half hours devoted to discussion
of the amended clause 1(a) Steel's amendment and a rider
of Lyons was accepted by 18 votes to 9 so that the new clause 1(a)
read:-
(i) That the continuance of the pregnancy would involve
risk to the life of or injury to the physical or
mental health of the pregnant woman or the future
well-being of herself and/or the child or her other
children.
(ii) in determining whether or not there is such a risk of
injury to health or well-being account may be taken of the
patient's total environment actual or reasonably
foreseeable.
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ALRA regarded this as a bitter defeat. That the safeguarding
criteria of •grave* and •serious' risk had been lost did little
to assuage their anger at Steel^s actions; indeed such
criteria had been dropped on the advice of the BMA who
regarded them as too ill-defined. This increased ALRA's
resolve that no other restrictive amendment could be allowed
by way of compromise. They were willing however to allow
a conscience clause in the Bill which laid the burden of
proof in any court action upon the defendant.
The other main issue of the committee stage concerned
the necessity of stipulating the status of the practitioner giving
the second opinion and/or the practitioner performing the
operation. Proponents of liberal reform saw these amendments
as highly restrictive and designed to weaken the effects of
any legislation passed since the suggestion was that only
consultant gynaecologists ought to perform the abortion and
provide the second opinion. Their objections to this lay in the
limited number and uneven distribution of consultant gynaecologists
in the country, and the very conservative attitude adopted by
the K2 and many individual gynaecologists towards abortion. Their
objf I ns were strengthened in that there was no precedent for
stipulating that only certain doctors could perform certain
operations. The amendment was seen as a wrecking one which, if
passed, would severely restrict the numbers of abortions
performed; would lead to intolerable pressure on hospital
facilities; and possibly to delays in performing operations with
increased physical and psychological risks.
Moreover it was argued that abortion techniques were
constantly being advanced and simplified so that they did not
require the considerable skills of consultant gynaecologists.
Certainly the anticipated development of an abortifacient pill
would render such skills superfluous. The advocates of this
ciause viewed abortion differently, seeing it as a potentially
risky operation requiring highly developed surgical skills and
one that was open to abuse for profit by doctors. It was
suggested that consultant gynaecologists were less likely to be
so motivated.
Four and a half hours were spent discussing whether the
second opinion should be that of a consultant gynaecologist.
In the event the pro-reformers successfully argued that the
grounds for abortion often involved assessment of factors
other than gynaecological. Five hours were spent discussing
the amendment that the operation should be carried out only by
a gynaecologist, accepted medical practice although not a legal
requirement. Again this was narrowly defeated.
Two other main issues were settled during the committee
stage. It was agreed that there ought to be a system of
notification to the Chief Medical Officer in the Ministry of
Health and that such notification should be confidential. Secondly,
it was agreed that abortions could only be carried out in NHS
hospitals or in places approved for that purpose by the Ministry
of Health and subject to periodic review.
The committee stages show the BMA as having effected the
loss of clause 1(c) and (d) which ALRA had regarded, 1(c)
especially, as crucial to a liberal reform and the substitution
of a vague clause 1(a) which could then be differentially
interpreted by individual doctors. That a sub-clause was
added allowing for 'total environment considerations' to be
taken into account was not necessarily a victory for ALRA; the
BMA had itself made such a recommendation following the Church
Assembly Board's report. However, ALRA successfully resisted
the views of both the RCOG and the BMA on the status of the
doctors concerned. The RMPA's views did not carry much weight:
'social' grounds were lost although an extended definition of
health accepted. ALRA also failed to halt the notification
clause. The Church Assembly Board's recommendations had been
followed in clause 1(a) but not by the specific inclusion of
clause 1(b) nor its recommendations regarding consultants.
SPUC had failed on both its aims viz. to halt the legislation
outright or to limit the provisions of the Bill solely to
those existing in case law.
Despite the radical changes in committee and by Steel to
pacify the profession the medical hierarchy was still
unsatisfied with the Bill. The BMA continued in its
representations to Steel, the Home Office and the Ministry of
Health. In particular, it objected to the inclusion of 'well-
being' in clause 1(a) which had been recommended by the Church
Assembly Board, the Joint Committee of the Law Society and the
British Academy of Forensic Sciences as well as by the BMA
itself in its early interim report. Xt also wanted a
safeguarding consultant clause in the Bill.
Opponents of Steel*s Bill on the committee had been so
successful in prolonging the committee stages that the Bill
had only one Friday in which to complete its report stage and
third reading. If the Bill could not be completed on one day
then it would drop automatically to the bottom of the list of
private members' Bills which had been through committee and there
would be little likelihood that it could be reconsidered before
the summer recess. As such, it was obvious that Steel and his
reformers needed to persuade the Government to grant extra
time. The Home Office had objected to the inclusion of
•well-being* but had been ignored; Steel now decided to
compromise on this if it would ensure the necessary support
to get a majority vote. In this he was supported by ALRA but
only to the extent that 'total environment* or some similar
provision stayed. Neither Steel nor ALRA was prepared to
compromise on the inclusion of a consultant clause and they
were not asked to do so for the Minister of Health,
Kenneth Robinson,stated that he would not wish to make such
invidious distinctions between doctors.
The substituted amendment was tabled but no
immediate promise of support in the form of extra time. Indeed
it gave his opponents an excellent opportunity to keep the debate
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going and they tabled a large number of amendments
themselves. On the first day of the report stage the debate
was easily continued past 4 p.m. However, by then,
Richard Crossman announced that the Cabinet was prepared to
set aside twelve night hours for further consideration of
the Bill. Opponents still tried to talk the Bill past the
twelve hours; further time was granted to allow a vote, in
which the opponents were defeated. The Bill as it emerged from
the report stage was further amended to suit the wishes of
the medical profession and the Home Office in that reference
to 'well-being of herself and/or the child or her other children'
was dropped in favour of 'health of the pregnant woman or any
existing children of her family'. The 'consultant clause'
amendment was again successfully resisted.
For the first time, a Bill to reform the law regarding
abortion had passed in the Houee of Commons but it had still to
pass the Lords. Hopes, based on the Lords' attitude to Silkin's
Bills, that Steel's Bill would have an easy passage were
unfounded. The reformers had some success when the conscience
clause was altered to provide for emergencies which had been
recommended by the Home Office which also wished the Act to be deferred
for six months to allow regulations to be drawn up. The chief
issues were the 'consultant clause' and clause 1 1(a). A move to
strike out 'the health of any existing children in her family'
which had been suggested to Steel by the Home Office after he had
agreed to leave out 'well-being' met with success which further
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restricted the ambit of the Bill. But what was regarded
as the most serious change was the success of Lord Dilhorne's
amendment requiring that one of the two doctors required to
certify that an abortion was necessary should be an NHS
consultant or should be approved for this purpose by the
Minister of Health.
The effect of this was a creation of a 'crisis1 situation
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by the mass media. One of the reformers, Charles Pannel,
had suggested that if the Lords insisted on its two amendments
then the reformers ought to invoke the Parliament Act. This
was seized upon by the press and described as a constitutional
crisis. Ian Trethowan wrote in The Times:
Just before Parliament packed up for the recess last
week, the House of Lords made two important amendments
to the Bill ... These will go back to the Commons as
soon as Parliament reassembles in late October ... If
they are rejected, the peers will have to decide
whether to stick to their guns. If they do then the
sponsors of the Bill in the Commons threaten to use
the Parliament Act to push it through in its original
state, gije argument might then become "peers against
people".
This seems most unlikely for although there is no specific
limitation in the Act against private members it had only been
invoked previously by governments, and then only rarely, for the
Lords invariably adhere to the convention that they give way to the
Commons. Even given that it was possible, it is also doubtful
whether as a tactic it would have proved effective. A Bill
defeated in the Lords only automatically becomes law after twelve
81. See e.g. The Times 3 August 1967 and 5 August 1967 and account
by Richards, P.G.: Parliament and Conscience, Faber and
Faber, London, 1970, p.lOl.
82. See article by Ian Trethowan: The Times, 3 August 1967.
months if it is approved in its original form by the Commons
in the next parliamentary session; the twelve month delay would
have allowed the supporters of these amendments time to rally
their forces in as effective a manner as the pro-reformers had
so successfully done and, given the narrow split over the
•consultant clause1 in particular, it is just possible that
they would have succeeded. Whether concern over the
constitutionality of their actions did cause them to change their
mind or whether it was the fear of the Government pressing for
sweeping reform of the Lords is impossible to ascertain but when
the Bill came to its report stage on October 23 the amendments
were reversed.
One other important change was made that day. It was
suggested by the Lord Chief Justice that some indication of the
degree of risk to life or health ought to be given. 'Serious*
and 'geave? had already been dropped as being too difficult to
ascertain and too readily open to subjective interpretation. It
was now proposed that a suitable criterion was 'that the risk to
life or health is greater by continuing the pregnancy than by
terminating it'. This was readily accepted but no one seemed to
realise that, statistically, childbirth carried more hazards than
legal abortion when carried out in sanitary conditions by
qualified medical practitioners. Moreover neither was it realised
that with medical advances and simpler abortion techniques this
would almost certainly become so in every case and that this would
lead to an unanticipated consequence viz. that it would be extremely
difficult to prove in legal proceedings that abortion on health
grounds was not preferable to the continuation of the pregnancy
in terras of risk to life or health - the criteria on which
the judgement had to be made. The Abortion Act received the
Royal Assent on October 27 1967, thirty-one years after the
first concerted effort to reform the law.
7. Victory or defeat; whose views prevailed?
None of the interested pressure groups can be said to have
.achieved a total success in 1967 and only one, SPUC, may be
regarded as having suffered a defeat. In assessing these
successes and failures one must consider the passing of an
Abortion Act at all to be ALRA's victory. Its campaign started
when the subject was 'taboo* and the media refused to discuss the
issue. Throughout three decades its activities gradually made
the object of reform seem respectable and desirable. It helped
create a climate of opinion favouring some measure of reform
although not necessarily the reform it itself desired. As a
pressure group it was tactically effective, recognising the need
for a planned campaign, for building up support in the country,
on the backbenches and especially in the Cabinet. It exploited
every opportunity which presented itself and created its own.
It constantly kept the subject alive in Parliament through
parliamentary motions, questions, private members Bills, and
effective lobbying of M.P.s. In particular, it coolly appraised
the activities of the other groups involved, recognised their
interests and sought to counter them.
By contrast, SPUC appeared to have little conception of
political reality. As a pressure group it failed to realise
the effects of other groups' activities. Although it emerged
late on the political scene, it ignored the effect of this
on its own activities for, during the committee stages of
Steel's Bill when ALRA was constantly briefing members on the
instrumental effects of proposed clauses and amendments, SPUC's
main energies were concentrated on raising a petition designed
to persuade the Government to set up a pre-legislation Royal
Commission - a well known stalling device.
It is true that SPUC failed to halt the progress of the Bill
or to restrict its contents to severely limited considerations.
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However, Richards has analysed voting patterns at second and
third reading and has shown that the objectors to the Bill were
able to attract proportionally more support than did the Bill's
sponsors.
Despite ALRA's sophistication as a pressure group and the
fact that a large part of the credit for the existence of an
Abortion Act rests with it, it did not achieve many of its
specific aims. It failed to secure a separate social clause,
specific provision for girls under sixteen, or for rape victims;
its views on notification and the need for a second opinion
were over-ruled. By contrast the BMA and the RCOG did succeed in
preventing separate social grounds for abortion or abortion as an
83. Richards, P.G.: Parliament and Conscience op.cit.. pp.109-111.
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automatic right for girls under sixteen and rape victims.
They secured the need for a second opinion but failed to get
a 'consultant* or 'consultant gynaecologists' clause. They
had advocated notification and a conscience clause and both
measures were approved. Both the Church Assembly Board and
the Joint Committee of the Law Society and the British Academy
of Forensic Sciences had advocated a 'total environment' or
'total circumstances* clause and this was accepted. The RMPA
too had been partially successful in that the Act allowed a
wide concept of health to be employed in decision making, but
had failed in that social conditions were not specifically
recognised nor *well being' accepted.
The outcome of the struggle for abortion legislation
clearly vindicates Lemert's thesis that laws rarely represent
the interests or values of one group but are instead a *patch-work
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monster'. That legislation was passed or rather that there
was a perceived need for legislation of some form can be seen
as a victory for the values propounded by ALRA, but the form
of the legislation shows the influence of other groups, especially
of the medical profession and, in particular, of the BMA. The
powerful position of the BMA as a pressure group has been discussed
earlier and this does help explain its relatively high success
in promoting its interests at the legislative stages. By
comparison the RMPA was a far less established organisation,
lacking the contacts of the BMA and its success was correspondingly
84. Lemert, Edwins op.cit.. p.57.
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less. The power and influence of the various groups can then
be seen to have altered at different stages in the legislative
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process - a fact to which Hubert has drawn our attention.
But pressure group activity as an explanation cf abortion
law reform is inadequate, for determining factors in whether
attempts at legislation succeeded or failed were the rules of
parliamentary procedure and their recognition and skilful handling
by individuals. Pressure groups influence but they do not
necessarily determine. Successive governments refused to adopt
abortion law reform as an issue and indeed, until Roy Jenkins,
successive Home Secretaries denied the need for reform. Until
David Steel secured a high position in the private members'ballot,
opponents of reform successfully used parliamentary procedure
to their advantage. Steel's Bill, given the natural course of
events, would have suffered the same fate but for the
Government's decision to manipulate the procedures to the
advantages of the reformers.
The present unavailability of public records means that one
can only guess why this was done. Was it the cost to the NHS
of cases resulting from illegal abortions, the number of working
days lost due to abortion, the fears of over population and a reduced
standard of living? The ostensible reasons include a decision not
to waste future parliamentary time by debating the same old issue
and that demands for reform had reached such an intensity that
'something had to be done once and for all'.
85. Aubert, C.H.: op.cit.
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Furthermore, the reformers had supporters in key-
influential positions in Parliament and the success of the
Abortion Bill was due in great measure to the benevolence
of Ministers; Roy Jenkins was Home Secretary; Douglas Houghton,
Chairman of the Parliamentary Labour Party; Kenneth Robinson,
Minister of Health; John Silkin, Chief Whip; Richard Crossman,
the Leader of the House. Only two members of the Cabinet,
Lord Longford, Leader of the House of Lords, and Anthony Greenwood,
Minister of Housing, were opposed to the Bill in principle and
only two to the particular contents of this Bill, Ray Gunter,
Minister of Labour and William Ross, Secretary of State for
Scotland. Moreover, the Government had been elected with a
large majority, it was early in its term of office and it is
arguable that tacit support of the Bill would not be an
electoral liability. The assistance of the Cabinet was vital to
the Bill's outcome. When the standing committee dealing with
private members' Bills was slowed down by another Bill, the
Employment Agencies Bill, arrangements were made to move the
Abortion Bill to another committee. Again, when it appeared that
a filibuster was developing at the report stage, extra time was
granted.
Also, the Bill did not seek to reverse an established
principle of social policy despite what its most ardent
opponents maintained. Abortion was a practice of limited
acceptance, legitimised by case law. Few rejected the need for
it when medical reasons were compelling. No one disputed the
prevalence (although disagreements did exist on the extent) of
backstree abortions and few disputed the desirability of reducing
them. The issues tended not to be of principle but of detail, of
how far an existing practice should be permitted and what
safeguards were needed to prevent abuses.
8. Legal changes effected by the 1967 Act
It has become popular with opponents of abortion law
reform to describe the Abortion Act as introducing radical
changes into British law. It is questionable whether this was
so.
The 1967 Act did not repeal the Offences Against the
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Person Act 1861 jpr the Infant Life Preservation Act 1929
which therefore still apply in England and Wales. Instead the
Abortion Act specifies only when an offence does not occur under
sections 58 or 59 of the former Act viz. that a person is not
guilty of an offence under those sections if (a) two registered
medical practitioners are bona fide of the opinion that an abortion
is necessary on the grounds specified in sections 1(1)(a) and
(b) with regard to the indications contained in section 1(2) in
reaching that judgement; (b) the abortion is carried out by a
registered medical practitioner whether or not he is one of the
two mentioned in (a); and (c) subject to certain limitations, the
termination of the pregnancy takes place in a hospital vested in
the Minister of Health or in a place currently approved by him.
Section 5(2) of the 1967 Act explicitly states that anything done
with intent to procure an abortion is unlaivfully done unless
86. 24 and 25 Vict. ch.lOQ.
87. 19 and 20 Geo, V ch.34.
authorised by section 1 of the Act and the offender is liable
to prosecution under the pre-1967 law.
The obvious intention of the 1967 Act is to protect not
only the doctor but any person who takes part in an abortion,
such as theatre or nursing staff and any person who procures ar
supplies instruments or other abortifacients knowing that they
are to be used with 'intent to procure the miscarriage of
any woman'. As Hoggett notes0"' this latter protection seems
unnecessary as it is only a crime under section 59 of the 1861
Act to supply 'unlawfully* and it can scarcely be unlawful to
supply abortifacients for a legal abortion. The effect of
sub-section 2 of section 5 of the 1967 Act was to remove the
common law protection afforded to doctors doing an abortion to
save the life of the mother. Accordingly it was necessary to
make specific provision for emergencies and this was done in
section 1(4). Hoggett questions whether this section is
sufficiently wide to cover all cases where it may be desirable
89
to induce an abortion quickly. He quotes the example of a
woman operated on for the removal of fibroids from the uterus
so that she may have further children. If, during the operation,
it is found that she is pregnant, then in order to complete the
operation, it would be necessary to abort. This would be an
offence as it would fall outside the scope of section 1(4) and
88. Hoggett, A.J.C.: The Abortion Act 1967, (1968) Criminal Law
Review, pp.247-258 at 254 fn.27.
89. Ibid, at 254.
there would be no second opinion to permit it being carried out
on any other ground. Furthermore the operation would also have
to be stopped if it was being performed in other than an NHS
hospital or on premises approved by the Minister of Health.
The 1967 Act followed case law in the provision doctors
must be 'of the opinion formed in good faith* that the requirements
of section 1(1) are satisfied. The opinion need net be
reasonable; no objective criteria were established; the sole
test is that of good faith. The common law was actually less
restrictive than statute law in that it did not lay down a
positive legal requirement that there had to be two medical
opinions although the absence of a concurring opinion, in the
event of criminal proceedings, may have called that good faith
into question. Moreover, under statute lav/, if one medical
practitioner gives an opinion mala fide and another performs the
operation in good faith and with no reason to doubt the
genuineness of the first opinion, then it would seem that the
second practitioner would be guilty of an offence under
section 58 of the 1861 Act.
Statute law further follows case law in that it is not the
patient's situation or circumstances which are important in
themselves but their effect on the life or health of the mother or
of her existing children. It is debatable whether such
considerations extended normal medical practice as opposed to
case law for many doctors, albeit those in favour of reform,
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argue that they always considered a patient's total
circumstances, including living conditions, when assessing
health. However, the grounds for legal abortion were
probably extended by the inclusion of the deformity clause
and reference to the health of existing children, and by
the absence of reference to 'grave' and 'serious* risks to
life or health.
In yet other respects statute law appears more restrictive
than case law. The pregnancy must be terminated by a registered
medical practitioner for it to be legal whereas there was no
requirement in the Bourne case that the aborter had to be so
registered nor was there any requirement of notification nor
stipulation of where the operation could be performed. These
was no positive duty under common law to perform abortions
although there was a risk of being charged with manslaughter by
criminal negligence if the woman died. Similarly there is no
general duty under statute law (under section 4) to perform
abortions, indeed there is a conscience clause but the
exceptions to this clause suggest not merely a duty to save
life but extends to the need to prevent grave permanent injury
to the physical or mental health of a pregnant woman.
The nature, extent, and, indeed, the existence of any
exception to the law prohibiting abortion in Scotland had never
been judicially determined. It is therefore impossible to say with
certainty what effect the 1967 Act had with respect to therapeutic
abortion. As the Infant Life Preservation Act 1929 does not extend
to Scotland, abortions may be permitted under the 1967 Act
9G
at any stage of pregnancy. However, as Gordon notes,
although the destruction cf a viable foetus in utero is
abortion; to remove and then destroy a live foetus is
presumably homicide and unprotected by the Act.
The 1967 Act did not confer any right to an abortion, it only
enables women to seek the advice and consent of two doctors. It
conferred a privilege on doctors to carry out abortions on one
of the grounds set out in the Act, at a place authorised and in
accordance with procedures laid down by the Act. It could perhaps
be argued that what the Act did achieve for women was to make
them more fully aware that under certain circumstances abortion
was legally available and perhaps therefore made them more willing
to approach medical practitioners on this matter. It may also have
had the effect of inducing a belief that abortion is now a more
acceptable solution to unwanted pregnancy or even an alternative
to birth control but it would require a more rigorous investigation
into the effects of law on public opinion to be able to state
whether these possible changes in attitude did in fact occur. The
reformers claimed that the Act freed the medical profession. It
is asserted here that it did not. A certain degree of medical
freedom had existed since the Bourne case. The Act probably
enhanced that freedom but it is certainly not unfettered; the Act
9Q. Gordon, G.H.: The Criminal Law of Scotland, 2nd edn., op.cit..
at p.813, 28—05. ~
merely provided a defence for doctors provided they complied
with its provisions, which are of course open to a large degree
of subjective interpretation. The 1967 Act was not then a
radical measure but a limited reform which in some ways extended
and in some ways restricted the conditions of availability of
legal abortion.
CHAPTER FOUR
HTd- CONTINUING STRUGGLE (1967-74}
1. Introduction
The compromise which emerged as the Abortion Act 1967 was
unstable. The controversy surrounding the Act's passage did not
diminish but was to some extent intensified by SPUC which had
failed in its objective of stopping or limiting the Bill.
Thereafter it continued in existence to press for the Act's
repeal or amendment on highly restrictive lines. This chapter
will examine the nature of this controversy and its outcome.
2. SPUC
(i) The people involved
SFIJC was formed jointly by two people, Elspeth Rhys-Williams
and Alan Smith. Elspeth Rhys-Williams is the grand-daughter of
Elinor Glynn, the Victorian romantic novelist, and daughter of
Dame Juliet Rhys—Williams who founded the National Birthday Trust
Fund, an organisation to promote the dissemination of knowledge
on all aspects of childbearing, and who had been a member of the
Birkett Committee. Alan Smith was a systems analyst and Conservative
Councillor. From its inception Phyllis Bowman, a freelance
journalist, was to play a leading role in the organisation as press
secretary, rally organiser and public speaker. Viscount Barrington
was elected chairman.
None of these people had any children and three were unmarried,
a face to which attention was often drawn by pro-reformers
in attempts to cast doubt upon their right to influence the
lives of women faced with unwanted pregnancies. In the early
years, the executive was dominated by upper and upper middle—class
people with a preponderance of consultant gynaecologists,
including three of those who had been most vociferous in opposition
to Steel's Bill, namely Professor Ian Donald of Glasgow,
Professor James Scott of Leeds and Professor McLure Browne of
the Hammersmith Hospital, London.
In more recent years (since around .1972) three younger
and more radical figures gradually assumed greater influence
within the movement; Nicholas Fogg, sometime Senior Social Worker
with St. Mungo's Community, an organisation working with the
single homeless in London, and once editor of Christian Action,
Austin Williams, a Labour Councillor and Senior Social Worker;
and Paul Cavadino who worked with the National Association for
the Care and Resettlement of Offenders (NACRO).
Of the ordinary membership little can be said.1 The
executive claimed a large following which increased over the years
to around twenty thousand in 1975. It felt that they were branded
2
by the media as hysterical, right-wing reactionaries whereas they
believed they represented a cross-section of working class people.
The movement was strongest hovjever in Merseyside, the west of
Scotland, east London and the north-east of England.
1. SPUC ha» never, unlike ALRA, conducted a survey of its members
and does not welcome any attempt to do so.
2. Interview with Phyllis Bowman.
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Influential names, it was suggested in chapter two, are
important to an organisation's reputation and among SPUC's
most vociferous M.P. supporters were Gbaervative M.P.s
Norman St.John Steves and Jill Knight, and Leo Abse, a Labour
M.P. who resigned from the British Humanist Association over its
policy on abortion said who is on record as stating that:
Surely if you kill a man's child that is the penultimate
step to the ultimate emasculation - to the castration of
the male himself.
Malcolm Muggeridge too has often added his voice to SPUC's
cause. He has stated:
I would like to think that if I were the only man left
in the world who believed in the cause [i.e. repeal of
the Abortion Act 1967] ... I should still find it
worthwhile to stand up and proclaim: man is made in the
image of Godj and to denounce those who see our
generation as just a productive process, to be fostered
or aborted like any other poultry, or pigs or ^angel-wursles -
in accordance with our material circumstances.
It is noteworthy that Alec Bourne, the gynaecologist involved
in the famous case Rex v. Bourne,J also joined SPUC in protest
at the 1967 Act which he perceived as extending the law to cover
more than 'deserving* cases and as allowing social considerations
to influence medical judgement.
(ii) Definition of the social problem
SPUC's definition of the nature of the social problem has
not changed since its inception, stemming as it does from the
belief in the sanctity of a life which begins at conception.. It
believes that the foetus is an actual as opposed to a potential
3. Quoted by Sara Vaughan, Morning Star, 14 N0vember 1973.
4. Muggeridge, Malcolm: Speech given at SPUC Rally 1973
Manchester.
5. [1939] 1 K.B. 687 [l938] 3 All E.R. 615.
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human being,3 ana abortion is then defined as murder. Most
of the pamphlets sent out by SPUC to potential supporters
contain pictures of foetuses and one particular leaflet is
composed of various pictures of the result of abortion when
carried out by the different methods of performing the
operation; dilation and curettage, vacuum aspiration,
7
hysterotomy and saline injection. The human qualities of the
foetus are consistently emphasised in all SPUC literature. It
states that the foetus is:
Mresponsive to pain and touch and cold and sound and light.
He drinks his amniotic fluid, more if it is slightly
sweetened, less if it is given an unpleasant taste. He
gets hiccups and sucks his thumb ... This thgn is the
foetus we know and indeed we each once were.
These leaflets emphasise the human nature of the foetus which
is not regarded as an integral part of the pregnant woman's
body, since it sometimes happens thsit it ha £ a different blood
group' from the mother and it is impossible to have two parts
9
of the same body with different blood groups. Operations to abort
are also not seen as simple operations with few attendant risks
but as carrying with them possibly severe complications with
regard to both physical and mental health.
Given the human nature of the foetus, SPUC believes that it
6. Interviews with Viscount Harrington, Elspeth Rhys-Williams,
Phyllis Bowman, Margaret White, Nicholas Fogg, and Alan Smith,
executive committee members. This belief is stressed in all
SPUC literature.
7. See e.g. SPUC leaflets a. Abortion Kills; b. You paid to
have him killed; c. Life or Death.
8. See SPUC leaflet! Who Imposed their Morality?
9. Interview with Margaret White GP.
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enjoys certain rights the raest important of which is the right to
be born; that right should be denied only in certain
carefully defined circumstances involving considerable danger
to the life or health of the pregnant woman. The Abortion Act
1967 did not limit the performance o.f abortion to such
circumstances and is thus viewed, as a denial of the rights of
the foetus. It is thought that the principle of the sanctity of
life, which is regarded as fundamental to British society, will
be eroded by the 1967 Act and thus the problem is characterised
as being a moral choice between fundamentally opposed values.
SPUC also thinks that abortion will encourage promiscuity which
is seen as a pressing social and moral problem. Later in SFUC•s
development the problem is presented as being of a social
nature, not solely because it involves a choice of the type of
morality society wishes to uphold, but also because the provisions
relating to social considerations will lead to the postponement
of tackling real social problems such as bad housing conditions,
unemployment and low wages.^
The problem is partly defined as medical because of the
risks involved in the operation. It thinks these may not be
immediately obvious but suspects that they include increased
likelihood of spontaneous abortions occurring in subsequent
12
pregnancies. It predicted that the increase in the numbers of
13
abortions performed would lead to lengthier hospital 'waiting lists.
10. SPUC letter to Prime Minister, April 1968.
11. SPUC Manifesto: Abortion or Social Justice, 1973.
12. Wynn, M. and Wynn, A.: Some Consequences of Induced Abortion
to Children Born Subsequently, Foundation for Education and
Research in Childbearing, London, 1973.
13. SPUC Press Release, May 1967.
The medical definition also covers the effects of the
legislation upon the profession which it sees as opposec to
abortion as being a repugnant task contrary to medical ethics
and training. In particular SPUC fears for the promotion
prospects of those practitioners refusing to perform abortions.
Moreover, the exclusion of a *consultent clause* is seen as
permitting wide-spread * racketeering* by less reputable
14
practitioners who will bring the profession into disrepute.
The problem is further defined as legal in that the law
is seen as being (and properly being) the embodiment of society*s
morality and a highly influential educative source of that
morality in helping to create a climate of opinion regarding
the limits of acceptable, and thus expected, social behaviour.
The Abortion Act 1967 is viewed as upholding the morality of
only a small minority of *trendy liberals* and not that of the
majority of people. It is further predicted that this piece of
15
legislation will lead to demands for legalised euthanasia.
What is missing from the early definitions of SPUC is
reference to abortion being a xvoraan's problem. It was not until
much later in this period that this aspect is first emphasised.
Then abortion is presented as an instrument of exploitation of
women occurring in the pressures brought to bear by husbands,
parents and lovers, who present it as the only solution to a
16
personal dilemma instead of one alternative among several. It
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. SPUC Manifestos Abortion or Social Justice, 1973.
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is also feared that women Villi come to see abortion as an
alternative to contraception and thus expose themselves to
17
unnecessary health hazards.
it has been recognised that legislation designed to
alleviate certain social conditions may subsequently give rise
18
to the perception of new social problems, for example SPUC's
increasing emphasis on the exploitation of women, from 1973
19
onwards. Some of the other social problems perceived by SPUC
stein from the implementation of the Act. The increase in the
numbers of abortions performed is viewed with disquiet as
indicating that abortion on demand exists. Regional variation
in abortion rates is also defined as a problem. Variation is
thought to result from the differential interpretation of the
provisions of the Abortion Act 1967 by the medical profession
and is viewed as a measure of the degree of responsibility
brought to their work by different members of the profession.
Areas with high abortion rates are viewed as being areas in
which doctors disregard the intentions cf Parliament and vice
versa.
The upsurge of private abortion referral agencies and
clinics following the passage of the Abortion Act is deprecated.
No distinction is drawn between those with charitable status and
those which are profit making, although it is agreed that British
women do deal mostly with the charitable agencies whereas it is the
17. White, Margaret« Abortions Moral Problems of Today, Church
Literature Association, 1973.
18. Rose, Arnold, M.: Law and The Causation of Social Problems,
Social Problems, vol.16, pp.33-43.
19. The information on which this section is based stems
from interviews with SPUC committee members and the concerns
set out in SPUC bulletins.
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private profit-making clinics which are seen as attracting
foreign women and making headlines such as 'London - Abortion
Capital of the World*.20 One aspect of racketeering which
21
gained such emrhaEis wa® that known as 'taxi-touting'. "
Jill Knight alleged that live foetuses were burned after
22
abortion "" - a claim she later withdrew as being based on
23
misleading evidence. SPUC gave considerable publicity and
credence to the investigations of News of the World reporters,
Michael Litchfield and Sue Kentish who spent several months
examining the operation of the private profit-making and
charitable sectors of the abortion business and who offered
24
their findings as an alternative to that of the Lane Committee.
briefly, the reporters concluded that there existed organised
corruption from the very top to the very bottom of th« medical
profession in the abortion trace, ihey claimed that seven
pregnancy testing centres and clinics diagnosed Michael Litchfield*s
pregnancy. It was alleged that girls were literally coerced into
having abortions, that from the moment they were declared pregnant
by the testing centre they were whisked from one doctor to
another so that they ended up in a state of confusion, ready to
believe that the only solution to their problems was abortion.
20. See e.g. The Sun, 16 December 1972.
21. For an account of the private abortion sector and its practices
see? The Daily Telegraph Magazine, No.370, 20 November 1971.
22. The Guardian, IS July 1969,
23. The Daily Telegraph, 16 July 1969.
24. Although their findings were originally published in serialised
form in the News of the World, for a full account see
Litchfield, M. and Kentish, S.s Babies for Burning, Serpentine
Press, London, 1974.
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It was claimed that barley Street abortionists had told them
that 'the great thing about the Abortion Act is that it has
given us the opportunity to perpetuate Hitler*s progressive
25
thinking'. It was further alleged that one surgeon was
trying to sell the bodies of aborted foetuses to factories for
the making of soap:
Animal fat is a very Valuable commodity. I get sone really
fat babies. It seems a shame to drop there in the
incinerator when they could be pulp to such good use and
also make roe an extra bob or two.*"
The allegations made by Kentish and Litchfield were later largely
27
discredited and the tapes on which the more contentious
allegations were reputedly based were never produced when called
for by the parliamentary Select Committee on the Abortion (Amendment)
Bill in 1975.28
(iii) Stereotype of the deviant
The stereotype of the woman seeking abortion has changed over
the years. At first although SPUC recognised that some women
did seek abortion for 'genuine* reasons, it more often contended
that those who did sc were frivolous and promiscuous. Thus
Marga.ret White wrote:
A mother might perhaps claim that her children always go
winter sporting at Christmas and her confinement in January
would interfere with this to the detriment of their physical
2^* Ibid. Introduction.
26. Speech to SPUC Rally, London, 28 April 1974.
27. See Gillie, G. , Wallace, wi. and Ashdown Sharp, P.: The
Sunday Times, 3C) March 1975.
28. See Spare Rib, No.39 and The Times, 9 July 1975.
or mental health or even that the birth of a third
son would mean taking the other two away from their
expensiv|9public schools and sending them to day
schools.
And again this theme is reiterated:
30
One group to gain will be the promiscuous rich.
That this view was so far removed from that presented by the
media, by public opinion polls and in Parliament at the passage
of the Abortion Act probably did little to help SPUC's cause.
Latterly however, SPUC has changed its perceptioncf the
stereotype deviant to that of a woman needing help; as being
pressurised by families and boyfriends into having abortions
without any real chance to consider all the alternatives; as
being exploited by successive governments who fail to tackle
effectively those social conditions which may lead women to
seek abortion; exploited by unscrupulous referral agencies
and doctors who seek to profit from their misfortune, and
exploited by the liberal press which pushes abortion as a
31
responsible solution. By presenting the woman as a helpless
victim who can be •saved1 by concerted action, it is hoped to
win greater support for SPUC*s cause through making lack of
response to such victims appear void of human concern.
The doctors performing abortions and especially those in the
32
profit-making and charitable sectors are very much 'enemy1 deviants.
They are viewed as totally amoral, devoid of any humanitarian
29. White, Margaret: Having It Taken /way, Mothers Union Publication,
p. 5.
30. Ibid, p.6.
31. See e.g. SPUC Manifesto: Abortion or Social Justice, 1973.
32. See Gusfield, J.R.: Moral Passage: The Symbolic Process in
Pub!ic Designations of Deviance, op.cit.
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instincts and motivated by avarice. They have been equated
with muggers and abortion viewed as socially sanctioned
violence. So they were described by Leo Abse in an address
to a SPUC rally:
No distinction can be made between the violence of the
professional Harley Street abortionist, wresting his
tax free cash payments out of women in ^jLfficulties and
the mugger on the street. The one uses the scalpel
and needle, the other the brick and boot. Both are
psychopathic and both are releasing their aggression on
the innocent: the one releases it upon the unborn child
and a bewildered mother, the mther on the helpless aged.
Both are prepared, without remorse, to kill for money.
The only difference between them is that the teenage
mugger, who is the product of a deprived home, is
sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment whilst the doctor,
who is the product of an expensive State provi^gd medical
education, has the full protection of the law.
(iv) Motivation
Like ALRA, self interest, humanitarianism, moral indignation
and symbolism can be seen in the motivation of SPUC's members
both at this time and in later years. Boredom, however, was not
a motivating factor for, with the possible exception of
Elspeth Rhys-Williams, all its key members had full-time
occupations. Financial self interest was also not a motivating
factor but, given the preponderance of gynaecologists on SPUC's
executive, professional self interest cannot be dismissed.
Given the conviction that the foetus is a human being, there
exists a humanitarian concern for its welfare. The foetus is seen
as being 'innocent', 'defenceless' and in need of special protections:
The most vulnerable and the most innocent being of all
33. Abse, Leo: Speech given at SPUC Rally, 25 March 1973.
is the unborn child ... It cannot be right that in 34
the past five years half a million have been slaughtered.
That humanitarian concern is also shown towards the woman whom
it is thought is endangering her health by having an
abortions
It is not a simple operation, and there can be very
serious after effects. The commonest are probably
haemorrhage and sepsis, but many patients suffer
from severe depression for prolonged periods afterwards.
There is also a humanitarian concern that her real needs are
ignored; that the social conditions giving rise to the need
for abortion are dealt with by abortion rather than at their
source and the woman is then exploited by social manipulators:
At my hospital, the majority of abortion cases are on
grounds related to inadequate housing - a woman living
with her husband and two or three other children in a
couple of rooms and who genuinely feels that she cannot
go on. It is a pretty crazy society which cannot correct
its policy and get its social pr^grities right when
housing is in such a poor state.
Humanitarianism also extends to the nature of society SPUC would
like to sees
Choosing abortion as a solution to social problems would
seem to indicate that certain individuals and groups of
individuals are attempting to maximise their own comforts
by ignoring their own prejudices ... It becomes very
disturbing when we think that this destructive medical
technique may replace love as the shaper of our families and
our society ... We must move towards creating a society in
which material pursuits are not the end of our lives; where
no child is hungry or neglected, where even defective
children are valuable because they call forth our power to
34. White, Margaret: Moral Problems of Today, op.cit.. p.16.
35. Ibid, p.13.
36. Gordon, Harrys SPUC Manifesto op.cit.
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love and serve without reward. Instead of destroying
life, we should destroy the conditions which make
life intolerable. Then every child regardless of
its capabilities or the circumstances o^his birth
could be welcomed, loved and cared for.
Within the motivation of SPUC members, there is a fusion of
moral indignation and symbolism. Given that abortion and killing
are used as inter-changeable terms, there is moral indignation
over the numbers of abortions performed. There is indignation
that profits are made out of human misery and that society
condones such exploitation. This indignation is reflected in
tht titles of some of SPUC's leaflets, for example Need we kill
5QO every day? and You paid to have him killed. It is further
evidenced by the following quotations:
We have every right to look back in anger over the way
the nation has been betrayed and by people whom it
should and did trust. We have a duty to look forward
to clearing up the mess. We shall not be popular. We
shall be abused and ridiculed but we have the deep
satisfaction of being in the right. We bear the
responsibility of our generation to think and act as
human beings aj^g not as hedonists for whom life is no
longer sacred.
and:
... [we shall] testify to our abhorrence at the State -
supported mass murder of babies before they are born - in
this outdoing of Herod who at least waited for them to be
delivered before the knives came out.
The objections that SPUC raises against abortion can be seen in part
as a wider protest against the values it sees in the society




SPUC Leaflet: Life or Death.
SPUC, AGM, Minutes, 7 February 1972.
SPUC Press Release, 30 April 1972.
abortion itseff. It is a symbol of the reaction it experiences
to what it perceives as happening in society and for what it would
like to see happening. Since abortion is viewed as being
contrary to the value of the sanctity of life (which is regarded
as fundamental to a civilised society) then abortion policies
are viewed as having a dehumanising effect on society. 'The
40
Act has caused moral coarsening in our society.* But the
Abortion Act is itself seen as a product of dehumanising trends
41
and the efforts of selfish people. SFUC sees society very
42
much in Lord Devlin's terms in that it is viewed as being founded
upon cherished values and that an attack on one of these values
(viz. the sanctity of life) is a threat to the whole of society.
Any change in the law is then seen as a proposed change in moral
standards and if the law makers are open to manipulation by
moral trendsetters then it may have adverse effects on the
moral climate of society.
SPUC views the period between the late 1950s a&d late 1960s
as a time in which the values of those in power changed rapidly
from benevolence to self interest, from being protective and
43
conservative to being in favour of change for its own sake.
Such changes are seen as consolidating or enhancing the position of
a few 'woolly-minded, trendy, bourgeois, Hampstead liberals'.
Prestige and influence are seen as having moved into the hands of
4°. Ibid.
41. See e.g. SPUC Press Releases; July 1968, April 1972,
May 1973.
42. Devlin, Patrick, Lord: The Enforcement of Morals, Oxford
University Press, London, 1965.
43. The information for this section was obtained by interviews
with Elspeth Rhys-Williams, Phyllis Bowman, Margaret White,
Nicholas Fogg.
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people drawn from the media, the film, pop and literary worlds,
all of whom are seen as rejecting traditional middle-class
values of hard work, deferred gratification and responsibility
to others. The prestige and values of professional people
are thought to have slipped in the 1960s, and abortion law reform
is seen as a symbol of these changes. Whether these perceived
changes actually did occur is open to question; their importance
lies in SFUC's belief that they did and that the morality which
was seen as disappearing required to be re-asserted.
SPUC's philosophy contains a contradiction in that it
discerns its values as being those of the 'ordinary people in
this country' whilst consistently calling upon influential
people 'to set an example*. Indeed its actions can be seen in
part as the approach of a dominant class to those in subordinate
positions, an approach Gusfield has termed 'assimilative reform'
44
characterised by a 'come, you can be like us* attitude. The
objection then, although explicitly stated as being to the
imposition of a morality on ordinary people, is not so much to
that imposition but rather to whose morality and what constitutes
that morality. It has no hesitation in naming those it holds
responsible for the Abortion Act 1967 and thus for the debasing
and trivialising of social values?
I accuse the sponsors of the Act who by their propaganda
made the country believe childbirth was in our times a
dreadful disease ... I accuse David Steel for his assurances
that the Act did not mean abortion on demand when it was
obvious that the strong opposition by his supporters to
reasonable amendments which would have underwritten this
safeguard was specifically designed to ensure abortion on
44. Gusfield, J.R.: Symbolic Crusade, op.cit.. p.3.
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demand. I accuse the mass media for the heavy slanting
of their programmes and articles in favour of the abortion
lobby. The public was given the impression that all
intelligent people were for the Act and that only ignorant
reactionaries and Roman Catholics were against it ... I
accuse those churchmen who in their zeal to cultivate a
•with-it image" have forsaken their Christian heritage
and embraced pagan standards ... As long as the Church
is not accused by the mass media as being reactionary it
would appear to be satisfied ... I accuse my own
profession [i.e. medical] of similar errors to those of
the Church.
The attitudes adopted on abortion are also seen by some
members as a focus on which to argue for a better society, based
on caring and responsibility. It is viewed as a time to choose
between a society which oppresses under the guise of freedom or one
which gives freedom to all, including the unborn child; one in
which each raember cares for every other member by realising
his responsibilities to others and to himself. To decide for the
46
former is seen as being in favour of a 'machine-like* society
in which quality control of human beings is possible through abortion
and euthanasia, in which individuals are processed and programmed
according to the plans of an elite. To decide for the latter is
to allow the great mass of the people to determine and express
their own morality.
(v) Airas4^
When SPUC failed to defeat Steel's Bill, its aim became the
repeal of the Act. However it added a subordinate aim, the modified
one of seeking amending legislation limiting the legally recognised
45. SPUC Leaflet: The Abortion Act: A Social Malady.
46. Rhys-Williams, Elspeth: The Machine Society, Monday World,
Autumn 1969, p.4.
47. See SPUC Leaflet: What do you want to know about SPUC?
grounds for abortion to those it was willing to countenance
in Steel's Bill. To some extent then there was a compromise
of aims, but it has never concealed its absolute goals. As
has been noted earlier, tactical considerations often lead
pressure groups to aim for incremental reform, but this
willingness to compromise has not been very evident in SPUC's
formulation of its aims or the methods it uses to achieve them.
It will be recalled that one of the social problems concerning
SPUC is the abuses that are seen as arising in the private
sector of abortion facilities. However, SPUC has not sought to
make their prohibition or regulation a major short-term goal at
the expense of its longer term considerations.
3. ALRA
(i) Aims
The problem for pressure groups of organisational adaptation
48
to a changing social environment has long been recognised. One
question which remains is what happens to a pressure group after
its goals have been realised fully or partly (or indeed if they
appear to have wholly failed). This obviously depends to some
extent on the changes which are taking place in the larger
environment. If a movement assumes that a static set of
conditions will result as a consequence of its efforts, it will fail
49
in the long run. Its chances of succeeding in the long-term or
48. Clark, B.R.: Organisational Adaptation and Precarious Values:
A Case Study, American Sociological Review, vol.21 (1956),
pp.327-336.
49. Green, Arnold W. and Melnick, Eleanor: What has happened to
the Feminist Movement? in Gouldner, A. (ed.): Studies in
Leadership, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1950, pp.277-302.
of consolidating what success it has attained are increased
if it continues to change in response to any changing conditions
and remains active. This is especially true of groups which
have compromised over their original goals in order to achieve
some measure of reform.
It has been maintained in this study that what ALRA tMfe&gi*}
was very different from what it demanded; that it publicly aimed
at modified goals in the hope of achieving some success on which
to build for further reforms more in line with its long-term
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objectives." A poll ALRA carried out on its ordinary members
shortly after the passage of the Act further evidences this, as
fifty two per cent thought the Abortion Act 1967 did not go far
enough to meet ALRA's aims, whilst one hundred per cent thought
that the Abortion Act 1967 went as far as was politically possible
at that time.
Given the dissatisfaction with the perceived limited nature
of the 1967 Act, it is to be expected that ALRA would remain in
existence to further its long-term aims but also to protect
what it had already won. The formally stated aims of ALRA were
changed, therefore, in September 196 e:
1. To act in both a research and educative capacity by
obtaining and publishing information relevant to abortion
and by encouraging research into all its aspects.
2. To secure such changes in British law as may be
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considered necessary.
50. But see: Hindell, K. and Simms, M.: op.cit.. p.224 where it is
argued that further law reform would have little effect.
51. ALRA Executive Committee Minutes.
52. ALRA Executive Committee Minutes.
It is noteworthy that there was no explicit statement
of intent to press for further extension of the law to allow
abortion on request. The tactical considerations which had
influenced ALRA* s formulation of its aims in the past were
still evident in this period. At a meeting of the executive
in June 1973 it was stated:
The executive committee has iveighed up the politics of
pressing for abortion on request against the immediate
practical value to wonen in this country. There is a
consensus that currently such a policy would not assist
any individual to have a pregnancy terminated and
would probably lose some of the support which we have
long had among the women's organisations and back-bench
M.P.s.
Working towards the realisation of the first aim, ALRA
periodically published research reports setting out abortion
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statistics and commenting upon them. The tone of the comments
was deliberately kept as non-emotive as possible. These reports
were always circulated among M.P.s and all interested bodies,
e.g. medical and women's groups.
(ii) Definition of the social problem
Of the social problems perceived as arising from the
implementation of the 1967 Act, ALRA did not deny that taxi-touting
and some racketeering existed and added its voice to demands
that they ought to be controlled. However, it saw the solution
lying not in legislation but in DHSS administrative action to
53. ALRA Executive Committee Minutes.
54. ALRA Leaflets: Abortion Now series.
require stricter criteria to be applied in granting approval
certificates to nursing homes and also to institute a similar
system for referral agencies. It saw the major problem as
being the large variation of abortion rates in different NHS
regions and, in particular, the low rate in those areas where
consultant gynaecologists had been vociferous opponents of fcii*,
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1967 Act. Its proposed solution was the establishment of
special NHS abortion units and the extension of day-care
facilities. The opponents of abortion law reform were still
56
largely seen to be the Roman Catholic Church acting through
SPUC.
(iii) Tactics
ALRA adopted a defensive rather than offensive role since
it was judged inappropriate on tactical grounds to fight for any
further extension of the law. It provided an information service
to M.P.s and monitored the development of the implementation of
the 1967 Act. The latter was done with a view to stirring the
DHSS to take administrative action. In addition to this, however,
ALRA diversified. It helped set tip a new organisation, the Birth
Control Campaign (BCC), which was financed largely in its early
years by ALRA and involved many of its key personnel.
55. See ALRA Leaflet? Abortion Now.
56. See ALRA Leaflets Briefing 2.
Throughout the parliamentary debates on the 1967 Abortion
Act considerable emphasis was laid on the fact that abortion
was not to be regarded as an acceptable form of birth control;
that it was required only for the 'hard-cases* desperately in
need. Yet BCC was specifically set up because many of its
supporters who had been engaged in family planning work and
abortion law reform recognised that;
It is no longer possible to consider contraception,
sterilisation and abortion separately ... that there
was a need to see all these things as interlinked and
as laethgi^s which are already being used to control
births.
By the time the formation of BCC was publicly announced, abortion,
in ALRA* s view, was no longer needed for *hard-cases* only but
had become *a last resort' when contraception failed to prevent
unwanted pregnancies.3^
Yet another voice was to be added to ALKA's cause with the
setting ip of another organisation, late in 1973, Reason — an
Organisation To Give a Common-Sense Perspective on Abortion.
Again its establishment was largely due to ALRA'5 initiative.
By its diversification, ALRA hoped to create a climate of opinion
in which abortion would be seen not as an alternative but as a
back-up facility to failed contraception. By so doing it was
hoped that it would perhaps influence the attitudes of those
providing contraceptive and abortion facilities and, in the
long-term, make it easier to fight for abortion on request.
57. ALRA Private Papers (uncatalogued).
58. BCC Leaflet: Introduction and Prospectus.
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4. Comparison of SFUC's tactics with those of ALRA
Although SPUC's principal aim is to 'uphold at all times
59
our belief in the sanctity of life1, which requires orientation
to an absolute value in terms of activities, its desire for
legislation imposes tactical considerations upon the group.
It requires acting as a pressure group within the population
in general and on Parliament in particular. A pressure group
works within a particular framework and its success will be
determined to some extent by its ability to come to terms with
this framework.
ALRA continued as a tactically effective pressure group by
its adaptation to and careful manipulation of the rules
governing pressure group activity. It pursued its policy of trying
to keep all its statements as 'reasonable* and as free from
emotive language as possible. It carefully followed the
implementation of the Abortion Act, relying on official sources
such as the Registrar-General's Quarterly Returns on abortion
6Q
figures, and publicised those figures in simplified form. It
did not deny that abuses had occurred as a result of the Act; nor
that some doctors working privately were charging what were thought
to be unduly large fees and urged the General Medical Council (GMC)
to discipline its own members for abuse of financial opportunities
afforded by medical practice. It expressed concern over the
59. See SPUC Leaflets What do you want to know about SPUC?
CO. See e.g. Abortion Now series, available from ALRA.
61. GMC Booklet: Functions, Procedure, and Disciplinary
Jurisdiction, 1970.
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activities of commercial referral agencies and the high fees
charged by them and urged the DHSS to take administrative
action. " ALRA was willing to support any legislation seeking
to curb the activities of such agencies provided the charitable
sector was exempt from such legislation. It thought the latter
necessary to temper the unevenness of availability of abortions
under the NHS, and opined that their fees were reasonable and
that some of the money obtained was used for a loan system to
other patients; and that the charitable agencies provided
counselling services. ALRA constantly urged better NHS provision
of facilities for abortion as the best method of eradicating
most of the abuses arising from the 1967 Act.
ALRA continued to seek the support of other groups including
the CWG, the National Union of Students, the Conservation
Society, the British Humanist Association and the Doctors'
Over-Population Group. In addition it started to initiate
contact with the Women's Movement and with groups such as
Women in Media and the Faweett Society. It was constantly looking
for channels of influence to expand its base as well as consolidating
established links. Also it continued to note changes in
parliamentary opinion, concentrating its efforts on its known
supporters and the 'don't knows' rather than waste its energies
on the die-hard opponents. SPUC's activities were carefully
monitored and countered in every way by ALRA.. Claims about aborted
foetuses being drowned, burned or left to die were carefully pursued
62. For ALRA's views on the 'abuses' see Evidence submitted to the
Lane Committee, ALRA publication, 1972.
as to their accuracy, and denied when possible. It
commissioned further opinion polls which showed support of the
Act.63
By contrast, SPUC did not effectively master pressure group
techniques. Its approach to the passage of the 1967 Act had been
haphazard, concentrating on organising a petition to demonstrate
public opposition to the Bill rather than lobbying and briefing
M.P.s. At the beginning of this period, SPUC made no concentrated
attempt to come to terras with the way pressure groups can act
on Parliament. \ny letter writing was on a haphazard basis
wasting effort either by covering all M.P.s, including known
diehard oppoaents, or by not consistently following up approaches
to known supporters or equivocators. It did not systematically
compile lists of known supporters, known opponents and
potential supporters, nor monitor the way M.P.s voted on
attempts to amend the 1967 Act. Nor did it ascertain the
attitudes of new M.P.s elected at general elections, or balance
the weight of opinion in each session.
Although desiring amending legislation, SPUC made no effort
to draft a suitable Bill. Yet the time between the private members*
ballot and the lodging of Bills is short, drafting is technically
complex and it is advantageous for a pressure group to have a Bill
ready to offer to sympathetic members winning a place in the ballot.
63. See later in this chapter
Indeed, SPUC maintains that it did not lobby those M.P.s
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who did win places in the ballot. SPUC has organised
several lobbies of Parliament in addition to specific lobbying
at the time of various private members* Bills. The most
notable was in N0vember 1973 for the launching of its
manifesto Abortion or Social Justice v/hich many thousands of
people attended.
SPUC did succeed in having several meetings with the DHSS,
but this avenue of influence can be used to greatest effect
by pressure groups of an 'interest* rather than a 'cause' nature
because of the need on the part of the ministry to secure the
compliance of many 'interest' groups. It may only 'take note* of
the views of a 'cause* group and discussions with the latter are
usually of a general nature, with little specific result.
Another method of influencing Parliament, and indeed the
general public, is by shoving a large body of support for a
cause. To this end, mass rallies and demonstrations were held
each year attracting between fifty and one hundred thousand
demonstrators.°5 These demonstrations were augmented by the
laying of wreaths on Holy Innocents Day to commemorate the
*unborn dead*.^
Within the movement itself there was no attempt made to have
any organised division of labour. Decisions appear to have been
64. Interview with Elspeth Rhys-Williams.
65. See e.g. figures quoted by Daily Mail, 3 March 1973.
66. See SPUC Bulletins for full account of these activities.
made by whoever was on hand at the time. information issued
by SPUC was not checked by people specialising in the medical/
social/moral aspects of the problem (as in ALRA) and yet much of
the information disseminated was subject to criticism, not
merely because it was thought emotive but because it was shewn
to be factually inaccurate or backed by inconclusive evidence,
for example Jill Knight's statement that live foetuses were being
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burned, and the Wynn Report "" which, although initially
praised,69 was subjected to later criticism.70 SPUC had no
lobby organiser, letter-writing organiser or speakers panel.
What it did, however, was to organise a nationwide network of
groups, which would have an important influence later.
ALRA has always accused SPUC of being, among other things,
a front for the Roman Catholic Church, which SPUC denies. But
it makes no attempt to dispel the image or accusation by
pollirg its members, whereas ALRA does not hide the fact that
the majority of its members are agnostic/atheistic/humanist.
It is noteworthy that SPUC advertises mainly in the newspapers of
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the Roman Catholic and Anglican Churches. It does not adopt a
systematic policy of trying to get other groups to pass resolutions
supporting its cause. Instead it relies on other groups formed
67. See fn. 23 supra.
68. Wynn, M. and Wynn, A.s op.cit.
69. See e.g. BMJ 3 March 1973.
70. See Potts, D.M.: BMJ 24 March 1973.
71. Interview with Elspeth Rhys-Williams.
211.
specifically to fight the 1967 Abortion Act, e.g. Life and
72
Let-Live with which? albeit sporadically, it works. Among
groups with wider interests than abortion, SPUC receives
support from the Anglican Mothers* Union (of which
Margaret White, a SPUC committee member, is Vice Chairman),
the Festival of Light and the National Viewers* and
Listeners* Association#
Pressure groups often achieve some of their objectives by
corapromising on their long term goals and using what modicum
of success they achieve on a limited front to further long terra
aims. SPUC however appears unwilling to compromise. The language
SPUC vises appears emotion charged; the equation of doctors who
perform abortions on grounds other than risk to life with
muggers; the accusations levied at those held responsible for
the Act; the characteristics ascribed them as being, not misguided,
but inhumane manipulators, probably makes compromise difficult
and perhaps leads to a hardening of attitudes.
5. The mass media
One important source of influence in creating a *cliraate of
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opinion* is the media. Newspapers have a built-in need to
generate news and much of what finds its way into the press is of
a sensational nature. On the abortion issue, the popular dailies
particularly concentrated on touting, disreputable clinics and the
72. Ibid.
73. For a discussion of the role and influence of the mass media
see Cohen, S. and Young, J.? The Manufacture of News,
Constable, London, 1973.
horror of the operation. In 1971 the Dally Mirror invited
its readers to send them their personal experience of
abortion. It concluded, under the headline 'The shattering
truth*:
A scream of heartbreaking stories ... In almost every
case the "message" delivered, the experience described
was a tragic one ... The overwheling impression from
these lettt^js is that people are appalled by this
operation.
The Daily Express reported, that many hundreds of foreign women
75
were invading London seeking abortions, and the general
impression gained was that London was the abortion capital of
76
the world. The Evening Standard revealed the taxi-touting
prevalent at London Airport; touts were reputed to earn up to
£2,500 a week. Such stories undoubtedly had an effect on the
climate of opinion. Demands were made for an inquiry into the
working of the 1967 Act both in Parliament and by outside
bodies e.g. the main churches called for an inquiry which was
set up in 1971.7'
6. Public opinion
It is notoriously difficult to assess public opinion over any
issue. Opinion polls give some indication of it, and between 1967
and 1973 several polls were conducted which allow for limited
comparison of any change in opinion since not all polls were
74. See Daily Mirror 29 March 1971.
75. Daily Express 2 July 1969.
76. Evening Standard 7 January 1970.
77. Lane Committee c>n the Working of the Abortion Act.
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carried out by the same organisation and both the questions
asked and the methods used varied. Subject to their
limitations, however, they are useful given the lack of other
evidence.
In 1970 ALRA commissioned NOP to undertake a survej/ of
the general public*s attitudes to abortion. The survey was
repeated in 1972 and 1973 and little change was observed.
Question 1. Do you think the Act is right or wrong to allow legal
abortion if the pregnancy may damage the pregnant 'woman's physical
or mental health taking account of her circumstances?
Percentage of Public Opinion
1970 1973 1973
Right 71 72 68
Wrong 23 21 23
Don't Know 6 7 9
Question 2. Do you think the Act is right or wrong to allow legal
abortion if the pregnancy may damage the health of her existing
family ...
Percentage of Public Opinion
1970 1972 1973
Right 61 59 54
Wrong 29 30 31
Don't Know io 11 15
Question 3. Do you think the Act is right or wrong to allow
legal abortion if there is substantial risk that the child would
be born seriously deformed.
Percentage of Public Opinion
1970 1972 1973
Right 77 78 75
Wrong 16 15 16
Don't Know 7 7 9
Question 4. Do you think the law should bes
Percentage of Public Opinion
1970 1972 1973
Left as it is or
changed to make it
easier. 55 47 48
Changed to make it
more difficult. 38 44 35
Don't Know 7 io 17
Other surveys also indicated that the majority of the general
public supported the 1967 Act. In 1971 the Daily Express
commissioned Harris Poll to conduct a survey. This showed that
86 per cent were in favour of abortion when the mother was
likely to become either physically or mentally ill; 81 per cent
were in favour of abortion where there was risk of deformity in
the child if born; 15 per cent were in favour of abortion at
the woman*s request and only 17 per cent thought abortion was
too early available. An Opinion Research Centre Poll for the
Evening Standard in 1970 included one question relating to
the availability of abortion which showed that 20 per cent of
men and 15 per cent of women thought abortion should be
available to anyone who wanted it and only 6 per cent of men
and 9 per cent of women thought abortion should never be
legal.
In a Gallup survey for SPUC in 1973, 54 per cent of men felt
abortion should be allowed in particular(unspecified)
circumstances and 60 per cent of women shared this view.
Eleven per cent of men and 16 per cent of women thought abortion
should never be legal and 20 per cent of men and 15 per cent of
women thought it should be available on demand.
Subject to the limitations of such polls, the majority of
public opinion did appear to be in support of the 1967 Abortion
Act.
7. The churches
In 1970, The British Council of Churches* Advisory Group on
Sex, Marriage and the Family produced a report on the working of
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the Abortion Act 1967. This report concluded that although it
was too soon to assess responsibly or to make firm judgements
on the effects of the implementation of the Act, nevertheless it
was essential to assemble and examine information on which an
informed assessment could be made. It recommended that an
independent enquiry should be instigated in order to review the
78. Report of the British Council of Churches: The Abortion
Act 1967-69: A Factual Review, 1970.
working of the 1967 abortion legislation. This call for an
independent enquiry was to be upheld by all the major
denominations, including the Church of Scotland and the
Methodist Church.
By 1974, the Church of England was of the view that 'the
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Abortion Act had gone badly wrong'. The General Synod of that
year passed a motion presented by the Bishop of Wakefield calling
on the Government to modify the law, in such a way as to
recognise the interests of both mother and child, to eliminate
abuses and fully protect all medical and nursing staff claiming
conscientious objection.80
In the debate, the Bishop of Wakefield explained his
motivation for framing the motion:
I would venture the opinion that abortion is a kind
of murder ... The fact that it is legal does not make
it moral. Nothing could indicate more surely the
decline of Christian belief and standards in this
country than the legalising of abortion. It is a
very short step from abortion to euthanasia and J<j> the
liquidation of those who are a social burden ...
He urged the creation of NHS abortion units to remove abortion
from the private sector of medicine and that all abortions after
the twelfth week of pregnancy should be prohibited.
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In 1974, too, the Vatican issued a sternly worded declaration
which reiterated a total ban on abortion. The document states that
79. The Times, 20 February 1974
SO. Report of Proceedings of General Synod, vol.5, No.l,
February 1974.
81. Ibid.
82. Declaration on Procured Abortion, 1974.
the first right of every human being is its life:
He has other goods and some are more precious, but
this one is fundamental - the condition of all the
others. Hence it must be protected above all others.
It does not belong to society, nor does it belong
to public authority in any form toQ^ecognise this
right for some and not for others.
The committee established by the Roman Catholic Church in the
United Kingdom to examine abortion with a view to recommending
84
changes in the law took as their starting point the fact that
legalised abortion (under certain defined circumstances) was
part of the fabric of contemporary British society and it was
as such the issue would be examined rather than as defined
in Catholic teaching. It recommended that the law required
amendment in order to prevent abortion on demand. This would
be best achieved by requiring that one of the two consenting
doctors should be a consultant gynaecologist. It further
recommended that all abortions be prohibited after the twelfth
week of pregnancy.
The medical profession
The medical profession did not argue so intensely over
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abortion as it had done immediately prior to 1967, but
nevertheless produced a number of substantial reports in response
83. See report in The Times, 26 November 1974.
84. See The Tablet, 5 February 1972.
85. As evidenced by the comparative lack of correspondence in the
medical journals during this period.
to the calls for an independent enquiry which led to the
setting up of the Lane Committee on the Working of the Abortion
Act86 and the subsequent need for submission of evidence to
that committee.
(i) The BMA
A leading article in the British Medical Journal in 1969
described the 1967 Act as a piece of:
Hasty legislation combined with lack of agreement both
in the medical profession and among the general public
during formulation [which] has resulted in aQBjore
than usually imperfect piece of legislation.
The same feeling led to a resolution being passed at the July 1969
BMA Annual Representative Meeting which expressed concern over the
implementation of the Act and recommended that the Association
itself set up a committee to consider the Act's effects and
workings.
The committee was set up under the chairmanship of Professor
Ian Donald, who had been an active opponent of the 1967 Abortion
Act and who was a committee member of SFUC. Professor Donald
is on record as stating that the 1967 Act was 'a doctrine of
hideous atheistic expediency' and that the present era was one
88
of * sex-sodden prurience*. His appointment caused such disquiet
that the BMA admitted that complaints had been received from its
members and that the names of other members of the committee were
being kept secret.89
86. Report of the Committee on the Working of The Abortion Act,
Cmnd.5579,vols. 1, 11 and 111, HMSO, 1974. Hereinafter the
report will be referred to as 'Lane' or the 'Lane Committee'.
87. 1969 BMJ Vol.1 p.199.
88. Quoted in New Humanist, May 1972.
89. The Daily Telegraph, 26 January 1970.
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The report of this committee called for the setting up
of an independent enquiry into the workings of the Act. It
believed the public expected abortion on demand, contrary to the
declared intention of Parliament, and therefore the matter warranted
full examination as did the existing regional variation in abortion
rates. The report further recommended that there ought to be
more adequate provision of contraceptive services and an
improvement of NHS facilities for abortion, by the establishment
of special clinics within the NHS framework.
91
The BMA evidence to the Lane Committee was published in 1972.
Again the fear was expressed that the lack of clarity in the 1967
Act led the public to expect abortion on demand. It was hoped
that the committee would stress that that had never been
Parliament's intention. Furthermore the BMA recommended:
a. That comprehensive contraceptive services be provided
by the NHS.
b. That more help be given to unmarried mothers to stay at
work while raising children.
c. That more provision be made within the NHS so that every
woman with proper grounds for abortion under the terms of the
Act should be able to obtain it in an NHS hospital.
d. That termination of pregnancy should be undertaken at the
earliest possible stage, preferably by the twelfth week and
that it should be considered normal practice for a gynaecologist
to refuse termination after the twelfth week.
90. BMJ (Supplement), 8 May 1971.
91. BMJ (Supplement), 29 January 1972 and (Supplement) May 1972.
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e. That better regional provision be made of NHS
facilities i.e. better and more accommodation and staff and
that the idea of special abortion units within hospitals
but geographically sited close to gynaecological departments
be given careful consideration.
f. That there should be sufficient numbers of gsmaecologists
in each area to terminate pregnancies.
g. That prospective studies be set up into the long term
general and reproductive health of women and o" the community;
on the effects of women not having an abortion that has been
requested and on the unwanted children born as a result of
refusal to terminate.
(ii) The RCOG
In the controversy surrounding the passage of the 1967 Abortion
Act, the RCOG had been one of the strongest bodies in voicing its
objections to the Act and repeatedly suggested that its advice
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was of the greatest, if not the only, relevance. It is hardly
surprising therefore that it immediately established a committee
to enquire into the first years' working of the Act.
The themes which had underlined the RCOG position prior to
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the passage of the 1967 Act are further evident in this report,
in which the hostility of the RCOG to the Act is evident:
92. See chapter 3 supra.
93. See FJMJ 30 May 1970, pp.529-535.
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When the Bill which resulted in the Abortion Act 1967
was under discussion the [RCOG] ... repeatedly gave
advice as to the form and likely consequences of
the proposed legislation. Such advice, based on
first-hand expert knowledge, was accepted only in
part ... [We] insisted that induction of abortion is
indicated only where, in the opinion of medical
attendants, it is less dangerous to physical and
mental heexlth than is continuation of pregnancy.
Abortion on social grounds ALONE, or on demand, was
regarded as unethical and also undesirable ...
Had our advice been heeded many of the abuses which
now worrying its sponsors would have been prevented.
The RCOG circulated a questionnaire to all NHS consultant
obstetricians and gynaecologists in England and Wales, which
elicited a response rate of SO per cent. Among its more important
findings were that only 6 per cent of consultants had a conscientious
objection to all abortion; that 58 per cent wished the 1967 Act
to be amended restrictively whereas only 2 per cent wished it to
be amended to extend the grounds on which legal abortion is
available; and that only 28 per cent were happy with the provisions
of the 1967 Act as they stood. By far the greatest number of
those seeking more restrictive amendments wished those to cover
provisions allowing consideration of the health of existing children
and social conditions alone (what is meant by social conditions
alone is unclear since there is no provision within the 1967
Abortion Act which allows 'social conditions alone* to constitute
sufficient grounds for legal termination). All this, taken
together, meant 47 per cent objected to socio-economic
94. Ibid.
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considerations being part of the decision to terminate; an
overwhelming majority (92 per cent) were against abortion
on demand and 80 per cent were in favour of the operation being
performed only by or under the direction of an NHS consultant
gynaecologist; although 48 per cent thought special aborts,on
units should be set up within the NHS it is perhaps
significant that only 21 per cent were prepared to xvork in
such units; 58 per cent thought that an increase in abortions
performed would lead to a drop in recruitment to the
speciality.
Running through the commentary of the report is a concern for
the effect of the 1967 Act on the practice of gynaecology.
Gynaecologists were not thought to have altered their views but
were subject to increased demand for legal abortion and this was
the only reason for the rise in numbers of abortions performed.
This was thought likely to lead to a drop in recruitment to
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the speciality which would have serious consequences. Again
the RCOG expressed the view that the operation was neither simple
nor without attendant risks and that only a consultant
gynaecologist was in a position to judge its necessity:
... only in this way can women escape from risks the
presence of which they themselves cannot judge. Indeed
only an experienced gynaecologist can properly decide
whether it is more dangerous in any case f^g pregnancy
to continue than it is to induce abortion.
95. Ibid, at 532.
96. Ibid, at 533.
Although 50 per cent thought therapeutic abortions should not
be allowed except in NHS hospitals, nevertheless the RCOG did
not want to see the closure of 'approved places*:
Gynaecologists are afraid that if the "approved places"
were closed they and their departments would be overwhelmed
with demands for abortion on sgj^ial grounds alone, they
wish to protect themselves ...
The real problem however was seen as being one of abortion on
demand:
... the legislators, the Press, and a small group of
agitators have, ever since the enactment, fostered the
idea that it provides for abortion on demand, or for
social and economic reasons alone ...
When the Abortion Bill was under discussion its advocates
repeatedly assured the Houses of Farliaraent that abortion
on demand was not their object. Had they done otherwise
it is unlikely the Bill would have become law. Once the
Bill was passed, however, there had been a persistent and
intense campaign which has had the effect of making the
public believe that any woman has a right to have a
pregnancy terminated if she so wishes, and that gynaecologists
have a duty to apply their surgical skills when told and
irrespective of their expert judgement ...
[This] is certainly causing disquiet among gynaecologists.98
The desire to avoid degradation of status is still evident:
Obstetricians and gynaecologists are not to be regarded
as technicians ...
Finally the RCOG report recommended that:
The time has come for the legislators to decide whether
they and the community they represent really want abortion
on demand. If they do not, this should be made clear ... If
they do they should say so, modify the Act and make
provisions which dj^pot involve coercion of unwilling
gynaecologists ...
97. Ibid.
98. Ibid, at 534.
99. Ibid, at 535.
IOC). Ibid.
These themes were also evident in the RCOG's submission101 to
the Lane Committee, especially the demand for Parliament to
102
decide what was actually wanted with respect to abortion.
This report went further however in recommending positive
103
measures to curb prevalent abuses. These were:
a. That one of the two doctors signing the certificate be
the person undertaking the operation.
b. That although the closure of the approved places would
go far to stop abuse, unless the present law is strictly
interpreted this would cause chaos in NHS hospitals so
it would be necessary if there was to be abortion on
request, to replace these approved places by newly created
abortion units.
c. That residency clauses be introduced to stop foreign
women coming to Rritian for abortions.
d. That notification should be tightened up? post-operative
care should be made compulsory longer and that further
reports should be made.
<?. That there be further limitation of the duration of
pregnancy beyond which abortion can be induced.
(iii) The Royal College of Psychiatrists (RCOP)
The branch of the medical profession most in favour of reform
of the law at the time of the passage of the 1967 Abortion Act
104
was the psychiatry speciality. During this period,
101. See BMJ 29 April 1972, p.303.
102. See report in The Times, 28 April 1972.
1C3. BMJ, 29 April 1972 p.303.
104. See chapter 3 supra.
psychiatrists '.vera again the most favourably disposed to
the 1967 Act as is evidenced by their submission to the Lane
105
Committee. The RCOP strongly supported the Act which
it thought 'had worked well'. However, it did think that
certain abuses had arisen resulting from inadequate provision
of NHS facilities and regional variation in abortion rates and
advocated special NHS abortion units to help eradicate these
abuses. It took the view that abortion, despite its unpleasantness,
was currently necessary for the mental health of the nation.
Underlying this view was the belief that:
... as a nation we are now very^ggch less concerned to
promote increased reproduction.
and that:
A major aim of social policy should be to ensure that
every child is wanted and can enjoy a loving and secure
environment for his upbringing ... fw^ich] is an essential
requirement for good mental health.
The report went even further in almost recommending abortion on
demand:
There is an increasing body of opinion amongst psychiatrists
as well as amongst some CPs that there should be abortion
on demand, at least in the first three months of pregnancy
and that more discrimination should be reserved for patients
in the second aygQthird trimesters for whom abortion is
more difficult.
(iv) Opinion polls of general practitioners (GPs)
During this period a number of opinion polls were carried out
which showed that the majority of GPs tended to favour the




provisions of the 1967 Act or further amendment to make
abortion easier to obtain.
The first of these polls was undertaken by ALRA in 1969
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of six sample areas in England and Wales: Cardiff, Leeds,
south-east London, Manchester, Oxford, Cumberland and Westmorland.
Its findings suggest that 64 per cent of GPs thought the Act had
assisted them to help their patients and that only 19 per cent
thought the 'conscience clause* was inadequate in safeguarding
doctors with religious or ethical objections to abortion.
NOP conducted three surveys of GP's attitudes during this
period. Their results were:-
Question: The Abortion Act has been in operation since
April 1968. Having regard to its essential provisions, do
you think that the law should bet-











difficult 28% 26% 23%
Undecided 691 4% 4%
A further study was conducted in 1974 by the Gallup organisation
for the medical newspaper, Doctor.**^ This study was however
concerned primarily with family planning so that the question
relating to abortion is not strictly comparable with the other
1Q9. See ALRA Annual Report, 1969-70.
HO. See Doctor, 28 November 1974, vol.4 No.47.
227. ^
surveys. Nevertheless it is noteworthy that *three out of
every four GPs approved of abortion ©n social grounds whether
for a schoolgirl who had planned a career before marriage or
for a married woman with four children and limited financial
means'/11 Nevertheless 20 per cent of the GPs interviewed
said abortion on social grounds was rarely or never available
in their area and more than a third said it was available
only occasionally. This was interpreted to mean that 3 out
of every 5 GPs were finding it difficult to obtain help for
a woman who might have a reasonable case for termination of
112
pregnancy.~
9. Legislative attempts to amend the 1967 Abortion Act
During this period four M.P. s tried unsuccessfully to
introduce legislation in Parliament to amend the 1967 Act.
(i) Norman St.John Stevas' Bill 1969
The Abortion Act 1967 had been in operation for less than
ten months when on 16 February 1959 a motion was presented in
Parliament by a Conservative M.P., Norman St.John Stevas, seeking
leave to bring in a Bill to improve the law governing abortion and
the 'status and rights of the medical profession in relation
113
thereto*. His objections appear to have been three-fold;
111. See report in The Times, 28 November 1974.
112. Ibid.
112. See Catholic Herald, 24 January 1969 and The Universe, 10
July 1969.
(a) to destroy the medico-social clause which
legalises abortion in the interests of the health
of existing children of the family;
vb) to strengthen the conscience clause; and
(c) to provide for a 6 month residential qualification
to prevent foreign women entering Britain to obtain abortion.
He was supported by SPDC, the bMA and the RCOG. When he
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introduced his Bill under the Ten Minute Rule on 15 July 1969,
St.John Stevas outlined only one amendment which had been the
source of much bitter debate during the passage of the 1967
Act viz. the proposal that one of the two certifying opinions
should be that of an NHS consultant gynaecologist or a doctor
of equivalent status approved by the Minister of Health from
panels submitted by the professional medical bodies. This,
he explained, would rectify many of the abuses which were growing
out of the Act. In reply, David Steel deplored the emotional
approach of the anti-reformers and described St.John Stevas*
proposed amendments as a •thoroughly regressive measure1. The
real problem was regional variation within the NHS, especially
the restrictive practices in centres like Birmingham which
themselves stimulated the growth of private abortion clinics.
The House divided and St.John Stevas was refused leave to
introduce his Bill, albeit by a very narrow raaiority of 21Q votes
to 199.
(ii) Bryant Godman Irvine's Bill 197Q
The very narrow defeat of St.John Stevas• Bill encouraged those
114. Hansard, H.C. vol.787, cols.411-424, 15 July 1969.
opposed to the terras of the 1967 Act to try again in the next
session. Bryant Godiaan Irvine, & Conservative J".P., had drawn
ninth place in the private members' ballot so the chances of
his Bill becoming law were not particularly favourable. His
Bill, the Abortion Law(Reforra) Bill, was similar to that
introduced previously by St.John Stevas. He wished one of the
two certifying doctors to be an NHS consultant gynaecologist or
a medical practitioner of equivalent status approved for the
purpose of the Act by the Secretary of State for Health and
Social Services. Again SFHC, the BMA and the RCOG supported
115
this Bill which had 5ts second reading on 13 February 1970.
Goctean Irvine professed to want only to safeguard the
iinterests of the health of the women concerned. He was certain
that in cases where consultants had conscientious objections
they were most meticulous in seeing that those cases wore handed
over to people ivho held different views. St.John Stevas
expressed the view that one effect of the Bill could be to reduce
the number of abortions performed, a result he personally would
welcome. Dr. John Punwoody, the Government's spokesman,
referred to the Bill as misdirected because the Abrotion Act
was working reasonably well. He admitted however that a very
small number of doctors in the private sector were 'doing things
which could not be approved of* but that these abuses could and
would be checked by administrative action which would take the
form, for example, of increased inspection of approved places and
115. Hansard, H.C. vol.795, cols.1653-1703,13 February 1970 and
Appendix 1(10) for text of Bill.
their facilities in relation to numbers of patients, and the
issue of approval certificates on an annual basis with no
automatic renewal. Douglas Houghton, defended the 1967 Act
making a plea for a 'cease-fire' of the 'sniping' at the
Abortion Act in order to give it a fair chance of working.
It being almost four o'clock, he asked the House to register
a vote on the Bill but a Conservative M.P., Sir Stephen McAdden,
an opponent of the 1967 Act, rose to speak, thus making this
impossible. An attempt to move the closure by a Labour M.P. and
supporter of the 1967 Act, Peter Jackson, failed; the Speaker
refused to accept it as discussion had lasted less than three
hours, and the debate was adjourned.
It seems probable that the supporters of the Bill
deliberately 'talked-out' the Bill in order to avoid defeat
given the large number of pro-reformers in the House on that
day and the Government's attitude. Both Leo Abse and
St.John Stevas, noted supporters of restrictive abortion law,
had spoken at length on the preceding Bill (on death-bed
marriages); and it was a known opponent of the 1967 Act who was
responsible for preventing a vote. The Bill was later dropped
by its proposers.
(iii) John Hunt's Bill 1972
Another Conservative M.P., John Hunt, made a further amending
attempt when he introduced the Medical Services (Referral) Bill
on 18 February 1972.116 This Bill differed considerably from its
116. Hansard, H.C. vol.827, col.460, 18 February 1972. See Appendix
1(11) for text of Bill.
immediate predecessors in that it did not seek to amend the
criteria for legal abortion as contained in the 1967 Abortion
Act but sought to curb lay profiteering by preventing commercial
abortion agencies from taking fees from women seeking abortion.
The charitable sector was exempt from the terras of the Bill
which read:
1. Subject to the provisions of the next following
sub-section, it shall be an offence for any person to
charge or to seek to charge a fee for or in connection
with referring or recommending a person to a medical
practitioner, hospital, nursing home or other
establishment offering medical services.
2. The provisions of the foregoing sub-section shall
not apply to a referral or recommendation made by a
registered medical practitioner or by an accredited
official or representative of a charitable body.
This Bill, although not having the explicit support of ALRA,
nevertheless did not meet with that body's opposition and was
supported by the BMA, the Medical Practitioners Union (MPU) and
David Steel. To SPUC however the Bill was seen as falling
far short of its objectives, as 'only scraping the surface of
117
the abuses'. There is some evidence that the Government was
not willing to support it, not because of objections to its
contents, but because it was deemed inappropriate to undertake
1XB
legislation whilst the Lane Committee was sitting. In the
event, Hunt's Bill proceeded no further as he had drawn only a
very low place in the private members' ballot, twelfth, and there
proved to be insufficient parliamentary time.
117. SPUC Press Release, 24 January 1972.
118. ALRA Private Papers (uncatalogued).
(iv) Michael Grvlls' Billfs) 1974
The last attempt during this period to amend the law
was by another Conservative M.P., Michael Grylls, who drew a
relatively high place in the private members' ballot, fifth,
and was thus in a relatively strong position to see his Bill
become law. Originally Grylls intended studying the report
of the Lane Committee, which was expected by the end of 1973,
119
before framing his proposed legislation. In the event,
the Lane Committee was not ready to report and Grylls decided
that:
The issue is such an emotive one that I think it
better not to get involved in the medical side at
all, but to concentrate on the rackets and
exploitation that are going on. It is this highly
unattractive financial side that concerns me ...
People should not be making vast profits out of a
woman's misfortune, and I would think there is room
for expansion of the charitable pregnancy services.
The Act is law and I recognise the social need for
it, although I dislike it. It safeguard women
from the backstree abortionist.
The Abortion (Amendment) Bill had wide approval as is evidenced
by the diverse character of Grylls* parliamentary supporters,
amongst whom were Leo Abse and William Deedes, both opponents
of the 1967 Act who often gave their voice to SPUC's cause, and
David Steel and Douglas Houghton, both supporters of the 1967 Act.
Government support was also anticipated. Grylls is on record
as saying that from contacts he had with the DHSS 'the indications
119. The Times, 20 November 1973.
120. The Times, 17 December 1973.
233.
are that they will be pleased to see this sort of measure
121
passed'. ALRA saw the Bill as not threatening the 1967
Act and therefore encouraged Grylls in his attempt to curb
profiteering, provided that the charitable sector was
122
exempt from any provisions he might formulate. SPUC was
less sure of the line it wished to take; there was a real
chance of amendment given Grylls' relatively high place in
the ballot, so that an opportunity existed for real change,
provided Grylls could be persuaded to formulate his proposals
123
on much stricter lines than he had so far announced. In the
event, SPUC failed to persuade Grylls to its viewpoint and
condemned the Bill as 'providing a respectable veneer to abortion
v. i . 124brokers'.
The main provisions of the Bill formulated by Grylls read:
1. No person other than -
a. a registered medical practitioner; or
b. a person for the time being approved for the purposes
of this section by the Secretary of State shall give to
any other person any advice or information to which this
section applies in circumstances in which he receives or
expects payment (whether from the person to whom the
advice or information is given or from any other person,
and whether under an agreement or otherwise) for doing
so, or for providing in connection with giving that
advice or information, any other advice, information,
service, facility, or article.
121. The Times, 2 February 1974.
122. ALRA Private Papers (uncatalogued).
123. SPUC Private Papers (uncatalogued).
124. SPUC Bulletin No.14.
2. This section applies to any advice or information
(whether given to the woman to whose circumstances it
relates or to any other person) -
a. indicating a person to whom a woman may apply
for the purpose of obtaining, or fulfilling the
requirements for obtaining, treatment for the
termination of pregnancy in accordance with the
Abortion Act 1967;
b. indicating a hospital or place in which such
treatment may be provided; or
c. indicating a person from whom advice or information
to be effect mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b) above
may be obtained.
However, in the event Grylls' Bill did not progress further
for Parliament was dissolved, a general election called and the
Bill therefore fell.
In the next parliamentary session, on 8 May 1974, Grylls
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reintroduced the Bill under the Ten Minute Rule. He explained
that he thought his Bill would appeal to both sides in the abortion
controversy for it concerned only one aspect of the workings of
the 1967 Act on which there was widespread disquiet viz. the scandals
arising from referral agencies and advisory bureaux through which
unscrupulous profiteers flourished and from taxi touting. The
125. See Hansard, H.C. vol.873, cols.403-6 and col.853; vol.874,
col.2084; vol.875, cols.947-8, and Appendix 1 (12).
purpose of the Bill was to establish a method of licensing
agencies and bureaux on lines similar to those already
existing for abortion clinics. He was granted leave to
introduce the Bill which, such was the support in the House,
was given an unopposed second reading, an important occurrence
and a relatively unusual one, for a single cry of 'object' would
have stopped its progress. Grylls fared less well when the
Bill's committee stages began on 24 July 1974. Four M.P.s
walked out of the committee in protest at his refusal to widen
its scope and thus make abortion law more restrictive. The
M.P.s involved, three Conservative and one Labour, were all known
opponents of the 1967 Abortion Act.
For lack of a quorum, the committee had to be adjourned
and the protest of the four M.P.s thus effectively killed the
Bill. The adjournment meant that the Bill could not complete
all its stages in one parliamentary session and it was lost with
the summer recess.
lO. The Lane Committee of nguirv
The Committee on the Working of the Abortion Act under the
chairmanship of Mrs. Justice Lane was set up in June 1971 by
Sir Keith Joseph, Conservative Secretary of State for Social
Services, in response to increasing calls for an enquiry by,
among others, the churches, the medical profession, the press,
SPUC, and especially M.P.s, over three hundred of whom signed an
Early Day Motion initiated by Norman St.John Stevas. Its terms
of reference were much more restrictive than many opponents
of the 1967 Abortion Act would have wished, given that it was
not within the committee's brief to examine the principles
underlying the Act but only to be concerned with the way the
Act was working. The exact terms of reference were:
To review the operation of the Abortion Act 1967 and,
on the basis that the conditions for legal abortion
contained in paragraphs (a) and (b) of subsection (1)
and in sub-sections (2) (3) and (4) of section 1 of
the Act remain unaltered, to make recommendations.
The members of the committee were: chosen deliberately so that
no person of known committed views either for or against the
1967 Act was selected. A majority of the members were women and/or
representatives of the medical profession. The committee
comprised: two consultant gynaecologists, two general
practitioners, two members of the nursing profession, one a
nursing sister and the second a Chief Nursing Officer, one
doctor who was an NHS area Senior Administrative Officer, one
Professor of Psychiatry, one medical social worker, a
headmistress, one university lecturer in social administration,
a staff manageress with Marks and Spencer Limited, an information
officer with the Confederation of British Industry and one
Queen's Counsel.
The committee sat for three years, received written and/or
oral evidence from over four hundred organisations and individuals
and from over one hundred members of the public on their personal
experience of abortion. Over two hundred expressions of personal
opinion on the principle of abortion were also received. The
committee visited almost thirty hospitals, clinics and
Health Boards. Questionnaires were sent to every NHS
hospital having a gynaecological department, to all approved
places and to what were thought to be the addresses of thirty
two referral agencies. Furthermore, various surveys were
undertaken; of abortion patients in both hospitals and
other approved places; of social workers (including medical
social workers) and of foreign women coming to London for
abortions. Both committee secretaries visited the United States
and compiled information on abortion practices there. Finally,
the committee studied numerous books, articles, surveys and
opinion polls. Its report (Lane) was published in 1974 in
X2&
three volumes, running to almost seven hundred pages.
One of the committee's aims was to investigate how far some
of the hopes and fears expressed concerning the working of the
127
Act had been realised. It was recognised that these hopes
and fears stem from an ideological controversy concerned
primarily with the relief of the suffering of individuals as
opposed to the sanctity of life.
Lane concluded that although complications can and do occur,
the great majority of therapeutic abortions are performed safely
\2S
and uneventfully. Deaths arising from legal abortions were
found to have declined for each year following the 1967 Act. When
126. Lane.
3.27. Ibid. 1, 29.
128. Ibid. 1, 94.
it is recalled that s.1(1)(a) of the 1967 Act requires
balancing the risk of death or injury to physical or raental
health involved in the pregnancy continuing against that of
the pregnancy being terminated, Lane's findings that the fatality
risk is lower for abortion performed early in pregnancy, by
dilatation and curettage or vacuum aspiration, than it is for
continued pregnancy, is important (3.4 per 100,000 operations as
opposed to 18 per 100,000 live births). Significantly, Lane
did not think that this factor provided sufficient justification
3 29
to terminate as 'there are other factors involved*. ' Taking
all methods of abortion together, the mortality rate in the
United Kingdom was found to be very much higher than in east
European countries where the vast majority of operations were
performed before the twelfth week of pregnancy and by vaginal
130
methods unaccompanied, in most cases, by sterilisation.
With regard to risk of morbidity, Lane found that again there
was only a small risk of early morbidity and that this was
further minimised if abortion is performed early in the pregnancy
131
by a vaginal method and unaccompanied by sterilisation. Late
and/or latent morbidity was seen as rather more problematic,
however, since there is little satisfactory evidence about
13?
long term effects. It was noted that the Wynn Report ' omitted
129. Ibid. 1, 118.
130 • ibid.
131. Ibid. 1, 124-129.
132. Wynn Reports op.cit.
to include existing evidence that the incidence of late
complications of therapeutic abortion was often no greater
133
than that following childbirth.
When considering the risk to mental health presented by
legal abortion, Lane found that the risk of a serious mental
illness or even of any kind of disabling mental disturbance
was slight but that a substantial number of women did suffer
more or less transiently from feelings of regret, guilt,
bereavement arid depression. However, it was found difficult to
distinguish the effects of the operation itself from the
circumstances associated with pregnancy being unwanted and it
was stressed that those concerned with the care of abortion
patients should avoid showing attitudes toward the patients which
134
were likely to arouse feelings of guilt or resentment. Where
fethe decision to seek abortion was made jointly by husband and
wife which, on the basis of the evidence available to Lane, was
the majority of cases, then abortion was not seen to have adverse
effects on the marriage. In other cases, that is where the
husband did not know of the abortion or where the wife was pressurised
by him into having the operation, it was thought that friction
135
was likely to ensue.
The committee also examined the effects to health of legal
abortion being refused and concluded that although serious
133. Lanes 1, 140.
134. Ibid. 1, 151.
135. Ibid. 1, 153—158.
psychological illness rarely follows a failure to obtain an
abortion, the risks of less serious illness and of unhappiness
X 30
are substantial. In particular it was stressed that the
consequences of producing an illegitimate child may weigh
so heavily upon the mother that they are to be taken into account
137
when assessing the risks to her health. Lane also rejected
the view that the present shortage of babies for adoption was a
13Q
valid reason for refusing abortion and noted:
Happily the view formerly held by some people that
unmarried women should have to bear their unwanted
children as a punishment for becoming pregnant without
regard to ccjjjg^quent injury to health has largely
disappeared.
In considering with whom the decision to terminate should lie,
Lane distinguished two alternatives in both of which distinctions
can be drawn: either the decision should be made dependent on the
©pinion of two doctors, with the further distinction that panels
or referees of doctors should be set up either to decide or
to hear appeals from refusals to recommend or perform the
operation; or the decision should rest with the woman, with the
further distinction that this could mean abortion on demand
(where the doctors* professional opinion is ignored) or abortion
on request (which would involve a right, but subject to a doctor's
professional approval and willingness to perform the operation).
136. Ibid. 1, 171.
137. Ibid. 1, 173.
138. Ibid. 1, 166.
139. Ibid. 1, 185.
Lane recognised that, strictly speaking, consideration of
the latter was outside its terms of reference but concluded
•nevertheless we should have recommended against abortion
solely at the request of the woman even if the matter had
140
been fully open to us'. Its reasons for so concluding
were based on the view that the modern conception of mediaal
care involved treating a patient as a whole person viewed in
the light of personal, physical and mental health and
social conditions and not merely as one suffering from a
particular disease or condition requiring amelioration or cure;
that to expect doctors to operate under orders without
reference to their judgement would be contrary to good
medical practice and the interests of their patients; that
women would find the burden of decision making a heavy one,
possibly leading to feelings of guilt; that women would be
more vulnerable to pressure from family and boy friends; that
this might lead to neglect of contraception; that public
opinion was still against abortion at the woman*s request; and
that it was likely to inflate the number of abortions and further
lead to an unwillingness on the part of many obstetricians
141
and gynaecologists to perform the operation.
Lane also rejected the proposal for panels or referees of
doctors. Its reasons were: that it was difficult to settle how
such appointments should be made; that such a system would involve
unacceptable delay with consequent increase in death risks; that
140. Ibid. 1, 189.
I41' Ibid. 1, 189-192.
there would be unnecessary embarrassment to the woman or
arbitrary decision making if the woman*s presence was not
required; that unwanted pregnancy would be seen in isolation
from its associated problems; that the decision of the panel
or referees would be final unless an appeal system was set
up which would lead to further delay; that such a practice
would not lead to greater uniformity of decision making; and
v
that it would interfere with the doctor-patient relationship
142
and with the continuity of patient care.
Finally, Lane rejected the idea that the decision should
be made only by consultants as this could lead to fewer
abortions being performed without due regard to the terms of
the Act and that it would draw invidious comparisons between
doctors. This reasoning also led to the rejection of the
proposal that there should be an 'approved* list of doctors who
143
could perform abortions outside the NHS.
With regard to the criteria for abortion, Lane, although
recognising that to recommend any changes in the terms or
principles of the Act would be outwith its brief, examined the
way in which the principles are expressed and interpreted. It
concluded that the criteria are imprecise and can be widely
interpreted but that any change, for example by quantifying degree
of risk, would not lead to a better implementation of the intention
142. Ibid. 1, 194-196.
143. Ibid. 1, 197-198.
of Parliament in passing the 1967 Act which was that the
criteria be applied and the risks to health weighed in each
144
individual case.
The Lane Committee considred some special categories
145
of women seeking abortion and concluded that on the basis
of available evidence, girls under sixteen and women over
thirty five should be given sympathetic consideration, the
former because of their immaturity and the attendant risks to
the girl's health; and the latter because of the risks to
the woman's health and the risk of bearing a deformed child,
both of which are increased with age. Lane was not prepared
to limit the number of abortions which could be performed on
the same woman but recommended that such women should be
regarded as in particular need of counselling on the grounds
that *a woman who is prepared to undergo repeatedly what, to
most women, is a distressing experience and one to be avoided
in future, may point to some psychological or other problem
146
affecting her health*.
The upper time limit (28 weeks) for abortions laid down
in the 1967 Act was considered to be too high in view of
advances in medical techniques of sustaining premature babies.
Accordingly, a twenty four week upper time limit was recommended
as according protection for any foetus with a real chance of
survival independent of its mother, with the further recommendation
144. Ibid. 1, 199-211.
145* Ibid. 1, 212-273.
146. Ibid. 1, 269.
that any termination carried out after that date to preserve
the life or health of the mother or the child should be treated
as induction of labour and that every effort should be made
147
to preserve the life of the child.
In considering procedure in abortion, Lane recommended
that in view of the comparative safety of abortions performed
before the 12th week of pregnancy, as far as possible terminations
should be carried out before that date although no suggestion
was made regarding how best to avoid delay except that
arrangements for patients seeking abortion should be kept under
148
review.
The committee was particularly concerned that any woman
seeking abortion should have adequate counselling i.e. opportunity
for discussion, information, explanation and advice before the
decision is taken. Its reasons were twofold: it had evidence
of women who felt they were rushed into termination without any
discussion of their individual circumstances and also of women
refused abortion without adequate consideration cf the grounds
put forward. The object of counselling was envisaged as ascertaining
a woman's real wishes and ensuring that a request for
149
termination was not the result of pressure from other people.
Lane also recommended that where a woman of 16 years or over
refuses to allow her general practitioner to be informed, her
wishes must be respected in order to maintain the traditional
150
doctor-patient relationship.
147. Ibid. 1, 274-283.
148. Ibid. 1, 285-287.
149. Ibid. 1, 288-311.
150. Ibid. 1, 312-316.
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Lane examined the question of where abortions should be
performed, with regard to both the private sector and the
NHS. Within the latter, it felt that provision of abortion
facilities should not be separated from gynaecological
services in general. In forming this opinion, it appears to
have been influenced by its conception of changing patterns
of the type of medical care practised in that discipline, in
that gynaecologists were seen as tending to treat medical
and surgical care as equally important.151 There is an apparent
contradiction in the report over this point in that the survey
of abortion patients undertaken by the Institute for Social
152
Studies in Medical Care for the Lane Committee revealed that
abortion patients regarded hospital gynaecologists as both less
153
sympathetic and less helpful than other doctors. Moreover,
Lane took the view that,although the 1967 Abortion Act did not of
itself cast upon hospitals or doctors any duty to provide for or
perform abortions,the grounds on which abortion was allowed by
the 1967 Abortion Act were all for the purpose of saving life
or health or of preventing a seriously handicapped child being
born and as such fell within section 1(1) of the National Health
Service Act 1946 which reads:
It should be the duty of the [Secretary of State] to promote
the establishment in England and Wales of a comprehensive
health service designed to secure improvement in the., gljysical
and mental health of the people of England and Wales^ and
the prevention, diagnosis and treatment of illness and for
that purpose to provide or secure the effective provision
of services in accordance with the following provisions of this
Act.
151. Ibid. 1, 395.
152. Ibid. Vol. 3.
153. Ibid. 3, 137.
154. The parallel provision for Scotland is found in s.l(l) of the
National Health Service (Scotland) Act, 1947, 10 and ll Geo. VI
ch.27. s.3(1) of this Act makes it a duty upon the Secretary of
State to provide a level of services sufficient to meet all
roacnnahlo romi^romontc.
On this ground there was a duty upon the Secretary of State,
under section 3(1)(a)(b) and (c) of the 1946 Act, to provide
hospital accommodation, medical, nursing and other services,
and the services of specialists to such an extent as he
considers necessary to meet all reasonable requirements.
In the case of abortion, however, no guidance was given to
hospital authorities as to what the Secretary of State deemed
necessary to meet reasonable requirements. Accordingly Lane
recommended that such guidance should be given as would obviate
the risk of patients being forced to seek abortions in the private
sector. It was recognised that patients were being forced to
do that, with the result that 50 per cent of abortions were
performed in the private sector, which state of affairs caused
155
Lane considerable disquiet.
Criticisms of the 1967 Act as leading to a fail both in
recruitment to obstetrics and gynaecology and to resignations of
medical and nursing staff were found to be unwarranted, nor was
any evidence found of waiting lists for gynaecological
156 treatment
being lengthened as a result of the Abortion Act. However,
Lane viewed the increasing proportion of abortions performed in
the private sector and the regional variation in rates of women
obtaining abortion within the NHS as suggesting that there was an
inadequate service provided by the NHS and this the committee thought
should be solved by a planned development of comprehensive
gynaecological services, including abortion facilities, to meet the
155- Ibid. 1, 395—401.
156. Ibid. 1, 408-410.
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real need. The committee's belief that abortion should
remain within mainstream gynaecology was reasserted in its
rejection of the suggestion that separate units be established
to provide abortion facilities only. Its reasons for rejecting
this proposal included: that the majority of medical opinion
was against it; that there would be greater probability of
stigma attaching both to patients and staff; that confidentiality
would be threatened; and that the establishment of a large
number of units w&uld be likely to result in a move nearer to
abortion on demand.*5®
Lane also considered the position of conscientious objection
to abortion and, although recognising it as justifiable,
recommended that any doctor having such objection should refer
159
any patients seeking abortion to another doctor. The problem
was also recognised that conscientious objection may lead to
some doctors failing to secure appointments in obstetrics and
gynaecology. While expressing sympathy with the position of
those few doctors, Lane thought it inevitable that health
authorities should prefer those doctors who saw abortion as
properly part of clinical gynaecological practice since the
attitude of consultant obstetricians is important in determining
the level of service provided.1^0
The private sector was found to comprise three elements:
private nursing homes approved by the Secretaries of State;
157. Ibid. 1, 412-418.
158. Ibid. 1, 419-423.
1.59. Ibid. 1, 404.
160. Ibid. 1, 425.
supporting services such as referral agencies, some commercial
and some charitable in nature; and doctors certifying, operating
and notifying abortion other than under an NHS contract. Lane
did accept that there had been abuses arising out of the
implementation of the 1967 Act. Once it was realised that
women were prepared to pay for abortion, commercial entrepreneurs
had become involved in the private nursing home sector and
that, in order to maintain profits, they had resorted to
extensive advertising both in this country and abroad and even
to taxi-touting and 'hi-jacking' of patients. However, although
these abuses were recognised, so too was the fact that the DHSS
had been taking an increasingly active role in stamping out these
abuses. Not only was there official examination of the
facilities provided but the owners of places seeking approval
were now subjected to examination. In addition to visits of
inspection prior to approval, the DHSS had undertaken
unannounced inspection to ensure the maintenance of required
standards which were constantly reviewed and increased as further
abuses came to light. Moreover, the DHSS had gone further than
this by appointing special investigators with police experience
to check upon the assurances given as to the management and
administration of approved places.*61 The committee was
satisfied that administrative procedures were sufficient to
control abuses and that no statutory regulation was needed.
The problem of referral agencies was thought more difficult
to control, however, in that the 1967 Act did not require their
161. Ibid. 1, 435-437.
licensing or approval. The DHSS had sought assurances from
approved places that they would not accept patients from
bureaux and agencies involved in touting but such assurances
were not felt to be sufficient safeguards. Consequently Lane
recommended that all medical referral agencies (i.e. not solely
abortion referral agencies) should be subject to licensing by
the Secretaries of State and that it should be a criminal offence
for any unlicensed person or body other than a registered
medical practitioner or dental surgeon to charge or seek to
charge any fee for referral to any medical services or for
treatment. The committee did not seek to legislate referral
services out of existence because it took the view that,
properly controlled, they performed a useful service. It
further recommended that only those agencies providing medical
162
consultation should be licensed.
The committee considered the criticism that the large
16
numbers of abortions performed on foreign women was scandalous.
It took the view that abortion was part of medical treatment and
that doctors considered their first duty to the patient,
regardless of nationality or residence. Further, provided
the statutory grounds for abortion were satisfied, abortion was
perfectly lawful without regard to the residence of the woman.
Lane recommended, therefore, that no restrictions should be
placed on abortions performed on foreign women and remarked, in
passing, that such numbers were likely to fall as other countries
reformed their abortion laws.
162. Ibid. 1, 451-456.
163. Ibid. 1, 457-472.
On considering notification procedure and abuses, the
committee recommended that a further control on abuses could
be achieved by giving authority to Chief Medical Officers to
disclose information derived from notifications to the
president of the General Medical Council for the purpose of
164
investigating serious professional misconduct.
The committee welcomed the provision of day-care
facilities for abortion, subject to certain ppvisions, on the
grounds that complication rates had not increased as a result
of this provision ami that it ensured shorter waiting lists with
the added benefit of abortions being performed at an earlier and
safer stage of pregnancy. However, such facilities, it was
recommended, should only be used before the twelfth week of
pregnancy, on patients living locally and returning to the care
of a local general practitioner, and only in cases where it
was not necessary to use operative techniques or anaesthesia
necessitating prolonged recovery. In addition it was advocated
that the place in which such facilities were provided should
be required to give adequate counselling, contraceptive advice
and full follow-up consultant cover, adequate surgical and
pathological facilities and sufficient beds to make possible
admission of patients when required, and also to allow patients
to rest and be assessed before leaving.
In assessing the effects of the Abortion Act 1967 on illegal
abortions, the committee noted the difficulty both before and
164. Ibid. 1, 473-478.
after the passage of the Act in putting a figure on the
number of illegal abortions. However, on balance, from what
statistics were available (i.e. from Hospital In-Patient
Enquiry, the London Emergency Bed Service, Registrar-General
data on abortion deaths, Confidential Enquiries into Maternal
Deaths, specific case studies in different hospitals and
prosecutions for illegal abortion) it concluded that:
The 1967 Abortion Act had made a real jggtribution
to the reduction of illegal abortions.
Nevertheless, it felt that an unknown number of abortions
performed in purported compliance with the Act were, strictly
speaking, illegal because of disregard of the criteria of the
Act. Furthermore, it was concerned with breaches of the
regulations regarding certification and notification and
recommended that any such breaches should be triable either
summarily or on indictment (the latter sould circumvent the
possible difficulty of establishing evidence within the time
limit applying to summary prosecutions) and that the maximum
penalty for any breach should be raised from a fine of £100 to
12 months imprisonment and/or £1,000 fine in order to emphasise
the legal requirements more forcefully.
In considering the effects of the 1967 Abortion Act, the
Lane Committee had regard for the type of society in which it
was operating. It noted that the 1960s were a time of
165. Ibid. 1, 509.
166. Ibid. 1, 512-516.
extensive and rapid cultural, social and economic change
in which:
... societal expectations of prosperity were rising;
sexaul mores were changing at a pace which many
considered to constitute a sexual revolution; and
relationships between medicine, the law and the
public ... were altering in an atm^g^here of increased
critical scrutiny and questioning.
It perceived the quality of life as having changed and
considered that expectations and standards had so changed that
conditions thought tolerable twenty years previously were
no longer so thought. Women were viewed as being more
independent, no longer prepared to accept pregnancy after
pregnancy and the availability of contraception was seen as
fostering that attitude. Furthermore it was recognised that
for many women, a career was more important than exclusive
devotion to raising a family. Economic views were also seen
as influencing contemporary society's views about child-bearing
and it was recognised that many women now worked in order to
168
raise the living standards of their families.
The committee concluded that:
... by facilitating a greatly increased number of
abortions, the Act ha|6^elieved a vast amount of
individual suffering.
and was:
... unanimous in supporting the Act and its provisions.
We have no doubt that the gains facilitated by the Act
have much outwei^gd any disadvantages for which it has
been criticised.
167. Ibid. 1, 16.
168. Ibid. 1, 17.
169. Ibid. 1, 600.
170. Ibid. 1, 605.
The committee further recognised that the content of its report
was not likely to find favour with:
... those who see the Act and its workings as
evidence of a serious and progressive decline in
the standards., of morality in sexual behaviour of
this society.
but had come to the conclusion that the 1967 Act cannot!
... be interpreted, or should be used, in a punitive
way in an attempt to improve this so^gty's morals
and to diminish sexual misbehaviour.
From an examination of Lane's findings it can be seen that
SPUC's views were not upheld by the Committee of Enquiry.
SPUC had stressed that abortion was a dangerous operation;
that it should be performed only when there was grave or
serious risk to life or health; that the decision should be
made by two doctors at least one of whom was a consultant
gynaecologist; that there would be increased waiting lists
for gynaecological operations; that gynaecologists opposed to
the 1967 Act would have poor career prospects; and that abuses
stemming from the implementation of the 1967 Act would only be
avoided by a 'consultant gynaecologist clause' or by having
panels of referees drawn from the medical profession and
approved for the purpose by the relevant Ministry. However,
only SPUC's stress upon the need for abortion counselling was
upheld by the Lane Committee.
Similarly the position adopted by the RCOG received only
partial support in that Lane did recommend a restriction of the
171. Ibid.1, 608.
172. Ibid. 1, 609.
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time limit in which legal abortions could be performed (a
view which had also been presented by the BMA). However, Lane
did not support a 'consultant clause' nor a residency clause
for foreign women which had been suggested by the RCOG. The
RCOP had made a positive recommendation for special NHS
abortion units (as had the BMA and ALRA and as was suggested
as a possibility by the RCOG) but Lane disagreed. All
these organisations had recommended that better NHS
facilities should be provided, in which Lane concurred. ALRA's
view that the 1967 Act was working well was upheld by Lane as
was their proposed solution to the 'abuses' of the Act
viz. the introduction of new administrative procedures by the
DHSS. The Church of England's recommendation that the abuses
stemming from private abortion clinics be controlled by
a system of licensing and prohibiting the charging of fees
was also adopted by Lane.
On balance, the findings of the Lane Committee supported
to a greater extent the arguments advanced by ALRA over the
years rather than those of any other body:
a. that abortion was not a particularly dangerous operation.
b. that the criteria for therapeutic abortion should not
be couched in terms of 'grave and serious* risk to life
or health.
c. that neither a 'consultant gynaecologist clause' nor
a system of panels of referees would halt abuses.
d. that abuses could be best controlled by administrative
action.
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e. that abortions are better performed early in
pregnancy and especially within the first twelve
weeks when day-care facilities could be used to
a large extent.
f. that better NHS facilities were required to avoid
abuses and regional variation in abortion rates.
g. that the legalisation of therapeutic abortion did
not lead to lengthy NHS waiting lists nor adversely affect
the career prospects of gynaecologists who had conscientious
objections to abortion.
The only points on which the Lane Committee*s recommendations
entailed rejection of ALRA's view were those concerning the need
for special NHS abortion units and reduction of the time limit
within which it should be lawful to undertake therapeutic
abortion.
11. Conclusion
To sum up, this was a period of continued controversy. There
now existed two principal pressure groups whose raison d'etre
was the abortion issue: however their roles were reversed;
ALRA now fought a defensive campaign and SPUC the offensive
one. Although the general climate of opinion appeared to support
the 1967'Act in principle, that support was by no means overwhelming
or indeed stable. There was however almost total agreement
that the effects of the implementation of the 1967 Act
constituted a new social problem although this agreement
did not extend to the measures of its eradication. This
generalised concern led to the establishment of the Lane
Committee which reported very favourably towards the 1967
Act and disproved many of the allegations which had been
made. In Parliament, the outcome of the attempts to amend
the law was again governed by the rules of parliamentary
procedure and tactics.
CHAPTER FIVE
FURTHER POLARISATION AND POLITICISATION (1975-77)
1. Introduction
Between 1975 and 1977 the abortion controversy was both
intensified and altered in nature. The vigorous activities
of the two principal pressure groups were largely responsible
for considerable parliamentary time being devoted to further
attempts to amend the Abortion Act 1967. At the same time the
issue became much more politically important; public opinion
was both aroused and harnessed, and M.P.s were made fully
aware of the potential political implications of their stand on
the issue. This chapter will examine these changes in
polarisation of both organised and public opinion and their
effect on parliamentary activity by firstly analysing the
groups' definitions, solutions and tactics and secondly relating
these to the attempts at legislative reform. This method thus
retains the continuity of approach adopted in earlier chapters.
2. ALRA
(i) Position at the beginning of 1975
The publication of the Lane Report was regarded by ALRA
as a vindication of all it had fought for since its formation
and as a justification of all it had said in the six years since
the Act came into operation. The report was greeted as an
authoritative statement which conclusively disproved most of 'the
myths that have grown up around this emotive subject'.*
Nevertheless, it was criticised on two counts; firstly for
its recommendation of a reduction of the upper time limit
for legal abortion from 28 weeks to 24 weeks, and secondly
for being too timid in its overall recommendations. The
evidence in the report was interpreted as pointing to both
the need for and the desirability of abortions being freely
available to all women who desire them up to the 12th week of
pregnancy, yet the report failed to draw such a conclusion.
It is actually doubtful whether such a conclusion was open to
the committee given its terms of reference, which did not
include consideration of the criteria on which abortion may be
performed nor criticism of that criteria. Yet such a
criticism was perhaps an indication of the way in which ALRA
was planning to direct its activities in the coming years.
With the publication of the Lane Report, which quite clearly
supported the working of the 1967 Abortion Act, ALRA reappraised
its activities and future direction. Between 1970 and 1974,
Diane Munday had increasingly run ALRA almost single-handed while
the other members of the 1960s 'old guard' had extended their
interests and activities to other concerns. Consequently one of
the most effective pressure groups in the United Kingdom comprised
one full-time activist who had built up considerable knowledge
over the years on all aspects of abortion.
Although many ALRA supporters had felt in 1967 that the
provisions of Steel's Bill were not sufficiently extensive, the
1. ALRA Press Release, 3 April 1974.
organisation had not then publicly supported an 'abortion
on request' campaign. It thought it would be injudicious
on the ground that it would be politically unwise to move
to a more contentious position so soon after the passage of
an Act which was the result of a campaign based on middle-of-the-
road arguments. The setting up of the Lane Committee had
postponed any decisive move but now ALRA had to decide what
line to take on this matter. In effect, this required
Diane Munday's commitment to a more assertive position. This,
it can perhaps be surmised, was not forthcoming for her
resignation was announced on 21 June 1974; the official reason
being that the Lane Report had vindicated ALRA's view that the
1967 Act was working well and that she was overworked and
had urgent family commitments. Her resignation precipitated
an internal crisis for the organisation lacked both active
full-time personnel and clear direction in its aims and
activities. Its affairs were placed in the hands of three
members, Alastair Service, Madeleine Simms and David Flint,
and all work of the association was put in abeyance for six
months whilst possibilities for future activity were explored
2
and some firm decision taken.
This crisis was seized upon by those who thought the time
was right for ALRA once more to adopt an offensive rather than
a defensive role. In the six months interim peridd, those
individuals known to be committed to abortion on request (mainly
people active in the Women's Movement) were contacted with a
2. ALRA Minutes of AGM, 28 June 1974.
view to revitalising ALRA. The need for new personnel and
ideas was recognised by many of those most closely identified
with reform movement of the 1960s. Vera Houghton,
for example, thought that unless ALRA could produce a
rebellious element e^ery decade it was in danger of dying on
3
its feet. She thought the time had come to build on to the
existing structure rather than allow a situation to develop
such as had existed in the early 1960s when a 'palace
4
revolution* had been necessary to reinvigorate ALRA. Moreover,
SPUC had sustained a very active campaign since the passage of
the 1967 Abortion Act and was unlikely to halt its activities
in view of its reaction to the Lane Report. There was also a
political advantage in having new names associated with the change
of aims. The 1960s reformers had concealed the *abortion on
request* ideal and it was judged inexpedient for them now to
campaign publicly for a cause they had denied was their object.
(ii) The new personnel
The new executive committee announced in January 1975 were all
women in their twenties and thirties, and all were active in
the omen's Movement. Jane Barker had worked for BCC and was
then working with King's Community Health Council; Berry Beaumont
was a doctor specialising in community medicine; Carol Blaymire
was Press and Public Relations Officer for the National Federation
of Women's Institutes, a national executive committee member of the
Fawcett Society and member of the UN Status of Women Working Group;
3. Interview with Vera Houghton.
4. See Hindell, K. and Simms, M.: Abortion Law Reformed
op.cit.. p.112.
Caragh Fiddian was an SRN; Fran McLean was a counsellor with
the London Pregnancy Advisory Service; Jan Murray had formerly
worked for the Brook Advisory Centre before becoming a law
student; Eileen Meredith was a member of NCCL, an executive
member of the Haldane Society and a trustee of Release and had
helped set up a rape crisis centre in London. The new
campaign, called A Woman's Right to Choose (AWRTC) was supported
by the NCCL who provided office space and facilities and
were represented on ALRA by Teresa Woodraft, who worked in a
community advice centre, and Tess Gill, a solicitor and
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co-author of a book on women's rights. The campaign organiser
appointed was Sally Hesmindhalgt, a journalist who had formerly
worked for the TUC. Later she was joined by Judy Cottara, a
translator and market researcher.
It is significant, however, that since 1975 ALRA has
not been associated with any individuals for the new personnel
wanted to build a rather different movement, one which would
become a grass-roots movement rather than a small, highly
organised, traditional pressure group run by a few individuals.
Indeed since the end of 1977 there has at times been no full
or even part-time campaign organiser, partly from lack of funds,
with the work of ALRA being undertaken by all members of the
executive committee working on an evening rota system and by
any volunteers.
5. Coote, A. and Gill, T.: Women's Rights: A Practical Guide,
Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1974.
(iii) Definition of the social problem
ALRA sees abortion as a comparatively simple operation
with few attendant risks if carried out in hygienic conditions
by qualified people. Legal abortion within the first three
months of pregnancy is regarded as being much safer than
childbirth.
It is possible to prove that all abortions taking
place within the first twelve weeks of pregnancy can
be justified, because the risk of sterility,
infection and other complications attached to
abortion during this period is less than the risk
attached to childbirth ... childbirth is always a
greater risk than early abortion.
It does stress however that backstreet abortions are dangerous.
Abortion is not presented as an alternative to contraception but
as a necessary back-up facility. Stress has been laid on the
view that women who use contraception can still become
pregnant and that there are women who cannot use the most
reliable methods of contraception. Abortion is seen as a remedy
for failed contraception and failed contraceptive advice and
7
thereby the lesser of two evils.
What distinguishes the new ALRA's definition of abortion
as a social problem is its public acknowledgement that it is
primarily a woman's problem. The early founders of ALRA were
of the view that readily available legal abortion would be 'the
6. ALRA leaflet: Why we must fight the Abortion (Amendment)
Bill, p.3.
7. See AWRTC leaflet: Abortion: Have you ever used a
contraceptive that failed?
key to a new world for women' but, for tactical reasons,
stressed the public health aspects of abortion to a greater
degree. These same tactical considerations determined
the line pursued by the 1960s reformers. Now, however, this
definition becomes the predominant one on which the campaign
9
for a "Woman's Right to Choose' (AWRTC) is based. It is stated
that:
... unless abortion fills the gap where contraception
fails, women will never be able to plan their lives
and careers ... The right to plan when and if to have
children is inseparably linked with the right to equal
job opportunities, equal tjoining and the chance to
live an equally full life.
(iv) Stereotype of the deviant
Whilst not abandoning the presentation of 'hard cases' as
those women who seek abortion, ALRA has included all women as
11
possible abortion patients, given failed contraception. It
is asserted that those seeking abortion are ordinary women, drawn
from no particular segment of society, for whom contraception
has failed and who have taken a decision that, for them, to bear
a child or another child, would be too demanding on their personal
health, economic or family circumstances.
Those people whose behaviour ALRA does condemn are local
health authorities who are thought to have done little to ensure
8. Stella Browne - see chapter 2 supra.
9. Interview with Sally Hesmondhalgh.
10. ALRA leaflet: Why we must fight the Abortion (Amendment)
Bill, p.9.
11. See ALRA leaflet: Five case histories of women who failed
to get an NHS abortion or who were never referred to the
NHS.
adequate provision of abortion facilities, far less outpatient
clinics which ALRA sees as providing a solution to the low rate
of NHS abortions performed. These inadequate facilities lead
to lengthy delays experienced by women seeking an NHS abortion,
with attendant risk to health, both because of the delay itself
and the prevalence of less safe methods of carrying out the
operation. ALRA also objects to the behaviour of doctors whose
refusals to recommend abortion are represented as stemming from
their moral, rather than their medical, judgement of the
patient. Where such doctors exist (it is judged that areas
having low levels of NHS abortions are an indicator of this)
special abortion units are required, it is thought, but, more
importantly, in ALRA's view, legislation is required which
will grant women rights to abortion rather than enable doctors
to form judgements which it thinks are more likely to be
moral than medical in nature.
(v) Motivation
Underlying the involvement of the new generation of
reformers, humanitarianism, moral indignation and symbolism are
to be found. Boredom can be dismissed as a motivating factor
for all the key members have full-time occupations. Self-interest,
too, is only apparent in the sense that all are women of
childbearing age.
Humanitarianism covers several aspects. Firstly, there
is a desire to eliminate all back street abortions. There is a
concern for women who have to deal with doctors described
as being unsympathetic and even punitive and who, because
they are granted no rights of decision, then have to 'shop
around' for a sympathetic doctor with the risk that they may
fail to find one. This concern is intensified by the wide
regional variations in the number of abortions performed
within the NHS. There is also a humanitarian concern for
many who do succeed in obtaining an NHS abortion as many
of those are carried out at a later stage in the pregnancy
and using methods carrying considerably more risk than
those performed in the private sector. The situation of one
law for the rich and another for the poor, it is claimed,
still exists:
... in some areas doctors refuse on grounds of moral
or religious objection. In this situation women may
face long delays in obtaining an abortion or, because
it is too late, or they do not have enough money for
a private abortion, they may have to have the child.
About half the women applying for NHS abortions
are turned down, but anyone who can pay is likely*0
face very little delay in obtaining an abortion.
The concern expressed, however, is to secure recognition of
individual choice by the woman as to whether or not she bears a
child. It does not wish 'compulsory* abortion but a genuine
choice between having an abortion and bearing a child:
Let us be quite specific about this - when we say that
we wish to have control over our own lives, we are
saying that we have no wish to control or dominate others.
12. ALRA Press Release, 2 January 1975.
13. Woodcraft, T.: The Ethics of Abortion. In: Proceedings of
a Conference on Abortion Rights and Community Health Care,
ALRA Private Papers, (uncatalogued).
In order to provide that genuine choice ALRA wants
improvements in State assistance to mothers through both
increased family allowances and encouraging local authorities
14
to provide housing for mothers.
Given these humanitarian concerns, there is a sense of
indignation over the existence of these perceived social
problems. In particular, there is indignation over the degree
of control doctors pxercise over women*s bodies, a control
thought to derive not from their technical expertise but
from the power, authority and status they, as a professional
group, have built up and do not wish to have questioned.
Judgements on abortion are seen to be not merely medical
diagnoses- but often primarily moral appraisals anci there is
indignation that doctors can and do impose their own moral
judgements on wonen.^
This indignation is linked to the view of abortion
legislation as being symbolic of the role and status of women in
society. Significantly the campaign for AWRTC was launched on
the second day of International Women's Year with the statement:
The Association believes that until women can control
their own fertility th^f cannot attain true social
and economic equality.
The importance of women's status is stressed by all ALRA's
executive and runs through all their literature. The indignation
14. ALRA Press Release, 2 January 1975.
15. Interview with Berry Beaumont.
16. ALRA Press Release, 2 January 1975.
expressed over the perceived subordinate role of women is
clearly evident:
We believe in freedom and freedom involves choice,
they are inextricably linked. Because we believe
that women must define who they are, we fervently
believe that a woman in 1976 cannot, if she does
not choose for herself, be seen as anything more
than the bearer of children. She must not be
ruled by her biology. We^ave been tyrtrrsised by our
biology for far too long.
An editorial in the movement's newsletter, which is called,
significantly, Breaking Chains, puts the same point:
Abortion must be the key to a new world for women,
not a bulwark for things as they are, economically
or biologically. Abortion should not be the
prerequisite of the legal wife only nor merely a
last remedy against illegitimacy. It should be
available for any woman without insolent
inquisitions, nor ruinous financial charges, nor
tangles of red tape. For our bodies are our own.
So said Stella Browne in 1935 ... Forty years later
we still have not achieved the freedom she spoke of.
We are still subject to insolent inquisitions,
ruinous financial charges and tangles of red tape and
we are still fighting for the right to treat our
bodies as our own. It is regrettable that ALRA still
exists in this era of supposed enlightenment rj-gbut
exist we still do and fight on we still must.
Such concerns have given rise to demonstration slogans as:
Not the Church, not the State, Women must decide their
fate.
(vi) Aims
From 1975 there is for the first time in ALRA's history
an explicit and publicly acknowledged connection between its
17. Woodcraft, T.: op.cit.
18. Breaking Chains: ALRA Newsletter, May 1977.
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formal aims and its underlying objectives. The aims of the
19
AWRTC campaign announced in January 1975 were:
1. To campaign for every woman to have the right
to control her own fertility through contraception, and,
if she becomes pregnant, to end or continue her
pregnancy as she wishes. Therefore, the campaign calls
for the following:
a. a legal right to medical abortion in the first
twelve weeks of pregnancy;
b. unacceptable risk to a woman's health to be the
only grounds for refusal of abortion after twelve
weeks of pregnancy.
No person should be tssider any duty to participate in any
treatment to which he or she has conscientious objection.
2. In support of the primary aims, the campaign will
press for the provision throughout the United Kingdom of:
a. free and comprehensive facilities for abortion,
staffed by sympathetic members of the medical
professions;
b. NHS facilities for outpatient abortion during
the first trimester of pregnancy;
c. free, easily available pregnancy-testing facilities;
d. an unbiased NHS abortion counselling service to
enable women to reach an informed decision and to obtain
contraceptive advice;
e. free and readily available contraception and
sterilisation.
19. ALRA: AWRTC, Statement of Aims.
3. The campaign will urge public recognition of a
woman's right to abortion and contraception and will,
in particular, inform the public and Parliament on
all aspects of abortion.
4. So that wotten who become pregnant without wishing
to may have a genuine choice between abortion and
motherhood, the campaign will press for improved State
assistance to mothers, through better family allowances
and through encouraging local authorities to provide
housing for mothers.
Although these formal demands are for the first time
linked explicitly with the underlying concern that abortion should
be the woman's choice, it appears that ALRA was already thinking
towards a wider view. Tees Gill is on record as stating that she
would like to see abortion totally decriminalised:
What we are really thinking is, why should abortion be
a crime? Why should it not be the same as obtaining
contraception or having one's appendix out or having a
baby? Why should women be made to feel that it is a crime
to choose to terminate a pregnancy? ... do we want to
restrict the carrying out of abortion to doctors'? There
are no laws restricting other medical operations to
doctors. We do not ask laymen to take out an appendix
because it is free and safe to have this done in a
hospital ... So to summarise our proposals, we would
like to repeal all laws which make abortion a crime and
that would be the 1861 Offences Against the Person Act,
the two Sections 58 and 59, and the Abortion Act 1967 as
well. We would like the retention of the Infant Life
Preservation Act with the substitution of 24 weeks for
28. We would like ... and this is perhaps the most
important point - to lay a duty on the ^gcretary of State
to provide facilities for NHS abortion.
By 1977, ALRA had moved much further towards that position than its
20. Gill, T.: Abortion and the Law. In: Proceedings of a
Conference on Abortion Rights and Community Health Care,
ALRA Private Papers,, (uncatalogued).
declared aims of 1975 did. In that year it announced a more
extreme draft Bill which may nevertheless have been a
tactic to allow for later compromise. The Bill announced
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in 1977 went a large way to encompass the ideal position
described by Tess Gill, by allowing abortion on request to
a qualified person whether doctor or SRN, subject to the
provisions of the Infant Life Preservation Act 1929 and by
laying a duty upon the Secretary of State to provide adequate
facilities and personnel. It further decreed, however, that
any abortion performed or procured by an unqualified person
would constitute an assault regardless of consent. Finally
it sought to extend the availability of legal abortion to
Northern Ireland.
(vii) Characterisation and tactics
The AWRTC campaign marked the final demise of the old
ALRA, the tightly knit, elitist group concentrating almost
exclusively on the legislature within which it had established
contacts built up over a course of time. The new campaign had
to postpone all active attempts to promote its own aims,
(although it did produce a draft Bill) and instead try to
protect the existence of an Act which it had had no part in
promoting and which many saw as being inadequate in providing
for the perceived needs of women. The new group lacked any
experienced personnel, either in the day-to-day administration of
21. ALRA Model Abortion Bill: New Humanist, Jan/Feb 1977.
For full text see Appendix II.
the pressure group or, equally importantly, the operations
of Parliament. As Paul Ferris noted:
Now it's the turn of the anti-abortionists to be
politically devious. ALRA itself has been
taken over by radical young feminists who chose
last month to launch a campaign for abortion on
request. The reformists are no longer a highly
organised lobby with long experience of handling
M.P.s. The best organised lobby is now SPUC and
its associates. They have bided their time, as
politicians grew more uneasy about reported abuses
that the Department of Health seemed unable to stop.
Now they are suddenly gaining results, and the ggformers
have spent the past week feverishly regrouping.
Within the new group there was no organised division of labour,
it lacked an experienced lobbyist within Parliament and had
no specialist committees. Decisions, as in SPUC's early days,
appeared to be made by whoever was available when the need
arose. It was perhaps inadvisable to launch a new and more
far-reaching campaign when a major attempt to amend the
Abortion Act 1967 was about to be made in Parliament. Just as
SPUC had been surprised by the second reading of Steel's
Bill so was ALRA by the James White Bill:
We did not thin^that i*16 White Bill would pass a
second reading.
The new group wanted a different type of movement from the
old ALRA, a grass-roots campaign rather than a highly technical
lobbying organisation and one which would involve women in
asserting themselves to secure their rights, rather than an
elitist group securing rights for them. Apart from the
obvious wish for women to be more self-assertive and to assume
22. Ferris, P.: Putting the clock back on abortion, The
Observer, 16 February 1975.
23. Interview with Sally Hesmondhalgh.
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a greater control over their own lives, it was judged that
a grass roots campaign was politically necessary both in
the long and the short term. In the short term, it was
thought necessary to combat SPUC*s pressure on individual
M.P.s which had reached proportions such that a small lobbying
group could not hope to counter effectively. But in the long
terra it was thought that abortion on request was likely to
prove a long campaign and would require raising the public^
consciousness of the issue before any attempts at legislation
could be made in Parliament.
ALRA wished to take the issue to the grass roots, not to
build a mass ALRA movement but a mass generalised movement
seeking abortion on request. To that end, it sought to work
with existing local groups and not only those which had
always supported ALRA (the CWG, BCC, etc.). ALRA tried to
politicise the issue by lobbying for the support of powerful
political groups; trades councils, the TUC and political
parties. In addition to the traditional methods of letter
writing to the press and M.P.s^proposing resolutions at
conferences, it encouraged picketing local health authorities
and factories, sit-ins, theatre workshops, demonstrations and
having questions raised at local council meetings as well as
24
extending pressure on Hospital Management Committees. This new
approach appears to be succeeding,for many organisations have
24. See Action Guide, ALRA /AWRTC Publication and 'Why we must
fight the Abortion (Amendment) Bill*, ALRA Publication.
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passed resolutions supporting abortion on request, most
importantly, the TUC Women's Conference (1975) which was
followed by the TUC conference itself and the overwhelming
vote of the Labour Party Conference in 1977 in favour of
free abortion on request, adequate NHS facilities, and
resistance to any attempts to restrict the 1967 Abortion
Act (4,666,000 in favour, 73,000 against).
ALRA still had also to concentrate its activities on
Parliament where there have been two major attempts to amend
the Abortion Act 1967; the first introduced by James White
and the second by William Benyon, Labour and Conservative
M.P.s respectively. It is in Parliament that ALRA has been
least effective, particularly with regard to the James White
Bill. They were very slow to organise and the new organisation
still lacks the kind of detailed follow up and concerted effort
which characterised ALRA in the 1960s. ALRA initially worked
mainly through various branches of the Women's Movement, in
particular the Women's Abortion and Contraception Campaign
(WACC) and the National Abortion Campaign (NAC), which was founded
in March 1975. The Women's Movement has rarely been sympathetically
portrayed by the mass media and within ALRA there is a recognition
that if an unfavourable image is presented:
They [the press] depict us as irresponsible, hysterical,
emotional screaming radical feminists
this is unlikely to advance their cause in Parliament. Certainly
the behaviour of some alleged NAC supporters in the House of
25. For a full list, see Action Guide, op.cit.
26. Interview with Sally Hesraondhalgh.
Commons is unlikely to convince the majority of M.P.s
otherwise, as the following report perhaps indicates:
Three women, believed to be members of the National
Abortion Campaign, were detained in the House of
Commons after two separate incidents. In the
first incident, a woman rushed to the railings at
the edge of the public gallery and shouted down
to M.P.s: "Who the hell do you think you are?".
In the second incident, two women jumped from the
Strangers' Gallery to the special gallery below 07
and tried to handcuff themselves to the railings.
Furthermore NAC risked having an action brought against it
for contempt of the House by refusing to give evidence to the
Select Committee on the Abortion (Amendment) Bill as it felt
it would:
... serve no purpose at all to talk to M.P.s who
are already ggised to restrict the existing abortion
legislation.
Although NAC was cleared by the Committee of Privileges of all
29
charges of contempt, it obviously does not help its cause
to be seen not to play the 'rules of the game*.
3. Other groups supporting ALRA
After 1975 several organisations were formed to defend
the Abortion Act 1967 or to advocate abortion on request. These
included Christians for Free Choice, Labour Abortion Rights
Campaign, Tories for Free Choice and Doctors for a Woman's Choice
on Abortion. In March 1976 a Co-ordinating Committee in Defence
27. The Times, 10 February 1976.
28. The Guardian, 2 March 1976.
29. The Times, 25 March 1976.
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of the 1967 Act was set up (Co-ord), its instigators being
former ALRA personnel, Vera Houghton, Alastair Service and
Madeleine Sirams. Whether it was thought that ALRA/AWRTC was
failing to have any significant impact on Parliament through
a lack of awareness of the intricacies of political processes
and/or that NAC, WACC and the Women's Movement in general would
not be seen as sufficiently representative of public opinion,
or a combination of both, is speculation. Whatever the
reasons for its formation, this group once again provided a
highly sophisticated political lobbying machine producing
detailed briefing to M.P.s in general and standing committee
members in particular, with established links with government
departments. Co-ord started with sixteen founding organisations,
including ALRA and NAC, and within a few months that number
had doubled (and has continued to increase). The committee
has the advantage of embracing many different types of
30
organisation including 'respectable' middle-of-the-road groups,
and a wide variety of national and specialist organisations. A
30. By August 1976 organisations belonging to the Co-ordinating
Committee were: ALRA, BCC, Birth Control Trust, BHA, BPAS,
Brook Advisory Services, Child Poverty Action Group,
Christians for Free Choice, Co-operative Women's Guild,
Doctors and Overpopulation Group, Doctors for a Woman's
Choice on Abortion, Family Planning Association, Federation
of Conservative Students, Labour Abortion Rights Campaign,
London Youth Advisory Service, Marie Stopes House, Medical
Practitioners Union, NAC, National Association of Family
Planning Doctors, National Association of Probation Officers,
National Association of Young People's Counselling and
Advisory Services, National Council for Civil Liberties,
National Joint Committee of Working Women's Organisations,
National Labour Women's Advisory Committee, National League
of Young Liberals, National Organisation of Labour Students,
National Secular Society, National Union of Journalists
Equality Working Party, National Union of School Students,
NUS, National Union of Townswomen's Guilds, Northern Ireland
ALRA, PAS, Rationalist Press Association, Release, Six-Point
Group, Socialist Medical Association, Tories for Free Choice,
Ulster PAS, Union of Liberal Students, WACC, Women in Media
and the Young Communist League.
panel has been established of consultant gynaecologists,
general practitioners and representatives of other
professions. The committee takes as its stance one of
the main conclusions of the Lane Committee that the gains
facilitated by the Abortion Act 1967 have much outweighed
any disadvantages. It believes:
If Parliament really cares what happens to women
who wish to terminate unwanted pregnancies, it
will stop considering restrictive measures like
James White's and William Benyon's Abortion
(Amendment) Bill and will start considering the
needs of women and how to meet them. Instead of
narrowing the operation of the law^the
authorities should be widening it.
4. SPUC
(i) Position at the beginning of 1975
SPUC had originally welcomed the establishment of the Lane
Committee:
The Society for the Protection of Unborn Children was
the first to fight for an independent inquiry into
the Abortion Act ... Now at last, after four years,
a proper official inquiry has been set up, to be
headed by Mrs. Justice Lane, Britain's first woman
High Court Judge. It is a victory - particularly as we
have urged from the outset that the Chairman of such
a Commission should be an eminent lawyer, somebody well
versed in sifting evidence.
On the publication of the report, however, SPUC's reaction was
rather different. Lame was called:
31. Co-ordinating Committee in Defence of the 1967 Abortion
Act, New Humanist, May/august 1976.
32. SPUC Bulletin No.7.
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One of the greatest whitewashes in the history of
Government inquiries. It saw what it wanted to
see, ignored what it wanted to ignore and has
argued what it wanted to argue.
The report's factual findings were rejected on the grounds
that the committee 'did not review the evidence in the
spirit of independent inquiry' and that the 'committee was
34
biased in favour of a liberal abortion policy from the start'.
35
Instead the findings of the Wynn Report are regarded as
more authoritative than Lane:
I personally accept Wynn's findings on this. They 36
are as authoritative if not more authoritative than Lane.
Evidence of bias, it is claimed, lies in the view that:
The Committee was tie^to the apron strings of the
Department of Health.
and that:
The evidence is their conclusions. We could have
appointed a committee which ^guld have come to
quite different conclusions.
Nevertheless, SPUC's formal submission to the DHSS on its
response to Lane's findings was a much more careful and
reasoned document. Dr. C.B. Goodhart, a Cambridge Zoologist
33. SPUC Bulletin No. 14.
34. Nicholas Fogg interviewed by The Sunday Times, 11 August 1974.
35. Wynn, M. and Wynn, A.: op.cit.
36. Fogg, N.: op.cit.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
and SPUC executive committee member, who drafted SPUC's
original evidence to the Lane Committee and helped draft
the organisation's comments on the report itself, has
said that he challenges Lane's facts only on 'minor and
39
possibly nit-picking things' and specifically rejects
SPUC's oft publicised view that abortion is riskier to a
woman's life than normal pregnancy:
I would not go along with that. It is no^tiue. The
death rate from abortions is so very low.
Goodhart's main criticism of Lane was that 'the Act is




During this period, SPUC's major personnel changed
slightly. Phyllis Bowman became its most public figure in
her new role as director of the organisation. Elspeth Rhys-
Williams ceased to be involved in its day-to-day management and
instead devoted her time to a new anti-abortion organisation
which she helped to found, the International Pro-Life Information
Centre. Her place as administrative secretary was taken by
Jennifer Murray who had previously been involved in SPUC in a
more minor capacity. John Smeaton, formerly a teacher, became
a full-time worker for the organisation. These changes in
personnel, however, did not presage any change in SPUC's
39. Goodhart, C.B. quoted in The Sunday Times, 11 August 1974.
40. Goodhart, C.B.: Ibid.
41. Ibid.
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nature; its definition of the social problem, its
stereotype of the deviant and the motivation of its
members remained unaltered.
(iii) Tactics
After 1975 the argument, which had always been stressed
by SPUC, that Parliament's intentions of 1967 were being
flouted began to be effective in Parliament itself. The tactic
employed was to use the arguments presented by ALRA prior to
the passage of the 1967 Act and expose their weaknesses in
view of what happened thereafter. This is exemplified
by SPUC answering reformers' fears of a population explosion
by pointing to the declining birth rate in the 1970s. Similarly,
the pro-reformers had consistently argued that abortion was
a necessary evil to deal with 'hard* or marginal cases only;
M.P.s had been assured that abortion on demand would not
result from a measure designed to cater for such marginal
groups. To counter this SPUC cited Professor Peter Huntingford,
a consultant gynaecologist and strong supporter of ALRA, as an
example of a doctor permitting abortion on demand. In an
article headed Professor permits abortions on demand.
Huntingford said:
I have no qualms about this at all and I am quite certain
that it does not contravene the Abortion Act ... the Act
allowed abortion when the risk of permitting the pregnancy
to continue was greater than the risk of abortion ... The
simple fact is that when an abortion is carried out in the
first twelve weeks of pregnaijgy it is safer than allowing
the pregnancy to go to term.
42. The Daily Telegraph, 21 July 1971.
SPUC's aim is ultimately the repeal of the Abortion Act 1967
but between 1975 and 1977 there was evident in SPUC a
willingness to compromise its long term goal for shorter
term aims. This compromise would only be made, however, in
the case of legislation not solely controlling abuses but
seriously altering the grounds on which abortions can be
performed, so that the relevant criteria would be purely medical
rather than socio-raedical. This, it was claimed, would have
the effect of reducing the number of abortions performed by
43
between 60,000 and 70,000 each year. SPUC believes that
they are fighting:
... a small but evil and exceptionally vociferous
minority [who] have taken control of some sections
of our administrative system. By their actions
they show themselves determined to corrupt the
young and to undermine the family - the cornerstone
of our society ... we know that some leading
pro-abortionists are obsessed with the idea of
spreading the erosion further. Time and again one
sees the same people in the unrelenting fight to
legalise sexual intercourse with childrei^ to
legalise incest, to legalise euthanasia.
SPUC's organisation has become much more sophisticated. A
nationwide network of groups was established; shifts in
parliamentary opinion were carefully monitored by lobbying
and letter-writing; a special political committee was set
up to build up and brief parliamentary committees; demonstrations
were held to show the strength of support for their cause;
M.P.s were circulated with SPUC literature and with copies of
45
sections of Babies for Burning; the issue of abortion was
43. See The Times, 6 February 1975.
44. SPUC Letter to members 'Defend the Family'.
45. Litchfield, M. and Kentish, S.» pp.cit.
kept alive in Parliament by parliamentary questions and
early day motions. SPUC aimed to develop abortion into
an election issue by exerting constituency pressure upon
M.P.s, by withholding votes from pro-abortion M.P.s, and
by trying to have politically active members on selection
committees for parliamentary candidates;
a. canvass for the candidate most sympathetic to our views.
b. ensure everything possible is done to bring home the
importance of voting for the candidate most strongly on our
side to local organisations as well as in churches and
to neighbours. Use every means possible to ensure our
candidates are given maximum support.
c. Even if you have an M.P. in a *safe seat* locally
still do all you can to assist the anti-abortion candidate.
Votes count and if you can undermine the number of votes given
46
to the pro-abortionist, this will have effect.
The Roman Catholic Church has aided SPUC in maintaining
47
considerable constituency pressure and in organising demonstrations,
for example the Bishop of Nottingham reminds his parish when
48
•writing-to—M.P.-time' has come round once more.
It is noteworthy however that attempts to influence the
official policy of the TUC and major political parties, a new
tactic for SPUC and one which proved successful for ALRA, failed.
Nevertheless, SPUC*s success in politicising abortion at
46. SPUC letter to members •Defend the Family1.
47. For an analysis of Roman Catholic involvement based on
quotations from newspapers, see article by Diane Munday,
New Humanist, December 1976.
48. Nottingham Evening Post, 6 February 1977.
constituency level has been recognised; The Glasgow Herald
said that abortion was:
... a political hot potato which could threaten the
Labour stronghold in the West of Scotland, Liverpool,
Birmingham and Manchester ... Now if Mr. Callaghan
didn't realise it before, Mr. George Crozier of
the Scottish Catholic Lay Apostolate has pointed out
forcibly that Labour could lose more than a million
votes because of the party conference vote ...
The Government is in an appalling dilemma. On the one
hand, party conference by its substantial vote commands
serious consideration for easier abortion to be
written into Labour's election manifesto. On the other
hand, panic stricken Labour M.P.s who depend on the
Catholics for their majorities - particularly in
Scotland - are telling Government Ministers that if
the conference decision is implemented Mr. Callaghan
can wave goodbye to No. 10 forever.
In a rare survey of M.P.s' opinions on abortion carried out by
two Sunday Times reporters, it is stated that:
... virtually every M.P. spoke of an avalanche of
letters. Nine-to-one they came from the anti-abortion
lobby and one M.P. reported receiving some letters
before the second reading of the Benyon Bill."
The success and energy of SPUC in this field gives concern to
ALRA. Madeleine Simros has written:
At present it deploys its troops with much greater
sophistication than do the rather disorganised and
individualistic members of anarchic women's groups.
Unlike them, the Catholic activists and their allies
leave no stone unturned, no letter to the press
unanswered. They have learned how to raak^a recalcitrant
M.P.'s life a misery if he disobeys them.
5. Other influences
(i) The larger social environment
Between 1975 and 1977 there were two major attempts to amend
49. The Glasgow Herald, 17 October 1977.
50. The Sunday Times, 26 June 1977.
51. Simms, M.: Abortion and Democratic Politics, New Humanist,
May/August 1977.
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the 1967 Act; the first was a Bill presented by James White
which had its second reading in February 1975, and the second
by William Benyon, the second reading of which was in
February 1977. The first attempt resulted in the
establishment of a parliamentary select committee. Consequently
there was a regeneration of interest which achieved an
intensity parallel to that existing in the run-up to the
enactment of the 1967 Act. A description will follow
of the controversy aroused, in which it will be seen that many
of the positions adopted and the viewpoints expressed in
extra-parliamentary forums were adopted and formulated in
direct response to the parliamentary contests and debates.
(ii) The mass media
Many newspapers and journals carried &pfcicles and
52
correspondence on the abortion issue; a selection will indicate
the range of concern over attempts to amend the 1967 Act.
When the Lane Report was published in 1974, a Times
53
editorial described it as a 'Thorough if Inadequate Report'.
Immediately prior to the second reading of White's Bill The Times
52. See, for example: Morning Star, 16 February 1975, The
Guardian, 3 March 1975, The Guardian, 14 May 1975, The
Scotsman, 19 March 1975, The Sunday Times, 11 May 1975, The
Sunday Times, 18 May 1975, The Scotsman, 20 May 1975, The
Sunday Observer, 6 June 1975, The Sunday Times, 25 May 1975,
Evening Standard, 29 July 1976, The Guardian, 3Q July 1976,
The Guardian, 12 July 1977, The Guardian, 26 June 1977, The
Times, 31 January 1975, The Times, 2 February 1975, The
Times, 7 February 1975, The Times, 21 February 1975, The
Times, 6 August 1975, The Times, 29 July 1976; Harrison, Paul:
Abortion: what the trends are, New Society, 31 July 1975,
The Politics of Abortion (editorial): New Statesman, 5 March
1976; Turner, Jill: The battle of abortion, New Society,
11 March 1976; The Monstrous Regiments: Battle for and against
Abortion, The Economist, 16 July 1977.
53. The Times, 4 April 1974.
carried two articles by Ronald Butt welcoming the White
Bill as necessary to eradicate the abuses arising from the
implementation of the 1967 Act. He wrote:
Is there any other area of social concern in which
such detailed evidence of fraud and illegality,
cruelty and profitable contempt of human life
would not have been taken up and sifted in special
television programmes and by means of investigating
journalists ... But the evidence cog^erns abortion
and the silence has been deafening.
The evidence to which Butt referred was the book Babies for
33 56
Burning. later discredited. He went on:
The present Act was supposed, such was the bromide
offered, to strike a balance between the rights of
the mother and the rights of the foetus. By
definition, even that specious claim will go out
of the \*^ndow ... the foetus will be left with no
rights.
Butt also shows concern for the effect of the Act on the
medical profession, which he sees as having been placed in an
impossible position:
But most serious are the pressures to conform which
doctors face ... Something that was once regarded
with horror by most people can now be seen as a mere
by-product of a social climate which has a very meagre
notion of human dignity ... These are the points which
Parliament should consider when it evaluates the ...
important private Bill by which two meters are trying
to make the law work more responsibly.
54. Butt, Ronald: This Awful Silence ^langing M/er Abortion on
Demand, The Times, 23 January 1975.
55. Litchfield, M. and Kentish, S.: Babies for Burning, op.cit.
56. See Chapter Five supra and earlier in this chapter.
57. Butt, Ronald: op.cit.
58. Butt, Ronald: The dangerous pressure on doctors, The Times,
30 January 1975.
An editorial in The Times also came out in support of the
White Bills
It is not a wrecking measure in intention, and many
of the abuses that it sets out to correct are ones
that the supporters of the Act should take more
seriously ... The clash between two principles in
conscience, the principle of reverence for life and
the principle of personal freedom, cannot be evaded.
What can and should be stopped is the greedy
exploitation of the abortion tragg by a small number
of doctors and their associates.
The Times view was not shared however by other newspapers.
The Observer carried an article by Paul Ferris entitled Putting
the Clock back on Abortion in which he stated:
... There is every chance of the law being changed to
make abortion more difficult ... However necessary
some of the measures may be, they [i.e. the ones to stop
racketeering] are not the heart of the Bill. A press
statement from its sponsors says that it "does NOT seek
to limit the existing grounds for a lawful abortion", but
this is inmediately contradicted by the Bill itself ...
If the law does become more restrictive, it goes without
saying that the usual people will suffer. Criminal
abortion has dwindled but it could be back in all its
nastiness tomorrow. Leo Abse said in the House of Commons
that the bells had begun to toll for the avaricious.
Perhaps they have begun to toll for the women as well.
An editorial in The Sunday Times also supported the retention
of the 1967 Act and voiced its opposition to any attempt to
amend it:
If the new Abortion Bill ... becomes law it will create
a vast amount of individual suffering. The words in that
judgement are not ours but we agree with them ...
The moralities of abortion are complex - is the embryo a
person or a potential? What are the rights of the
family? Is there any morality without choice? In itself
59. The Times, 7 February 1975.
60. The Observer, 16 February 1975.
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abortion will always be a tragedy, but few women
decide without anxiety, doubt and grief. There
is certainly no morality in the imposition of a
code by those who do not have to bear its
consequences. The 1967 Act was a credible
reconciliation of all6|hese difficulties. It
should be left alone.
So too, The Guardian:
It [the White Bill] creates more confusion, more
anxiety, more distress for women already in a
distressed state ... No profound reform ever
justifies itself unless it is given a chance.
Mr. White1s amendments, plus t^g surrounding din,
merely throw away that chance.
(iii) Public opinion
Public opinion expressed itself partly through those
63 64
pressure groups which supported either ALRA or SPUC.
Both organisations also used the technique of mass demonstrations,
SPUC being particularly successful in attracting many thousands to
65
its cause.
61. The Sunday Times, 11 May 1975.
62. The Guardian, 14 May 1975.
63. Groups supporting ALRA's aims include the TUC; the National
Trades Council, the National Labour Women*s Advisory Committee;
The Labour Party Young Socialists and the Labour Party. For
a list of those supporting Co-ord (and therefore ALRA to
some extent) see fn. 3Q, supra.
64. Included in those are Life, Let-live, the Festival of Light,
The National Viewers and Listeners Association, the Human
Rights Society, The International Pro-Life Movement.
65. An estimated 50,000 demonstrated in London alone on 19 October
1975, see The Times, 20 October 1975.
Another means of assessing public opinion is by
opinion polls. In 1975, SPUC sponsored a Gallup survey
of the general public's attitude to the James White Bill.
This showed that 62 per cent were in favour of abortion in
only particular circumstances; 12 per cent were totally opposed
to abortion and 18 per cent were in favour of abortion on
demand. Of those agreeing with the availability of legal
abortion in certain circumstances, 72 per cent thought that
its availability should be subject to there being 'grave risk
to the life or grave injury to the physical or mental health
of the mother* whereas 8 per cent thought this would be too
lax a provision and 17 per cent thought it too restrictive.
In 1976, however, NOP found public opinion to be rather different;
55 per cent were in favour of abortion on request with only
31 per cent against. The evidence from these polls is
thus inconclusive.
6. The churches
(i) The Church of England
4
As a result of the resolution passed in February 1974 by
the General Synod, the Church of England was committed to
undertake a review of its position on abortion for the first
time since its major statement of 1966. In fact a working party
had already been formed jointly with representatives of the
Methodist Church to examine the matter 'as far as possible in all
its aspects'.^ The report of this joiit working party has never
66. Report of Proceedings of General Synod of Church of England,
vol. 6, 30 June 1975.
2.89.
been made public as its publication was stopped by the
67
Board for Social Responsibility, ostensibly because the
68
report was inadequate. Yet, during a debate of the General
Synod, it was described by the chairman of the Board as
being *a most careful, conscientious and scientific piece of
of work'.*^
70
Reports have been made which suggest that the joint
working party was favourably disposed to the workings of
the 1967 Act and the spirit behind that legislation and disagreed
with the fundamental objective of the White Bill; the report
of the joint party was to have laid the basis for the
consideration of the churches' evidence to the Select Committee
viz. to tighten the conditions under which abortion is allowed
and to impose a residential qualification for foreign women
seeking abortion. More importantly, however, it is understood
that the suppressed report shifted 'some way towards the concept
of abortion on demand, at least in the first twelve weeks of
71
pregnancy' and that, 'although wishing to see the final decision
remain with the medical profession, the key decision on whether
67. Ibid.
68. See The Times, 20 June 1975.
69. Proceedings of General Synod, op.cit.. at p.348.
70. See The Times, 20 June 1975 and 23 June 1975; also New
Humanist, August 1975.
71. See The Times, 20 June 1975.
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to have an abortion should be the woman's*. This report
also advocated the provision of extensive counselling services
to women seeking abortion. What is certainly known is that
the report did state that:
For many couples and single women the experience of
abortion, particularly where there is adequate
counselling and after-care, can be a learning
process of great value, a means by which they
discover the significance of conception and the
beginning of new life.
This particularly gave ris* to concern for:
Standing as one of the main conclusions, [it] would cause
grave misunderstanding ... anc^would have been acclaimed
as the view of the Church ...
In the event, the Board for Social Responsibility produced its
75
own report which was accepted by the General Synod in July 1975.
76
It expressed general support for the White Bill, although
reservations over its precise terras, and was described as:
72. These reports are supported in particular by the evidence of
Mrs. Cornwal1-Jones, the only woman member of the Church
of England's delegation to the Select Committee on abortion
but see also that of Professor Dunstan (see Reports of the
House of Commons Select Committee on the Abortion (Amendment)
Bill 1975 H.C. 250-iii 22 March 1976. Hereinafter this will
be referred to as Select Committee).
73. Proceedings of General Synod, 1975 op.cit.. pp.348-349.
74. Ibid.
75. Ibid.
76. Church of England: Abortion Law Reform, 1975.
More of a gesture to indicate Christians* general
anxiety ... than the discovery of a real an^yer to
the deeper questions which are being asked.
However, this official policy was later challenged by the
secretary of the Board for Social Responsibility in an
editorial in the Board's official journal. He argued that
doctors* attitudes had changed in the last decade:
... away from the Olympian judicial style and towards
that of the sympathetic technician, offering skills
but leaving his pat^gnt to make the fundamental
personal decisions.
and went on:
When once the majority of the medical profession conclude
that the best interests of the woman are served, and their
own legitimate interests are protected, by a system of
abortion on considered request, is any useful purpose
served by retaining enactments which assume that induced
abortion is to be treated as a felony except in carefully
defined circumstances? A law which so imperfectly
reflects contemporary attitudes and practice is surely
a liability to the g^^eral interest in maintaining
respect for the law.
Moreover, he anticipated a day when an effective self-administered
abortifacient drug would be available and in the light of this
suggested that Parliament should be concerned with framing a
body of law 'which will be apt for tomorrow's purposes rather
than yesterday's*.80
The division within the Church of England is reflected in
81
the oral evidence given to the Select Committee on Abortion. The
77. Ibid.




81. Report of the House of Commons Select Committee on the
Abortion (Amendment) Bill 1975 H.C. 250-iii 22 March 1976.
Bishop of Truro laid stress on the view that abortion was
still to be regarded as an ♦emergency procedure' rather
than as a 'kind of normal process of disposal' which was
viewed as being totally abhorrent and incompatible with
the inviolability of the foetus. Nevertheless the
church, he said, had not moved from its position that, in
the decision to terminate, the whole of the woman's situation
should be taken into account but it hoped that this would
displace the view that balancing the risk to life of
termination against that involved in continuation of a
pregnancy was a sufficient criterion on which to base any
decision. Furthermore, he expressed the need for adequate
counselling and social help for women seeking abortion and
also for the end of any victimisation or discrimination against
members of the medical profession choosing to exercise
conscientious objection. Mrs. Cornwall-Jones, a member of the
joint working party, stated:
Speaking for myself alone, I would say that if in the
first trimester, a woman, after proper advice, knowing
the risks and the alternatives, makes up her own mind
that abortion is the only solution, then hers must be
the key decision, tak^q in proper partnership with
her medical advisers.
(ii) The Roman Catholic Church
The delegation of the Roman Catholic Church to the Select
Committee was particularly large with no fewer than twelve
83
witnesses attending. The memoranda submitted to the committee
clearly stated the Catholic position as being opposed to
82. Ibid.
83. Select Committee Reports: H.C. 250-iv 29 March 1976.
abortion in principle'.
We believe that God if the ultimate authority of life
and that this imposes responsibility on mankind. The
protection of human life is a fundamental principle ...
All the members of this delegation and those they
represent are against abortion in principle ... The
members of the delegation approach ... [the meeting]
as an opportunity to support any measures which are
leading towards a legj| permissive attitude towards
abortion in general.
The memoranda state further:
The slogan "A woman's right to choose" has been use<4
as an argument for abortion on demand. It is suggested
that it is an impertinence for the community to
decide that a woman must continue with a pregnancy
which she herself does not wish to continue ... It is
strongly urged that in the question of life and death,
the individual ... must submit to the community as
a whole. ... In the case of abortion ... such a decision
cannot be left to the whim of an individual who is
attacking the right tg^life which belongs to an innocent
person as yet unborn.
It strongly supported every clause of the White Bill except
those dealing with legal and administrative requirements for
the application of the law (clauses 11-16) on which it thought
inappropriate to comment. It did, however, express one
reservation on the proposed legislation, viz. that it still
retained the balancing of the risk of serious injury to the
physical or mental health of the woman or any existing children
of her family which the church saw as being too permissive. The
delegation stressed the unity of the Catholic Church in its
beliefs:
Our own Church tends to be more coherent and therefore
presents a more solid block of opinion ... the teaching
of the Roman Catholic Church has jp^en clear, concise and







The Vi.iity of the church does appear, however, as with, the Church
of England, to be more apparent than real. After the
delegation had given its evidence, there began a long
correspondence in The Times on 'the Catholic viewpoint*.
This was started by Juliet Cheetham, a Roman Catholic who
had been a member of the Lane Committee. She wrote:
For Catholics to keep private their liberal views
is dishonest in that it gives a false impression
of unity. It may also be cowardly when apparent
consensus hinders sober analysis of the realities
of the alternatives to abortion which are so often
extolled, in 9'g^t faith and great ignorance, by
many Catholics.
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Moreover, a study published in April 1976 showed that in 1973
only 43 per cent of Catholic women who had given birth in
the six months beforehand were against abortion on request.
(iii) The Methodist Church
The Methodist Church, it is reported, decided not to
publish the report of the ill-fated joint working party on its
89
own for 'fear of giving offence to the Church of England'.
Instead a separate report was prepared by the Family Life Sub¬
committee of the Division of Social Responsibility which was
90
subsequently adopted at the Methodist Conference. It stressed
five major points: rejection of abortion on demand; belief
that even an early foetus must not be aborted without serious
cause; insistence that counselling must always be offered so
87. The Times, 17 April 1976.
83. Cartwright, Ann: How Many Children? Routledge and Kegan
Paul, London, 1976.
89. The Times, 20 June 1975.
90. See The Times, 29 June 1976.
that women may consider what is involved and the
alternatives to abortion; no restriction of the law such
as would deter women from seeking that counselling;
responsible and equitable decisions on all requests for
abortion.
The evidence given by the Methodists to the Select
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Committee is perhaps best described as pragmatic. Whilst
recognising that 'there is never any moment from conception
onwards when the foetus totally lacks human significance',
they nevertheless expressed the belief that 'the degree of
significance manifestly increases'. They thought therefore
that it would be best to restrict all abortions to the first
twenty weeks of pregnancy except where there was a direct
physical threat to the life of the mother, or of a risk if
serious abnormality in the foetus became known. They defended
the present form of the 1967 Act as being of value in
recognising the two competing rights to be balanced in
decision making, but nevertheless saw its imperfections which
required clarification or amendment either by legislation or
administrative regulation.
These imperfections were seen as lack of counselling and
inadequate NHS facilities, the latter allowing a private sector
91. Select Committee Report: H.C. 25Q-vi 12 April 1976.
to flourish in which racketeering did take place. It
was stated that Methodists had constantly taken 'a middle
view' on abortion on demand (which they rejected) and
•veered towards the woman in the first trimester and towards
the foetus in the later stages1. Their rejection of abortion
on demand stemmed partly from the view:
... that the woman does not understand what idle is
asking for and may exaggerate the difficulties and
the isolation one feels and partly because at no
point do we say that the status of the foetus is of
no significance.
At best any legislation on abortion was:
... an attempt to balance rights and therefore abortion
on demand should be rejected as totally denying any
right the foetus has in the early stages.
On the specific clauses of the White Bill, the Methodists took
the view that the adjectives 'grave' and 'serious* as
applied to risk were too ill-defined for inclusion; that the
words 'greater than if the pregnancy were terminated' should
not be removed unless a precise definition of 'grave' and
'serious* could be given; that a residential requirement
for foreign women should be resisted; that a system of licensing
should be set up in order to reduce the profit motive; that
counselling should be encouraged; that the requirement that
the two medical practitioners certifying abortion should not
normally be in practice together was reasonable; and that
notification to G.P.s of abortion and the presence of parents
of girls under 16 years of age in any advice-giving at consultation
would probably lead to the deterrence of women seeking help.
The Methodists1 oral evidence to the committee does
not reveal any division va. thin the church and was strongly
criticised by the members of the committee, who suggested
that the Methodists held 'outdated' views, totally opposed
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to the views of other churches.
(iv) The Church of Scotland
In a report of the Moral Welfare Committee in 1975, the
Church of Scotland concluded:
We see the need for the Church to have greater
confidence in, and give greater support to, the
maturity and judgement of her people to make
their own decisions. It is the duty of the Church
to give her people the necessary information on
which to make a moral decision, but in the end,
in the free^m Christ gives, they must make their
own choice.
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However, in the evidence the church submitted to the Select
Committee that view is not much in evidence. It took the
view that:
... the inviolability of the foetus is one of the
fundamentals ... We firmly believe that from the
moment of conception the embryo possesses the potential
of full human life.
Abortion on request was thus rejected as it would:
... both trivialise the life and death issues involved
in abortion and would constitute a grave bxeach of the
principle of the sanctity of life.
Moreover, it was thought that the provision of abortion on
request would 'cut away at an important part of the marital
relationship, that is, procreation*. Their position, which might
92. For a report see, The Guardian, 13 May 1976.
93. Report of Church of Scotland Moral Welfare Committee on
Abortion, 1975.
94. Report of Select Committee on Abortion: H.C.250-V 1976.
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perhaps be thought curious, was that abortion was the
lesser of two evils, that the church was not opposed to
abortion in principle, but that:
We would want to maintain as a sort of priority the
rights of the mother to live, but the mother*s
right to terminate life undoubtedly seems to us
to come considerably below the right of the unborn
child to live.
Taking that as its position, the church advocated that fairly
stringent criteria be applied in decision-making and that
abortion remain primarily a medical matter:
We are, to put it mildly, unhappy with the social
grounds, so-called, which are in the present Act.
We believe this is primarily and, indeed, it should
be strictly a medical matter.
The church accordingly recommended the insertion of 'grave*
and 'serious* to qualify risk to be taken into account in
decision-makingj the need for better counselling facilities
to ensure that the possible alternatives to abortion are
fully explored; the licensing of advisory bureaux to cut out
profiteering; a strenthening of the 'conscience clause* to
protect the medical profession; and the setting up of
special NHS abortion units to protect doctors and patients, to
provide better counselling and advice not only on abortion but
also on contraception and to eradicate regional variation. The
church summed up its approach as being 'not simply to argue
for restrictive legislation but an overall positive approach
to the abortion issue*.
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7. The medical profession
The Lane Report was met with general approval by the
medical profession. The RCOG was perhaps most critical and
the RCOP most favourable. The former stated that:
The majority of members of Couneil welcome the
recommendations of the Report as a whole, but
a minority of members who are opposed to
termination of pregnancy on socio-economic grounds
regret that the terms of reference excludgg
consideration of the criteria in the Act.
.The statement did however reiterate one of the College*s
recommendations, that is that the regulations should be
altered so that at least one of the doctors signing the first
certificate should have been registered for at least five
years.
A leading article in the BMJ assessed the Lane Report
thus:
The Report is not a whitewashing exercise ... Running
through the seven hundred pages of th^report is a
humanitarian approach to the problem.
This leader also commented that *the situation has changed,
abortion for a wide range of indications, is now part of
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conventional medical practice in Britain*. Furthermore it
expressed the hope that:
Perhaps the most useful result of the exhaustive inquiry
by the Lane Committee ... could be the fading away of so
much shrill and emotional argument, for it is now clear
95. Statement issued after a meeting of The Council of the RCOG
on 15 June 1974.
96. British Medical Journal, 13 April 1974, pp.69-70.
97. Ibid.
that no major change will J^g made in Britain
in the foreseeable future.
This hope was not realised and once again the various branches
of the medical profession were forced to reappraise their
attitudes to legal abortion.
(i) The BMA
Although the White Bill received its second reading in
p arliament in February 1975, it was not until May of that
year that the BMA produced a commentary on the provisions of
99
the proposed legislation. The publicised version of this
100
commentary was brief and stressed only that there were
inherent dangers in the amending Bill. In particular, it was
felt that doctors would be jeopardised by the attempt to shift
the onus of proof from the Crown to the accused and that
the adjectives 'grave* and 'serious' were so ill-defined that
doctors could find themselves frequently in court until
some judicial interpretation clarified their meaning. The
report of the general medical committee of the BMA is rather
fuller in the version published in the BMJ.^3" This shows quite
clearly that the BMA feared any attempt by Parliament to
interfere with medical freedom:
... [The^Q^ll] is a serious threat to the freedom of
doctors.
§8. Ibid.
99. See The Times, 17 May 1975.
100. Ibid.
101. British Medical Journal, 17 May 1975, p.352.
102. Ibid.
The restriction on the profession's freedom was seen to stem
from a number of factors; from the restrictions placed on
the indications for legal abortion; from the attempt to make
it an offence for a doctor to advise girls under sixteen without
the presence of their parents; from placing the onus of
proof on doctors in any prosecution; and from the granting of
anonymity to anyone giving evidence in abortion proceedings.
The BMA took the view that the basic intention of the Bill's
sponsors was to reduce the number of legal abortions
performed by making the procedure legally hazardous for
doctors. However, the BMA rejected the view that restrictive
legislation would eradicate abuses of the Act (which they
recognised) and that the only solution to these abuses lay in
the provision of better NHS facilities.
The fact that the BMA had done so little to publicise its
views led to anger on the part of some young members of
the profession, which manifested itself in a sit-in of the BMA
headquarters to protest at the 'silence' of the Association to
103
the White Bill. The protesters wished the BMA to organise
a national petition among the medical profession against the
Bill and to publicly announce its opposition. This protest
was partly successful for the BMA did issue a press statement
104
which affirmed such opposition. The unity of this opposition
103. See The Times, 23 May 1975.
104. See The Times, 24 May 1975.
was shown by the fact that when the conference of local
medical committees met in May 1975, only four out of 360
delegates opposed the position adopted by the BMA."*"05
In its evidence to the Select Committee the BMA stated
that:
In general, the Association supports the recommendations
of the Lane Committee ... and has grave doubts whether
the proposed Bill would achieve the purpose of the
sponsors to find a reasonable consensus of opinion
which would make sensible^ggovision for removing some
of the abuses of the Act.
The opposition to the Bill was based on two interrelated
factors; the threat to the freedom of doctors and the lack
of clarity and difficulty of enforcement of the provisions of
the Bill. Specifically, the BMA thought that the reference
to 'doctors not normally in practice together* needed
clarification to exclude NHS doctors; that both certifying
doctors should have been registered for a specified number of
years (three was recommended); that the introduction of
•grave* and 'serious* to qualify risk would be a retrograde
step taking the law back to the pre-Ronrne position and its
vagueness would open the way to prosecutions of doctors; that
a residential qualification for foreign women would be
difficult to enforce, would place too great a burden on doctors
105. See The Times, 12 June 1975.
106. Report of Select Committee on Abortion: H.C. 253-ix,
23 June 1975.
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and would be against medical ethics; that notification of
abortion to a patient's G.P. was reasonable, but again a
burden on doctors; that attempts to discourage touting
were to be recommended as was licensing of referral agencies,
but that both provisions required clearer drafting to exempt
bona fide advisers; that the presence of a parent for girls
under sixteen was to be encouraged but could not be made a
legal condition as it would jeopardise the confidentiality
of the doctor-patient relationship; and finally that
changing the onus of proof was totally unacceptable.
The committment of the BMA to opposing any attempt to
restrict the provisions of the 1967 Abortion Act was
reaffirmed at the 1977 annual conference when the association
voted overwhelmingly to oppose the Benyon Abortion (Amendment)
Bill, taking the view that any deficiencies in the working of
the 1967 Abortion Act could be made good by changes in
107
regulations. It was stated that there had been an
enormous change in the profession's attitude to the Abortion
Act in the ten years since it had become law. Barely concealed
hostility had changed to support 'because we, the ordinary
108
doctors, have seen the enormous benefits this Act has brought*,
(iv) The RCQG
109
The evidence the RCOG gave to the Select Committee shows
107. See The Guardian, 22 July 1977.
108. Ibid.
109. Report of Select Committee H.C. 253-x, 30 June 1975.
that the RCOG had shifted towards a more favourable view of
the 1967 Act. Part of the evidence was heard in private,
however, and it would appear that the change in attitude
was explained then so one cannot account for this change.
In giving evidence Sir Stanley Clayton, President of the
College, said:
I would be quite happy^grsonally if the Act were
left exactly as it is.
He stated that he was also speaking on behalf of the College,
for the Council had voted 28 to 2 in favour of the retention
of the 1967 Act as there had been:
As great a shift of opinion within the College and
within the profession as there had been in the public.
Furthermore, this change in attitude had occurred after the
College had submitted its evidence to Lane which explains the
discrepancy between the two sets of evidence. The new
prevailing opinion of gynaecologists was that the 1967 Act
was working well in general but that the abuses occurring,
especially in the private sector, could be stopped by
administrative action and that the only 'worry of the College
was why the Lane Report was not being implemented, which
112
would be the simplest answer to the whole thing'.
However, Clayton took cognizance of the fact that there




reactions to those proposed modifications. Specifically,
it was thought that the Bill was badly drafted and
required clarification. In particular the phrase 'two
doctors not normally in practice together* required
amendment to exclude practitioners working within the NHS;
that the words *grave* and * serious* as applied to risk were
ill-defined and would therefore place doctors in
jeopardy during any legal proceedings; that a residential
requirement for foreign women was too difficult to enforce
effectively and would also be medically hazardous given that
it would involve considerable delay in the performance of
any operation; that notification of abortion to a
patient's G.P., although good medical practice, was not always
possible; that the presence of a parent of a girl under sixteen
would jeopardise the confidentiality of the doctor-patient
relationship; that every G.P.*s surgery would have to be
licensed especially to allow the G.P. to provide abortion
advice; that an upper time limit of twenty weeks required an
exception for rare cases involving real risk of death or
consequent ill-health if the pregnancy continued; and that to
reverse the normal onus of proof in criminal proceedings
was totally unacceptable.
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A 1977 Gallup poll commissioned by SPUC found that 70 per
cent of gynaecologists believed abortion up to six months
pregnancy carried little risk to the woman. It confirmed that
113. See The Guardian, 13 July 1977.
the overwhelming majority of gynaecologists (81 per cent)
thought abortion should be available only in defined
circumstances. However, when asked specifically about
abortion on demand, only 57 per cent were totally against
whereas 30 per cent favoured it in certain circumstances
(e.g. during the first three months of pregnancy). Most
gynaecologists (83 per cent) did however think that
abortion on demand was generally available.
(iii) The RCOP
The evidence given by the RCOP to the Select Committee
strongly opposed the White Bill which was seen as an attempt
to 'put back the clock' which would be a 'public health
114
disaster* if passed. In particular the words 'grave*
and 'serious* as applied to risk were viewed as unnecessary,
restrictive in intention, difficult to interpret and so ill-
defined that they would lead to legal hazards for a doctor.
Every clause was subject to criticism on the grounds that
they were impractical; difficult to enforce; would not lead
to the eradication of abuses which it was thought would only
happen with increased NHS facilities; would cause unnecessary
suffering on the part of women and would be a burden on doctors.
The evidence of the Royal College was supplemented by that of
twenty senior members of the psychiatric team at Charing Cross
Hospital, London, who recommended that the entire Bill should be
115
scrapped.
114. Report of Select Committee H.C. 253—ix, 23 June 1975.
115. See The Times, 1 July 1975.
8. Legislative attempts to amend the law
(i) James White's Bill 1975
James White was the first Labour M.P. to try to amend
the 1967 Abortion Act. He had secured third place in the
private members' ballot in November 1974, and his chances
of success were therefore rather higher than those of earlier
M.P.s who had sought new legislation. White's motives were
partly inspired by election considerations for he said that he
had never thought of abortion until the 1970 election.116
He initially described his aims as being:
... to curb the gross abuses which are causing such
widespread concern among the public and members of
Parliament alike ... The law was originally passed
in order to help dire cases, yet it had led to
abortion on demand, and an ever increasing number
of M.P.s who originally voted for Act in good
faith are now calling for changes.
The Bill's intention then was not to prohibit all abortion but
to restrict it to 'dire' or 'hard* cases. The stance taken
by the supporters of the Bill which became the Abortion Act 1967
had been not to decriminalise all abortion but to permit it
for 'hard* or 'dire' cases. The arguments used throughout the
debate on the White Bill show remarkable similarity to those
used during the passage of the 1967 Act. White thought that the
best way to control abuses and avoid abortion on demand was
to write into the Act stricter criteria of risk and remove
reference to the balancing of the risks involved in termination
116. The Times, 31 January 1975.
117. The Scotsman, 28 November 1974.
with those associated with childbirth. This was necessary,
he thought, as a straight statistical comparison of these
risks always favoured termination wfeich thus allowed abortion
on demand to occur if two doctors held that to be the
only criterion for decision making.
It was stressed that the sponsors of the Bill did not:
... intend to attack the so-called social clause of
existing law which allows doctors to take account of
a pregnant wjijign's actual or reasonably foreseeable
environment.
Moreover, it was argued by Leo A&tse, a sponsor of the Bill,
that the Bill was not a wrecking amendment and did not limit
the grounds for abortion but would merely prevent *criminal
abortionists' who, by statistical arguments, thwarted the
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original intentions of Parliament. It was further intended
that London should cease to be the 'abortion capital' of
the world by legislation framed to prohibit abortions on
non-resident foreign women.
There is some confusion as to who actually drafted White's
Bill. He did have a committee of parliamentary colleagues,
most notable of whom was Leo Abse, a long opponent of the 1967 Act
and a lawyer who enlisted the help of other lawyers in the drafting,
and there were meetings with representatives of SPUC, most
notably Nicholas Fogg and Paul Cavadino, but there is a
118. The Times, 31 January 1975.
119. Ibid.
suggestion that a branch of the Roman Catholic Church was
involved in the drafting of the Bill. This was denied
by White in Parliament, but an article in The Scottish Catholic
22Q
Observer reports George Crozier, a Dunbarton solicitor and
chairman of the Glasgow Archdioc%an Lay Council, as admitting
to helping White draft his Bill.
The final Bill, produced only one week before its
second reading, was long and complicated, running to some
sixteen clauses organised in three parts;
a. termination of pregnancy,
b. experiments on foetus and foetal material,
c. miscellaneous (covering regulations, burden of proof,
penalties and the anonymity of witnesses in abortion
prosecutions).
The text of this complex lengthy Bill is contained in an
121
Appendix.
The Bill's supporters and opponents naturally disagreed
on its intended effects but there was one point of common
agreement viz. that the number of legal abortions performed
122
annually would be greatly reduced. The former estimated
that they would fall by about 70,000 per year; the latter
thought no more than 10 to 20 thousand abortions would be carried
out per year.
120. Scottish Catholic Observer, 14 February 1975.
121. See Appendix 1(13) for copy of full text of Bill.
122. The Times, 6 February 1975.
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Greenwood and Young have interpreted the Bill as:
... being primarily ideological in that it would
permit abortion only where it will alleviate social
problems and strengthen the nuclear family ...
Abortion legislation would work as intended, only
the "deprived" the "sic^3and the "inadequate"
would obtain treatment.
They saw the provisions of clause 1(1) as a clear attack upon
those *psychopathic doctors* who had interpreted the 1967
Act liberally and prophesied that such a provision would
delay the process of obtaining legal abortion, thereby
forcing women to seek treatment in the private sector which
124
the sponsors of the Bill wished to stamp out. Clause
1(2) was described as the most restrictive clause in the Bill as:
... although theoretically doctors would still be able
to take into account the environment of the woman or
their existing families, the "grounds" would^g
stricter and less women would get abortions.
Clause 7 was seen as having a potentially ironic effect given
that it set an upper time limit of twenty weeks but the desire
was to restrict legal abortions to hard cases, the young girl
or the overburdened mother, both of whom were found by Lane
to consistently seek abortion at a late stage in pregnancy.
Furthermore, it was predicted that the ban on late abortions
could lead to further excesses in the private sector, since late
terminations could then command very high fees. The clauses
relating to restrictions on referral and advisory agencies
were viewed as likely to have adverse consequences, unforeseen
by their promoters, in that they wouid forbid the giving of advice






by anyone other than a registered medical practitioner
or a person approved for the purpose by the Secretary of
State. This, Greenwood and Young state, would place
abortion clearly in the realm ofs
127
... the clandestine, the immoral and the taboo.
Again the impact of this provision would fall most heavily
upon those women the Bill was designed to help, for:
... lack of time, knowledge and finance have always
meant that it is harder for some women than for
others to get abortions; limiting info^gtion
would make this situation more unequal.
Finally, they state that concentration on the abuses served as:
... a justification for restrictions, as a front
behind which the wider reformist concerns of the
reformers could be^^sked, whilst mass support
could be gathered.
There are other points which can be made on the Bill and its
130
likely impact. Greenwood and Young are probably correct
in their assessment that the numbers of legal abortions would
be severely reduced. It seems reasonable to assume that, in
the seven years between the passage of the 1967 Act and the
presentation of James White's Bill, doctors would have settled
on criteria by which to judge whether there was a risk to life
or health and that the Bill, if passed, would render those
criteria useless. Moreover, the fact that interpretation of
•grave1 and •serious' could ultimately be a judicial




130. See, for example, those made by the Haldane Society of Labour
Lawyers.
The intention behind clause 2 (residential
qualification of foreign women) is perhaps rather difficult
to interpret. Concern over foreign women seeking legal
abortion in Britain tended to stem from the taxi-touting
and profiteering associated with them, which would be
controlled by clause 4 of the proposed Bill, rendering
clause 2 superfluous. If, however, the intention was to
prevent such women obtaining abortions then this was to place
abortion totally apart from any other medical treatment,
from which foreigners are not barred. Furthermore, doctors
who refuse to treat patients on the grounds of nationality
or any other similar criterion, offend professional medical
ethics and risk being struck off the medical register.
Clause 3 (notification to a patient's G.P.) presented
difficulties of enforcement since some (the number is unknown)
women have no medical practitioner with whom they are
registered as a patient. Clause 5 (the prohibition of
advice giving) would have had far reaching implications. Its
drafting was so imprecise that it is suggested that it could
have been construed as rendering illegal the activities of,
for example, social workers and the personnel of charitable
bodies, whose pregnancy advisory and termination facilities
augmented those of the NHS, or of any person providing advice
on abortion without being especially licensed for the purpose
by the Secretary of State. Similarly sub-section 5 of clause 5
might well be construed as prohibiting any individual from
offering any information at all regarding abortion
facilities (both in relation to advice and facilities).
Clause 7 (upper time limit of 20 weeks) might well have
led to ill-health or the death of women given that the only
exception allowed to the twenty week limit was for foetal
abnormality and not for risks to the women. Clause 11
sought to place the onus of proof on the accused person to
prove that he or she is not guilty of an offence, overturning
the normal rule in criminal law that it is for the prosecution
to prove the accused guilty.
The provisions of the White Bill differ greatly from
the findings of the Lane Committee, which recommended that
the inclusion of 'grave* and 'serious1 would not result in
a better implementation of the intention of Parliament; that
there be an upper time limit of twenty four weeks; that no
restriction should be placed upon abortion of foreign women
but that provisions be made (if abuses such as taxi-touting
continued) that legislation to avoid these abuses should be
considered. In only one respect did the White Bill follow
the recommendations of Lane (the licensing of medical referral
agencies) but even here White was much more restrictive than
Lane envisaged.
Four positions can be distinguished during the debate
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on the second reading of White's Bill: those wishing
abortion to be legal on the grounds contained in the
Amendment Bill; those wishing abortion to be legal on
the grounds contained in the 1967 Act; those arguing for
abortion on request but willing to uphold the principles of
the 1967 Act in the face of the Amendment Bill; and those
wishing to prohibit all therapeutic abortion but willing
to support the Amendment Bill. The great majority of the
speeches supported one or other of the former two positions.
The supporters of White's Bill argued that the time had
come to end all abuses arising from the 1967 Act by ensuring
that Parliament's intentions were genuinely carried out.
Those were that the rights of the mother and of the foetus
would be finely balanced in each decision and that each
individual case would be judged on its merits. It was
envisaged that the women who would benefit from the
availability of legal abortion would be young girls; older
married women with many children whose home circumstances were
such that they could not face the prospect of another child
and whose health was endangered by that prospect; and women
who risked giving birth to a child known to suffer from some
abnormality.
It was argued that there was instead abortion on demand due
to the wording of the 1967 Act which allowed the risk involved
131. Hansard H.C. Vol. 885, cols.1757-1868, 7 February 1975.
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in termination to be balanced against that involved in
continuation of the pregnancy which, since statistically
the balance favoured termination, allowed unscrupulous
doctors to flout the intention of Parliament. Moreover,
the 1967 Act had allowed the creation of a huge private
sector to cater for the demand and which itself encouraged
that demand by its very existence, as Babies for Burning had
shown. This private sector was described as being the
source of many of the abuses which had given rise to such
concern over the years and over which the DHSS appeared to
exercise only ineffective administrative controls. Concern
was expressed for women who were granted operations the
dangers of which they were unaware; who were exploited by
ruthless 'sharks*; and who were often given inadequate
medical care and inadequate medical judgement. Concern was
also expressed for members of the medical profession who were
thought to suffer intolerable pressures from the demands
created by the 1967 Abortion Act. It was repeatedly stressed
that the Bill was not a wrecking amendment, that it 'retained
the existing grounds for abortion' but sought to ensure that
132
'those existing grounds are observed*.
The supporters of the 1967 Act argued from a different
standpoint. They stressed that one of the prime objectives
of the 1967 Act had been to stamp out criminal backstreet
abortion with its attendant suffering; that this had been
132. Ibid.. col.1780.
achieved; and that it would return if the Bill became law.
The view that abortion was an intrinsically dangerous
operation was disputed and the findings of Lane were cited
to support this belief. The existence of abuses in the
private commercial sector was not denied, but it was argued
that increased administrative action, now taking place, would
stop them.
The 1967 Act was defended as embodying the best compromise
of two conflicting values, the life and health of the mother
and the sanctity of the unborn child, by allowing the
medical profession freedom to exercise its judgement in
each individual case. To insert *grave' and 'serious' as
criteria applied to risk was attacked as a regressive step
which would cause suffering to women and hardship to the
medical profession in its interference with medical judgement
and its ill-defined nature, which would make decision making
unnecessarily difficult and open the way to frequent prosecutions.
Concern for the medical profession was also manifest in the
objections raised against reversing the normal requirements
regarding onus of proof in criminal proceedings; it was
predicted that this was bound to cause a substantial reduction
in the availability of safe legal abortions, especially when
read with the proposed vaguely defined criteria for decision making.
Those who argued in favour of the retention of the 1967
Act in the absence of abortion on request stressed that this
issue above all concerned women and that, since the passage
of the 1967 legislation, working class women had been able
to get what better-off women had always been able to obtain.
It was argued that no woman ended unwanted pregnancies for
frivolous reasons, but only after deep thought and
consideration and that her decision ought to be respected
and given due weight. The proposed legislation was seen as
being clearly intended to undermine the original Act to
such an extent as to make it *unworkable and Draconian for
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women*. It was thought to be inspired by the Roman Catholic
Church and by the inundation of Parliament with propaganda
material of distorted pictures of foetuses. The real abuses
of the 1967 Act were the deficiencies of NHS provision which
drove women to the private sector. Fortunately, not all of
the private sector was corrupt, for there existed respected
charitable bodies which 'filled the need which ought to be met
134
by the NHS*, but which were being attacked by the proposers
of the Bill on the same grounds as was the private commercial
sector.
The view of those who opposed all abortion but were willing
to support the present Bill as a compromise measure was plainly
expressed by Donald Stewart, a sponsor of the White Bill:
I shall make my objection to abortion on one
fundamental ground. I believe it is a great sin ... I
welcome the Bill. I think that in some^gggree it
will remove the abuses of the 1967 Act.
133. Ibid.. col.1815.
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The position adopted by the Government proved to be crucial
to the outcome of the Bill. Dr. David Owen, then Minister
of State at the DHSS, explained the Government's wish to
establish a parliamentary select committee to examine fully
the issue of abortion. He stressed that the Government wished
to deal with this matter speedily and that what was proposed
was not a delaying tactic. A commitment was given that:
Should the eventuality arise that the House goes into
a different session before the Bill is considered, the^^
Government ... will re-establish the Select Committee.
He went further and said that:
The truth is that it is more likely to reach the statute
book more quickly through adopting the proposed procedure.
Not only is a pre—legislation Select Committee a good
principle, but it is a sensible way in which to proceed
in a difficult area. When the Select Committee reports,
it will be open to Members to put forward legislation
in the normal way or for the Government to consider ^37
whether they themselves should put forward legislation.
It is noteworthy, however, that he refused to commit the
Government to introducing legislation based on the report of
a select committee. Owen also outlined the Government's
position regarding the White Bill should a select committee
not be appointed. In these circumstances it was unlikely to
support the Bill by granting it any necessary extra time.
Owen also announced the administrative action taken by
the Government to control abuses and stated that it would not rest
until all exploitation of patients had been stopped and abuses
136. Ibid.. col.1794.
137. Ibid.. col.1795.
of the Act curbed. The Government supported the principle
of legislation in the area of licensing pregnancy advisory
bureaux but opposed the attempt to qualify risk as being
'grave' or 'serious*. This, Owen said, was restrictive and
therefore contrary to the central conclusion of the Lane
Committee. In addition, he argued that the full import of
this provision was not apparent until it was read with
clause 11 (onus of proof) which, taken together, would deter
doctors from performing abortions. Furthermore, the
adjectives 'grave* and 'serious* had been rejected during
the passage of the 1967 Abortion Act on the advice of the
Lord Chief Justice who had said that since there was
always some risk involved in either abortion or continuation
of pregnancy what was needed was a means of balancing those
risks by reference to a test of comparison.
Both White and Abse, his principal sponsor, welcomed
the initiative of the Government in seeking to set up a
select committee and tried to withdraw the Bill. However,
they were opposed on this and the Bill was given an
overwhelming majority by 203 votes to 88. The Government's
position had been that it wished to establish a select
committee not solely on the Bill but on the need for abortion
legislation in general but, after the vote on second reading,
a motion was moved and carried that the Bill be sent to a select
committee.
() The select committee on abortion
The Select Committee, appointed in February 1975, had
15 members. The Labour M.P.s were Leo Abse, an opponent
of the 1967 Abortion Act and sponsor of the White Bill;
Betty Boothroyd and Hel#5" Hayman, supporters of abortion on
request; Kevin McNamara, a Roman Catholic supporter of
the White Bill; Dr. Maurice Miller who had supported the
1967 Act when it was passed but who now supported the White
Bill; James White; and Fred Willey, a supporter of the
White Bill and chairman of the Select Committee. The
Conservative members were Elaine Kellett-^owman, who did
not vote on the White Bill; Andrew Bowden, a supporter of
the White Bill; Sir Bernard Braine, who had voted both
for the second reading of the 1967 Act and yet also for every
Bill to amend it since then; John Biggs-Davison, a Roman
Catholic opponent of the 1967 Act; Antony Fell, a Roman
Catholic supporter of the White Bill; and Sir George Sinclair,
a supporter of the 1967 Act. The Liberal member was
David Steel, an opponent of the White Bill. There were
therefore nine known supporters of the White Bill, five known
opponents, and one unknown who later proved to be a supporter
of the White Bill.
The Select Committee was empowered to send for papers,
persons and records; to sit notwithstanding any adjournment
of the House; to adjourn from place to place; to report from
time to time; and to report Minutes of Evidence from time to
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time. By the time it finished sitting it has received
written and/or oral evidence from over two hundred individuals
and/or organisations. The work of the committee was beset
by problems almost from the start due to the deep division of the
attitudes of its members. Its composition gave rise to a series
of protests, most notably in Parliament where ten Labour women
M.P.s unsuccessfully demanded that the committee be increased so




It produced four special reports in its first session,
the most important of which was the third, produced in July 1975,
141
which was unanimous and contained specific recommendations.
The Times considered that it *probably represented the lowest
common denominator in a committee sharply divided on whether the
142
grounds for abortion should be made more restrictive1. The
report did not refer to the provisions of the White Bill. Again
The Times may be quoted:
Sharply divided ... and discouraged perhaps by the
weight of official and medical opinion against any
change in the form as opposed to the operation of
the existing law ... the Select Committee has not
even referred to the provisions of the [white] Bill ...
Instead [it] has concentrated upon areas of possi^^
agreement rather than of inevitable disagreement.
138. First Special Report of Select Committee, H.C. 253, 3 March 1975.
139. See The Times, 14 March 1975.
140. Reports of Select Committee: H.C. 253, 3 March 1975,
H.C. 496, 21 July 1975, H.C. 552, 30 July 1975, H.C. 692-1,
10 November 1975.
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142. The Times, 6 August 1978.
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The areas of possible agreement referred to were the
abuses seen to arise from the implementation of the 1967 Act;
the interim report's recommendations were limited to
administrative changes which were regarded as matters
for urgent action. It recommended that the DHSS lay
a duty upon G.P.s, hospitals, pregnancy advisory bureaux, etc.
that they must inform women of the availability of counselling
both before and after a decision on abortion is taken; that
any certificate of opinion should be given only after medical
examination of the woman; that the methods of officially
recording abortions (certification and notification forms) be
examined with a view to improvement; that the regulations
under the 1967 Act be amended to allow disclosure of
information given to the Chief Medical Officer to the General
Medical Council in order that the latter may investigate
professional misconduct; that the DHSS should ensure that
terminations carried out after the twentieth week of pregnancy
should only be performed in hospitals with appropriate
equipment, including resuscitation equipment; that the Retx>rt
of the Advisory Group on the Use of Foetus and Foetal Material
be implemented forthwith; and that better records be kept of
the numbers of foreign women obtaining abortions and checks made
that foreign women did not constitute the majority of patients
at any one place.
Perhaps, however, the two most important recommendations
related to the private sector and referral agencies. The committee
thought that the DHSS ought to draw up a scale of fees
with which private clinics must comply; that any financial
arrangements between a clinic and a referral agency or
advice bureaux must be published; that private clinics must
give an undertaking not to perform abortions after twenty
weeks gestation, except if they have been especially approved
to do so by the Secretary of State. Furthermore, it was
recommended that approval of 'other places* by the Secretary
of State should be contingent upon the clinics complying with
the above conditions. It was recommended that the DHSS draw
up a *white list* of approved referral agencies and bureaux.
Moreover, a further criterion for approval of private
clinics should be that they be required to accept patients
only from approved referral agencies or bureaux. The report
also indicated that a re-established committee would comment
on the provisions of the White Bill.
The Government*s response to the interim report, unlike
that to Lane, was immediate. It announced in October that it
accepted in principle all nine recommendations made as being
necessary to curtail abuses occurring in the administration
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of abortion law. Barbara Castle, then Secretary of State
for Social Services, announced the administrative changes which
had been or would be made as a result of the Select Committee's
recommendations and said:
144. The Times, 21 October 1978.
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I think the House will be glad to know that action
is being or has already been taken on all the
recommendations made by the Select Committee in
their Third Report and on many of the «f«|gor
recommendations of the Lane Committee.
Furthermore, she announced that although the White Bill
and the Select Committee on it had now lapsed,
nevertheless the Government wished to honour its pledge
that it should be re-appointed. Accordingly it was thought
that the House should be given the opportunity of deciding
whether it desired this course of action and a motion would be
tabled to test that question early in the next session of
Parliament. The formal Government motion was tabled on
10 January 1976 that a Select Committee be established
to consider the Abortion (Amendment) Bill, committed to a
Select Committee in the last session of Parliament. It
was proposed that any new committee should be composed of the
same members as the previous one, in order that the
balance of opinion should not be altered. On a free vote the
motion was carried by 313 votes to 172.
Those opposed to its re-establishment tried to argue that
the motion was without precedent because it invited M.P.s to
set up a Select Committee to consider a Bill which had already
lapsed in the last session and that it would be a waste of
parliamentary time and resources to set up another Select Committee
on such narrow terms of reference. David Owen however said:
145. Ibid.
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To have ref used to put this motion down would have
been to shield behind a technicality and would not
have been in keeping with the spirit of the previous
debate. Whatever the views, it was the duty of the
Government to give the House the opportunity4£o
decide whether to re-appoint the committee.
The re-constituted Select Committee was bedevilled by
problems from its inception. Within a week the six M.P.s
opposed to the White Bill resigned in protest at its bias
towards the anti-abortionists, and expressed the belief that
the committee's work was finished and that any further
deliberations would undermine the Abortion Act 1967 and make
147
if more difficult for women to get abortions. Only one
other member was appointed in their place, Nicholas Winterton,
a Conservative supporter of the White Bill. In addition to
the protest by the M.P.s there was a boycott on giving evidence
148
to the committee by the sixteen leading pro-abortion groups,
including the Family Planning Association, the two main
149
abortion charities, ALRA and NAC.
The re-constituted Select Committee produced two reports,
150
in July and November 1976. The most important, for the
purposes of this study, was the first, since it affected
146. See The Times, 10 February 1976.
147. See The Evening News, 2 February 1976 and The Times, 5 March
1976.
148. Members of Co-ord.
149. See The Times, 5 March 1976.
150. Report(s) of Select Committee H.C. 573-1, 12 July 1976,
H.C. 737, 22 November 1976.
legislation whereas the second did not. The latter recommended
that an Advisory Committee should be established on Research
and Counselling on Abortion; that administrative action
should be taken to strengthen the position of conscientious
objectors to abortion, including nurses; that consideration
should be given to the possibility of establishing, on an
experimental basis, special NHS abortion units in areas with
low NHS abortion rates; and that pilot studies be made into
the cost-effectiveness of the provision for termination of
pregnancy in the NHS.
The first report recommended that the Government should
introduce legislation without delay to cover a range of
abuses and provided detailed comment on what provisions ought
to be made in that legislation by examining the provisions
of the White Bill. It was recommended that the 1967 Abortion
Act should be amended to ensure that the final decision on
abortion should be taken by doctors with maturity and insight,
a view supported by the BMA and the RCOG. This would be by
providing that, if in private practice, the two registered
medical practitioners necessary to certify the abortion
should not be partners and the one should not be the assistant
of the other, or be employed in, or share a financial interest
in, the same nursing home or agency. Moreover, it recommended
that one of the two certifying doctors should be of at least
five years' standing.
The committee considered the criteria on which the grounds
for legal abortion are based and especially the possibility
of amending that criteria by qualifying the risk to be
assessed as being 'grave* or * serious*. In the event, it
took the view that this was so contentious an issue that
it ought to be left to the individual consciences of M.P.s
to decide and therefore it made no definite recommendation,
save to express the hope that an opportunity should be
created for full discussion of the issue in Parliament.
The White Bill had required that all approved nursing
homes should have on their staffs a consultant medical adviser
to superintend and approve clinical procedures, the appointment
of staff and the use of the home by registered medical
practitioners. The committee, however, recognised that
this provision was subject to drafting and practical
difficulties (a view expressed by the DHSS and the medical
bodies) and took the view that it was a matter for administrative
regulation, not legislation, after consultation with the
professional bodies. The Select Committee also disagreed with
the provisions of the White Bill which sought to impose a
residential qualification on foreign women seeking abortion.
It recommended merely that quarterly returns be made of foreign
women obtaining abortion and that these returns should be published
together with a full statement of the special facilities
provided for their reception, counselling and aftercare.
The report accepted in principle the provision of the
White Bill which required notification of abortion to the
woman's G.P., but stressed that this should only be done after
obtaining her consent in accordance with regulations to be
made by the Secretaries of State. Although welcoming the
quick response of the DHSS to the recommendations made in
the interim report regarding referral agencies and advisory
bureaux (clauses 4 and 5 of the White Bill) the committee
took the view that the need for legilsation remained since
administrative power fell short of the changes deemed necessary.
It recommended therefore that legislation be introduced
to require all referral agencies, pregnancy advisory bureaux
and pregnancy testing centres which charge fees to be licensed
by the Secretaries of State. Moreover, it was recommended that
no exemption from this requirement should be granted to the
charitable agencies.
In principle the Select Committee accepted the need for
clause 6 of the White Bill (approval and regulation of premises
on which advice on or treatment for the termination of pregnancy
is given) but thought it badly drafted. In particular it
stressed that exceptions to the clause were required for
advice given by G.P.s and to preserve the exception for
emergencies in section 1(4) of the 1967 Act. Accordingly it
recommended that legislation should oblige the Secretaries
of State to make regulations by Statutory Instrument for the
licensing and controlling of the use of places for abortion and
for referral agencies, pregnancy advisory bureaux and pregnancy
testing centres which charge fees.
Another major recommendation of the Select Committee was
that the 1967 Act should be amended to lower the upper time
limit for legal abortions from twenty eight weeks to twenty
weeks but that exceptions should be made above that period
in the case of foetal abnormality and where it was necessary
to save the life or prevent grave permanent injury to the
physical or mental health of the pregnant women; and to provide
the Secretaries of State with powers to vary the upper time limit
by Statutory Instrument. White's provision on this aspect, that
exceptions would only be allowed for foetal deformity, was
seen as being too restrictive.
The committee further recommended that the implementation
of the Report on the Use of Foetus and Foetal Material (the Peel
Report) (clauses 8 and 9 of the White Bill) which had been
activated by the DHSS in response to the interim report should
be monitored, reviewed and reported to the House, no
legislation being necessary on the lines envisaged in the
White Bill. Clause 10 of the White Bill (restriction on
publication of identity) would have made it an offence to
disclose the identity of any woman who had had an abortion,
sought advice or information on abortion or given or been
summoned to give evidence in criminal proceedings under the
1967 Act or under the Bill. This the committee thought to be
too wide ranging and it recommended that legislation be
introduced which would restrict the publication of identity on
the same lines as that contained in the recommendations of the
Report of the Advisory Group on the Law of Rape (the Heilbron
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Report). This would include any witness who has had, or
who has been advised about an abortion which resulted in
criminal proceedings. The Select Committee also rejected
the need for clause 11 of the White Bill (onus of proof)
on the grounds that it did not consider there was a
sufficient case to breach such a fundamental rule of law. It
did, however, recommend legislation which would allow senior
police officers in the course of their investigations to apply
to a judge to inspect or take copies of any records kept by
'approved* places, referral agencies, pregnancy advisory
bureaux and pregnancy testing centres.
Clause 12 of the White Bill (penalties) was also criticised
by the Select Committee as imposing too stringent penalties
for contravention of the provisions of the 1967 Act or of
the Bill. Instead it was recommended that proceedings could
only be brought on summons and that there should be a maximum
fine of £1,000 and provision made to extend the time limit
for summary proceedings to three years from the commission of
the offence. It further recommended that clause 13 of the White
Bill (offences by corporate bodies) should be implemented viz.
that, in the case of offences committed by corporate bodies, then
responsible officers should also be liable.
151. Report of the Advisory Group on the Law of Rape, Crand. 6352,
HMSO, London, 1975.
Two recommendations of the committee went beyond
consideration of the White Bill. Firstly, it recommended
that the law was unclear with regard to the procedure known
as menstrual evacuation and that the 1967 Abortion Act should
therefore be amended to provide that references in the Act
to termination of pregnancy include acts done with intent to
terminate a pregnancy if such exists. Secondly, the
committee recommended that section 4 of the 1967 Act should be
amended to make it clear that a conscientious objection may
be on religious, ethical or other grounds and the proviso
that the burden of proof shall rest with the person claiming
it should be deleted as contrary to the general principle
governing the burden of proof.
The recommendations of the Select Committee can thus be
seen to be considerably more modest than the proposals contained
in the White Bill. As David Steel put it, given its
composition, 'the report could have been much more
152
destructive*. Nevertheless, the report did not find favour
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with any of the major bodies concerned. SPUC welcomed it
as merely a first step, although Life thought it bitterly
disappointing. ALRA, NAC and Co-ord attacked it as
being unnecessarily restrictive. The medical profession was
154
divided, limited support being given to some of the
recommendations but concern expressed over them when taken
en masse as likely to make it harder for women to have safe legal
152. The Guardian, 29 and 30 July 1976 and The Evening News,
29 July 1976.
153. Ibid.
154. The Times, 6 August 1976.
abortion and others totally rejecting the committee's
findings and calling for freer access to abortion.
(iii) William Benvon's Bill 1977
William Benyon, a Conservative M.P. , drew fifth place
in the private members' ballot in 1976 and announced his
intention to introduce an amending Bill to the 1967 Act on
155
the lines of the Select Committee report of July 1976.
Again the Bill was a long and complex measure containing some
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thirteen clauses. During the second reading debate,
Benyon explained his intentions and the purposes of his Bill.
He had introduced it because of the mounting disquiet in the
House about the working of the 1967 Act; as a response to
the recommendations of the Select Committee that there be
immediate legislation on certain matters relating to abortion;
to ensure that the specific recommendations contained in the
Select committee report found their way into the statute book;
and because the Government's legislative progremme was such
as to preclude any consideration of the Select Committee report
during the current session so that a private member's measure
was necessary to provide that opportunity for discussion. He
stressed that he intended to follow closely the recommendations
of the Select Committee report and added:
155. The Times, 22 December 1976.
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... if I have strayed beyond the recommendations ... in
any respect, that is entirely inadvjg^ent ... Any
erros can be remedied in Committee.
His central concerns were to remedy the abuses still in
existence despite the administrative action taken by the DHSS
and by so doing he hoped to remove the worst exploitation of
women in the private sector and to afford greater protection
to doctors and nurses in the performance of their tasks.
Moreover, one of his important aims was to reduce the upper
time limit for legal abortions to twenty weeks gestation.
The Bill incorporated very largely the recommendations
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of the Select Committee with four main exceptions in
clauses 1, 2, 6 and 7 where it exceeded, on a strict comparison,
those recommendations. It is probably useful to clarify
this latter point given that the ostensible reason for the
Bill was said to be the implementation of the Select Committee
report. In clause 1 an upper time limit of twenty four weeks
was imposed as an exception to the rule of twenty weeks for
foetal abnormality, but the Select Committee did not stipulate
any such limitation to the exception. In clause 2 no reference
was made in the Benyon Bill to the Select Committee's
recommendation that the qualifications of registered medical
practitioners applied only to those in private practice. In
clause 6, the Bill went further than the Select Committee report
by laying down the criteria on which licences were to be granted.
157 • ISM* col. 1784.
158. See Appendix 1(14) for full text of Bill.
Finally, clause 7 provided for no exception for
emergencies under Section 1(4) of the 1967 Act which
the Select Committee had recommended.
When the contents of this Bill are compared with
the findings of the Lane Report, it can be seen that in
seven clauses (1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, and 9) the Bill goes beyond
the recommendations of that committee, in addition to exceeding,
in four clauses (1, 2, 6 and 7) on a strict comparison, the
recommendations of the Select Committee.
During the second reading of Benyon's Bill it is again
possible to discern the four positions described as prevailing
in the second reading of the White Bill. In this instance,
however, there were rather more voices asserting that abortion
was solely a woman's concern and ought to be her decision
alone, with correspondingly fewer asserting that abortion was
always a sin which ought to be totally prohibited. Again,
however, the majority of speeches reflected varying versions of
the middle of the road position, supporting either the 1967
Abortion Act per se or the Benyon Bill per se.
The supporters of the Benyon Bill argued that abortion
on demand existed in clear contravention of the intentions
of Parliament when it passed the 1967 Act. Consequently abuses
had arisen in the implementation of that Act, abuses which the
DHSS had been unwilling or unable to curb. It had been slow to
take administrative action until some necessary changes had
been forced upon it by the Select Committee. Although it was
recognised that action had been taken on the basis of
the recommendations contained in the interim report, nevertheless
it was felt that administrative action was insufficient
in itself and that legislation was required, in particular
to deal with the private sector. The nature of the controls
necessary to curb the gross abuses existing in that area
were, it was argued, such that the Secretaries of State did
not have sufficient powers to initiate without further
legislation. Furthermore, it was thought likely that the
first report of the reconstituted Select Committee was likely
to be allowed to gather dust if it was left with the Government
to take action.
The perceived abuses arising from the workings of the
1967 Act were the profits being made in the private sector,
from which the charitable bodies were not exempt. The view
was expressed that many of the charitable pregnancy advisory
bureaux and referral agencies acted as little more than a
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*funnel through which to channel women to abortion clinics*
which were under the same ownership and with the same
personnel. A concern for women was expressed in the argument
that if control over the private sector was tightened then some
of the worst exploitation of women would cease. In addition,
it was thought extremely unlikely that counselling was unbiased
where financial links existed between advisory bureaux and
abortion clinics.
159. Hansard H.C. vol. 926 col.1844.
A further argument was that there was a pressing
need to protect doctors and nurses who had objections,
not necessarily based on religious beliefs, to performing
or assisting in abortion operations and that they had been
subjected to intolerable pressures since the passing of the
1967 Act. Again it was stressed that abortions were dangerous;
that they caused sterility; increased the incidence of
ectopic pregnancy; increased the risk of future spontaneous
abortion; and caused untold mental distress to all women
160
save those who were of 'a rather tough fibre'. It was
also suggested that in view of the number of couples
wishing to adopt children women ought to be informed that
abortion was not the sole solution to an unwanted pregnancy.
Finally, considerable stress was placed on the view that
the Bill was not a restrictive measure; it did not seek to
alter the criteria on which legal abortions were available;
nor did it attempt to return to the pre-1967 position. Instead
the Bill was described as being a compromise measure which fell
far short of the extreme provisions contained in its immediate
predecessor and was designed to achieve a more equitable
working of the 1967 Act.
The supporters of the 1967 Act argued that the Bill was
badly drafted and had enormous implications, if enacted, in
its likely effect. It was stressed that only if the Bill was
considered in its entirety was the real purpose of its
sponsors clear. Some of its clauses, if considered separately,
160. Ibid, col.1861.
appeared reasonable but nevertheless, when taken together,
showed that the intention of the Bill was to restrict
the numbers of legal abortions performed and make it more
difficult for women to obtain safe abortions quickly.
Consequently the dangers to women would be increased and many
would once more turn to backstreet abortionists.
It was pointed out that since the passage of the 1967 Act,
many other countries had passed legislation to allow therapeutic
abortion and that many had passed laws allowing such abortion
on wider grounds than those encompassed in the 1967 Act. If
this Bill was passed then Britain would lag behind most other
civilised countries. They argued that most of the abuses had been
eradicated; that the DHSS had taken administrative action as
a result of the interim report; and that time was needed to
assess the effect of that action before the need for legislation
was further considered. It was pointed out that only one
per cent of abortions were carried out above twenty weeks gestation
and therefore there was no need to reduce the upper time limit
since those cases were the exceptions allowed in the clause as
drafted. The inclusion of the charitable bodies in the
provisions regarding the private sector was deprecated. They
were seen as being necessary to augment the inadequate
facilities of the NHS and were thought to offer skilled and
efficient services. Finally, it was argued that any enabling
legislation required the co-operation of those who would implement
its provisions and, in this case, such co-operation was not
forthcoming since the medical profession had placed its support
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firmly behind the retention of the 1967 Act and regarded
the proposed measure as an unwarranted interference with
medical freedom and judgement.
Those who argued that abortion was a woman*s right
were prepared to support the 1967 Act in the face of an
attempt to amend it on the ground that they did not wish to
see further restriction. It was suggested that 'this
male-dominated chamber is constantly considering anti-women
measures' and that 'the kind of thing we ought to be debating
is ... a Bill to amend the 1967 Act by giving women the
right to choose'.163' It was asserted that:
... it is time that they accepted the fact that
women, and only women, have the right to decide
what is to happen to their bodies, and hav^^Jhe
right to control them and their own lives.
The Bill was described as seeking to degrade women and to deprive
them of their rights. The real abuse was the inadequacy of
NHS facilities which forced women into the private sector, but
the Bill attempted to restrict the activities of that sector
and would thus cause nothing but hardship to women. It was
therefore 'immoral, irresponsible and unthought out and
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ought to be thrown out'.
There were few voices raised in outright opposition to all
abortion on principle. One, Stanley Cohen, a Roman Catholic
Labour M.P., did state that:
I may not agree with the Bill in its totality because







if we can introduce any amendment to the existing
legislation that permits us to consider the very^4
important question of life, I shall support it.
Another, David James, a Roman Catholic Conservative, stressed
fcis view that:
... abortion equals taking an inno^gjst life and
talking an innocent life is murder.
He further warned that the Bill ought to be supported for what
pro-abortionists wanted was:
... the destruction of Judaeo-Christian society and
civilisation. To destroy it [they] must destroy the
family and destroy it at its weakest point, the
unborn child.
Roland Moyle, Minister of State at the DHSS, spoke in
his personal capacity and stressed he was not putting a
Government view. He stated that his department had
progressively tightened and extended its control of the
private sector, so that the abuses which had given rise to
considerable concern in the early 1970s had been brought
progressively under control. The situation was kept under
constant review and much of what had been said by the sponsors
of the Bill was no longer applicable or was totally misrepresented
or ill-founded. The inclusion of the charitable bodies in
the provisions regulating the private sector gave rise to
particular concern for he thought their existence had contributed
to the general improvements occurring in the private sector and
164. Ibid, col.1878.
165. Ibid.
moreover they were already closely supervised. He argued
that what was needed was not legislation but a period of
legislative inactivity so that the changes effected by
recent administrative action could be assessed and considered.
He advised that he personally would vote against the Bill.
The Bill was given a second reading by a vote of 170 to
132, a greatly reduced majority compared with that obtaining
on the White Bill. A move to commit the Bill to a Committee
of the Whole House was defeated, the vote being 137 to 109, and
the Bill was sent to Standing Committee
The Benyon Bill was low in the queue for Standing Committee C,
there being four Bills ahead of it. However, one Bill was
withdrawn and another moved to another committee so that
consideration of the Benyon Bill came sooner than anticipated
and thereby increased its chances of completing its
parliamentary stages before the end of the session. The first
two sittings of the committee reveal the intentions of those
members opposed to the Bill, for they were devoted entirely
to arrangements regarding the scheduling of the comraittee,s
meetings. In the event, Benyon and his supporters were able
to use their majority strength on the committee to arrange
virtually round the clock sittings on three days a week instead
of the normal once weekly morning session.
The opponents of the Bill were determined to 'filibuster*
166. See Official Reports of Standing Committee C; 22 June 1977,
29 June 1977, 5 July 1977, 6 July 1977, 7 July 1977, 12 July
1977.
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it out and its supporters were determined, after
obtaining the extra sittings, to keep debate as short
as possible. On 8 July Benyon began using the unwritten
rule restricting discussion of amendments in committee to
three hours, and in doing so broke another unwritten rule
that ministers* speeches are not interrupted for a division
or indeed that ministers are always called to speak if they
have so indicated. Such actions led to the tabling of motions
163
of no confidence in the committee*s chairman. The opponents
were restricted in their attempts at filibustering when two
of their members, Renee Short and Maureen Colquhoun, left
for the United States after the first sitting on a fact
finding tour for the Social Services Select Committee and
were not replaced when the chairman refused to waive the
rule that, once a committee has met, discharge can be for
medical reasons only. Aheir departure meant that the four
remaining opponents of the Bill had to talk for something like
fifteen hours each to keep up their filibuster and moreover
that the supporters of the Bill were always able to defeat
amendments despite the non-appearance of Mrs. Winifred Ewing,
an SNP M.P., at any sitting of the committee.
The decisive factor in the Bill completing its committee
stages before 15 July, the last day for private members* business
in the Commons, was Benyon*s decision to ask leave to withdraw
167. See reports in The Guardian» 30 June 1977, 7 July 1977,
8 July 1977 and 14 July 1977.
168. See The Guardian, 8 July 1977.
clauses 7 to 11 of his Bill. Although his opponents insisted
upon discussing each clause separately, nevertheless
Benyon's actions did succeed in cutting the proceedings, for
all the debating was done by his opponents. The committee
was therefore able to complete its work in time for the Bill
to be printed for report on 15 July.
Although the committee stages were complete it was unlikely
that the Bill would pass through its report stages on 15 July
for it was sixth in line for debate, and to succeed would need
extra time granted by the Government, which was divided on
the Bill. It is known that at least one attempt was made
169
by ministers to arrange a compromise. They had offered
to help the Bill through the Commons but only if both sides
agreed to certain amendments. The most important proposals
were to raise the maximum time limit for abortion operations from
twenty to twenty two weeks from the presumed moment of
conception and to exampt the charitable bodies from the
regulations proposed in the Bill for pregnancy testing and
advisory centres. It is also thought that the government wanted
abortion on request during the first twelve weeks of pregnancy
in return for reducing the upper time limit for legal abortion
from twenty-eight weeks and an extension of the conscience
clause to cover objections other than those based on religious
beliefs. However, the Labour women M.P.s rejected the move
to compromise and it is thought that Benyon's supporters, although
169. See The Guardian, 15 July 1977.
not Benyon himself, refused to accept abortion on request.
The Government refused to grant the necessary time on the
grounds that there were strong feelings on both sides and
therefore the matter must be dealt with in accordance with
the normal procedures of the House. The Benyon Bill thus
fell with the end of the parliamentary session.
9. Conclusion
To sum up, the period between 1975 and 1977 was one of
intense parliamentary action parallel to that existing between
1965 and 1967. ALRA was taken over by young, politically
inexperienced people who were unfamiliar with the mechanics
of the legislative process and who did not organise their
forces (at least initially although this began to change
towards the end of 1976) as well as their predecessors. SPUC
on the other hand had become a much more tactically effective
organisation than before. It was not until Co-ord was
established that there existed a really effective lobbying
pro-abortion body. The concern generated by the media in the
earlier period (1968-1974) over the abuses arising from the
working of the Act had continued, due largely in part to the
slow reaction of the DHSS to the findings of the Lane Committee.
A great deal of publicity was given to Babies for Burning
which had been published in late 1974 and further increased
the disquiet felt over the abuses.
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These factors are reflected in the extremely large vote
on the second reading of the White Bill, which itself
further focused attention on the abortion issue. Most
of the leading newspapers came out against the Bill. Public
opinion polls tended to show support either for the retention
of the 1967 Act or its amendment to make abortion easier to
obtain. Moreover, an increasing body of organised public
opinion was for the retention of the 1967 Act, as evidenced
170
by the many resolutions passed during this period. The
churches were disturbed generally over the abortion issue but
apart from what might be thought an uncanny alliance between
the Roman Catholic Church and the Church of Scotland in support
of the amending Bill, opinion was deeply divided as to how best
to deal with that concern. For the first time the medical
profession was united and wished to retain the 1967 Act subject
to some minor points. As a result of the interim report of the
Select Committee the DHSS moved quickly to take administrative
action on its recommendations. Babies for Burning was largely
discredited during the later part of this period.
These factors combined to suggest why the majority vote
on the Benyon Bill was very much reduced from that in support
of the White Bill. There are signs too that M.P.s were
171
becoming tired of being besieged by letters on abortion, as
one M.P. stated in the survey conducted by The Sunday Times, 'the
170. As is evidenced by previous sections of this chapter.
171. See The Survey of M.P.• s opinions on Abortion by The
Sunday Times, 26 February 1977.
next M.P. who tries to amend the Abortion Act will get
172
castrated*. Whether the Benyon Bill would have passed
its report stage and third reading or got through the House
of Lords in its same form is a matter for speculation but
it does appear that the desire of M.P.s, at least the members
of the 1974-79 Parliament, to legislate on abortion is
diminishing, a fact evidenced by the further decrease in the
majority vote in favour of amendment on the Bill introduced
by Bern$d Braine early in 1978 which passed its second
173
reading by only six votes. In the event, the Government's
decision not to grant extra time was decisive to the outcome
of the Benyon Bill and that decision was very largely influenced
by the intensity of feeling generated on both sides of the
abortion controversy, so that the Government did not wish to
stand accused of partisanship on an issue which was regarded
as one of conscience.
172. Ibid.
173. See The Scotsman, 22 February 1978
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CHAPTER SIX
THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE EMERGENCE OF LAW
I. Introduction
The previous chapters have provided a narrative history
of tS»e social, political and legal aspects of the changing nature
of the abortion controversy between 1936 and 1977. As stated
in the Introduction to this thesis, the production of this
comprehensive socio-political history of abortion law reform
has a subsidiary purpose. It allows general theories of
law emergence to be subjected to empirical examination and
their relevance to this issue assessed. Before making any
such assessment, it is necessary to derive a clear understanding
of what such theories purport to explain.
The first part of this chapter will provide therefore a
critical review of general theories of law emergence. The
second section will examine the four substantial existing accounts
of abortion law reform to ascertain if these works are
informed by or adhere to any one general theoretical position
and to compare their conclusions with that of this study.
Finally, the chapter ends by recognising that the legislative
process per se is a key determining factor in whether or not
laws actually come into being and therefore comprises an
examination of the rules and practices governing the legislative
arena in addition to providing an account of the recognised sources
of legislation.
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2. General theories of emergence of law
There are several theories of the emergence of
criminal law and in recent years there have been a substantial
number of case studies undertaken into the origin of specific
criminal laws which help evaluate the applicability of the
theories advanced concerning the social origins of criminal
legislation.1
Theories which have been advanced to explain the emergence
of law tend to follow general theories of society, broadly
distinguishable into order and conflict models of society. The
order model stresses cohesion, integration, stability, a shared
culture. Any disagreement that may arise is viewed as resoluble
by mutually agreed processes. Conflict theory on the other
hand sees society as unstable, involving continuous political
struggle between conflicting groups. In consensus theory,
criminal law is explained as a reflection of society's customary
beliefs; it is a body of rules which reflect the general
value consensus of society. In conflict theory, the criminal
law is seen as a set of rules which come about as a result of the
struggle between those who are ruled and the ruling class whose
interests are always protected and enhanced in law. In between
these two extreme positions are a number of case studies of
1. See, for example: Hall, J.: Theft, Law and Society, Bobbs-
Merril, Indianapolis, 1952; Becker, H.: Outsiders: Studies
in the Sociology of Deviance, Free Press of Glencoe, New York,
1963; Chambliss, W.J.: 'A Sociological Analysis of the Law
of Vagrancy1, Social Problems,Vol.12 (1964) pp.67-77;
Carson, W.G.: Symbolic and Instrumental Dimensions of Early
Factory Legislation: A Case Study of the Social Origins of
Criminal Law. In Hood, R.(ed.): Crime, Criminology and Public
Policy, Heineraann, London, 1974; Gunningham, N.: Pollution,
Social Interest and the Law, Martin Robertson, London, 1974;
Gusfield, J.: Symbolic Crusade: Status Politics and the American
Temperance Movement, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 1963;
Paulus, I.: The Search for Pure Food: A Sociology of Legislation
in Britain, Martin Robertson, London, 1974.
particular laws which point to the criminal law emerging as a
result of the activities of particular segments of society
concerned over specific issues at particular times.
3. Consensus theory of law emergence
In consensus theory, certain acts are defined as criminal
because they offend the moral beliefs of the members of society.
The law is seen to represent those values which are regarded as
being fundamental to social order and which it is in the public
interest to protect. The formal mechanism of law is resorted to
when behaviour goes beyond the tolerance limits of society.
Crime is then seen as establishing the limits of the community's
tolerance and thus creates a tighter bond among all members in
the community and increases moral solidarity. Criminal
behaviour is seen as the result of inadequate socialisation and
is more likely to be indulged in by the lower classes, since
their agencies of socialisation are thought less likely to work
effectively*-
There are problems with this approach in that in complex
modern industrialised societies it is extremely difficult to point
to a monolithic set of values (this may also be so in simpler
societies but that is not the present concern). One is left
asking why the law is used to uphold some moral values and not
others; at what point is behaviour regarded as so offensive to
morality that the law is called into action rather than informal
mechanism; at what point are certain values seen as so
fundamental to the public interest and order that the
disintegration of society is feared if the law is not used
2
to uphold them; why are some laws 'more honoured in the
breach than the observance*; why is considerable moral
3
opprobrium nevertheless attached to quite legal activities?
4
Erickson's study of the Puritans in New England is one of
the few examples of an attempt to test consensus theory and in
particular the idea that crime leads to increased moral
solidarity. Erikson describes three major crime waves in the
Puritan settlement within sixty years. Briefly, he concluded
that the crime waves were created by the community in order to
help establish the moral boundaries of the settlement. Yet,
as Chambliss"5 notes, that there were three such waves in a
relatively short period suggests that each wave failed in
reinforcing moral solidarity. Moreover, on Erikson*s evidence,
it does not seem that the crime waves stemmed from a moral crisis
but were in fact created in order to resolve the power struggles
within the community; for example, the Quaker movement was
gaining in popularity within the settlement and posing a threat
to the authority of those who controlled the colony and it was
therefore defined as criminal to be Quaker.
2. For a discussion of these points see: Hart, H.L.A.: Law,
Liberty and Morality, Oxford University Press, London, 1968
and Lord Devlin: The Enforcement of Morals, Oxford University
Press, London, 1968.
3. Downes, D.: Praxis Makes Perfect. A Critique of Critical
Criminology , in Downes, D. and Rock, P. (eds.): Deviant
Interpretations, Martin Robertson, Oxford, 1979.
4. Erikson, K.T.: Wayward Puritans: A Study in the Sociology of
Deviance, Wiley, New York, 1966.
5. Charabliss, W.J.: Introduction to "Whose Law? What Order?"
op.cit.
At the time of the witchcraft trials, Erikson also
notes that the community was torn by internal quarrels between
the magistrates and clergymen who rul®4 the settlement and that
the colony itself was threatened by England in that
King Charles II revoked the colonial charter, sent a Royal
Governor to protect his interests and ordered the establishment
of an Anglican Church. The witchcraft trials created a
diversion and served to obscure the disputes which were rife
among the leaders of the community. When the persecutions
got out of hand and led to accusations of witchcraft amongst
the rulers themselves, the rules of evidence were changed and the
trials died away. These factors do suggest that the crime
waves, far from increasing solidarity, pointed to inherent
conflict within the community and the use of the criminal law
by those who ruled to maintain that position.
4. Conflict theory of law emergence
Within conflict theory there are various traditions which
emphasise conflict to varying degrees, for example, interest
group theory vis-a«*vis Marxist theory, but, for the moment, the
extreme form will be discussed. In conflict theory, as was
mentioned earlier, criminal law is seen as a set of rules which
emerge as a result of the struggle between those who are ruled
and the rulers who are the owners of the means of
production. The outcome of that struggle is that the
interests of the rulers are always maintained and protected
and the laws are enforced against those who are trying to
overthrow the ruling class. The criminal law is not a
reflection of objective values but is laid down in the
interests of the ruling class and results from the conflicts
inherent within class-structured societies:
Because the law is the outcome of processes of
definition which emanate from the powerful and,
as a result, is so cast as both to secure their
interests and minimise the likelihood of their
incrimination it cannot be taken as a neutral^
arbiter of conforming and aberrant behaviour.
Criminal behaviour is seen to result either from the struggle
between classes, being the expression on the part of the ruled
of their alienation, or to stem from and represent competition
for control of the means of production. Criminal labels are
applied, whether or not the behaviour would otherwise be tolerated
by the society at large, if it is in the interests of the
ruling class so to do.
The existence of crime is seen as diverting the lower
classes' attention from the exploitation they experience toward
and against other members of their class. It is used by the
ruling class to produce 'false consciousness* among the ruled
by making them think that their interests are the same. Any
apparent moral consensus on some issues is mistaken; such
6. Downes, D.; 'Praxis Makes Perfect. A Critique of Critical
Criminology.' op.cit.. p.3.
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•consensus1 is the result of the false consciousness which
is produced:
"Facts" are a product of the work of those with the
power to define what is taken to be "factual" and
of the willingness of those without such power to
accept the given definitions.
Nor is any credence given to the view that within the ruling
class itself there may be diverse and conflicting interests.
Superficially, it is granted, there may appear to be differences
on some issues but what is ignored is that they all work within
a common framework, a framework within which they all wish to
work and compete. Their primary interest is to preserve that
framework. So too is any possibility of compromise in law-making
denied. This, we are told, *is a myth perpetuated by a pluralistic
9
model of politics*. This view of the criminal law being the
outcome of a class struggle has been further developed by
the radical criminologists who started by advocating analyses of:
... the structured inequalities in power and interest
which underpin the p^gcesses whereby the laws are
created and enforced.
Their essential position is of course that capitalist society
is criminogenic:
... the processes involved in crime creation are
bound up in the final analysis with the material
basis of contemporary capitalism and its structures
of law ... Critically we would assert that it ijs
possible to envisage societies free of any material
7. Taylor, I., Walton, P. and Young, J.: The New Criminology:
for a social theory of deviance, Boutledge and Kegan Paul,
London, 1973, p.26.
8. Quinney, R.: Crime Control in Capitalist Society: a critical
philosophy of legal order. In: Taylor, I., Walton, P. and
Young, J.: Critical Criminology, Routledge and Kegan Paul,
London, 1975, pp.194-195.
9. Quinney, R.: The Social Reality of Crime, Little and Brown,
Boston, 1970, p.39ff.
lo. Bbadfws>J168Malton. P. and Young, J.: The New Criminology.
mi* ' P* 168.
necessity to criminalise deviance. Other controls
on "anti-social" behaviour (and other definitions
of what that might constitute) can be imagined, and,
from the point of vjjw of a socialist diversity,
would be essential.
From this point they further argue that the task is to create
a criminology committed to the abolition of inequalities of
12
wealth and power.
A case of the emergence of a criminal law designed to
protect the interests of the economic elite is that of the
laws of vagrancy, according to Chambliss in a well-known study
13
of those Acts. He explains the emergence of these laws by the
need on the part of the landowners to have an adequate supply of
cheap labour. The Crusades had necessitated the landlords*
raising money which they did largely by selling serfs their
freedom. The serfs then fled to the towns which were growing
into commercial and trading centres at that time. The Black
Death decimated England*s labour force and thus destroyed the
large pool of labour on which the manorial system was based.
The effect of this was to raise the wages of freemen which
exacerbated the condition of the remaining serfs, so that even
more sought refuge from depressed living conditions by flight to
the developing towns. The solution for the landowners was the
Vagrancy Acts which were designed to force labourers to accept
employment at low wages to ensure an adequate supply of cheap
11. Taylor, I., Walton, P. and Young, J.s Critical Criminology,
op.cit.. p.20.
12. For a discussion of the issues raised by radical criminology,
see Downes, D. and Rock, P. (eds.) op.cit.. and Rock, P.,
The Making of Symbolic Interactionisra, Macmillan, London,
1979.
13. Chambliss, W.J.: The State, the Law, and the Definition of
Behaviour as Criminal or Delinquent. Ins Glaser, D. (ed.),
Handbook of Criminology, Rand-McNally, Chicago, 1974, pp.7-43^
and *A Sociological Analysis of the Law of Vagrancy*, op.cit.
labour. In 1349 when the first vagrancy statute was passed,
its wording made its intention quite clears
Because that many valiant beggars, as long as they
may live of begging, do refuse to labour, giving
themselves to idleness and vice, and sometimes to
theft and other abominations; it is ordained, that
none upon pain of imprisonment shall, under the
colour of pity or alms, give anything to such which
may favour or presume to favour them towards their
desires; so that thereby they may be compelled to
labour for their necessary living.
Moreover it was further ordained that:
Because great part of the people, and especially of
workmen and servants, late died in pestilence, many
seeing the necessity of masters, and great scarcity of
servants, will not serve without excessive wages, and
some rather willing to beg in idleness than by labour
to get their living; it is ordained, that every man
and woman, of what condition he be, free or bond, able
in body and within the age of three-score years, not
living in merchandise nor exercising any right, nor
having of his own whereon to live, nor proper land
whereon to occupy himself and not serving any other, if
he in convenient service (his estate considered) be
required to serve, shall be bounded to serve him which
shall him require ... And if any refuse, he shall on
conviction by two true men ... be committed to gaol till
he find surety to serve. And if any workmen or servant,
of what estate or condition be be, retained in any man's
service, do depart from the said service without
reasonable cause or license, before the term agreed on,
he shall have pain of imprisonment.
As feudalism declined and commerce and trade ascended,
new social problems were perceived. One of the most pressing
problems was seen as ensuring the safe transportation of goods.
Consequently, the Vagrancy Acts underwent changes in application
and formulation. The emphasis was now placed upon criminal
activities and especially the suspicion of such activities. The
law was not now so concerned with those who refused to work
but with vagabonds and rogues and in particular 'roadmen'. This
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is exemplified by the statute passed in 1571:
Whereas divers licentious persons wander up and
down in all parts of the realm, to countenance
their wicked behaviour; and do continually assemble
themselves armed in the highways, and elsewhere in
troops, to the great terror of her majesty's true
subjects, the impeachment of her laws, and the
disturbance of the peace and tranquility of the
realm; and whereas many outrages are daily committed
by these dissolute persons, and more are likely to
ensue if speedy remedy be not provided.
At a general level, one criticism which can be made of the view
which sees crime as an inevitable derivative of capitalist society
(and this perhaps applies particularly to radical criminology) is
14
that 'proclamation alone is not sufficient'. The case has yet
to be substantiated:
The premise that crime derives from the material
facts of life in propertied societies rests on a
set of uijigxarained assumptions about crime and its
control.
Moreover, the view that not only is it possible to envisage a
truly socialist (and therefore crime-free) society but also that
this should be the task of the criminologist is likewise
insufficiently developed, for:
... [there is no] statement of the properties which a
truly socialist (and crime-free) society would possess ...
in the case, as it has so far been stated, of critical or
radical criminology, the entire intellectual construction
rests on the postulates that capitalist society is
essentially criminogenic, and that only by the total
repudiation of the ethic of possessive individualism on
which it rests, can "true" equality and "socialist
diversity" -^he prerequisites for a "crime free" society -
be attained.
14. Rock, P.: 'The Sociology of Crime, Symbolic Interactionism and
Some Problematic Qualities of Radical Criminology' in Downes, D.
and Rock, P. (eds.), op.cit.. p.80.
15. Downes, D., op.cit.. p.8.
16. Ibid.. pp.5-6.
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More specifically a criticism which can be made of the model
which sees all criminal law as protecting the interests of
the economic elite is that there are in existence laws which
17
apparently curtail the interests and activities of this group.
The Sherman Anti-Trust Laws in the United States, laws
regulating the administration of food and drugs, pollution and
health and safety at work are some examples of this type of law.
Although superficially these laws might appear to support the
view that the interests of the economic elite are not all-pervasive
in the creation of criminal laws, evidence does exist that the
effect of such laws as a restrictive force is more apparent
than real. Both Carson18 and Kolko,19 for instance, provide
cases in which those apparently threatened by the enactment of
laws actively participated in their promotion, because, by means
of their participation, they could ensure more limited compromise
measures. Moreover, in both examples, the encouragement came
from large companies who saw legislation as providing an
opportunity to curtail the activities of smaller companies in
competition with them.
17. See e.g. points made by Carson, W.G.: The Sociology of Law
and the Emergence of Criminal Law. In: Rock, P. and
Mcintosh, M. (eds.) Deviance and Social Control, Tavistock
Publications, London, 1974, pp.67-91 and Chambliss, W.J.:
The State and Criminal Law. In: Chambliss, W.J. and Mankoff,
M., op.cit.. pp.66-106.
18. Carson, W.G.: Symbolic and Instrumental Dimensions of Early
Factory Legislation, op.cit.
19. Kolko, G.: The Triumph of Conservatism: • re-interpretation of
American History 1900-1916, Free Press of Glencoe, New York,
1963 and Rail Roads aicRegulations, Princeton University Press,
Princeton, 1965.
Our attention is also drawn to the fact that not only is
legislation itself not always as restrictive or inimical as
might be thought but that there may in fact also be ineffective
enforcement: Carson found that the number of criminal prosecutions
instigated under the Factory Acts was in no way comparable to the
20 21
number of officially recorded violations. Indeed, Aubert in
his study of economic regulation, the •Housemaid Laws', found
that barriers to efficient implementation were built in at the
legislative stage itself by the very nature of the enforcement
machinery provided. This he explains as a reflection of a
compromise measure to assuage the feelings and interests of two
opposing groups: the labour movement and certain government
agencies who had their victory in the enactment of the legislation
and certain business groups who suffered no defeat by ensuring
that the legislation would not be enforced too rigorously. Aubert's
study is important in its recognition that there was not one
elite which •won' but, in this case, two powerful groups, one
ascendant and one descendant (in the power they wield) neither of
whom •won* or 'lost1 totally, in that a compromise solution was
found. This points to the possibility that there may be various
groups, all with some degree of power, which achieve different
objectives in the legislative and enforcement arenas. One group
may obtain recognition of its interests in securing the passage
of legislation, may even influence its drafting to some extent,
20. Carson, W.G.: White Collar Crime and the Enforcement of Factory
Legislation, u970'British Journal of Criminology, 10(4),
pp.383-98 at 391.
21. Aubert, V.: White Collar Crime and Social Structure, ^1952)
American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 58(3), pp.263-71.
but another may influence the enforcement of the law or even
secure its amendment at a later stage. The importance of
power and conflict is not denied if one admits this
possibility but discerning the exercise of power becomes
problematic in the recognition that during the different stages
of formulation, enforcement, and possible amendment, power and
prestige may shift from one interested group to another.
Additional criticisms can be made of the position which
views criminal law merely as the reflection of the interests of
the economic elite. The most obvious of these is that there is
a substantial consensus about some criminal laws, especially
those forbidding crimes against the person, which cannot be
seen as protecting the interests of an economic elite more than
any other group. Such observations have led some conflict
writers to acknowledge that their model must allow for some
22
consensus. In addition, what is often ignored is that
consensus may in fact be established as a result of passing a
law. As was noted earlier, the fact that formal mechanisms of
law are resorted to in some instances suggests that conflict has
arisen, that the law came about as a result of that conflict.
However, once the conflict over behaviour has been •resolved* by
a law which lays down the desired behaviour then consensus may
thereby be established.
22. Cf. Chambliss, W.J. The State, the Law and the Definition of
Behaviour as Criminal or Delinquent, op.cit.
One important point, which has been inadequately drawn out
by most writers in this area perhaps with the exception of
23
Carson, is that the effectiveness of legal regulations
rarely rests solely upon the threat of physical sanctions but
also upon a general attitude of respect for law and for a
particular legal system. Moreover, this attitude itself is
to a large extent determined by moral approval of law as
embodying social justice. The use of law as an instrument
of social control will be more effective and enduring if
individuals not only conform to socially prescribed rules of
conduct but, as members of society, accept them as their own.
24
Weber pointed out the need for legitimization of any system
of domination but this question has not been given sufficient
recognition by most writers embracing the conflict perspective
of law creation. As Carson notes there are 'self defeating
properties of criminal law when used merely as a coercive
25
means to the end of acquiring and maintaining power*. Or, as
Thompson has recently stateds
Most men have a strong sense of justice, at least with
regard to their own interests. If the law is evidently
partial and unjust, then it will mask nothing, legitimise
nothing, contribute nothing to any class*s hegemony. The
essential precondition for the effectiveness of law, in its
function as ideology, is that it shall display an ^
independence from gross manipulation and shall seem just.
23. Carson, W.G.: The Sociology of Law and the Emergence of
Criminal Laws, op.cit.« p.83.
24. Rheinstein, M.s Weber on Law and Economy in Society, Simon
Schuster, New York, 1967.
25. Carson, W.G.: The Sociology of Law and the Emergence of
Criminal Laws, op.cit.. p.83.
26. Thompson, E.P.: Whigs and Hunters; The Origin of the
Black Act , Allen Lane, London, 1975, p.263.
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5. Pluralist theory of law emergence
The essential position of a 'pluralist* approach is that
there exists a multiplicity of groups in society holding
different values and goals and seeking their recognition in
27
legislation. None of these groups is dominant; all compete with
one another for the attention of the legislature; any alliances
which are formed are dependent upon the nature of the specific
issue at hand. Under this approach, the role of public opinion
as an influence upon the nature and content of legislation is
then seen as 'constantly expressing itself not only through public
discussion in the press and radio but also through pressure groups
28
and professional associations'.
Once again, however, there is a failure to define what
constitutes a social problem or to explain why one area of
behaviour, as opposed to another, is viewed as problematic,
requiring attention, or to ask 'who regards the situation as
a problem?' A criticism which has been made of this approach is
that it tends to assume that groups are of equal power and have
equal access to, for example, the legislature and the mass media:
The objection that is voiced against such a view, of
course, is that while it does show what goes on in
situations, its astructural location of such situations
neglects the real issues ... Ultimately, as it builds up
into a cumulative portrait of the society, [it] ... has a
close affinity with the pluralist model of power - with
masses of apparently equally weighted pressure groups
vying and wrestling for control.
27. For a discussion see Chambliss, W.J. and Seidman, R.B.: Law,
Order and Power, Addison-Wesley, Reading, Mass., 1971, p.17
et seq.
28. Friedmann, W.: Law in a Changing Society, Peng&in, Harmondsworth,
1972, p.22.
29. Plummer, K.: Misunderstanding Labelling Perspectives, in
Downes, D. and Rock, P. (eds.) op.cit.. p.115 (where he goes
on to answer this objection).
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But again there is no conclusive evidence that this is so and it
may be that some groups are indeed more powerful than others,
do have more resources (in many senses) and are better able
to influence and maintain their influence over a longer jperiod.
Notwithstanding these reservations and, in particular, the
need to examine the relative power of various groups, there are
studies, a considerable number of which do, in fact, tackle the
power issue, which suggest that there are groups other than
economic elites which do influence and determine criminal laws.
Dickson's study of the emergence of drug laws showed the
importance of law enforcement bureaucracies to criminal law
30
emergence and Sutherland's study of sexual psychopath laws
points to the professional role of psychiatrists in defining
31
criminal legislation. Both of these works illustrate the
role of vested interests other than economic elites in the
process of legislation.
Other studies, however, show that groups other than those
with a vested interest do on occasion affect legislation and
that public opinion, when expressed through organised groups
acting on the legislature, can in fact have considerable effect.
One example of this is Becker's study of the American 1937 Marijuana
30. Dickson, D.J.: Bureaucracy and Morality: an organisational
perspective on a moral crusade, Social Problems, Vol. 16,
pp.145-56.
31. Sutherland, E.: The Diffusion of Sexual Psychopath Laws,
(1950) American Journal of Sociology, Vol. LVI, pp.142-148.
Tax Act. He uses the term •moral entrepreneur* to describe
those people who seek to bring about legislation which will
eliminate social evils as they perceive them and have no
direct interest, in a material sense, in the change they
would like to effect. He says:
Whenever rules are created and applied we should be
alive to the possible presence of an enterprising
individual or group. Their activities can properly
be called a moral enterprise for what they are
enterprising about is the creation of a new fragment
of the moral constitution of society, of its code of
right and wrong.
It seems even with this type of concern, however, that the
*public opinion' which is spoken of is middle class opinion and
that interest, albeit not apparently material, cannot be
excluded. Becker says that:
Moral reforming of this type suggests the approach of
a dominant class toward those less favourably situated
in the economic and social structure. This means they
add to the power they derive from the legitimacy of their
moral position, the j^wer they derive from their superior
position in society.
This of a dominant group augmenting its status through
legislation that incorporates its values is also evident, for
34
example, in Gusfield's analysis of the Prohibition Laws. Again,
the role of material interests may be seen, if not as insignificant.
32. Becker, H.S.: Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of
Deviance, op.cit.. p.145.
33« Ibid.. p.149.
34. Gusfield, J.R.: Symbolic Crusade: Status Politics and the
American Temperance Movement, op.cit.
at least as secondary, and reform can be seen to arise out
of conflict over status aspirations and discontent among
different social groups. The cri£ial idea is that political
action can influence the distribution of prestige by the
recognition of the values of the groups seeking change who
are motivated largely by moral indignation and/or humanitarianism.
Thus Gusfield says that, even if the law is not enforced, its
passage has symbolic significance in that it settles a clash
between two cultures, and enhances the prestige of the victors
and degrades the loeiws, by the public support of the one
35
conception of morality over the other.
Becker's study, in particular, may be criticised for his
tendency to see the success of a moral crusade as inevitable.
There may in fact exist various groups with differential
definitions and objectives all seeking to influence the
36
legislature. Aubert's study is important, as was noted
earlier, in its recognition of this fact. His study also
indicates that Gusfield's analysis may be deficient in its
conception of winners and losers for, as was also mentioned
earlier, there may be no overall losers and winners but a
compromise solution may be found. The recognition of the
complexities of the legislative process has perhaps been most
ably stated by bamert who states that to understand the
interplay of so many groups in the development of new legislation
35. Ibid.. p.4.
36. Aubert, V.s op.cit.
requires a model of group rather than interpersonal
37
interaction. Moreover, he also endorses the view that
laws may not reflect the interests or values of one group
but instead may be the result of compromise between the
values of opposing, strongly organised associations. The
result of this compromise may however be, he says,
*a patchwork monster*.38
One criticism, so far only referred to by implication,
which has been made of pluralist theories by extreme conflict
theorists goes further than the recognition that the question
of the relative power of various groups should be given
attention and that is that pluralism assumes that groups
work within a value-neutral framework - the State. Despite
the very real difficulties associated with this term,
39
including the difficulties of definition, we shall accept for
present purposes that used by theorists who advocate this
position viz. that the State is made up of various elements:
the Government, the administration, the military and police, the
40
judiciary, and the units of sub-central government. These
elements are seen to be controlled by the dominant economic
class for:
In an epoch when so much is made of democracy, equality,
social mobility, classlessness, ami the rest, it has
remained a basic fact of life in advanced capitalist
countries that the vast majority of men and women
37. Leraert, £.i Human Deviance, Social Problems and
Social Control, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New
Jersey, 1972, p.20.
38. Ibid.. p. 57.
39. For a discussion of these issues see: Marshall, G.: Constitution
Theory, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1971, ch.II.
40. Miliband, R.: The State in Capitalist Society, Ouartet Books,
London, 1973, esp. Ch.3.
in these countries has been governed, represented,
administered, judged and commanded in war by
people drawn from other economically and^jocially
superior and relatively distant classes.
The State is seen as a weapon in the hands of the dominant
economic group which is used to suppress the exploited class
and protect the interests of the dominant group. Law, and
especially criminal law, is seen as the ultimate means by
which the State secures the interests of the ruling class:
Crime control becomes the coercive means of checking
threats to the existing economic arrangements ... Crime
control in the capitalist State is the concrete for
protecting the interests of the capitalist economy.
Yet this argument overlooks the fact that the various elements
comprising the State may in fact be opposed on occasion, for
example, at a simple level, the judiciary may rule in favour of
an individual against an executive organ. Although the thesis
of the unitary State expressive of dominant interests may be
true, it ought to be regarded as problematic, requiring proof
rather than assertion. It would have to be shown that each and
every piece of law furthers the interests of one homogenous
economic elitesor at the very least, does not harm their
interests. If it can be shown, however, that laws do exist
which do not do this then the assertion that the State, however
construed, is controlled always by the dominant economic class
becomes suspect. To construct a theory of the nature of the
capitalist state from a consideration of criminal law may also
seem short-sighted. It is to ignore a whole area of law, and law
41• Ibid.. pp.66-67.
42. Quinney, R.: Crime Control in Capitalist Society. In
Taylor, I., Walton, P. and Young J.i Critical Criminology,
o^»ci^. , p.199.
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which, on the face of it at least, appears more likely to
regulate and maintain capitalist relations in respect to the
means of production. However, to speculate too far on the
nature of the State is not the concern of the present paper.
Let it suffice here to say that the extreme view is much more
problematic than is allowed by writers embracing that
perspective.
6. A continuum in which to view law emergence
From the above review of general theories and existing case
studies of particular laws, it would appear that each theory has
been helpful to some exteat in furthering our understanding of
the emergence of laws yet each is convincing only in relation
to specific types of issues. Consensus theory provides the most
obvious explanation of laws regulating behaviour whose truly
'criminal' character is not controversial e.g. personal assault.
Conflict theory aids our understanding of laws regulating
activities which bear upon the power, influence and material
interests held in common among privileged groups. Pluralist
theory appears applicable to those issues which do not
affect such privileged groups in a direct material sense but
concern moral issues involving deep divisions of opinion even within
the privileged group or groups whose existence conflict theory
postulates. Each then provides a framework for interpreting
some examples of law emergence but it remains true that
there is still a need for generalisation to further understanding
since no one theory so far advanced explains the emergence of all
criminal laws and each, interpreted as a general theory, is confuted
by some of the evidence. To recognise their limitations, in short
the fact that none is successful for all cases, is not to deny that
each also contains illuminating aspects which further comprehension.
This would suggest that a potentially useful task would lie in
the construction of some sort of conceptual scheme which encompasses
those illuminating aspects whilst overcoming the shortcomings
of the major alternative theories of law emergence which have
been outlined. Such a scheme would then permit the location of
different laws on a continuum, their position being dependent upon
which theory had most explanatory power for that particular
example of law emergence.
The construction of such a continuum is not without
difficulty however given the present form in which consensus,
pluralist and conflict theories are postulated. Nevertheless, the
evidence from the case studies suggests that modifications to the
present formulations are required and it may be possible to
suggest certain refinements which would facilit&*e the construction
of such a continuum. It seems axiomatic that there is
considerable consensus on some laws extant at any given point
in time and also on the view that certain activities should remain
outwith the ambit of formal legal restriction. This consensus is
s
not however inconsistent with the existence either of a power elite
or of a multiplicity of specialised (fpressure') groups which,
although party to such general consensus as exists, are on other
points concerned to pursue or sustain their own dominance or to
promote issues or causes which are not consensual issues. If this
point is conceded, a continuum cam therefore be constructed between
consensus and either conflict or pluralism. A continuum between
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all three major theoretical positions requires a further
concession however viz. that groups, however understood, do not
necessarily always function cohesively for all purposes and that
constituent members may function, for purposes outwith the
particular concerns of the groups, as members of other
collectivities. From the stance of conflict theory, therefore,
refinement would be necessary to allow for the possibility that
members of a power elite function as such only when the basis of
their power is at stake while for other purposes they may be
active as members of other groups whose membership does not
conform to simple 'class* lines' of division. Similarly pluralist
theory would require refinement to allow for the possibility that
within the multiplicity of groups there may be constituent
members who also form part of a power elite*and act as such for
the purpose of maintaining that power when necessary although for
other purposes they function as members of other groups. Such
modifications would then allow for the construction of a continuum
between consensus, conflict and pluralism.
The review of existing case studies both suggests that
modifications are required and that such a continuum could be a
useful device for understanding the emergence of different types
of law. At present the general theories appear to be at too
general a conceptual level and too far removed from the explananda
they purport to explain. Further case studies of the emergence
of particular laws would probably not take us very far however
in a search for a theory of law in general and its relationship
to society. Apart from the danger of generalising from a
particular law or even a set of particular laws and their emergence
over a relatively short period of history, there is an additional
danger. The case studies examine only the emergence of specific
laws and the social conditions of their emergence. As such
they may be valuable in their own right by telling us something
about particular laws of which we may previously have been unaware
but a necessary step which they have not taken is to examine how
particular laws relate to the whole legal system and interrelate
with the societal institution or institutions they seek to regulate
and, in turn, how that institution or those institutions fit into
the overall social structure and how the overall structure of such
laws or legal systems or social institutions changes over time. It
is only by confronting these issues that a credible general theory
could be devised with adequate explanatory power for the whole
range of particulars which it embraces. No claim is made that the
present thesis has accomplished this Herculean task.
7. Accounts of emergence of abortion law
As was indicated in the Introduction to this thesis, there have
been four substantial accounts (prior to the present one) of various
stages in the reform of abortion law. Unlike the present author,
the writers concerned have not sought specifically to set their
accounts in the context of theories of the emergence of laws, nor to
give any direct critique of such theories. Nevertheless, it seems
proper at this stage to review these four accounts with a view to
establishing what (if any) implicit view they take on general
questions about law emergence. The issue for this section of this
chapter is as to the models of society and of law emergence implicitly
present in the works reviewed.
Greenwood and Young assert that the analysis of the politics
underlying the struggle for abortion law reform in the United Kingdom
43
has remained shallow and cursory. In a brief account of the
passage of the 1967 Abortion Act they contend that the
43. Greenwood, V. and Young, J.t Abortion in Demand, Pluto Press,
London, 1976, p.13.
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legislation was a result of reformist political activity
which they say took progressive demands and pegged thera to
the needs of the system. Reformist politics is defined as a
belief in the idea that the social order can be adjusted
piecemeal, that social progress can be achieved without
44
fundamental change but by social engineering. The central
idea is that it was in the interests of the system as a whole
45
to allow this reform. Social problems, from the reformers*
perspective, are seen to result either from individual
personal inadequacy and/or 'unreasonableness' or from
government oversight but do not stem from the very nature of
societal organisation. 'Problem cases' are then seen as being
at the peripheral or marginal edges of an essentially just
society. The authors argue that in the 1960s three types of
'problem' were discerned: (a) the problem of the new poor,
resulting from the decline of basic industries, who could be
reintegrated into a 'caring' society by welfare provision;
(b) the maladjusted such as juvenile delinquents who could be
•saved* by recategorisation from wilful culprit to sick victim;
and (c) the problem of the wrongly stigmatised which could be
46
solved by decriminalisation.
Abortion was then defined from the reformists' perspective
as peripheral affecting the medically unfit, the psychologically





rationally in their sexual behaviour. To the reformers,
it is argued, the notion that •normal* women might decide
they required abortions was untenable (if they considered
the possibility arising at all) for •normal* women used
reliable contraception and adopted a rational mode of
procreation. Moreover, the reformers believed that all
normal women welcomed motherhood and accepted and valued
the existing family structure. Abortion was then required
for those cases who, though not medically at risk in a
direct sense, would be medically affected by virtue of their
social circumstances. Abortion was then seen as a means of
maintaining a strong family structure in marginal groups
where the family was so large as to be threatened by an
additional birth or where individuals were considered psychologically
unable to support a stable family. Women outwith these
categories, i.e. 'normal'women who demanded abortions were thought
to be frivolous and irresponsible and no legislator could be
48
expected to cater for them.
Greenwood and Young delineate three basic positions on
abortion: (a) that of opposition to all abortion except to
save the life of the mother; (b) that which would allow
abortion on demand; and (c) that of the reformers who adopt
neither of these extreme positions but who would allow abortion
in certain defined circumstances. The latter are further
divided into progressives and conservatives depending on whether
47. Ibid.. pp.17-20.
48. Ibid.. pp.74-75.
they wish to retain the 1967 Abortion Act or to legislate
severely to restrict, but not to »peal it. Greenwood and
Young identify SPUC and NAC as representing, respectively, the
first two extreme positions. ALRA, David Steel and the
parliamentary defenders of the 1967 Abortion Act are classified
as progressive reformers; James White, Leo Abse and the
parliamentary supporters of the White and Benyon Bills are
49
categorised as conservative reformers. Any difference between
these two ^Lngs of the reformist position is not then one of
principle but relates only to technical details, to finer points
of discussion on who should be included in the 'deserving* group
to be allowed access to legally available abortion as a
palliative to the social problems they typically experience.
ALRA is placed very firmly in the wafoxjnist camp:
ALRA is the body which can be most identified with
progressive reformism ... In the heroic period of its
history ... [it] shared many of the fundamentals if not
the emphasis of the conservative reformers ... Both in
their attitudes to parliamentary politics and the socio-
medical nature of abortion ALRA were typically reformist.
It is only when we come to the question of which women
need abortion that their major diffgjence in emphasis with
the conservatives becomes apparent.
In order to place ALRA within essentially the same camp as
conservative reformers, Greenwood and Young have obviously
accepted ALRA's official statements and literature of its
'heroic' period at their face value whereas the present study, by
its fuller examination carried out over a longer time span has
49. Ibid.. pp.15, 36-46.
50. Ibid.. pp.78-81.
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shown that what ALRA always wanted, as opposed to formally
demanded, was abortion on request and that its more modest
official position was consciously settled on for purely
tactical reasons since the mood of Parliament was not
receptive to its more far-reaching demands.
Greenwood and Young also firmly place the blame for the
continuing controversy over the abortion issue at ALRA's
doorstep:
The current struggle over abortion is because of the
limitations of ALRA. Their elitism blinded them to the
necessity of a mass-based movement, the building of
which might have resulted in the achievement of more
thoroughgoing results at an earlier date. A mass movement
would havg^strengthened ALRA and broadened the
argument.
Furthermore, they argue that the inadequacies of the principles of
reformism underlying ALRA's activities oviJed the substance
52
on which anti-abortionisra thrived and were the backbone
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of the stance taken by White and his supporters in 1975. The
move by ALRA in the last few years to the more contentious
position of the 'Woman's Right to Choose Campaign', which is
viewed by Greenwood and Young as a fundamental change in ALRA* s
policy, is seen as having been forced upon the organisation by
the tiraen's Movement and more especially by the emergence of
54
NAC, (this interpretation is again at variance with that of the
present case study).
51. Ibid.. p.136.
52# Ibid. . p. 84.
53. Ibid.. p.43.
54* Ibid., pp. 61 and 78.
374.
The authors contend that the underlying model of
society held by the reformers shaped the debates surrounding
abortion. It was the practical concern of the reformers to
iron out a few of the more marginal problems confronting society
for, by so doing, the problem groups would be integrated into
55
the body of an essentially just and healthy society. The
Abortion Act 1967 is then seen by Greenwood and Young as
having been permitted by the dominant elites controlling
society and the law making processes for it was in their
interests to do so; their support for limited abortion was
practical, a means of controlling potentially threatening
social problems:
Abortion is a highly effective means of limiting the
cost to the social services of lower working class
groups therefore it is in the interests of reformists
to direct their abortion policy tc this group.
Ideologically this is easy as Eheir map of the social
order would label the marginal working classes as
inadequates. Reformist legislation therefore reflects
the ruling class material interests and is phrased in^
terms of reformist ideas as to the nature of society.
They further argue that abortion on demand would not have
been (and will not be) allowed (without the development of a
mass working class movement) and furthermore that it was and
is strongly resisted by the reformers (which includes ALRA) since:
... its existence would threaten most cherished
beliefs as to the nature of society.
Abortion on demand would explicitly admit that abortion was
available because of economic circumstances, that the system was
unable to provide women with a real choice regarding family
size. Moreover, to make abortion available to all women
regardless of financial circumstances would, it is argued,
undermine the reformers* fundamental conception of women
and of the family, for the authors believe that sexual
pleasure is still generally regarded as legitimate only if
related to having children and that procreation is legitimate
58
only within the nuclear familys
It is because of their belief that the economic
system and the nuclear family are fundamentally
sane institutions in this best of all worlds that
the reformers deem women seeking abortion — outside
of those in the most grim and marginal circumstag^es -
to be not rational and to be acting frivolously.
Greenwood and Young do not entirely rule out the possibility of
abortion on demand but see it as a possibility only if a mass
movement develops which wrests this concession from the
ruling classes. This will only be won, however, if the
ruling elite renegotiates its definition of abortion. This
renegotiation will only take place if the ruling class feel
threatened by too many crises, by too great a demand being
placed on social services, by soaring crime rates and by problems
of *ghettoes*s
In crisis situations, governments do veer in a reformist
direction, ... but that reform ... is shaggd and altered
in the direction of the ruling interests.
Greenwood and Young therefore see the shape and content of







upholding conflict theory of law emergence.
The underlying conception of Pym^* is more difficult to
trace and discern. In a relatively short book she briefly
reviews the role of pressure groups in effecting those
reforms in the 1960s she terras 'permissive1; abortion, capital
punishment, divorce, and homosexuality. In addition, she
draws from the work of other writers of case studies of such
diverse pieces of legislation as the Clean Air Act 1956, the
Race Relations Act 1965, the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade
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Practices Act 1957, and the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968,
in order to formulate her conclusions on the extent of pressure
group influence on the legislative process. In such a book,
concentration on abortion law reform is necessarily limited.
Pym draws a picture of group activity fighting for
recognition of their values and goals within the legislative
arena but set against a general background of rapidly changing
63
societal values in support of law reform. She recognises the
importance of thalidomide to the cause of abortion law reform
by generating awareness of the problem and by winning
sympathetic support for legally available abortion in certain
circumstances. The Roman Catholic Church, its lay organisations
and SPUC are seen as outright opponents of the Portion Bill;
the BMA and the RCOG, though not totally opposed to reform, as
61. Pym, Bridget: Pressure Groups and the Permissive Society,
op.cit.
62. Ibid.. see p.144 for full list.
63. Ibid.. see pp.56-81 especially.
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counselling moderation, in which they had the support of
the churches; and ALRA is seen as the reforming body. The
comparatively strong influence of the churches and the various
branches of the medical profession is recognised, an
influence seen to derive from their being well-established,
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institutionalised and respectable. Nevertheless, to Pym,
ALRA was very much the power behind the 1967 Abortion Act not
only in effecting its appearance on the statute book but also
(unlike the view adopted in this study) in shaping the content
and form of the Act itself:
By providing the Bill itself, ALRA set the terms around
which other groups had to argue and, despite some minor
concessions on some points, the Act incorporated a large
slice of its programme ... No other group had quite the
same success althougJ^BMA and RCOG intervention were
almost as important.
As did Greenwood and Young, Pym has accepted ALRA's public
pronouncements at face value. The nearest she comes to
articulating a position on how and why the 1967 Abortion Act
emerged is to say that:
Abortion law reform was a clear case of pressure group
politics having an influence and perhaps representg^
the highwater mark of pressure group intervention.
Pym therefore appears to adopt a pluralistic notion of law
emergence in relation to abortion. However, after she has
considered the numerous aforementioned Acts, her position io
not quite so clearly drawn. With the particular exception of
ALRA, she decides that 'the role of pressure groups is at best






powerful. Groups are said to have influence only in that:
... they are agencies disseminating opinions which,
impinging on the consciousness, become imperceptibly
part of the taken for granted world. This indirect and
uncertain process is the most common, perhaps the most
important and certainly the most insidious form of
group intervention in the political field ... So groups
do have some role ... but when all is said and done
their contributions tend to be confined to the periphery,
to the supportive campaign, the ggtchdog brief or
ineffective huffing and puffing.
At this point, Pym therefore appears to reject pluralism as
an adequate explanation of law emergence, yet she offers little
in its place for she also rejects both the idea that the
•permissive' reforms of the 1960s were necessary to economic
interests which 'demanded flexible and spendthrift consumers
69
rather than obedient producers and disciplined entrepreneurs*
and that which says that the more powerful economic interests
can *out-propagandise' any move contrary to their interests and
promote either directly or indirectly those changes consonant
70
with their interests. Moreover, she contradicts Greenwood
and Young, in arguing that abortion law reform was directly
contrary to dominant economic interests in that it led to self
71
determination on the part of women. The picture which
emerges from Pym therefore is that she endorses the view of the
1967 Abortion Act as being the product of pluralistic
competition but that her more general position is both unclear and
confusing.
67. Ibid., p.115
68. Ibid., p. 119




Richards* position is much easier to discern. At
one point in his chapter on abortion he seems to take the
view that the climate of opinion by the mid 1960s had come
to (generally favour the notion of reform and that the reform
was then a result of consensus:
The climate of opinion had become very different from
that which had produced the Birkett Report ... the
worry was ... a population explosion. Attitudes to
contraception had become more favourable ... There was
also greater tolerance of extra-marital sexual
intercourse. The idea that easier abortion would lead
to mor^ decay and sexual licence had lost much of its
power.
Then at another point he suggests that *it was necessary to
restrict the number of unwanted babies* thereby limiting the
demands made upon the welfare state in order to maintain the
levels of minimum social provisions which had been achieved in
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the post-war years. Presumably, although Richards does not
explicitly say so, the interests of any dominant economic elite
would also be protected through such a process. However,
shortly after this, Richards' implicit underlying notion of
how the 1967 Abortion Act came about becomes clear. It is one
of pressure group politics and pluralistic debate for he
delineates the positions of the various groups involved in
the abortion controversy and then describes their behind the
75
scene activities during the passage of the 1967 Act. Richards




too accepts ALRA's official public pronouncements as
portraying their real aims. Moreover, Richards does not
question whether the groups were of equal power and
influence and therefore his pluralistic outlook is of an
unmodified form. The outcome of the activities of the
groups is explained by better tactical manoeuvring on the
part of ALRA and especially its nurturing of sympathetically
inclined M.P.s, particularly Cabinet members. After
reviewing the reforms of the 1960s associated with 'conscience',
Richards concludes that British democracy is based on
representation, a system in which:
... the public can express opinions on any issue through
pressure groups, the mass media, aix^personal communication
with their elected representatives.
However, he does concede that public opinion, although it
can never be 'written off' entirely no matter the form it
takes, carries most weight when 'organised and specifically
77
and precisely expressed by persons of authority'.
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Finally, a brief word on the work of Hindell and Simms
will suffice for the purpose and nature of their book Abortion
Law Reformed was more extensively stated earlier in this case
study. Thar purpose is very much to describe the events leading
up to the main Bills of the 1960s, that of Lord Silkin and
David Steel, and to provide an exhaustively detailed description
76. Ibid.. p.201.
77. Ibid.. p.203.
78. Hindell, K. and Simms, M.: Abortion Law Reformed, op.cit.
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of the day to day mechanics and procedures involved in these
Bills' parliamentary lives. They were even less concerned
than the writers examined here with the general question
of why laws emerge or even with the specific question of
why as opposed to how the Abortion Act 1967 emerged and
they draw no explicit or implicit conclusions on this problem.
However, their work does provide a description of the main
groups involved, albeit with a naturally more detailed
description of ALRA and from ALRA's viewpoint. As such they
seem to see the Act emerging as a result of pressure group
politics. However these authors lay much greater stress on
interpersonal interaction than any other writer although this
does not take over exclusively in their descriptive work.
Moreover, perhaps more than any other writer, they also
stress the role of public opinion, of consensual politics, for
they are at pains to point out that ALRA was the spearhead of
a public opinion supportive of reform:
... the chief burden of representing those millions
of women and of demonstrating their opinions ... wa^g
carried by Vera Houghton and the ALRA Committee ...
They describe the task of ALRA as having been to activate what they
describe as a widely-held attitude:
The liberal-minded public was now dimly aware of the
need for some kind of abortion reform, so were
politically active working-class women. What was
required was to translate this now widely held
attitude into political reality. The task w§s less to
proclaim the truth than to organise [it] ...




other writers, it cannot be taken as the only conception
underlying their work for they recognise the existence of
their opponents and the widely differing views of those
bodies in favour of reform in principle. Again therefore
this work tends to support a pluralistic view of emergence
of law.
8. The legislative process
However helpful the general theoretical models outlined in
the first section of this chapter prove to be in an analysis of
why it is that some areas of behaviour come to be legally
defined as criminal (by pointing to different types of issue,
underlying concerns for example economic interest, moral
indignation, status aspirations) there is an arena through
which all laws have to pass, regardless of issue, promotors or
type of motivation and that is of course the legislature. Most
writers interested in general theories of the emergence of
law have paid scant attention to the simple fact that before
there is a law on the statute book it must pass through all
stages and procedures in Parliament and be given the Royal
Assent (although this latter stage will in practice be a
formality). Only Paulus explicitly recognises that an
examination of legislative processes is not only helpful but
necessary for any study concerned with the emergence of a law:
However one may perceive the rituals of the "parliamentary
process", they are a stark reality that must be takeg^nto
account in any evaluation of the law-making process.
81. Paulus, I.: The Search for Pure Food: A Sociology of
Legislation in Britain, op.cit.. p.53.
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With the exception of Greenwood and Young, whose approach
is more akin to the general theorists, the writers reviewed
in the second section of this chapter have shown themselves
much more acutely aware than the general theorists of the
political and legislative processes whereby new laws are
enacted. This is especially so in the case of Richards and,
to a slightly lesser extent, Pym, whose primary focus has
been in terms of the activities of pressure groups. The point
taken in the present thesis is that general theory is relevant
and important, and needs more attention than most other
writers on abortion have given it; but that it itself needs
to be enriched by greater attention to political processes and
pressure group activities. This section will be devoted
therefore to an analysis of these processes and activities.
Groups of individuals wishing to secure a new piece of
legislation must work through parliamentary processes to obtain
their objectives. For present purposes these groups will be
termed pressure groups, by which is meant subsections of the
population organised on the basis of fairly specific common
interests or attitudes and aiming to influence the Government
32
and its activities.
82. There is an abundance of confusing terminology in this
areae^g. lobbies, interest groups, cause groups, sectional
interests, promotional groups etc. For a discussion see,
for example, Potter, A. Organised Groups in British
National Politics, Faber and Faber, London, 1961;
Stewart, J.D.s British Pressure Groups, Clarendon Press,
Oxford, 1958; Duverger, M.: Party Politics and Pressure
Groups: a comparative introduction, Methuen, London, 1972;
Roberts, G.K.: Political Parties and Pressure Groups in
Britain, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 1970.
To see how they can influence Parliament in the
legislation which is passed, it is useful to look at the
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recognised sources of legislation in this country. The
most important source of any legislation is of course the
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Government of the day for, as Rush notes, it controls the
business of the House of Commons to a large extend and can
usually ensure the passage of almost all its legislation. The
nature of legislation introduced by any government will to some
extent be determined by the party manifesto for which it has
an electoral mandate.
Yet, in practice, this mandate is not as important a
factor as might at first be thought. Various studies of
legislative programmes have shown that in one parliamentary
year the number of measures originating in the election
manifesto is very small. In one of the earliest such studies,
85
Jennings showed that in the 1936-37 session only nine out
of 54 Acts passed were purely political in origin although this
was the first year of a new Parliament when the party manifesto
is likely to have most influence. In the 1962-63 session, only
one Bill emanated from the 1959 Conservative election manifesto
86
and in the following year none did. Similarly, in the 1967-68
83. For a discussion of these sources see Walkland, S.A.: The
Legislative Process in Great Britain, Allen and Unwin,
London, 1968, ch.2.
84. Rush, M.: Parliament and the Public, Longman, London,
1976, pp. 37 and 76. For a discussion of how control of
the timetable is achieved see especially pp.37-39.
85. Jennings, Sir Ivor: Parliament, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 1958, Appendix 2.
86. The Times, 19 September 1963.
385.
session only one measure contained in the 1966 manifesto
87
was introduced by the then Labour Government.
Such studies also show that by far the most
important sources of government legislation are government
38
departments themselves. This does not mean however that
all departmental measures are automatically introduced for
the Cabinet of the day retains ultimate control over what is
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introduced. Royal Commissions and parliamentary select
committees are another source of legislation. The reasons
90 91
for setting up such committees are tt^ried, and, as Pym
recognises, their role is often the negative one of blocking
attempts at reform while the committee sits; as for example
in the case of the Royal Commission on Marriage and Divorce set
up in 1950. Hostile or even divided reports can be ignored and
legislation may be introduced directly contrary to what was
87. Rush, M.: op.cit.. p.77.
88. See Jennings, Sir Ivor: op.cit.: see The Times, 19 September
1963 which showed that of 22 Bills pending legislation in
the 1963-64 session, 16 were departmental measures.
89. Walkland, S.A.: op.cit.. p.23.
90. See Cloakie ,H.MS^nd Robinson, J.W.: Royal Commissions of
Inquiry, op.cit..
who suggest that they can be used a. to prepare the way for
a predetermined policy; b. to act as a 'sounding* device;
c. to avoid dealing with a/controversial matter by referring
it to expert opinion; d. to prevent anticipated political
pressure; e. to delay a question distasteful to the
Government whilst pacifying politically powerful groups.
91. Pym, Bridget: <op.cit.. p.90* ^ >
recommended, as happened in the case of the Industrial




Government, which ignored the recommendations of the Donovon
Committee set up in 1965 by the then Labour Government to
look at the whole area of industrial relations. Even
unanimous reports can be ignored as happened with the Wolfenden
Report on Capital Punishment which did not result in
legislation until ten years later.
Private members can also be a source of legislation through
their introduction of private members* Bills. Generally
speaking, these Bills form but a small part of the legislative
programme. Richards has shown that in the 1968-69 session
private members' Bills accounted for only 6.7 per cent of
92
parliamentary time. However, such measures have recently
been the source of major social reforming Acts, for example
in the areas of divorce law, capital punishment, and homosexuality.
The avenues open to groups seeking to provide legislation
are then diverse. They can attempt to have their views adopted
on a party's manifesto by promoting their views through the
party conference or by seeking to 'convert' individual M.P.s
to their point of view so that they take up the issue with their
own parties. Another avenue is to try to influence government
departments and persuade them that their issue is a legitimate
cause for concern requiring legislative action. This is one of
the most important avenues through which pressure groups may
92. Richards, P.G.: The Backbenchers, Faber and Faber, London,
1972, p.95.
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exert influence. 'Consultation with pressure groups in
93
the process of policy making in Britain has a long history.'
Wherever there is acute competition for electoral support,
no political party can afford to ignore any important section
of the population. Just as political parties must recognise
the political thinking of important sections, so must
departments in their individual fields of responsibility. Many
groups are now consulted as a matter of course by departments
in their day-to-day administration, as is evidenced by the
growth of consultative committees which are made up of
representatives from the civil service and interested outside
bodies.^4
The need to consult is perhaps most obvious when it is
realised that many governmental activities are carried out by
bodies outside the Government itself; the NHS, for
example, requires the co-operation of the medical profession.
Indeed, in setting up the NHS, the Labour Government of 1945-50
needed the co-operation of doctors, dentists and other medical
workers. It had failed to recognise this during the passage
of the legislation but adopted a much more accommodating and
95
conciliatory attitude after 1946.
Although the term pressure group has been used up till now
93. Walkland, S.A. : op.cit.. p.34.
94. Political and Economic Planning: Report on Advisory
Committees in British Government, I960.
95. See Eckstein, H.: Pressure Group Politics: the case of
the British Medical Association, Allen and Unwin, London,
I960.
to cover both 'interest1 and 'attitude' groups, as Stewart
96
states, departments do tend to consult most frequently
with those groups in which 'interests* are concerned
(sectional pressure groups), rather than those characterised
by shared attitudes (cause pressure groups). Beer suggests
that this is most probably due to the power sectional interest
groups hold (they are mostly trade unions, employers*
associations and professional associations) and to the fact
that the Government requires their advice on, acquiescence in
97
and approval of their policies. 'Cause' pressure groups do
not have similar types of sanctions however and have either to
work very hard to become 'recognised* by departments, for
example the RSPCA, or work through 'established recognised'
sectional groups with ready-made links with departments by
persuading such groups to their viewpdint, as is evidenced by
this study which shows 'cause* groups trying to influence health
professionals and trade unions.
Groups can also try to have commissions established with
a view to subsequent legislation. This may be done by
publicising the perceived problem in the mass media, by
persuading individual M.P.s or parties or departments that a
96. Stewart, J.D.; British Pressure Groups: their role in
relation to the House of Commons, Clarendon Press, Oxford,
1958, p.18.
97. Beer, S.H.: Modern British Politics, Faber and Faber,
London, 1965.
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situation exists arousing concern and that it requires
examination. However, as we have seen, such bodies are
just as likely to be used in order to block legislation, if
only temporarily, as to promote it and their chief value
tends to lie in publicising an issue, and in arousing
awareness in the existence of a perceived problem area.
One important avenue for pressure groups of a •cause'
nature is to promote legislation through a private member's
Bill. There are three procedures for the initiation of this
type of Bills98 unballotted Bills; ^en *1inute *\ile Bills;
and ballotted Bills. Unballotted Bills are only likely to
pass the first reading stage if (a) they are given an
unopposed second reading which is most unlikely if the Bill
is controversial; (b) if all ballotted Bills due for
discussion on a particular Friday are disposed of before the
end of the sitting which is also unlikely; or (c) the
Government finds time for it which only happens if it wishes the
issue brought before Parliament but does not wish to take the
lead in doing so.
A ^en Inute &le Bill may be introduced after Question
Time on Tuesdays and Wednesdays and only ten minutes is allowed
for its introduction and a further ten minutes for one opposing
speech. In the unlikely event that such a Bill gets a second
reading (its progress can be blocked if any M.P. objects) it then
98. See Taylor, Eric: The House of Commons at Work, Penguin,
Harmondsworth, 1967, pp.72-73, 130-1, 134, 152-53.
follows the same procedure as unballotted Bills.
The main vehicle for private members* Bills is the
ballot which takes place on the second Thursday of every
session. Twenty-seven places are drawn and the Bills are
lodged three weeks later. Sixteen Fridays are set aside for
their consideration of which the first eight are for second
reading. Since one measure may take up the whole of a Friday,
only eight Bills have a realistic chance of a hearing. As
all private members* Bills go to one standing committee (except
when the Government intervenes and allows a Bill to be
considered by another) obviously the higher the place a
private member has in the first eight, the greater the
chances of all stages of his Bill being completed in one
parliamentary session. Inevitably many private members* Bills
fail through lack of time (for Bills uncompleted at the end
of a session lapse) so the whole process is fraught with
difficulty.
Although these avenues of influence are open to pressure
groups, it is obvious that, for a Bill to be introduced, somebody,
either Government or private member, must be convinced that it
is right to do so. This may be because they, the Government
or private member, are convinced of the absolute *rightness' of
the measure but it need not necessarily be so. Governments
usually wish to stay in power and private members do not usually
wish to lose their seats. Judgements are often made on the basis
of such political considerations. However much convinced
of the absolute rightness of an issue, few Governments would
persist with a measure which they knew would inevitably lead
to their downfall, either in the immediate sense or the long
term because of overwhelming opposition at the next general
election. Such a measure would not be introduced or would be
modified in such a way as to lessen opposition to it by
seeking compromise. Political considerations may also mean
that where a measure is regarded with indifference by
parliamentarians it will nevertheless be introduced if it
will attract popularity. Even where a Government regards an
issue as wrong or ill-conceived it may sometimes decide that
it is politically expedient to introduce a Bill on it.
One example of the non-introduction of a Bill on
political cost considerations is the Industrial Relations Bill
based on the White Paper In Place of Strife which was to have
99
been introduced by the Labour Government in 1969. Again, the
minority Labour Government elected in 1974 was forced to
modify even major pieces of legislation such as the Finance Bill.*"'
After the rejection by the Lords in 1956 of Sidney Silverman*s
Bill to abolish hanging the Government found itself in a position
of defending a Bill it had never wanted and decided to introduce
its own Bill to pacify parliamentary demands and avoid a collision
with the Lords.
99. See Richards, P.G.: op.cit.. p.lOl.
100. See Rush, M.: op.cit.. p.21.
101. See Pym, Bridget: op.cit.. p.51.
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Similarly, private members are often guided just as much
102
by political expediency as by principle. Few private
members, especially if young, ambitious and hoping for a career
in politics, are likely to introduce a Bill to which their
party is fundamentally opposed in principle and/or do not
103
regard as 'politically* desirable. 'Ambitious young men
know well that excessive independence of spirit will not ingratiate
104
them with their leaders.' On the other hand, private members
may consider it advantageous to introduce a Bill to which they
may as individuals be opposed or indifferent if their party
would like legislation on a certain issue but do not wish,
for one reason or another, to be identified with as a party
or Government. As Richards notes, this is often the case in
matters of 'conscience*105 or if there is strong constituency
support or pressure for a measure and it does not conflict with
party political or personal political considerations.
So far we have only been concerned with the major
preconditions of legislation, that is that a Bill must be
introduced into Parliament. But introducing a Bill is only a
first step and getting a Bill through Parliament is fraught
with difficulty. Only a few measures not introduced by the
Government actually succeed in becoming law as the odds are
102. For a discussion of the factors influencing private members
see Pym, Bridget, op.cit.. pp.102-114.
103. See Richards, P.G.: op.cit.. p.57.
104. Richards, P.G.: op.cit.. p.59.
105. See Richards, P.G.: Parliament and Conscience, Allen and
Unwin, London, 1970.
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heavily weighted against them. The Government takes up the
majority of the time of the House of Commons for its own
business so that there are severe time restrictions on
private members* Bills. All Bills to succeed must obtain
a majority vote in Parliament. The normal procedure106 is
that a Bill, after its introduction and formal first reading
in either House passes to a second reading debate at the end
of which a vote is taken on its general principles. If a
majority is obtained then it passes to a committee where it
is examined in detail and voted on clause by clause and amendments
are introduced. After this comes the report stage at which the
Bill in its probably new form is reviewed and further
amendments may be made. Then, at third reading, a vote is
taken and if a majority is secured the Bill moves to whichever
is the other House where it goes through the same stages. There
is ample opportunity therefore for those opposing the Bill,
either in principle or in specific details, to gather enough
votes to prevent a majority vote. The considerations entering
into the decision to introduce a Bill as outlined above are
obviously of extreme importance with regard to obtaining a
majority vote.
Government Bills have a greater chance of securing a majority
107 108
as usually a system of official whipping is involved. Failure
to vote with the party may cause the private member to be expelled
106. See Taylor, Eric: op.cit.. ch.4.
107. A rare case of members being allowed a free vote on a
Government measure was in 1971 on the principle of entry
to the Common market.
108. For a discussion of whipping see Richards, P.G.: The
Backbenchers, op.cit.. ch.5.
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from the whip, but this is rare, and the whip may be later
109
restored. More usually members are subject to informal
sanction or party discipline. They can be banned from
party meetings,13"0 upbraided, or, if persistent, reported to
their constituency party. However, sometimes no action is
taken, as in the revolt by sixty-nine Labour M.P.s who supported
entry to the Common Market in 1972. Sanctions are more
effective against individual rebels than factions; discipline
is probably more affected by loyalty than fear of sanction.
Occasionally a Government will withdraw a Bill when faced with
the prospect of large defection by its own members. This
happened on the Industrial Relations Bill 1969 which was not
even formally introduced; plans to nationalise steel in 1965
were similarly postponed; the Parliament Bill of 1969 was dropped.
If a free vote is allowed, as in the case of some Government
Bills and all private members* Bills, ensuring a majority vote
is much more problematic. For a private member's Bill the sponsor
and his supporters must act as their own whips. They cannot
however force even those members known to be sympathetic to vote
or even to stay in the House. The time strictures on such Bills
have already been noted and it would appear that few Bills of this
nature have much chance of success unless the Government*s attitude,
at the very least, is one of benevolent neutrality if not of tacit
support, so that there is at least a possibility of extra time being
109. As happened in 1963 when five members who had been expelled
in 1961 for opposing the service estimates were restored. See
Richards, P.G.: op.cit.. p.59 for further examples.
HO. As happened in 1968 when 25 Labour M.P.s abstained on a vote of
confidence relating to Government expenditure cuts; see
Richards, P.G.s op.clt». p.61.
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granted by the Government.
Given that these are the procedures which must be
complied with to ensure legislation, the pressure group must
come to terms with them since they are the channels through
which they must operate if they seek legislation. They must
attempt to focus the attention of M.P.s, the Government and
civil servants on what they consider to be a neglected social
problem and convince their audience that their solutions are
the correct ones. To do that, they must be politically
sensitive, they must have an awareness that opposition is not
only likely but inevitable if what they want is controversial.
That opposition must be taken into account when constructing
a plan of action. If a pressure group fails to appreciate
the existence of an opposition, far less underestimates its
strength, its chances of success are slight.
Opposition or not, any group*s tactics must include
appearing reasonable and responsible if it is to gain enough
support not only to have a Bill introduced but obtain a
majority vote. This may mean that obstensible arguments have
to be advanced as they may have the greatest chance of
success as persuasive tools. There may have to be a retreat
from the group's original aims to more moderate aims in the
hope of gaining more support or of arousing less opposition.*'1'
111. See Rush, M.s op.cit.. p.31 and Pym, Bridgets op.cit..
pp.95-96.
112. Schlesinger, Arthur M.: The Historical Climate of Reform.
In Gusfield, J.R. (ed.)s Protest, Reform and Revolt,
John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1970, pp.121-134 at 124.
The prestige of a group is extremely important. If it
is seen as responsible as complying with the recognised
channels of dissent and the limits of dissent, i.e. 'the
rules of the game*, then its chances of being listened to
113
are greater. They must make themselves expert in their
area so that the chances of being discredited are reduced.
Demands must be made which are seen to be in accordance with
generally accepted values, for it is only when the goals
of the group are seen as in agreement with existing values that
114
the group is likely to obtain a legitimate status. It is
an advantage too to have a well thought out concrete proposal
which may be taken up by a private member who is successful
in the ballot since the time between the announcement of
results of the ballot and the presentation of a Bill is very
short and it is notoriously difficult to draft a Bill which is
not readily torn to shreds by opponents exposing inherent
technical deficiencies.
The political considerations inherent in the decision
to introduce a Bill and also in obtaining a majority, mean
that a pressure group must be able to exploit any discontent
over any issue or create a climate of opinion both within and
outside Parliament which is favourable to the proposed
legislation. This will involve publicly promoting awareness
of the issue through the mass media, public meetings, leaflets etc.
113. Mackenzie, W.J.M.: 'Pressure Groups in British Government',
British Journal of Sociology, Vol.6, p.133.
114. Clark, B.R.: 'Organisational Adaptation and Precarious
Values: acase study*, American Sociological Review,
Vol.21, pp.327-336.
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and concentrated efforts to have the group's solution regarded
generally as the 'right* one. Attempts will then have to
be made to demonstrate the strength of support for a particular
issue, for example through opinion polls or demonstrations, so
that it becomes politically desirable to introduce
legislation either for a Government or a private member. Such
a climate of opinion then greatly aids the process of
obtaining a majority for the issue has become one on which
it is politically desirable to act.
It is only by confronting the legislative processes over
any issue, by examining whether public opinion plays a part;
whether groups help mould that opinion; whether they use the
apparent channels of influence which are open to them and, if
they do, in what manner are they used; whether those channels
are in practice open to all or only to more powerful groups
or even only to one, the dominant economic group, that the
validity of the models of law emergence which have been advanced




The preceding chapter provided a review and critique of
the various theories which have been advanced to explain the
emergence of laws within advanced capitalist societies. It
also concluded that no one theory appeared to provide an
adequate explanation of the emergence of all criminal laws, but
each appeared to contain some elements of truth which were
applicable to different types of issue. Consequently it was
suggested that it was perhaps more useful to envisage a continuum
embracing pure consensus, extreme conflict, pluralism and
modified conflict theories.
The usefulness of this continuum was seen to lie in
allowing for differentiation between different types of criminal
laws and for consensus and conflict to be treated as problematic.
Furthermore it was suggested that however helpful these
theoretical models proved to be in understanding the social
processes involved in effecting legislation, most writers in the
sphere of emergence of laws had failed to pay sufficient
attention to the procedures actually involved in the legislative
process which are necessary preconditions for the emergence of
any law. Consequently a section of the previous chapter was
devoted to a description of the necessary legislative conditions
for introducing and passing a Bill and the factors which
influence those activities. The task remaining in this
chapter is to examine how applicable such general theories
are to the particular case study, abortion law reform in
the United Kingdom; where it falls in the continuum and how
the detailed examination of the legislative stages provided
illuminates these theories.
This will be done by very briefly reconstructing historically
the pressures and counter pressures in the struggle for
abortion law reform, and their outcome in the legislative
processes. The theoretical themes discussed in the preceding
chapter will be examined against this background of practical
politics, with the struggle for legislative reform being
divided into three main cycles; the period of legislative
inaction between 1936 and 1961; the period of increasing
legislative activity between 1961 and 1967 which culminated
in the legislative action viz. the passage of the 1967 Abortion
Act; and the period following the passage of that Act, (between
1967 and 1977), which is again characterised by legislative
inaction despite much activity directed towards and within the
legislature.
2. The first legislative cycle 1936-1961
Prior to 1936, the law relating to abortion was governed
in England by the Offences Against the Person Act 1861.1 That is
1. 24 and 25 Vict. Ch.lOO.
to say that abortion was clearly defined in the legal code,
at least of England, as being criminal in nature, no matter
how it was defined socially. The position was rather different
in Scotland where it would appear that the law had allowed
exceptions for therapeutic abortion when performed by a
medical practitioner. The first public calls for reform came
from a few individuals, and it was not until 1936 that a pressure
group was formed specifically for the purpose of pressing for
reform. The women of ALRA cannot be classified as part of a
dominant economic elite despite their middle or upper middle
class origins. They are better described as moral entrepreneurs;
but there is also a considerable element of status politics
in their activities. They wanted the operation to be available
at the woman's request made to a medical practitioner, except
where medical considerations indicated that it would be dangerous
or undesirable for the health of that woman.
Within the larger social environment other groups were
operating. One of these groups was the medical profession. This
group defies easy categorisation. In a sense it can be
characterised as a vested interest group for its motivation
was partly self interest but the interest was not a material
one but stemmed from the necessary involvement of its members in
implementing any legislation. There was an element of status
politics for it was anxious to retain its autonomy and therefore
status. There was too a considerable element of disinterest
evidenced by a desire to secure any such measures seen to be
most protective of its patients' health interests. The
profession was not united on the abortion issue, the BCOG being
additionally motivated by internal status politics.
Although no specific organised pressure group existed,
opposition to reform came from the churches, especially the
Roman Catholic Church, but the Protestant churches also did not
favour any major change in the law especially as it stood .fter
the Bourne judgment.
There are difficulties in any attempt to refer to social
climate or public opinion since it is not easily defined or
measured, being of an amorphous or fluid nature. Key has noted
this difficulty rather aptly:
To speak with precision of public opinion is a task not
unlike coming to grips with the Holy Ghost.
Nevertheless as he states it is often an influential although
not necessarily determining factor in human affairs, and some
attempt must be made to assess it.
Although a few relatively powerless groups did call for
limited reform, the fact that it was not considered a suitable
subject for discussion in the media tends to confirm the view
that the social climate was not conducive to reform and certainly
inimical to the notion of abortion on request. As a result ALRA
2. Key, V.O. Jnr.: *A Definition of Public Opinion*, in
Christiansen, R.M. and McVVilliams, R.O. (eds.) Voice of
the People, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1967, 2nd edition.
modified its original extreme platform and looked to
generating general awareness of the issue.
What limited pressure for reform existed was partly
responsible for the establishment of the Birkett Committee
which exemplifies the role of such committees in 'cooling
passions'. Its report was an unequal compromise, its
recommendations principally upholding the views of the more
powerful established groups, the medical profession, in
particular the BCOG, and the churches.
It has been said that such committees often act either
as a source of legislation or as a means to delay legislation.
The intervention of the war years makes it difficult to assess
the intention of the Government in setting it up, but in view of
the inaction of successive Home Secretaries after the war, it
can perhaps be seen as a stalling technique rather than as a
pre-legislation endeavour.
The fact that the three post-war legislative attempts to
reform the law were all private members Bills indicates that
governments felt no pressure to tackle the issue. There was no
overwhelming demand for abortion law reform within the country;
it did not form part of any election manifesto; the health
service professionals, normally consulted by government
departments, were not pressing for reform. Political cost
considerations favoured legislative inactivity on such a highly
controversial issue.
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Joseph Reeves was personally committed to abortion law
reform. His Bill, primarily a publicity exercise, was drafted
by ALRA in such a way as to appeal to the lowest common
denominator; it thereby hoped to obtain a majority at second
reading. However, the rules of parliamentary procedure
governed the fate of this Bill: its low place in the ballot (a
chance issue over which no-one has control) meant that Reeves
had only one and a half minutes for its introduction. It was
anyway so badly drafted that the opposition would easily have
discredited it. The Speaker could not accept that 'the question
be now put1 and the Bill was talked out. But it could have been
talked out by any M.P., it required no power on any individual's
or group's part. Failure was therefore due to a chance factor
within parliamentary procedure.
Lord Amulree's Bill was more carefully drafted by ALRA
but went little further than that of Reeves' since it was
introduced in the Lords and therefore likely to be only a
publicity generating exercise. Its withdrawal was due to ALRA's
own lack of sensitivity in trying to pressurise an individual
peer to go beyond what accorded with his own principles and not
to be power of any group.
Kenneth Robinson was again an M.P. firmly committed to the
idea of reform. Relatively young, and probably ambitious, he
judged that the political cost of introducing such a measure would
at least not be detrimental to his career ambitions. The Bill,
like Reeves', was a compromise but it did contain some new ideas,
perhaps in the view that his low ballot position would mean
it was again likely to be only a publicity generating exercise.
Although the debate lasted rather longer than that on the
Reeves' Bill, it was still not long enough to prevent the Bill
being 'talked out'. In this case, the 'talking out' was done
by a group of Roman Catholic M.P.9 but the rules are such
that any group of M.P.s could have done so. The failure of
the Bill is thus not evidence that its opponents belonged to
a dominant economic elite, or were moral entrepreneurs, or
belonged to a vested interest group or whatever characterisation
one wishes to employ. They could just as well have been acting
purely and simply on their oxvn individual convictions or on individual
political cost considerations such as constituency pressures or
the desire to enhance their own standing within their own
parties.
3. The second legislative cycle 1961-1967
The limited awareness of the issue which had been generated
and the Bills which had been introduced facilitated the task of
ALRA by providing a foundation on which to build. The new ALRA
personnel of the 1960's were motivated by factors similar to those
guiding the previous generation and felt the same need to
compromise. Again they are most aptly described as moral
entrepreneurs. In this era the element of status politics was
even more carefully concealed.
Among the other concerned groups the medical profession and
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the churches, again comprising a mixture of vested interest
(in the sense already described) status politics and disinterest,
were again incontrovertibly well-established and powerful. The
medical profession was not proactive but reactive; although
united in its concern that its views should carry the most
weight, its internal divisions (again the result of status
politics) helped diminish its normally considerable power. The
failure of its stalling tactics is worthy of note as
demonstrating that even well represented and normally consulted
groups may not have sufficient power to influence ministers
against their own individual views. It is true that the Bills
introduced were not Government Bills but the Government resisted
calls for commissions of inquiry, and did provide parliamentary
time for the legislation. The churches too were not united,
there being a multiplicity of definitions of and proposed
solutions to the problem and 00 unaniiiily as to whether indeed
the matter constituted a problem at all.
Counter-reform groups (the Roman Catholic Church, Catholic
Lay Organisations and SPUC) disputed the claims of the
reformers and pressed for a Royal Commission and the consequent
withdrawal of the Bills. Their failure was due partly to the
personal values and beliefs of important members of the Government
and partly because the legislative programme was well advanced.
ALRA continued to try to influence the climate of opinion,
with some success. However, the greatest impetus to rallying
support in favour of reform was provided by the thalidomide
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tragedy in the early 1960»s which captured the media's
attention. The period, too, appeared, at least superficially,
to be a reforming era.
During this period there vimtte no fewer than five Bills
introduced in Parliament within two years to amend the law.
Again the Government failed to tackle the issue itself, regarding
4
xt as one of individual conscience. The fact that it could
have introduced a Bill but allowed a free vote on it sugge ts
however that the Government's inaction was governed by more than
a desire to leave the matter to individual members' consciences.
Once more political cost considerations were probably operating
given that there had been no vote at a Party Conference committing
the party to reforming the law nor had government departments
been pressurised by the health service professionals to tackle the
issue. Indeed the latter urged delay and examination. There
was no overwhelming pressure for reform in the country at large
such that to ignore it might cost votes and there was a danger,
given the existing disagreements over the issue, that to tackle
the issue might cost votes or cause damaging party splits.
Legislative attempts to reform the law were therefore left to
private members Bills.
3. The recognition of the role of a serious incident or
accident in generating concern and subsequent legislative
action has been discussed by Rock. See Rock, P.: The
System of Debt Collection in England and Wales and its
Social Consequences. D.Phil, thesis, University of
Oxford, 1969> p#6#
4. For a discussion of 'conscience' in relation to
legislation, see Richards, P.G.: Parliament and Conscience,
op.cit.
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Renee Short was personally committed to abortion law
reform. Her Bill stood little chance of success, and was
therefore a compromise designed to attract the least
opposition. However it did not receive an unopposed second
reading as a ten minute rule Bill must do and therefore failed
by the rules governing parliamentary procedure. Again it must
be stated that these rules in such circumstances can be used by
any individual acting either from his own principles or
constituency pressures or whatever and that it does not require
power, strength or agreement of any other person or persons.
Although Simon Wingfield Digby had been persuaded by ALRA
to take up the cause of abortion law reform he was not prepared
to be further persuaded beyond the measures he thought
desirable. His Bill endorsed the views of the BMA rather than
ALRA, and he chose these proposals in the hope that they would
appeal sufficiently to M.P.s to obtain a majority vote at
second reading. However, Digby's place in the ballot was
relatively low, eighth, (a chance issue); debate was curtailed
and there was insufficient time for the Speaker to allow the
•question to be put*. Again the rules of parliamentary procedure
governed the outcome of this Bill.
It is unlikely that Lord Silkin was motivated by ambition
to be identified with this issue, nor does it appear that he had
a deep and personal commitment to abortion law reform; his
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interest appears to have stemmed from a chance remark by a
supporter, although not a member, of ALRA, and the conclusion
must be that he thought the measure desirable. The format of
his first Bill was not originally marked by compromise; it
presented the extreme case of middle range proposals.
However, he thought compromise essential when there were
deep divisions of opinion and no general consensus and was willing
to collaborate with his opponents to produce a Bill accept ble
to the greatest majority. This willingness, coupled with the
prevailing opinion that some form of legislation was necessary
and/or desirable, led to a large majority in favour of the Bill
at second reading. The Bill was further amended before and
during the third reading. The amendments, some of which were
introduced by Silkin himself, were generally influenced by the
views of the medical profession and the churches, better
established and more powerful groups than ALRA. Parliament
was dissolved before Silkin's Bill reached the Commons and it
was therefore lost.
In the next session Silkin re-introduced the amended Bill
and it was given an unopposed second reading. However, two
major amendments were introduced in the committee stages.
This is further evidence that no one group was all powerful in
its influence but that each was experiencing minor victories
and defeats; in this case the two groups were ALRA and the RCOG.
Events overtook the progress of this Bill: David Steel announced
his intention of introducing a Bill in the House of Commons;
Silkin withdrew his Bill so that the Commons could debate
fully the issues of Steel's Bill, since it is virtually
unknown for the Commons to find time for a non-government
Bill originating in the Lords.
There is no evidence to show that prior to the introduction
of his Bill, David Steel was committed to the cause of abortion
5
law reform. Indeed the evidence is to the contrary, since he
spent some time deciding which option to choose. His preference
was for a Border Development Bill, but he was urged by the Home
Office to take up either abortion or homosexual law reform and
told by the Ministry of Agriculture that no Government support
would be forthcoming on a private development Bill. In
discussions with the Home Office he discovered that the Church
of Scotland was the only major denomination opposed to
homosexual law reform. Moreover, in sounding opinion within his
constituency, he discovered that there was almost universal
opposition to the subject whereas abortion law reform, although
not favoured, did not meet with the same rooted objections. His
motivation arose therefore not so much from prior personal
comrr itment to the cause but from 'political cost* and feasibility
considerations.
Steel's position in the ballot (a chance factor) was high,
third, and for the first time in the history of abortion law
5. The following passage is based on information provided in
David Steel's private papers given to ALRA.
reform there was a real chance of legislative action. He
was determined to make full use of the opportunity by taking
note of all the involved groups and the Bill he introduced
represented a mixture of the prevailing views; he was
certainly intent on being more than the mouthpiece of ALRA.
The struggle to influence the terms of the Bill intensified
during its parliamentary passage. ALRA's vigorous lobbying,
coupled with the changed social climate which appeared to favour
some (unagreed) measure of reform, probably helped secure the
considerable majority at second reading. However, in the six
months elapsing between this and the committee stages ALRA's
influence diminished while that of the medical profession, the
various government departments and the churches, especially the
Church of England, increased. Of these Steel regarded the
BMA's support as crucial.
The Bill which emerged from committee had undergone
considerable changes which reflected the power and influence of
the more well-established groups. The outright opponents of
the measure had filibustered so successfully that the Bill could
only become law if the Government granted extra time. In an
attempt to win that extra time Steel further compromised to
accommodate the Home Office's viewpoint. In the event, though
not immediately, the necessary time was granted.
Control of the legislative timetable is very much in the
hands of the Cabinet, and there the majority favoured reform.
This was crucial to the favourable decision for Steel's Bill but
political considerations cannot be entirely excluded; the
very large Common's majority for the Bill suggested that
back-benchers were likely to be in favour of extra time; the
increasing intensity of the legislative campaign was not likely
to abate and a negative decision would probably only have
delayed reform; Steel's Bill probably represented the
compromise most likely to appeal to the widest variety of
viewpoints.
4. The third legislative cycle 1968-1977
This period is again characterised by the involvement of
various groups interested in moral reform, status politics and
the protection of vested interests. It also shows increasing
agreement within the larger social environment on two issues:
the abuses arising from the implementation of the 1967 Act were
defined as a new social problem; and there was increasing,
although not universal, support for the 1967 Abortion Act.
Until 1975 ALRA remained very similar in form and
character. Only thereafter did it publicly acknowledge its goal
of abortion on request. The personnel changed also; it ceased
to be an elite pressure group run by a few middle-class women,
or to be identified with any particular individuals, but was
operated by women from all walks of life drawn together only by
their Commitment to the Women's Movement. By contrast, SFUC was
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dominated by people from the middle and upper classes,
nevertheless it is best classified as a moral counter-
reforming group. To some extent SPUC also engaged in status
politics for it perceived the abortion issue as symbolising
a shift in the distribution of prestige within society. While
ALRA had previously been tactically adept and willing to
compromise, SPUC had not. For a brief period after the emergence
of the new ALRA, its influence waned while SPUC had developed
an increasingly more sophisticated organisation; it also :>egan
to show some willingness to adopt limited compromise.
The medical profession's stance was also largely governed
by considerations of self interest; general practitioners,
gynaecologists and psychiatrists all wanted legislation that
would leave medical freedom unfettered to allow doctors to make
their own decisions on any considerations they thought relevant;
however internal status politics was still evident. Certain
changes can be discerned in the viewpoints each segment
expressed compared to the positions adopted prior to 1967, and by
1975 each section had come to favour the retention of the 1967
Act, to believe that, on the whole, it was working well, and that
any ibuses could and should be resolved by DHSS administrative
action. In reaching this concord, the RCOG position had altered
more radically than those of the other groups.
The various churches are again best classified as moral
crusaders with an interest in ensuring that any legal definition
of abortion should reflect their ethical teachings. All
the major churches were agreed that there were abuses
stemming from the Act's implementation and called upon the
Government to set up an independent enquiry, but agreement
stopped at this point.
After the passage of the 1967 Act there was a growing,
though not total, consensus of public opinion in favour of
its retention. There was at the same time almost total
agreement that the implementation of the Act had led to abuses
although no agreement on how they could be eradicated. The
magnitude of the pressure for a special committee of inquiry
was such that the Government acquiesced for to have done
otherwise would probably have shown too blatant a disregard
for public opinion. The Committee's report represented a
compromise but this time an unequal one favouring ALRA which
perhaps suggests that their power to influence was increasing.
After 1967 there were no fewer than seven attempts made
in Parliament to amend the law regulating therapeutic abortion.
Again all were private members' Bills, a fact which suggests
that Governments still regarded it as politically inexpedient
to tackle an issue on which feelings were deeply divided.
Furthermore it is probably reasonable to assume that for three
years there was no discerned need for legislation until the
committee of inquiry had reported and advised on what type of
legislation, if any, might be necessary or desirable.
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Deep personal conviction motivated Norman St.John Stevas
to propose an amendment to the 1967 Act although the form of
the amendment was shaped more by pragmatism than by philosophy.
St.John Stevas' judgment was vindicated by the narrowness of
the defeat which in turn determined the content of the next
amending Bill presented by Godman Irvine (identical to
St.John Stevas'). This was followed by John Hunt's Bill which
was designed to regulate only those issues on which there was
widespread agreement that 'something had to be done' (taxi-touting
etc.). Moreover this appeal to the lowest common denominator
is again evidenced in the next legislative attempts made by
Michael Grylls (to curb abuses in the private sector). In the
aforementioned attempts at legislative reform, the motivation
stemmed from either personal corwtsCtion or political cost
considerations, acting either singularly or in combination. The
actual content or design of the proposed measures was determined
by the need to attract more support or arouse least opposition.
However, irrespective of motivation and content, the principal
determinant of success or failure was the rules of parliamentary
procedure and their skilful manipulation.
By 1975, SPUC had become a much more effective political
pressure group at parliamentary and constituency level.
Moreover the Government had been slow to act on the Lane Report
recommendations for administrative action and had not even
provided an opportunity for it to be discussed in Parliament
so that there was still considerable disquiet among M.P.s over
abortion. This disquiet was intensified by the considerable
publicity generated by Babies for Burning.^ There was then
no evidence disputing the claims made in the book.
James White's involvement in abortion can be clearly
seen to stem from constituency pressures. Even if White had
thought his measure undesirable, and there is no evidence that
he did, it is arguable that inaction on his part might well
have lost him votes. The general climate of opinion was in
fact illustrated by the vast majority in favour of the Bill
at second reading. As a result of these pressures and of the
very high place he secured in the ballot, the measure White
introduced was the most radical attempt to amend the 1967 Act.
However, in the event the Bill avoided normal parliamentary
procedures. On the Government's suggestion, and on a majority
vote in the Commons, it was sent to a select committee. This
suggestion may be seen as an attempt to use a traditional
technique of 'cooling passions* and of avoiding any situation
requiring a decision which could be interpreted as partisan.
Despite the evident anti-abortion bias in the composition
of the select committee (which reflected the balance of voting
at second reading), the interim report produced in July 1975
reflects an accommodation to the lowest common denominator of
agreement within it. The Government's swift move to take action
on its recommendations can be viewed as a political recognition
6. Litchfield, M. and Kentish, S.: Babies for Burning,
op.cit.
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that to do otherwise might well have damaged the party's
standing, given that it had advocated its establishment.
In the normal course of events, the rules of parliamentary
procedure would have meant that both the Bill and the select
committee on the Bill would have fallen at the end of the
parliamentary session. The Bill did lapse but the Government
had given a promise that in that event the Committee would
be re-established. Despite pressures to the contrary, it
honoured that promise by allowing members to vote on its
re-establishment. In doing so, it was again probably more
influenced by considerations of political cost and a possible
loss of standing had it done otherwise, than by any deep
conviction that to do so was right or proper.
The reports of the reconstituted select committee showed
a considerable move away from the absolutism of the White Bill
to a much more limited and modest approach to the amendment of
the 1967 Act despite the fact that they were produced
entirely by M.P.s opposed in principle to the 1967 Act. They
represented a recognition of the prevailing climate of opinion,
an accommodation to and consequent compromise of the many
conflicting definitions of and solutions to the 'social
problem•.
The final attempt to amend the 1967 Abortion Act was made
in 1977 by William Benyon, who had a relatively high place in
the ballot and thus a substantial opportunity for making his mark
on the statute book. His motivation probably stemmed as much from
personal conviction as from political cost factors. He did
not seek to alter the criteria of the grounds governing the
availability of legal abortion which suggests that he and his
sponsors designed the measure in such a way as to appeal most
to Parliament given that there had been a very large vote both
in favour of the initial establishment of the select committee
and of its re-establishment and that the reports had tried
to accommodate divergent views. It is noteworthy that from the
beginning, he was willing to compromise with other factions in
Parliament in order to construct measures representing majority
opinion both in the House and in the larger social environment.
Benyon was successful in obtaining a majority at second
reading, but it was a very much diminished majority compared
to White's.
The Committee stages of Benyon's Bill, commenced earlier
than expected as a preceding Bill was withdrawn and another moved
(under Lib-Lab pact arrangements). Both proponents and opponents
in their respective efforts to shorten or lengthen the available
discussion time indulged in considerable parliamentary
procedural manoeuvring. Following an unsuccessful attempt to
withdraw certain clauses, Benyon's supporters effectively cut
short the proceedings by their refusal to debate these clauses.
This adroit tactic could not determine the final outcome however;
the Bill was too low in the line for debate on the final session
day for consideration of private members* Bills and, in the event,
extra time was not allowed by the Government, notwithstanding
appeals from some M.P.s, the Church of Scotland and the
Archbishop of Canterbury.
There were probably a number of factors influencing
its decision, not least that the Cabinet itself opposed the
measure; both ministers most directly involved with abortion
were against the Bill in principle and a compromise suggested
by ministers had been rejected. The medical profession which
would 'implement* any Bill was also opposed. Furthermore the
weight of public opinion appeared to support the 1967 Act and
mahy influential and powerful bodies had opposed the Bill. The
pressure of opinion against extra time was therefore stronger
than that in favour thus bringing into force political cost
considerations which, on balance, favoured taking refuge
behind the normal rules of parliamentary procedure and allowing
the Bill to fall.
5> General Conclusions
This case study follows a particular facet of criminal law
reform from its embryo stages through all its phases of
development to the consequential events following the passage
of the 1967 Abortion Act. Such examination clearly illustrates
the process of harmonising the initially apparently
irreconcilable conflicts and disagreements between interacting
individuals and groups into a pragmatic accommodation resulting
from compromise which, albeit not the final solution of such
conflicts, nevertheless temporised sufficiently to allow
a process of redefining and re-negotiation for further
dilution of significant outstanding differences. This two¬
fold process is clearly exemplified at every significant
stage in the history of abortion law reform. The idea of
reform per se initially seemed unattainable in a predominantly
hostile climate of opinion in which well established and
powerful groups opposed such a notion. Yet as early as 1937
a committee was established at least partly as a result of
pressure from relatively powerless groups, and its report,
although an unequal compromise, did not altogether ignore the
views of these groups. The 1967 Act itself was also a compromise
but one more favourable to the reformers, whereas by 1974 their
views had come to be the most influential but again not all
powerful.
The identification and classification of social problems
may emanate from a large variety of different social and economic
groups, for example from an elitist economic faction, moral
entrepreneurs or very often from purely self-interested
objectives (such as concern over status) of a reforming group.
Furthermore such social problems are very often the recent
derivatives of changes in social structure which unfold a
subsequent problem imperceptible at first to the majority but
discernible to a certain group who consider previous systems
of control to be no longer adequate. Perhaps even a crisis has
developed as the result of some accident, such as that of
thalidomide, or perhaps there has been a series of incidents,
such as the *abuses' arising from the 1967 Act's implementation,
which are thought to require control. In such a case action is
required (i.e. from the viewpoint of the concerned individuals
or groups) to develop public and other relevant awareness of
the particular problem with its subsequent solution or
diffusion.
Whilst the generation of awareness is more easily achieved
by prestigious persons or groups such as economic elites, moral
reformers, status politicians, nevertheless there is no uniformity
or homogeneity in the nature and classification of such
groupings and the factors affecting their motivation are
themselves of considerable diversity in their origin. Indeed,
the evidence from this study is that classification of these
groups need not be mutually exclusive. For example in both
tfa major reform groups, ALRA and SPUC, there is to be found
a mixture of moral enterprise and status politics conducted
through symbolic crusades and within the medical profession there
is found both self interest and disinterest. Moreover, the
expositions and publicity activities of a group will often
proc ice a multi-directional chain reaction ,aj*jong other groups
and individuals who, whilst recognising a problem, will have a
different conception or definition of the problem and of its
solution. The action and interaction of such groupings usually
end in some degree of polarisation around different and opposed
demands for governmental or legislative action.
The subsequent action of Government, if any, is dependent
however on a variety of considerations such as the importance
of the problem; the nature and magnitude of the groups calling
for change; the support such groups command and the resources
they possess and the way in which the Government's image would
be affected by ignoring the problem. In these circumstances,
government action may sometimes take the form of establishing
an examining committee to make recommendations. This may
encompass such a long interval of time that the perceived urgency
of the problem as such may be diluted by the passage of time and
the emergence of other unanticipated events which are of such
a magnitude and importance as to cloud the original problem,
causing its subsequent removal from the arena of public concern
or it may be that weaker groups do not have the resources to sustain
their campaign over a substantial period of time. Such delaying
tactics of committees of inquiry also serve to remove the
possibility of a label of unconcern being attached to the
Government but, at the same time, prevent the need for
definitive positive action.
In the preceding chapter, a continuum was suggested as a
use L means of understanding the emergence of criminal laws
for it allows for differentiation between different types of
issues and treats the existence of conflict and consensus as
problematic. In the evidence presented by this case study,
abortion law reform does not appear to fit the extreme conflict
model of law emergence. Indeed, the issue appears to be
characterised by the absence of activity by any identifiable
dominant economic elite. In addition, if such a group had
existed, it is arguable that the 1960s would not have been
marked as an era in which activities were directed towards
making legal abortion easier and the 1970s by activities aimed
at restricting its availability.
The evidence also does not suggest the existence of a
general consensus either supporting or opposing reform of the
laws. Instead, the emergence of the 1967 Abortion Act and the
subsequent developments are better explained by the
activities of special interest groups, although the role played
by thalidomide, a serious accident, should not be under-emphasised,
nor should the publicity given to abuses - a series of incidents -
be underplayed regarding the attempted amendments in the 1970s.
The groups in question were many and varied. There were
established groups, the churches and the medical profession
who saw the issue as a threat to their status. There were
moral entrepreneurs, ALRA and SPUC, also not unconcerned by
status politics. Each of these groups formed their own
opinions, definitions and solutions and tried to influence both
the general public and Parliament by reasoned arguments, by
appeals to emotion and by sheer persistence.
The groups were not equal in power. The better established
ones - the doctors and the clerics - carried the social weight of
their prestige and influence and also had existing channels of
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communication with influential persons inside and outside
of Parliament. This differential access to political
influence was important to the outcome of the struggle for
reform and of its continuing existence after the passage of
the 1967 Act and subsequent developments. Pluralistic
competition there was, but a competition between originally
unequal forces. That ALRA managed to somewhat redressi/the
balance was chiefly due to their persistence (40 years of
advocacy) and their sensitive manipulation of both parliamentary
procedures and the general social climate.
The emergence of this law was a result of compromise,
a law which goes some way towards the state envisaged by its
most ardent supporters, but only cautiously and with many
safeguards secured by the more powerful groups, especially the
medical profession. There was no total victory or defeat;
no winners or losers; power and influence shifted during the
course of the conflict and each group achieved some but by no
means all of its objectives. But the struggle did not end with
the passing of legislation and has not ended ten years after
its oassflfle. The implementation of the 1967 Act led to further
situations in turn defined as social problems.
In this case there was almost overwhelming consensus that
a social problem existed and the conflict concerned the proposed
solutions to the agreed problem. In the actions that were taken
compromise can again be discerned. There was a multiplicity of
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groups in existence, the absence of one homogeneous dominant
group or of a general all pervasive consensus. However, the
aligraent of these groupings changed between 1967 and 1977.
The medical profession in particular ceased to regard a more
'liberal' abortion law as a threat to its freedom and interests
and began to consider it as a freedom enhancing, and therefore
status enhancing, measure and threw its considerable weight
behind the fight for the 1967 Act's retention. A growing body
of public opinion also supported the Act and, although it cannot
be claimed that an all pervasive consensus arose, nevertheless
it does seem fair to conclude that there was a growing consensus
on the desirability of relatively easy access to legal abortion,
a growing consensus which emerged as a result of the passage of
the 1967 Act.
It should be emphasised that the process of abortion law
reform is not being claimed as a general model for criminal law
emergence. For the reasons stated in the previous chapter, it
was not the intention of this study to try to generate any
'general' theory on the emergence of all laws or even all criminal
laws. Whilst this empirical case study did was to examine how
helpful to an explanation of abortion law reform were the theories
which have been advanced by other writers on emergence of laws and
to try to evaluate which, if any, particular theory seemed most
appropriate 6r illuminating to this particular law.
The production of a full account of the socio-political
history of abortion law reform tends to confirm the usefulness of
the continuum proposed in the previous chapter. This suggested
that different theories of emergence could be applicable to
different types of laws, and that the three major theoretical
positions used to explain general law emergence need not be
mutually exclusive in regard to the explanation of the creation
of one type of law, that elements of each might be discernible
within any one issue. This is certainly so in the case of
abortion.
\Af
There was a further prupose in undertaking the study. It
was thought that the empirical data and especially the detailed
attention paid to the mechanics of the various stages of the
legislative process could lead to suggestions for refinement
of the theories which have so far been advanced to explain the
emergence of criminal laws.
7
Although Lemert has previously drawn attention to the fact
that reforming groups work in a larger social environment and
that the existence of that environment may bring about compromise
and accommodation, this study perhaps brings out more clearly the
dependence of groups seeking change in the law on the larger
environment and that in order to assess the significance of any
group it is necessary to examine the interplay of many factors
and groups. The organisation of any group is to some extent
dependent upon the social environment in which it operates. It is




dependent on it for personnel, funds and also for the channels
through which it may operate if it is seeking to bring about
a new, or to change an old, law. But the environment in which
such groups operate is constantly changing and the movement's
organisation must be responsive to these changes if it is to
survive and succeed, since the changing conditions will affect
the movement's support and chances of success. The group, if
it is responsive, will alter its tactics and perhaps its goals
accordingly.
Furthermore the existence of other groups within the larger
system, some of which will share concern over the issue in
question but express concern of a different nature, must also
be considered for those groups will be competing for support.
If a movement fails to appreciate the existence of an
opposition, far less underestimates its strength, its chances
of success are decreased. These opposition groups may also cause
goals to be modified in order to achieve a modicum of success.
This goal alteration normally takes the form of a retreat from
the initial to more moderate aims but this may be strategic
> O .
sine reform is sometimes effected in a piecemeal fashion. '
The existence of the larger environment also affects the
groups' tactics for they will seek to shape the social climate of
that environment by propaganda, by appeals to the public, and by
8. For examples see Schlesinger, A.M.; The Historical Climate
of 'Reform in Gusfield, J.R. <©d.): Protest Reform and
Revolt, John Wiley, New Yor]£, 1971, pp. 121-134, and
Richards, P.G.: Parliament and Conscience, op.cit.. esp. p.199.
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by communication through the media. This is done to show
the legislature the strength of feeling on the issue and to
persuade it that, although not all members of the public have
necessarily joined the group, many are favourably disposed
towards it.
ALRA very largely recognised the importance of these
factors, perhaps the most notable example of its failure to do
so being the very brief period in its history in 1975 when it
almost fell into the trap of believing that the * Tightness'
of its cause should be sufficient to influence in itself.
SPUC was slow to adapt to the requirements of pressure group
activity and it was only after it did so and adopted a more
rational evaluation of means and ends that it began to be more
effective. The medical profession rarely recognised the
importance of the social environment and tended to rely upon
its power stemming from its technical expertise; as a result
its power, although considerable, could be overcome on
occasion by other forces.
The evidence suggests that although the social climate may
not be a determining factor in the passage of legislation it is
at least an influential one and is recognised as being so by
the concerned groups themselves: it points to the need for
a clearer recognition of its being so among writers interested in
the emergence of criminal law.
So far we have by implication only been discussing activities
preceding actual law-making i.e. identifying and defining a problem
area (control over which is sought in legislation) and the
subsequent communication and publicity necessary to focus
and generate sufficient interest for appropriate action. The
translation of all this into law-making is determined however
by someone, either the Government or a private member, introducing
a Bill in Parliament and, most importantly, obtaining the
necessary majority of parliamentary votes to secure its
safe passage through both Houses. This latter stage is very much
dependent upon the «tablished rules on procedures and on their
manipulation by the tactics of the parties and members. Indeed,
the private member's Bill is the only procedural means of
circumventing Governmentji unwillingness to take an initiative
on certain moral issues.
The skilled draftsmanship required to draw up a new Bill
is not an attribute of the majority of members. However, a
tactically effective pressure group can diminish this difficulty
by carefully pre-planning the desired measure. The successful
passage of a Bill is dependent upon its attractiveness to all
M.P.s and their subsequent support and also upon the contacts,
stature and effective power of its sponsors within the
legislature and especially within the cabinet. Not all sponsors
anticipate immediate success and many Bills are introduced to
publicise and generate interest in an issue so that at a later
date, in a more favourable climate (and in the case of a private
member's Bill when a high place is secured in the ballot) success
is more likely.
The difficulties in parliamentary legislative procedures
are not inconsiderable, for example a dissolution of Parliament
may occur; or unforeseen emergencies may necessitate the
hurried intervention of fresh legislation to the delay or
exclusion of existing measures; or the necessary steps for a
Bill to become law may take so long that it proves impossible
to complete all the legislative stages within one parliamentary
session. There is a recognised procedure and time limit for
private members' Bills. Moreover, their introduction is o ten
governed by probability and chance because of the draw of the
ballot. All these various factors affected the many Bills
introduced relating to abortion.
On the other hand, government introduced measures have a
much greater chance of success since the cabinet has considerable
control over legislative timetabling and it goes without saying
that such chance of success increases with the size of the
government's majority. This does not imply that governments
are insensitive to outside opinion. On the contrary, many groups
who are likely to be affected by proposed legislation often
exert counter influence upon the government, with some success.
Indeed, if the conflicting groups in any issue are numerous
and/or powerful, modifications and amendments will generally be
made to attempt a reconciliation of the diverging forces or
even final withdrawal of the controversial Bill. However,
notwithstanding all this, it is axiomatic that the degree of
success of a proposed Bill will be directly dependent upon the
status of its initiators and supporters. The more powerful groups
do have established contacts with the media, legislature
and other corridors of power where they 'count* because they
can threaten to withdraw their support, or, in the case of
enabling legislation as in abortion, not to implement the
provisions of the measure on the lines Parliament wishes.
Nevertheless, less powerful groups can and do exert influence.
For example petitions, group opinion and general public
representations, although in themselves unquantifiable, are
nonetheless considerable in their effectiveness in shaping
government attitudes. Governmental decisions on whether or not
to afford Bills extra parliamentary time and, for example, to
establish the Lane Committee were effected by such influences.
In this respect, constituency opinion cannot be disregarded. A
member may rarely be persuaded to vote against deep personal
convictions. On the other hand, he may be persuaded to vote
when he has no strong opinions or he may be persuaded to abstain
when local pressure is contrary to his own mild inclinations.
James White provides us with an obvious example of such
persuasion.
The long period of time involved in the legislative process,
together ivith the susceptibility of Governments and private members
to pressure of opinion creates many opportunities for the
successful exertion of influence on the final outcome of
measures. There can be no doubt that the Government, by virtue
of its control over the legislative timetable, and the facts
that in matters of 'party policy* it invariably controls the
preparation of Bills, and that it alone has the services of
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professional draftsmen at its disposal, is in the best
position to influence the shape and form of the Act. But
that control is not absolute and is capable of being influenced.
However, it is true that the private members' Bill is perhaps
more susceptible to influence with resultant compromise as
in the case of the Abortion Act 1967. The shape and effectiveness
of a Bill is to a considerable extent determined by the amount
of time afforded to its passage. The divergence between the
original and final form is usually a directly proportional
function of this time and of the concessions to conflicting
groups and public opinion. Again the changes which took place
in David Steel's Bill clearly demonstrate the importance of
this time factor.
The use of such inevitable compromise as an expedient in
controversial issues is a well established custom and practice
of experienced politicians. The task of campaigning bodies is to
influence public and parliamentary opinion but when the campaign
reaches the parliamentary stages, then the rules governing
parliamentary procedure and an examination of how they may be
affected cannot be discounted in any study of emergence of law.
The evidence from this study not only suggests the need
for consideration of these procedures, but especially suggests
that extreme conflict theory may be exaggerated. For it to be
correct, each and every criminal law would have to result from the
exercise of power by one homogeneous power elite. The case study
of abortion law reform provides further evidence that this need
not be so and, in addition, that legislation can be marked by
by compromise rather than by outright victory. The view
that this is a myth cannot be supported in the face of
empirical evidence to the contrary. Moreover, the
evidence presented in this study suggests that the processes
involved in legislation and the rules governing its procedure
perhaps lend themselves to compromise and are not the preserve
of one dominant elit*. Nevertheless, the evidence is
suggestive and not conclusive for the study was limited to one
type of law, criminal law, and to only one part of that body of
law, the law regulating abortion, and only to its development
over a comparatively short period of time.
Consequently no attempt is being made to expound a theory
to explain the emergence of all law or even of all criminal law.
Instead, all that is being suggested is that in understanding the
emergence of specific laws it may be helpful to employ the notion
of a continuum on which to place different types of issues,
that conflict and consensus be treated as problematic concepts and
that it is essential to examine the institutional arrangements
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Amend the law relating to abortion. A.D. 1952
Be it enacted by the Queen*s most Excellent Majesty, by
and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual
and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament
assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows
1. For the removal of doubt there shall be added the Amendment
following proviso to section fifty-eight of the Offences of s. 58
Against the Person Act, 1861 (which makes it a felony of 24 &
to administer drugs or use instruments to procure 25 Vict,
abortion) - c.lOO
*Provided that -
(a) no person shall be found guilty of an offence
under this section unless it is proved that the
act charged was not done in good faith for the
purpose of preserving the life of the mother;
(b) no registered medical practitioner who acts
with the concurring opinion of a second
registered medical practitioner shall be
found guilty of an offence under this
section unless it is proved that the act
charged was not done in good faith for
the purpose of preventing injury to the
mother in body or health.*
2. This Act may be cited as the Abortion Act, 1952. Short title
(Bill 20)
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An Act to amend the law relating to abortion. A.D. 1954
Be it enacted by the Queen's most Excellent Majesty, by
and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual
and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament
assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows
1. For the removal of doubt there shall be added the
following proviso to section fifty-eight of the Offences
Against the Person Act, 1861 (which makes it a felony








(a) no registered medical practitioner shall be
found guilty of an offence under this
section unless it is proved that the act
charged was not done for the purpose of
preserving the life of the mother;
(b) no registered medical practitioner who acts
with the concurring opinion of a second
registered medical practitioner shall be
found guilty of an offence under this section
unless it is proved that the act charged
was not done for the purpose of preventing
injury to the mother in body or health.•
2. This Act may be cited as the Abortion Act, 1954. Short title.
(36)
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Amend the law relating to the termination of A.D. 1961
pregnancy by registered medical practitioners.
Be it enacted by the Queen's most Excellent Majesty, by
and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual
and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament





1. Notwithstanding anything in section fifty-eight
of the Offences Against the Person Act, 1861 (which
makes it a felony to administer drugs or use
instruments to procure an abortion) it shall be law¬
ful for a registered medical practitioner to
terminate pregnancy in good faith -
(a) for the purpose of preserving the life of
the patient} or
(b) in the belief that there would be grave risk
of serious injury to the patient's physical
or mental health if she were left to give
birth to and care for the child; or
(c) in the belief that there would be grave risk
of the child being born grossly deformed
or with a physical or mental abnormality
which would be of a degree to require constant
hospital treatment or special care throughout
life; or
(d) in the belief that the patient became pregnant
as the result of intercourse which was an
offence under section one, five, ten or
eleven of the Sexual Offences Act, 1956, or
that the patient is a person of unsound mind.
2. A termination of pregnancy under paragraphs (b) to
(d) inclusive of section one of this Act shall require
the concurring opinion or advice, which must be based
upon a personal examination of the patient, of a
second registered medical practitioner, and shall not






3. The burden of proving that a termination of




practitioner with any necessary concurrence or advice of
a second registered medical practitioner, was not
performed in good faith for the purpose or in the belief specified
in this Act, or within the time permitted for
terminating pregnancy shall in any prosecution rest
upon the Crown.
4. Nothing in this Act shall affect the law Consent
relating to the requirement of consent to surgical to surgical
operations. operation
unaffected.
5. (1) This Act may be cited as the Medical Short title
Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1961. and extent.








Amend the law on abortion. A.D. 1965
Be it enacted by the Queen's most Excellent Majesty, by
and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual
and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament
assembled, and by the authority of the same, as
follows:—
1. Notwithstanding anything in section 58 of the Abortion
Offences Against the Person Act, 1861 (which makes it lawful in
a felony to administer drugs or use instruments to certain
procure abortion), it shall be lawful for a circumstances,
registered medical practitioner to terminate preg- 1861 c.lOO.
nancy in good faith:-
(a) for the purpose of preserving the life of
the patient; or
(b) in the belief that there would be grave risk
of serious injury to the patient's
physical or mental health if she were
left to give birth to and care for the
child; or
(c) in the belief that there would be grave
risk of the child being born grossly
physically deformed, or severely mentally
abnormal; or
(d) in the belief that the patient became pregnant
as the result of intercourse which was an
offence under sections 1 to 11 inclusive
of the Sexual Offences Act 1956. 1956 c.59.
2. A termination of pregnancy under paragraphs (b)
(c) or (d) of section 1 of this Act shall require
the concurring opinion or advice, which must be
based on a personal examination of the patient, of a
second registered medical practitioner and shall not
be performed after the end of the thirteenth week of
pregnancy.
3. The burden of proving that a termination of Burden of
pregnancy performed by a registered medical proof,




advice of a second registered medical practitioner
was not performed in good faith for the purpose or
in the belief specified in this Act or within the
time permitted for terminating pregnancy shall in
any prosecution rest upon the Crown.
4. Nothing in this Act shall affect the law





5. (1) This Act may be cited as the Medical
Termination of Pregnancy Act 1965.
Short title
and extent.








An Act to amend the law relating to termination of A.D. 1965
pregnancy by registered medical practitioners.
Be it enacted by the Queen's most Excellent Majesty, by
and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual
and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament
assembled, and by the authority of the same, as followss-
1. It shall be lawful for a registered medical Termination
practitioner to terminate pregnancy in good faith - of pregnancy
by registered
(a) in the belief that if the pregnancy were medical
allowed to continue there would be grave practitioner.
risk of the patient's death or of serious
injury to her physical or mental health
resulting either from giving birth to the
child or from the strain of caring for it;
or
(b) in the belief that if the pregnancy were
allowed to continue there would be grave
risk of the child being born grossly deformed
or with other serious physical or mental
abnormality; or
(c) in the belief that the health of the patient or
the social conditions in which she is living
(including the social conditions of her
existing children) make her unsuitable to assume
the legal and moral responsibility for caring
for a child or another child as the case may
be; or
(d) in the belief that the patient became pregnant
as the result of intercourse which was an
offence under sections one to eleven inclusive
of the Sexual Offences Act 1956 or that the 1956
patient is a person of unsound mind. c.69.
2. A termination of pregnancy under paragraph (c) Pregnancy
or (d) of section 1 of this Act shall not be performed not to be




3. In a prosecution under section 58 of the Offences
Against the Person Act 1861 (which makes it a felony to
administer drugs or use instruments to procure an
abortion) the burden of proving that a termination of
pregnancy performed by a registered medical
practitioner was not performed in good faith in the
belief specified in this Act, or within the time






4. Nothing in this Act shall affect the law
relating to the requirement of consent to surgical
operations.
Consent
5. (1) This Act may be cited as the Abortion Act 1965. Short title
and extent.








An Act to amend the law relating to termination of
pregnancy by registered medical practitioners.
Be it enacted by the Queen's most Excellent Majesty, by
and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual
and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament
assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows:-
1. (1) Subject to the provisions of this section, a
person shall not be guilty of an offence or crime of
abortion by reason of the termination of a pregnancy by
a registered medical practitioner if the practitioner is
of the opinion, formed in good faith, that the
termination of the pregnancy is necessary on any one
or more of the following grounds, that is to say —
(a) the continuance of the pregnancy would involve
serious risk to the life or of grave injury
to the health whether physical or mental of the
pregnant woman whether before at or after the
birth of the child; or
(b) there is a substantial risk that if the child were
born it would suffer from such physical or
mental abnormalities as to deprive it of any
prospect of reasonable enjoyment of life;
or that the pregnant woman is a defective or became pregnant
while under the age of sixteen
(2) Except in a case where the practitioner is of the
opinion, formed in good faith, that the termination is
immediately necessary in order to save the life of the
pregnant woman (and certifies his opinion in writing either
before or after carrying out the treatment), the following
conditions must be complied with in connection with any
treatment for the termination of a pregnancy, that is to say -
(a) the treatment must be carried out by a
practitioner who holds an appointment as
registrar or in a superior capacity under a
hospital board, being an appointment involving
the practice of gynaecology;







vested in the Minister of Health or the
Secretary of State under the National Health
Service Acts, or in a place for the time being
approved for the purposes of this section by the
Minister of Health or the Secretary of State;
(c) the opinion mentioned in subsection (1) of this
section must be certified in writing by the
practitioner who carried out the treatment
before the treatment is begun;
(d) another registered medical practitioner must be
of the same opinion, formed in good faith and
certified as aforesaid, as that specified in
the certificate of the practitioner who carries
out the treatment; and
(e) there has been before treatment an application in
writing by the pregnant woman, or, if under
sixteen years of age, of the pregnant girl and one
of her parents or of the pregnant girl and her
guardian for the termination of the pregnancy.
(3) In determining the matters referred to in
paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of this section, a registered
medical practitioner may taken into account such circumstances,
whether past, present or prospective, as are in his opinion
relevant to his patient's physical or mental health.
2. (1) The Minister of Health may by regulations made Notific-
by statutory instrument make provision - ation
(a) for requiring any registered medical practitioner
who terminates a pregnancy to give notice of
the termination, and such other information
relating to the termination as may be prescribed
by the regulations, to the Chief Medical Officer
ofr the Ministry of Health within such period as
may be so prescribed; and
(b) with respect to the disposal of certificates given
for the purposes of section 1 of this Act.
(2) The information furnished in pursuance of regulations
under subsection (1) of this section shall not be made
public or divulged by the Chief Medical Officer of the Ministry
of Health to any person other than a police officer duly
authorised to obtain such information.
(3) Failure to comply with the requirements of
regulations under subsection (1) of this section shall be
punishable on summary conviction by a fine not exceeding
one hundred pounds or in case of a second or subsequent
conviction by imprisonment for a term not exceeding three
months or by a fine not exceeding two hundred po&nds or both.
444.
(4) In the application of this section to Scotland
for any reference to the Minister or Ministry of Health
there shall be substituted a reference to the Secretary
of State.
3. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, Interpret-
the following expressions have meanings hereby assigned ation.
to then, that is to say -
•Defective* means in England and Wales a person
suffering from oubnormality within the meaning
of section 4 of the Mental Health Act 1959 or 1959 c.72.
in Scotland a person suffering from mental
deficiency within the meaning of section 6 of 1960 c.61.
the Mental Health (Scotland) Act I960;
•Hospital Board* means a Board constituted under
the National Health Service Acts as a Hospital
Board or as the Board of Governors of a teaching
hospital;
•the National Health Service Acts* means the
National Health Service Acts 1946 to 1964 or
the National Health Service (Scotland) Acts
1947 to 1961; and
•Registered medical practitioner* means a
practitioner registered under the Medical Act 1956 c.76.
1956 or legislation amending or replacing it.
4. (1) This Act may be cited as the Abortion Act 1966. Short title
and
(2) This Act shall not extend to Northern extent.
Ireland.
5. (1) Nothing in this Act shall affect the Supplementary
provisions of the Infant Life (Preservation) Act provisions
1929 (protecting the life of the viable foetus). 1929 c.34.
(2) For the purposes of the law relating to
abortion, anything done with intent to procure the
miscarriage of a woman is unlawfully done unless
authorised by section 1 of this Act.
6. In this Act, the following expressions have Interpret-
meanings hereby assigned to thems- ation.
•the law relating to abortion* means sections 58
and 59 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 c.100.
1861, and any rule of law relating to the
procurement of abortion;
445.
•the National Health Service Acts' means the
National Health Service Acts 1946 to 1966
or the National Health Service (Scotland) Acts
1947 to 1966.
7. (1) This Act may be cited as the Abortion Act Short title,
1967. commencement
and extent.
(2) This Act shall come into force on the
expiration of the period of six months beginning
with the date on which it is passed.
(3) This Act does not extend to Northern
Ireland.
446.




Amend and clarify the law relating to termination of A.D. 1966
pregnancy by registered medical practitioners.
Be it enacted by the Queen's most Excellent Majesty, by
and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual
and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament
assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows
1. Subject to the provisions of this Act, it shall be Medical
lawful for a registered medical practitioner to terminate termination
a pregnancy on any one or more of the following grounds: of
pregnancy.
(a) for the purpose of preserving the life of
the patient;
(b) in the belief that there would be a substantial
risk of serious injury to the physical or
mental health of the patient or both if her
pregnancy were not terminated;
(c) in the belief that it is as probable as not that
the child if born would suffer from such
physical or mental abnormalities or both as
to deprive it of any prospect of reasonable
enjoyment of life.
2. The provisions of section 1 of this Act shall not
apply to the termination of any pregnancy unless prior
to the said termination -
(a) two registered medical practitioners, one
of whom may be the practitioner terminating
the said pregnancy and both of whom are
registered medical practitioners falling
within one or more of the classes or
descriptions of persons specified in
Schedule 1 to this Act, have certified
in writing that in their opinion the
termination of the pregnancy was necessary
on one or more of the grounds specified






(b) the written consent of the woman whose
pregnancy is to be terminated or if she
be under the age of sixteen years the
written consent of one of her parents or
of her guardian has been obtained.
447.
3. (1) Within seven days of terminating a Notification
pregnancy the registered medical practitioner
terminating the same shall send or cause to be
sent to the Chief Medical Officer of the Ministry
of Health the documents and information specified
in Schedule 2 to this Act.
(2) Subject as hereinafter provided, any person
failing to comply with the provisions of subsection (1)
of this section shall be guilty of an offence and
liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding
£5 for a first offence or £100 for a second or
subsequent offence.
(3) A person shall not be guilty of an offence
under subsection (2) of this section if he shows -
(a) that there was reasonable cause for his
failure to comply with the aforesaid
requirements within the said period of
seven days; and
(b) that he did comply with them so soon as was
reasonably practicable thereafter.
4. In a prosecution under section 58 of the Offences Prosecution
Against the Person Act 1861 (which makes it a felony to under s. 58
administer drugs or use instruments to procure an of Act of 186J.
abortion) the burden of proving that a termination 1861 c.lOO.
of pregnancy performed by a registered medical
practitioner was not performed on any one
or more of the grounds specified in section 1 of
this Act shall rest upon the Crown.
5. The 'Minister* in this Act means the Minister of Interpret-
Health. ation.
6. (1) Thi3 Act may be cited as the Medical Short title
Termination of Pregnancy Act 1966. and extent.
(2) This Act shall not extend to Northern
Ireland.
448




Amend and clarify the law relating to termination of A.D. 1968
pregnancy by registered medical practitioners.
Be it enacted by the Queen's most Excellent Majesty, by
and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual
and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament
assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows:-
1. (1) Subject to the provisions of this section, a
person shall not be guilty of an offence under the law
relating to abortion when a pregnancy is terminated by
a registered medical practitioner if that practitioner
and another registered med ical practitioner are of





(a) that the continuance of the pregnancy would
involve serious risk to the life or of grave
injury to the health, whether physical or
mental, of the pregnant woman whether before,
at or after the birth of the child; or
(b) that there is a substantial risk that if the
child were born it would suffer from such
physical or mental abnormalities as to be
seriously handicapped; or
(c) that the pregnant woman's capacity as a mother
will be severely overstrained by the care of a
child or of another child as the case may be;
or
(d) that the pregnant woman is a defective or
became pregnant while under the age of
sixteen or became pregnant as a result of
rape.
(2) Except as provided by subsection (3) of this section
any treatment for the termination of pregnancy must be carried
out in a hospital vested in the Minister of Health or the
Secretary of State for Scotland under the National Health
Service Acts, or in a registered nursing home, or in a place
for the time being approved for the purposes of this section
by the Minister or the Secretary of State.
(3) Subsection (2) of this section, and so much
of subsection (1) as relates to the opinion of another
registered medical practitioner, shall not apply to the
termination of a pregnancy by a registered medical
practitioner in a case where he is of the opinion, formed
in good faith, that the termination is immediately
necessary in order to save the life of the pregnant woman,
(4) A termination of pregnancy performed on the
ground of rape shall require the certificate of a
registered medical practitioner consulted by the patient
freshly after the alleged assault that there was then
medical evidence of sexual assault upon her,
(5) A termination of pregnancy performed upon a
girl under the age of sixteen shall require her express
consent in addition to a necessary consent of her parent
or guardian.
2. (1) The Minister of Health in respect of England Notification
and Wales, and the Secretary of State in respect of
Scotland, may by statutory instrument make regulations
to provide —
(a) for requiring any such opinion as is referred
to in section 1 of this Act to be certified
by the practitioners or practitioner concerned
in such form and at such time as may be
prescribed by the regulations, and for requiring
the preservation and disposal of certificates
made for the purposes of the regulations;
(b) for requiring any registered medical practitioner
who terminates a pregnancy other than in a
hospital to give notice of the termination and
such other information relating to the
termination as may be prescribed;
(c) for prohibiting the disclosure, except to such
persons or for such purposes as may be so
prescribed, of notices given or information
furnished pursuant to the regulations.
(2) The information furnished in pursuance of regulations
under subsection (1) of this section shall be collected solely
by the Ministry of Health or the Scottish Office.
(3) Any person who wilfully contravenes or wilfully
fails to comply with the requirements of regulations under
subsection (1) of this section shall be liable on summary
conviction to a fine not exceeding one hundred pounds.
(4) Any statutory instrument made by virtue of this
section shall be subject to annulment in pursuance of a
resolution of either House of Parliament.
450.
3. (1) Nothing in this Act shall affect the
provisions of the Infant Life (Preservation) Act
1939 (protecting the life of the viable foetus).
(2) For the purposes of the law relating to
abortion, anything done with intent to procure the
miscarriage of a woman is unlawfully done unless
authorised by section 1 of this Act.
4. In this Act, the following expressions have
meanings hereby assigned to them:-
'defective* means, in relation to England and
Wales, a person suffering from severe
subnormality as defined by subsection (2) of
section 4 of the Mental Health Act 1959 and,
relation to Scotland, a person suffering from
mental deficiency of the degree described in
subsection (7) of section 96 of the Mental
Health (Scotland) Act, 1960;
'registered nursing home* means a nursing home
registered under the Public Health Act 1936,
the Public Health (London) Act 1936, or the
Nursing Home Registration (Scotland) Act 1938,
and a private hospital registered under the
Mental Health (Scotland) Act I960, or
legislation amending or replacing them;
'the law relating to abortion' means sections 58
and 59 of the Offences Against the Person
Act 1861, and any rule of law relating to the
procurement of abortion;
'the National Health Service Acts* means the
National Health Service Acts 1946 to 1966
or the National Health Service (Scotland)











5. (1) This Act may be cited as the Medical
Termination of Pregnancy Act 1966.
Short title
and extent.
(2) This Act does not extend to Northern
Ireland.
(Bill 29)
(9) 1967 Abortion Act
ABORTION ACT 1967
1967 CHAPTER 87
An Act to amend and clarify the law relating to termination
of pregnancy by registered medical practitioners (27th October 1967).
Be it enacted by the Queen's most Excellent Majesty, by
and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual
and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament
assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows
1. (1) Subject to the provisions of this section, a Medical
person shall not be guilty of an offence under the law termination
relating to abortion when a pregnancy is terminated by of preg—
a registered medical practitioner if two registered nancy,
medical practitioners are of the opinion, formed in
good faith -
(a) that the continuance of the pregnancy would
involve risk to the life of the pregnant
woman, or of injury to the physical or
mental health of the p«<B§2iant woman or any
existing children of her family, greater
than if the pregnancy were terminated; or
(b) that there is a substantial risk that if the
child were born it would suffer from such
physical or mental abnormalities as to be
seriously handicapped.
(2) In determining whether the continuance of
a pregnancy would involve such risk of injury to health as
is mentioned in paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of this
section, account may be taken of the pregnant woman's
actual or reasonably foreseeable environment.
(3) Except as provided by subsection (4) of this
section, any treatment for the termination of pregnancy
must be carried out in a hospital vested in the Minister
of Health or the Secretary of State under the National
Health Service Acts, or in a place for the time being
approved for the purposes of this section by the said
Minister or the Secretary of State.
(4) Subsection (3) of this section, and so much
of subsection (1) as relates to the opinion of two
registered medical practitioners, shall not apply to the
termination of a pregnancy by a registered medical
practitioner in a case where he is of the opinion, formed
in good faith, that the termination is immediately
necessary to save the life or to prevent grave permanent
45d.
injury to the physical or mental health of the
pregnant woman.
2. (1) The Minister of Health in respect of Notification
England and Wales, and the Secretary of State in
respect of Scotland, shall by statutory
instrument make regulations to provide -
(a) for requiring any such opinion as is
referred to in section 1 of this
Act to be certified by the practitioners
or practitioner concerned in such form
and at such time as may be prescribed
by the regulations, and for requiring
the preservation and disposal of
certificates made for the purposes of
the regulations;
(b) for requiring any registered medical
practitioner who terminates a pregnancy
to give notice of the termination and such
other information relating to the
termination as may be so prescribed;
(c) for prohibiting the disclosure, except to such
persons or for such purposes as may be so
prescribed, of notices given or information
furnished pursuant to the regulations.
(2) The information furnished in pursuance of
regulations made by virtue of paragraph (b) of subsection
(1) of this section shall be notified solely to the
Chief Medical Officers of the Ministry of Health and the
Scottish Home and Health Department respectively.
(3) Any person who wilfully contravenes or wilfully
fails to comply with the requirements of regulations under
subsection (1) of this section shall be liable on summary
conviction to a fine not exceeding one hundred pounds.
(4) Any statutory instrument made by virtue of
this section shall be subject to annulment in pursuance
of a resolution of either House of Parliament.
3. (1) In relation to the termination of a
pregnancy in a case where the following conditions are
satisfied, that is to say -
(a) the treatment for termination of the pregnancy
was carried out in a hospital controlled by
the proper authorities of a body to which





(b) the pregnant woman had at the time of the
treatment a relevant association with that
body; and
453.
(c) the treatment was carried out by a registered
medical practitioner or a person who at the
time of the treatment was a member of that
body appointed as a medical practitioner S&s !'
that body by the proper authorities of that
body,
this Act shall have effect as if any reference in section
1 to a registered medical practitioner and to a hospital
vested in a Minister under the National Health Service
Acts included respectively a reference to such a person
as is mentioned in paragraph (c) of this subsection and to
a hospital controlled as aforesaid, and as if section
2 were omitted.
(2) The bodies to which this section applies are
any force which is a visiting force within the meaning of
any of the provisions of Part I of the Visiting Forces Act 1952 c.67.
1952 and any headquarters within the meaning of the
Schedule to the International Headquarters and Defence 1964 c.5.
Organisations Act 1964; and for the purposes of this
section -
(a) a woman shall be treated as having a relevant
association at any time with a body to which
this section applies if at that time -
(i) in the case of such a force as
aforesaid, she had a relevant association
within the meaning of the said Part I with
the force; and
(ii) in the case of such a headquarters as
aforesaid, she was a member of the headquarters
or a dependant within the meaning of the
Schedule aforesaid of such a member; and
(b) any reference to a member of a body to which this
section applies shall be construed -
(i) in the case of such a force as
aforesaid, as a reference to a member of or of
a civilian component of that force within the
meaning of the said Part I; and
(ii) in the case of such a headquarters as
aforesaid, as a reference to a member of that
headquarters within the meaning of the Schedule
aforesaid.
4. (1) Subject to subsection (2) of this section, no
person shall be under any duty, whether by contract or
by any statutory or other legal requirement, to
participate in any treatment authorised by this Act to






Provided that in any legal proceedings the burden
of proof ef conscientious objection shall rest on the
person claiming to rely on it.
(2) Nothing in subsection (1) of this section
shall affect any duty to participate in treatment which
is necessary to save the life or to prevent grave
permanent injury to the physical or mental health of a
pregnant woman.
(3) In amy proceedings before a court in Scotland,
a statement on oath by any person to the effect that he
has a conscientious objection to participating in any
treatment authorised by this Act shall be sufficient
evidence for the purpose of discharging the burden of
proof imposed upon him by subsection (1) of this section.
5. (1) Nothing in this Act shall affect the Supplementary
provisions of the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929 provisions
(protecting the life of the viable foetus). 1929 c.34.
(2) For the purposes of the law relating to
abortion, anything done with intent to procure the
miscarriage of a woman is unlawfully done unless
authorised by section 1 of this Act.
6. In this Act, the following expressions have Interpret-
meanings hereby assigned to themi- ation.
'the law relating to abortion' means sections 58
and 59 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 c.lOO.
1861, and any rule of law relating to the
procurement of abortion;
'the National Health Service Acts* means the
National Health Service Acts 1946 to 1966 or
the National Health Service (Scotland) Acts
1947 to 1966.
7. (1) This Act may be cited as the Abortion Act Short title,
1967. commencement
and extent.
(2) This Act shall come into force on the
expiration of the period of six months beginning with
the date on which it is passed.




CERTIFICATES REQUIRED UNDER SECTION 2
The persons capable ©f giving the certificates required
under section 2 of this Act shall be the registered medical
practitioner of the woman whose pregnancy is to be terminated
and any one of the persons specified in the list hereunto
appended or any two of the persons so specified
a person employed under the National Health Service or in
private practice as a consultant in gynaecology,
psychiatry or surgery;
a person employed under the National Health Service for
full time service in a hospital who has been qualified
and registered as a medical practitioner for not less
than three years:
a person employed under the National Health Service for
part-time service in a hospital who has been qualified
and registered as a medical practitioner for not less
than three years;
such other persons as the Minister may from time to time by
order prescribe.
SCHEDULE 2
DOCUMENTS AND INFORMATION REQUIRED UNDER SECTION 3
1. The documents referred to in section 3 of this Act shall be -
(a) a document signed by both registered medical practitioners
who have certified under section 2 of this Act stating the
ground or grounds upon which the termination of pregnancy was
in their opinion necessary and the reasons why it was in their
opinion necessary; or
(b) if the said practitioners differ either as to the grounds
or reasons, two documents, one signed by each and specifying
the ground or grounds upon which and reasons why it was in his
opinion necessary.
2. The information referred to in section 3 of this Act shall
consist of -
(a) the name and permanent address of the woman whose
pregnancy has been terminated;
(b) the nature of the operation performed;
4
(c) the estimated duration of the pregnancy at the
date when it was terminated;
(d) the date on which and place at which the pregnancy
was terminated;
(e) the name of the registered medical practitioner
who terminated the said pregnancy;
(f) such further information as the Minister may from
time to time by order prescribe.
457.




Amend the Abortion Act 1967. A.D. 1970
Be it enacted by the Queen's most Excellent Majesty,
by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual
and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament
assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows
1. Subsection (1) of section 1 of the Abortion Act Amendment
1967 shall be amended by leaving out the words 'by of Abortion
a registered medical practitioner if two registered Act 1967.
medical practitioners' and inserting in place thereof
the words 'by or under the supervision of a 1967 c.87.
consultant gynaecologist in the National Health
Service or a medical practitioner of equivalent status
approved by the Secretary of State for Social Services
for the purpose of this Act, if the medical
practitioner carrying out or supervising the operation
and another medical practitioner'.
2. (1) This Act may be cited as the Abortion Law Short title,
(Reform) Act 1970. citation
and
(2) The Abortion Act 1967 and this Act may be extent,
cited together as the Abortion Acts 1967 and 1970.
(3) This Act does not extend to Northern
Ireland.
458.




Prohibit , subject to certain exceptions, the
charging of fees for referring or recommending A.D. 1972
persons to medical services or treatment.
Be it enacted by the Queen's most Excellent Majesty,
by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual
and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament
assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows
1. (1) Subject to the provisions of the next
following subsection, it shall be an offence for any
person to charge or to seek to charge a fee for or in
connection with referring or recommending a person
to a medical practitioner, hospital, nursing home or
other establishment offering medical services.
(2) ?he provisions of the foregoing subsection
shall not apply to a referral or recommendation made
by a registered medical practitioner or by an accredited
official or representative of a charitable body.
2. Any person found guilty of an offence under
this Act shall be liable on summary conviction to a
fine not exceeding £400 or to imprisonment for a term
not exceeding six months, or both.
3. In this Act -
•referring* includes introducing, and
•referral' shall be construed accordingly;
'person* includes a corporate person.
4. (1) This Act may be cited as the Medical Services
(Referral) Act 1972.

















Regulate the referral to, and recommendation of,
medical or other services in connection with
treatment authorised by the Abortion Act 1967, A.D. 1974
where such referral or recommendation is made
for reward otherwise than by a registered
medical practitioner.
Be it enacted by the Queen's most Excellent Majesty, by
and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual
and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament
assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows:-
1. (1) No person other than -
(a) a registered medical practitioner; or
(b) a person for the time being approved for
the purposes of this section by the
Secretary of State;
shall give to any other person any advice or
information to which this section applies in
circumstances in which he receives or expects
payment (whether from the person to whom the advice
or information is given or from any other person, and
whether under an agreement or otherwise) for so doing,
or for providing, in connection with giving that
advice, or information, any other advice, information,
service, facility or article.
(2) This section applies to any advice or
information (whether given to the woman to whose












(a) indicating a person to whom a woman may
apply for the purpose of obtaining, or
fulfilling the requirements for obtaining,
treatment for the termination of pregnancy
in accordance with the Abortion Act 1967;
(b) indicating a hospital or place in which such
treatment may be provided; or
(c) indicating a person from whom advice or
information to the effect mentioned in
paragraph (a) or (b) above may be obtained.
460.
(3) A person who contravenes subsection (1)
above shall be guilty of an offence and liable -
(a) on summary conviction to a fine not
exceeding £400;
(b) on conviction on indictment, to a fine or
to imprisonment for a term not exceeding
two years, or to both.
(4) Where an offence under this section
committed by a body corporate is proved to have been
committed with the consent or connivance of, or to be
attributable to any neglect on the part of, any director,
manager, secretary or other similar officer of the
body corporate or any person who was purporting to act
in any such capacity, he, as well as the body corporate,
shall be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to
be proceeded against and punished accordingly.
2. (1) This Act may be cited as the Abortion
(Amendment) Act 1974.
(2) This Act shall come into force on such






(3) This Act does not extend to Northern
Ireland.
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Amend the Abortion Act 1967 and to make further
provision with respect to the termination of
pregnancy and matters consequential thereto.
Be it enacted by the Queen1s most Excellent Majesty, by
and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual
and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament
assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows:
PART I
Termination of Pregnancy
1. Section 1 of the Abortion Act 1967 (hereinafter
referred to as 'the principal Act*) shall be read and
have effect as if -
(a) in subsection (1) thereof -
(i) after the words 'two registered
medical practitioners' there were inserted
the words 'who are not normally in practice
together and of whom at least one has been
registered for not less than five years'; and
(ii) in place of paragraph (a) there were
substituted the following paragraph -
*(a) that the continuance of the pregnancy
would involve
(i) grave risk to the life of the
pregnant woman; or
(ii) risk of serious injury to the
physical or mental health of the
pregnant woman or any existing children
of her family; or*; and
(b) after subsection (3) thereof there were inserted the
following subsection, namely
•(3A) Without prejudice to any regulations
which may be made by the Secretary of State
under any enactment, it shall be a pre¬
condition of approval of a place for the









on the staff of the said place a
consultant medical adviser who shall
be -
(a) a consultant within the National
Health Service; or
(b) a person who has been such a
consultant; or
(c) a registered medical practitioner
approved by the Secretary of State
as being of like status to such a
consultant;
whose duty it shall be to superintend and
approve in relation to the said place -
(a) clinical procedures;
(b) the appointment of medical staff,
sessional or otherwise; and
(c) the use of the said place by any
registered medical practitioner for
treatment of any person under this
Act. *
2. Notwithstanding anything in the principal Act, save
as provided in subsection (4) of section 1 thereof, it
shall be unlawful to carry out any treatment for the
termination of a pregnancy unless (except in the case of
a woman whom he believes to be of British nationality)
the person carrying out the treatment is reasonably
satisfied that during the period of twenty weeks
immediately preceding the carrying out of the treatment







3. Notwithstanding anything in section 2 (Notification) Notification
of the principal Act or in any regulations made of term-
thereunder any person who terminates a pregnancy shall, ination of
with the written consent of the woman who has been pregnancy,
treated, give notice of the termination and of any
relevant details thereof to her regular medical
practitioner.
4. It shall be an offence -
(a) for any person to offer or give to any
other person any fee or other reward,
whether tangible or otherwise, in
consideration of that other person
referring or having referred any pregnant
woman, for the purpose of obtaining
treatment for termination of pregnancy,
to any registered medical practitioner,
any hospital or any place approved for








(b) for any person to demand or accept any such
fee or other reward in respect of so
referring or of having so referred any
pregnant woman.
5. (1) No person other than -
(a) a registered medical practitioner; or
(b) a person for the time being approved
for the purposes of this section by








shall give to any other person any advice or information
to which this section applies in circumstances in which
he receives or expects payment (whether from the person
to whom the advice or information is given or from any
other person, and whether under an agreement or
otherwise) for so doing, or for providing, in connection
with giving that advice or information, any other
advice, information, services, facility or article.
(2) No person shall advice a pregnant woman to
seek treatment for termination of pregnancy at a place
in which that person has any financial interest, direct
or otherwise.
(3) No registered medical practitioner or person
approved under subsection (1) of this section shall give
to any other person under the age of 16 any advice or
information to which this section applies otherwise than
in the presence of that other person*s parent or guardian
if such parent or guardian can reasonably be ascertained
and is willing and able to be present.
(4) A person giving to any pregnant woman any
advice or information to which this section applies shall
at the same time give her advice as to available
alternatives to such treatment.
(5) This section applies to any advice or information
(whether given to the woman to whose circumstances it
relates or to any other person) -
(a) indicating a person to whom a woman may apply for
the purposes of obtaining, or fulfilling the
requirements for the purpose of obtaining,
treatment for the termination of pregnancy in
accordance with the provisions of the principal
Act;
(b) indicating a hospital or place in which such
treatment may be provided; or
(c) indicating a person from whom advice or
information to the effect mentioned in
paragraph (a) or (b) above may be obtained;
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and any person who contravenes or fails to comply with
any of the provisions of this section shall be guilty
of an offence.
6. (1) No person being a registered medical
practitioner or a person approved by the Secretary of
State for the purposes of the foregoing section shall





(a) giving treatment for the termination of
pregnancy; or
(b) giving advice or information to which section
5 of this Act applies;
unless those premises have been approved by the Secretary
of State for the purposes of this section and are used
in compliance with regulations made by the Secretary of
State and for the time being in force relating to the use
of such premises.
(2) Any person applying to the Secretary of State for
the approval of premises for the purpose of this section shall
disclose to the Secretary of State full details of any
financial arrangement or other agreement which he may have
with any persons or places approved under section 1 (3) of
the principal Act or this section and the Secretary of
State shall be entitled, when considering any application
for approval under this section, to take any such
arrangement or other agreement into account.
(3) Without prejudice to the foregoing provisions of
this section and of any regulations made thereunder, the
use of any such premises as aforesaid shall be subject to
the conditions for use of such premises set out in
Schedule 1 to this Act.
(4) Any person who contravenes the provisions of
this section or of any of the conditions set out in





Provided that this section shall not apply in any
case in which -
(a) the woman has been pregnant for not more than
24 weeks; and
7. Notwithstanding anything in any enactment it shall
be an offence for any person to carry out, or assist in
the carrying out of, treatment for termination of
pregnancy in any case in which the woman has been
pregnant for 20 weeks or more.
(b) a consultant within the National Health Service
is reasonably satisfied that the woman is
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pregnant of a child which would be born
with a major disability, whether physical
or mental.
PART II
Experiments on Foetus and Foetal Material
8. (1) No person shall carry out an experiment of
any kind on human foetus or foetal material which has
become available as a result of the termination of a
pregnancy otherwise than in accordance with the





(2) The Secretary of State may make regulations
for the purpose of the application and enforcement of
the provisions of the said Schedule and for amending
or adding to the said conditions.
(3) Any person who contravenes the provisions of
this section or of any of the said conditions for the
time being in force shall be guilty of an offence.
9. (1) The appropriate hospital authority having Ethical
jurisdiction over any institution to which women in Committees,
childbirth are customarily admitted shall, for the
purposes of ensuring compliance within that
institution, with the provisions of this part of this
Act, establish an Ethical Committee which must include
at least one doctor experienced in clinical
investigation.
(2) It shall be the duty of every Ethical
Committee to supervise the disposal of foetus and
foetal material which has become available as a
result of the termination of a pregnancy and the use
thereof for purposes of research and experiment.
PART III
Miscellaneous
lO. It shall be an offence for any person to publish
or cause to be published the identity, or any






(a) any woman who has been the subject of
treatment for the termination of pregnancy;
(b) any woman who has sought or received advice
or information to which section 5 of this
Act applies; or
(c) any person who has given, or who has been
summoned to give, evidence in any proceedings
under the principal Act or this Act.
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11. Where in any criminal proceedings brought Proof of
under the principal Act or this Act it has been compliance,
established to the satisfaction of the court that
the accused person has carried out or has assisted
at the carrying out of treatment for the termination
of pregnancy, or has given advice or information to
which section 5 of this Act applies, the onus of
proof that the requirements of the principal Act or of
this Act or of any regulations made thereunder, as the
case may be, have been complied with in respect of any
matter shall rest on the accused person.
12. Any person who contravenes any of the provisions Penalties,
of this Act or of the principal Act as amended by
this Act shall be guilty of an offence and shall be
liable -
(a) on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding
£1,000 or to a term of not more than six
months imprisonment or to both such fine and
imprisonment;
(b) on conviction on indictment to a fine or to a
term of not more than five years imprisonment
or to both such fine and imprisonment.
13. Where an offence under this Act which has been
committed by a body corporate is proved to have been
committed with the consent or connivance of, or to
be attributable to any neglect or misrepresentation on
the part of any director, manager, secretary or other
similar officer of the body corporate or any person who
was purporting to act in any such capacity he, as well
as the body corporate, shall be guilty of that offence
and shall be liable to be proceeded against and
punished accordingly, and shall be disqualified from
giving advice or information to which section 5 of this
Act applies.
14. For the removal of doubt it is hereby declared that
nothing in this Act shall affect the operation of
section 3 of the principal Act, which relates to the








15. (1) The Secretary of State may make regulations Regulations.
for any purpose for which regulations may be made
under the principal Act as amended by this Act or
under this Act and generally for the purpose of carrying
into effect the principal Act as so amended and this
Act.
(2) The power to make regulations under this
section shall be exercisable by statutory instrument
which shall be subject to annulment in pursuance of
a resolution of either House of Parliament.
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16. (1) This Act may be cited as the Abortion Short title
(Amendment) Act 1975 and the principal Act and this citation
Act may be cited together as the Abortion Acts and extent.
1967 and 1975.




CONDITIONS FOR USE OF APPROVED PREMISES
1. (1) The premises shall be open for inspection
at all times by persons appointed for the purpose by
the Secretary of State.
(2) No advertisement other than an approved
advertisement shall be displayed either outside or inside
the premises.
(3) The premises must be satisfactory as regards
size, lay out and the provision of facilities to ensure
privacy.
(4) There must be available on the premises or at
some other approved premises satisfactory arrangements
for pregnancy testing.
(5) A registered medical practitioner must be
available on the premises for consultation with any person
seeking treatment for termination of pregnancy or advice
on such treatment.
(6) Any fee charged for giving treatment or advice
at the premises shall include the fee for any such
consultation.
(7) Records must be kept showing -
(a) identity of person interviewed or treated;
(b) result of interview or treatment;
(c) details of fees charged;
(d) copies of receipts for payment;
and such records must be available for inspection by an
approved person.
(8) The books of account must be available for
inspection by an approved person.
2. For the purposes of this Schedule -
'advertisement' means any notice indicating the nature
of the business carried on on the premises and any
notice indicating that any treatment, facility,
service or product may be obtained on the premises;
•approved' means approved for the purposes of this
Schedule by the Secretary of State.
SCHEDULE 2 Section 8.
CONDITIONS FOR EXPERIMENTS ON FOETUS AND FOETAL
MATERIAL
1. An experiment may only be carried out on a dead
foetus and no experiment shall be carried out on any
foetus which weighs more than 300 grammes. The decision
that a foetus is in a category which may be used for
experimentation or research shall rest with the medical
attendants present at its birth and any intending research
worker shall be excluded from any such decision.
2. Any experimentation on foetus shall be carried out
in departments directly related to a hospital and such
experimentation shall not take place without the direct
authority of the Ethical Committee established for the
purposes of the hospital.
3. An Ethical Committee shall not permit research of any
kind on foetus unless they have first satisfied themselves -
(a) on the validity of the research;
(b) that the required information cannot be obtained
in any other way; and
(c) that the investigators authorised to carry out
the research have the necessary facilities
and skill.
4. No dissection of a foetus or experimentation on foetus
or foetal material shall take place in the operating theatre
or place of delivery.
5. No person shall accept or demand money in exchange for
a foetus or foetal material.
6. Full records of experiments and the source of the
foetus and the disposal of the remains of the foetus shall be
kept by the institution or person carrying out research.
7. Where a foetus is viable following the termination
of a pregnancy no experiment shall be carried out on it which
is inconsistent with treatment necessary to promote its life.
8. No person shall administer drugs or carry out any
procedures to or on a pregnant woman prior to termination of
her pregnancy with the intent of ascertaining the harm that
they might do to the foetus.
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Amend the Abortion Act 1967 and to make further
provision with respect to the termination of A.D. 1977
pregnancy and matters consequential thereto.
Be it enacted by the Queen's most Excellent Majesty, by
and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual
and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament
assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows
1. (1) Section 1(1) of the principal Act shall not Treatment
make lawful treatment for the termination of pregnancy prohibited
in any case where the woman has been pregnant for not in certain
less than 20 weeks or such other period as the Secretary cases,
of State may by order determine, unless the two
registered medical practitioners referred to in section
1 of the principal Act are of the opinion, formed in
good faith -
(a) that the pregnancy has lasted for less than
20 weeks; or
(b) that the pregnancy has lasted for less than
24 weeks and there is a substantial risk
that if the child were born it would suffer
from such physical or mental abnormalities
as to be seriously handicapped; or
(c) that the treatment is necessary either to save
the life of the pregnant woman or to prevent
grave permanent injury to her physical or
mental health.
(2) The Secretary of State shall not make an
Order under this section unless a draft of the order has
been approved by resolution of each House of Parliament.
2. After subsection (1) of section 1 of the principal Qualification
Act there shall be added:- of registered
medical
*(1A) At least one of the two registered practitioner
medical practitioners referred to in subsection (1)
of this section must be a registered medical
practitioner of not less than five years' standing.
(IB) A registered medical practitioner shall not
be eligible to form an opinion for the purposes of
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subsection (1) of this section if he -
(a) is a partner of the other registered
medical practitioner; or
(b) is employed by the other registered medical
practitioner; or
(c) obtains or is able to obtain financial
benefit from a place approved by the
Secretary of State for the purposes
of this section or to which section 7
of the Abortion (Amendment) Act 1977
applies, if the other registered medical
practitioner obtains or is able to obtain
financial benefit from the same place.'
3. (1) Notwithstanding anything in section 2
(Notification) of the principal Act or in any
regulations thereunder, any person who has
terminated a pregnancy shall give notice of the
termination to the regular medical practitioner of
the woman whose pregnancy has been terminated by
him, unless he is the regular medical practitioner
of the woman; provided that the consent of the
woman has been sought and obtained in accordance with
the regulations made by the Secretary of State.
(2) Any person who contravenes the provisions
of the foregoing subsection shall be guilty of an
offence and liable on summary conviction to a fine not
exceeding £500.
(3) Regulations under subsection (1) of this
section shall be made by statutory instrument subject
to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either
House of Parliament.
4. After subsection (3) of section 2 of the principal
Act there shall be added:-
*(3A) Summary proceedings in respect of any
offence under subsection (3) of this section may,
notwithstanding anything in the Magistrates'
Courts Act 1952, be commenced at any time not
later than three years from the date of commission
of the offence.*
5. (1) In subsection (1) of section 4 of the
principal Act, after the word 'objection* where it
first occurs, there shall be added 'on religious,
ethical or other grounds*.
(2) The proviso to subsection (l), and















6. (1) It shall be an offence - Licensing
(a) for the occupier of any premises to use
them for any of the purposes mentioned
in subsection (7) of this section, or to
permit them to be so used, unless he holds
a licence in relation to those premises
under this section; or
(b) for any person other than the occupier to use
any premises for any of the purposes
mentioned in subsection (7) of this section
unless the occupier holds a licence in
relation to those premises under this
section.
(2) An application for a licence in relation to
premises under this Act shall be made to the Secretary of
State, and shall be accompanied by a fee.
(3) Subject to subsection (4) below, the Secretary
of State shall, on receiving an application under subsection
(2) above, issue to the applicant a licence in respect of
the premises.
(4) The Secretary of State shall refuse to issue a
licence to an applicant in relation to premises if he is
satisfied -
(a) that the applicant, or any person employed or
proposed to be employed by the applicant at the
premises, is not a fit person (whether by
reason of age or otherwise) to carry on or be
employed at such premises; or
(b) that, for reasons connected with situation,
construction, state of repair, accommodation,
staffing or equipment, the premises are not, or
any premises used in connection therewith are
not, fit to be used for any of the purposes
mentioned in subsection (7) below; or
(c) that the premises, or any premises used in
connection therewith, are used, or proposed
to be used, for purposes which are in any
way improper or undesirable in the case of
such premises; or
(d) that the standard of medical advice offered at
the premises in relation to the use in respect
of which a licence under this section is required,
is not likely to be adequate in the circumstances;
or
(e) that, in the case of the applicant, the occupier of
the premises or any person associated or proposed
to be associated with the use in respect of which
a licence under this section is required on those
premises, there is a financial arrangement
or other agreement with persons associated
with a place approved for the purpose of
section 1 of the principal Act.
(5) Subject to subsection (6) below, a licence
under this section shall remain in force for such period
not exceeding 13 months as may be fixed by the Secretary
of State in each case, and may be renewed for a period
not exceeding 13 months at any one time.
(6) The Secretary of State may at any time refuse
to renew a licence under this section in relation to
premises -
(a) on any ground which would entitle him to refuse
an application for a licence under this section
in relation to those premises;
(b) on the ground that the applicant for the licence
has been convicted of an offence against the
provisions of the principal Act or this Act,
or on the ground that any other person has been
convicted of such an offence in respect of those
premises;
(c) on the ground that the applicant has been
convicted of an offence against regulations
made under section 7 below.
(7) The purposes for which a licence is required under
this section are -
(a) the provision for payment of consultation with a
medical practitioner who is prepared to sign
certificates under the Abortion Regulations and
who is prepared subsequently to terminate the
pregnancy of the person attending the
consultation;
(b) the provision for payment of an advisory service
in relation to treatment for the termination of a
pregnancy;
(c) the provision for payment of a service of testing
whether a woman is pregnant.
(8) Nothing in this section shall require premises to
be licenced because of the use of those premises -
(a) by a registered medical practitioner for the
purposes of his general practice; or
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(b) as a hospital vested in the Secretary of
State under the National Health Service
Acts; or
(c) in accordance with an approval of the Secretary
of State under section 1 of the principal
Act.
(9) A person guilty of an offence under subsection
(1) above shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine
not exceeding £1,000 and to a fine not exceeding £100 for
each day on which the offence is continued after
conviction thereof.
7. (1) The Secretary of State shall make regulations Regulations
in relation to the use of premises for any of the relating to
purposes to which section 6 above applies, and in premises,
relation to places approved by him for the purposes
of section 1 of the principal Act.
(2) Regulations under this section shall prescribe
the fee to accompany an application under section 6 above,
and may be made -
(a) with respect to the facilities and services to
be provided in such premises;
(b) with respect to the licensing of premises under
section 6 above, and in particular with
respect to -
(i) the making of applications for a licence;
(ii) the refusal of a licence; and
(iii) appeals to magistrates' courts against
refusals to issue or renew licences;
(c) with respect to the keeping of records relating to
premises licenced under section 6 above, and with
respect to the notification of events occurring
in such premises;
(d) with respect to entry into and the inspection of
premises used or reasonably believed to be
used for any of the purposes mentioned in
section 6(7) above;
(e) providing that a contravention of or failure
to comply with any specified provision of the
regulations shall be an offence against the
regulations.
(3) Regulations made under this section shall be
made by statutory instrument which shall be subject to
annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of
Parliament.
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8. (1) Subject to subsection (7)(a) of this section,
after a person is accused of an offence under an Act to
which this section applies, no matter likely to lead
members of the public to identify in relation to that
accusation any complainant or witness -
(a) who has had an abortion which is the subject
of proceedings; or
(b) who has been advised about an abortion and the
advice is the subject of proceedings;
shall either be published in a written publication
available to the public or be broadcast except as
authorised by a direction given in pursuance of this
section.
(2) If, before the commencement of a tri&l at which
a person is charged with an offence under an Act to which
this section applies, he applies to the court for a
direction in pursuance of this subsection and satisfies
the court -
(a) that the direction is required for the purpose
of inducing persons to come forward who are
likely to be needed as witnesses at the
trial; and
(b) that the donduct of the applicant*s defence at
the trial is likely to be substantially
prejudiced if the direction is not given;
the court shall direct that the preceding subsection shall
not apply in relation to the complainant or witness referred
to in the preceding subsection.
(3) If a person who has been convicted of an offence
under an Act to which this section applies and gives notice
of appeal to the appellate court against the conviction,
or notice of an application for leave so to appeal, applies
to the appellate court for a direction in pursuance of this
subsection and satisfies that court -
(a) that the direction is required for the purpose of
obtaining evidence in support of the appeal; and
(b) that the applicant is likely to suffer substantial
injustice if the direction is not given;
the appellate court shall direct that subsection (1) of
this section shall not apply in relation to any complainant
or any witness referred to in subsection (1) of this





(4) If any matter is published or broadcast
in contravention of subsection (1) of this section,
the following persons, namely -
(a) in the case of a publication, in a newspaper
or periodical, any proprietor, any editor
and any publisher of the newspaper or
periodical;
(b) in the case of any other publication, the
person who publishes it; and
(c) in the case of a broadcast, any body corporate
which transmits or provides the programme
in which the broadcast is made and any person
having functions in relation to the programme
corresponding to those of an editor of a
newspaper;
shall be guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction
to a fine not exceeding £500.
(5) For the purposes of this section a person is
accused of an offence under an Act to which this section
applies if —
(a) any information is laid alleging that he has
committed such an offence; or
*•
(b) he appears before a court charged with such an
offence; or
(c) a court before which he is appearing commits him
for trial on a new charge alleging such an
offence; or
(d) a bill of indictment charging him with such an
offence is preferred before a court in which
he may lawfully be indicted for the offence,
and references in this section and section 12(4) of this
Act to an accusation alleging such an offence shall be
construed accordingly; and in this section -
'a broadcast* means a broadcast by wireless telegraphy
of sound or visual images intended for general
reception, and cognate expressions shall be construed
accordingly;
•complainant* in relation to a person accused of an
offence under an Act to which this section applies
or an accusation alleging such an offence, means the
woman against whom the offence is alleged to have
been committed; and
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•written publication* includes a film, a sound
track and any other record in permanent form
but does not include an indictment or other
document prepared for use in particular legal
proceedings.
(6) Nothing in this section -
(a) prohibits the publication or broadcasting, in
consequence of an accusation alleging an
offence under am Act to which this section
applies of matter consisting only of a
report of legal proceedings other than
proceedings at, or intended to lead to,
or on an appeal arising out of, a trial at
which the accused is charged with that
offence; or
(b) affects amy prohibition or restriction imposed by
virtue of any other enactment upon a publication
or broadcast;
and a direction in pursuance of this section does not affect
the operation of subsection (1) of this section at any time
before the direction is given.
(7) The Acts to which this section applies are the 1861 c.lOO.
Offences Against the Person Act 1861, the Infant Life 1929 c.34.
(Preservation) Act 1929, the principal Act or this
Act.
9. If a chief officer of police, or a person authorised Court may
by him in that behalf, applies to a judge of the Crown order in-
Court and satisfies the judge - spection,
etc.
(a) that investigations are being carried out with
a view to the instigation of proceedings in
relation to illegal abortion under the
Offences Against the Person Act 1861, the
Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929, the
principal Act or this Act; and
(b) that there is reason to believe that such
investigations would be assisted by information
contained in any register or other book kept
by a body to which section 7 of this Act
applies;
the judge may order that the applicant may inspect and
take copies of any entries in any register or other book
of the body specified in the order.
lO. References in the principal Act and in this Act to Meaning of
termination of pregnancy shall include acts done with 'Termination
intent to terminate a prggnancy if such exists. of pregnancy*.
11. Where an offence under the Offences Against the
Person Act 1861, the Infant Life (Preservation) Act





committed by a body corporate is proved to have been
committed with the consent or connivance of, or to be
attributable to any neglect or misrepresentation on the
part of, any director, manager, secretary or other
similar officer of the body corporate or any person who
was purporting to act in any such capacity he, as well
as the body corporate, shall be guilty of that offence
and shall be liable to be proceeded against and
punished accordingly.
12. (1) This Act, except section 6, shall come into Commence-
force on the 1st January 1978 or at the expiration ment.
of six months beginning with the date on which it is
passed, whichever is the later.
(2) Section 6 of this Act shall come into force
at the expiration of six months beginning with the
date of the coming into force of the rest of this Act.
(3) Section 8 of this Act shall not have effect
in relation to an accusation which is made before the
coming into force of this Act.
13. (1) This Act may be cited as the Abortion
(Amendment) Act 1977, and this Act and the principal
Act may be cited together as the Abortion Acts 1967
and 1977.







(3) This Act does not extend to Northern Ireland
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APPENDIX II
ALRA»s Draft Bill, 1977
ALRA's Draft Bill 1977
A bill to make lawful the termination of pregnancy by
qualified persons subject to the provisions of the Infant
Life (Preservation) Act 1929, and for connected purposes.
1. Subject to the provisions of the Infant Lxfe (Preservation)
Act 1929, it shall not be an offence for any qualified person to
terminate or procure termination of a pregnancy at the request
of the woman whose pregnancy is to be terminated.
2. It shall not be an offence for any registered medical
practitioner to terminate or procure the termination of a
pregnancy, subject to the provisions within the Infant Life
(Preservation) Act 1929, when he or she is of the opinion formed
in good faith that the operation is necessary to save the life
or to prevent injury to the physical or mental health of the
pregnant woman.
3. In section 4 of the National Health Service Reorganisation
Act 1973 after the words 'and the supply of contraceptive
substances and appliances' there shall be inserted the words
'and to ensure that adequate facilities and qualified personnel
are made available for the termination of pregnancies as
prescribed by law*.
4. For the avoidance of doubt, it is hereby declared that
where an unqualified person terminates or procures the
termination of pregnancy it shall be an assault upon the
woman concerned irrespective of her consent.
5. (i) In section 1 (ii) of the Infant Life (Preservation) Act
1929, the words 'or for an offence under section 58 of the
Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (which relates to
administering drugs or using instruments to procure
abortion)' and 'or of an offence under the said section 58'
should be deleted.
(ii) Section 3(i) of the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929
is hereby repealed.
6. (i) In Section 3(i) of the Criminal Justice Act (Northern
Ireland) 1945 the words 'or *an offence under section 58
of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (which relates
to administering drugs or using instruments to procure
abortion)' and 'or for an offence under the said section 58*
shall be deleted.
(ii) Section 20(ii) of the Criminal Justice (Northern
Ireland) Act 1945 is hereby repealed.
7. (i) The Abortion Act is hereby repealed.
481.
8. (i) This Act may be cited as the Abortion Act 1977.
(11) This Act extends to Northern Ireland.
(ill) In this Act qualified person means -
(a) A registered medical practitioner
(b) A state registered nurse.
(iv) This Act shall come into force at the expiration of
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